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Bibliography Summary 
This  thesis attempts  a  sociological  and  feminist  analysis of  anorexia 
nervosa.  Anorexia is an  illness which affects predominantly  women,  and 
its  incidence  is  greatest  among  middle-class  young  women  in  Western 
countries.  Its strong  bias along  class and  gender  lines suggests that 
such  an approach to the illness could prove fruitful. 
The  thesis  argues  that  analysis  of  anorexia  demands  a  clear 
understanding  of  the  sociology of  the  body.  The  sociology of  the  body 
sees  the  body  as  constructed  in  social  life:  understandings  of  the 
body  vary  temporally  and  culturally,  and  reflect  the  categories  of 
their  culture.  It  is  suggested  that  anorexia  nervosa  represents  an 
attempted  transformation  of  the  concept  of  the  feminine  body  in 
contemporary culture.  Anorexic  women  aim to transcend appetite,  and to 
allow no  intrusions into the  body,  constructing an anorexic  body  which 
is  closed,  separate  and  inviolable.  Since  this  transformation  is 
individuated and  privatised,  however,  it cannot  ultimately succeed  in 
overturning  a  system  of  social  meanings.  The  thesis  concludes  that 
individual  solutions  to  anorexia  will  not  lead  to  the  end  of  the 
illness as  a  social  phenomenon  in the  lives  of  women.  Only  collective 
feminist  action  can  reconstruct  the  degraded  contemporary  concept  of 
woman. 
The  argument  is  pursued  firstly  through  a  discussion  of  the  initial 
use  of  the  term  "anorexia  nervosa"  in  the  late  nineteenth  century  by 
GJJJJ....  and  Lasegue.  The  treatment  of  anorexia  as  a  modern  disease  is discussed,  and  the  claim that  anorexia  has  always  existed but  has  not 
been recognised is refuted. 
Psychiatric and  feminist  accounts  of  anorexia are then considered.  The 
former  see  anorexia  as  a  purely  individual  phenomenon,  and  the 
limitations  of  this  position  are  discussed.  Feminist  analyses  of 
anorexia,  in  seeing  it  as  deeply  intertwined  with  women's  social 
position in  a  patriarchal  culture,  are  argued to advance  understanding 
of the illness,  while still retaining individualist elements. 
The  next  section analyses  the  ways  in which  anorexic  women  themselves 
explain their  illness.  This  leads  on  to  a  discussion  of  the  notion of 
the  body  as  concept.  After  a  theoretical  outline,  several  body-
concepts  are  analysed  and  placed  in  their  social  and  historical 
contexts.  Contemporary  understandings  of  the  body  as  an  individuated 
possession are  then discussed,  with  particular focus  on the concept  of 
the  feminine  body  as  passive  object.  Objectification,  discipline  and 
chaos  are  argued  to  be  the  central  meanings  of  the  feminine  body  in 
contemporary  culture.  Analysis  of  the issues of  abortion and rape seek 
to make  this theoretical  point clearer. 
A detailed  analysis  of  anorexic  practices  looks at  how  these  meanings 
are  transformed  in  anorexia.  It  is  suggested  that  anorexic  women  try 
to  construct  an  inviolate  anorexic  body  which  is  completely  under 
their  control  through  a  complexly  ritualised  eating  pattern.  The 
precarious  nature  of  this  control  points  to  the  limitations  of 
individual  "solutions"  to social  problems. Part One Introduction 
Twenty  years  ago  very  few  people  had  heard  of  anorexia  nervosa,  an 
obscure  psychiatric  illness  which  seemed  to  be  confined  almost 
exclusively  to  teenage  girls.  Since  then  anorexia  has  risen  from  its 
psychiatric obscurity to take its place  in "tabloidese".  Any  woman  who 
is  well-known  as  well  as  thin  has  a  reasonable  chance  of  being 
diagnosed  anorexic  by  journalistic  pop  psychologists.  The  latest 
theories  about  etiology  and  incidence  - "zinc  cures"  and  anorexic 
yuppy  men  - are  reported  in  the  serious  press.  "My  triumph  over 
anorexia"  stories  are  common  in  women's  magazines.  Popular  interest 
:mirrors  evidence  of  a  real  rise  in  cases  of  anorexia,  with  some 
estimates  claiming  that  one  in  every  hundred  teenage  girls  is  a 
sufferer.  <See  Bemis,  1978)  Many  more  are  thought  to develop  the  more 
covert disorder of bulimia or teeter on  the brink of  anorexia. 
For  the  sociologist  and  the  feminist,  too,  anorexia  is an  interesting 
phenomenon.  The  anorexic  "boom"  at precisely the time  when  feminism is 
again  challenging  the  oppression  of  women,  coupled  with  the  evidence 
that  almost  all  anorexics  are  women,  that  anorexia  has  a  strong 
middle-class  bias,  and  that  it  is  virtually  unknown  outside  the 
developed  West  suggests  that  the  illness  has  some  relationship  to  the 
social situation of  middle-class  women  in modern  Western culture.  Most 
discussions  of  anorexia,  whether  psychiatric,  feminist  or  popular 
include  at  least  some  reference  to  the  social  position  of  women.  Few, 
however,  develop  this  suggested  linkage  into  a  fully  sociological 
analysis  of  anorexia;  most,  further,  are  both  essentialist  and 
- 1  -phallocentric.  A  sociological  and  feminist  analysis  of  anorexia  can 
avoid  both these  traps. 
The  effects  of  the  politics of  physical  appearance  and  the  strictures 
of  femininity  on  feminine  psychology are  frequent  explanatory features 
in  analyses  of  anorexia.  However,  with  a  few  feminist  exceptions this 
sociological  perspective  is  simply  "added  on"  to  explanations  of 
anorexia  as  an  individual,  or,  occasionally  a  familial,  pathology, 
implying  that  these  two  distinct  types  of  analysis  are  totally 
compatible.  What  is  suggested  is  that  while,  yes,  there  are  "social 
pressures"  on  young  women  which  impinge  on their becoming anorexic,  in 
the  last  analysis  it  is  a  deficiency  in  the  "pre-anorexic"  girl's 
psychology which  explains anorexia.  (1) 
A  sociological  view  of  anorexia,  however,  sees  "social  pressures" 
differently.  In  this analysis the concept  of  a  "human  nature"  existing 
outside  of  culture  is  rejected;  rather,  human  personality  or 
psychology  is understood  as  constructed by  and  in specific historical 
contexts.  This  social  constructionist  view  of  "human  nature"  is 
reflected in  this  analysis  by  a  social  constructionist view of  the 
1  Analyses  of  anorexia  which  focus  on  the  social  situation  of  women 
are  criticized  for  their  inability  to  explain  why  all  middle-class 
teenage  girls  do  not  become  anorexic.  This  critique  rests  on 
determinist  assumptions,  suggesting  that  social  position  determines  a 
single  course  of  action.  Rather  than  being  the  one  inescapable 
response  to  patriarchal  social  structure,  anorexia,  I  would  argue,  is 
one  of  a  range  of  "solutions"  to  the  irreconcilability  of 
individuality and  femininity.  I  am  not  concerned to explain why  "woman 
A"  becomes  anorexic  while  "woman  B"  becomes  a  feminist;  rather,  my 
concern  is  to  establish  the  political  meaning  of  anorexia  as  one 
engagement  with the  dilemmas  of  patriarchy. 
- 2  -body.  Rather  than  being  direct  apprehensions  of  biological  reality, 
understandings  of  the  body  are  here  seen  as  cultural  constructions, 
which  incorporate  within  them  the  divisions  and  categorizations  of 
their  social  contexts.  Body  concepts,  therefore,  are  specific  both  to 
culture and  to  gender. 
From  this perspective,  then,  anorexic  women's attempt to radically and 
permanently  change  their  bodies  must  be  seen  not  as  individual 
deviations  from  the  norm  but  as  transformations  of  the  contemporary 
feminine  body-concept.  The  central  argument  of  this thesis is that  in 
the  anorexic  symptom  women's  aim  is  to  synthesize  contradictory 
elements  in  their  social  position  through  the  construction  of  an 
"anorexic  body".  Anorexic  women  attempt  to  change  the  meaning  of  the 
feminine  body,  and  to  make  sense  of  these  changes  both  a  social 
constructionist  perspective  on  the  body  and  a  clear  understanding  of 
masculine  and  feminine  body  concepts  in  contemporary  culture  are 
essential. 
In an early and  influential  feminist text  Simone  de  Beauyoir argued: 
"The  terms  masculine  and  feminine  are  used  symmetrically 
only as  a  matter  of  form ... In actuality the relation of  the 
two  sexes  is  not  quite  like  that  of  two  electrical  poles, 
for  man  represents  both  the  positive  and  the  neutral,  as is 
indicated  by  the  common  use  of  man  to designate  human  beings 
in  general;  whereas  woman  represents  only  the  negative ...  He 
is the Subject,  he  is the Absolute- she  is the  Other." 
Cde  Beauvoir,  1972:  15-16) 
Maria  ~and  Rosalind Coward  pick up  on this point,  arguing that: 
"the  attributes  of  the  male  can ...  disappear  into  a  'non-
gendered'  subject.  Women,  on  the other hand,  never appear  as 
- 3  -non-gendered  subjects.  Women  are  precisely  defined,  never 
general  representatives  of  human  or  all  people,  but  as 
specifically  feminine,  and  frequently  sexual,  categories: 
whore,  slag,  mother,  virgin,  housewife." 
<Black  & Coward,  1981:  83) 
Black and  Coward  point  out,  then,  that definitions of  femininity  often 
centre  on  sexuality:  women  are  "the  sex".  (ibid.:  85)  Women,  further, 
are  - in  a  significantly  different  way  to  men  - bodies.  De  Beauvoir 
argues  that  social  definitions  of  man  as  individual  and  woman  as 
feminine  resonate  in our  understandings  of  the  body.  C2)  She  suggests 
that  the  masculine  body  is  thought  to  be  "a  direct  and  normal 
connection  with  the  world ...  apprehend Ced)  objectively";  the  feminine 
body,  by  contrast,  is  "a  hindrance,  a  prison,  weighed  down  by 
everything peculiar to it".  Cde  Beauvoir,  1972:  15)  She  quotes ~: 
'"The  body  of  man  makes  sense  in  itself  quite  apart  from 
that  of  woman,  whereas  the  latter  seems  wanting  in 
significance by itself'". 
(ibid.:  16) 
Individuality  is  presented  as  gender-neutral  but  is  fundamentally 
masculine.  The  social  construction of gendered subjectivity conditions 
our  perception  of  sexuality  and  of  the  body.  Just  as  "individuality" 
and  "femininity"  are  understood  by  sociologists  to  be  social 
constructions  rather  than  naturally  existing  facts,  so  too  are 
masculine  and  feminine  desire  and  the  masculine  and  feminine  body.  The 
self,  the  body  and  desire  are  socially  constructed  in the  same 
2  I  am  not  suggesting  that  de  Beauvoir  takes  a  social  constructionist 
view  of  the  body,  but  that  her  work  can  be  used  in the  development  of 
such a  perspective;  see  Evans,  1983. 
- 4  -structure  of  meaning:  masculine  is both masculine  and  neutral,  and  is 
active;  feminine  is only  feminine,  and is responsive. 
The  masculine/neutral  self  is  constructed  as  independent:  complete, 
separate  and active.  Masculine/neutral  desire is constructed as active 
and  possessive.  The  masculine/neutral  body  is  constructed  as 
impenetrable,  active  and  intrusive;  its imagery  is of  muscular  action 
and  phallic  penetration.  The  feminine  self  is  constructed  as 
dependent:  incomplete,  responsive,  seeking  merger.  Feminine  desire  is 
responsive;  it  entails  possession  but  threatens  to  engulf.  The 
feminine  body  is penetrable:  simultaneously  weak  and  threatening,  its 
imagery  is of orifices:  mouth,  vagina,  womb. 
As  de  Beauvoir  points  out,  however,  masculine  and  feminine  are  not 
polar  opposites.  Masculinity  and  femininity  are  defined 
interdependantly,  through  a  series  of  differences  (3)  or  oppositions, 
but  a  third  category  neutral  intervenes.  In  our  equal 
opportunities  culture  a  non-gendered  subjectivity  is  - formally  at 
least  - "available"  for  women,  who  are  simultaneously  non-gendered 
subjects  and  feminine  objects.  The  superficial  gender-neutrality  of 
individuality  masks  its fundamentally  masculine  character.  The  social 
construction  of  masculine  and  feminine  around  difference  means  that 
being  a  man  is  not  being  a  woman;  being  a  woman  is  not  being  a  man. 
Women  who  aspire  to  "non-gendered"  subjectivity  undercut  this 
3  For  a  discussion  of  different  uses  of  the  concept  of  difference  in 
sociology  see  Barrett,  1987.  Here  I  am  using the  concept  in Barrett's 
second sense:  difference constructed through opposition. 
- 5  -structure  of  difference  but  rarely  perceive  it  directly.  Reconci l ing 
the  hidden  incompatibility between  individuality and  femininity  i s  the 
central 'task of  growing  up  female  in comtemporary  Western culture. 
It  is  this  hidden  incompatibility  which  lies  at  the  heart  of  the 
anorexic  symptom.  The  specific  class  and  gender  position  of  the 
"anorexic  population"  addresses  the  dilemma  of  individuality  and 
femininity  with  particular  acuteness.  Her  class  position  places 
expectations  of  educational  and  career  success  on  the  "pre-anorexic" 
girl' s  shoulders.  (see  Lawrence,  1984a)  She  must  act  in pursuit  of  her 
own  interests.  Her  gender  membership  imprisons  her  within  the 
constraints  of  femininity.  She  must  respond  to  the  needs  and  desires 
of  others.  The  mutual  exclusivity  of  these  demands  remains  submerged 
in  the  ideology  of  gender-neutral  individuality:  their  resolution, 
thus,  is often covert,  subconscious,  indirect. 
Gender  is  created  around  three  poles  of  difference:  masculine, 
feminine  and  neutral.  The  social  meanings  of  desire  and  the  body  are 
similarly  constructed.  In  anorexia  women  take  gender-neutral 
individuality  seriously,  working  with  the  social  constructions  of 
feminine  desire  and  the  feminine  body  in  an  attempt  to  construct  an 
anorexic  body  which  resolves  gender  contradictions  in  being  trul.(y 
neutral. 
This  resolution  commonly  takes  place  at  adolescence,  a  time  of 
transition  from  childhood  to  adult  life,  the  time  when  a  personal 
- 6  -assumption  of  an  individual  adult  identity is required.  Germaine  Greer 
writes that "the girl": 
"struggles  to  reconcile  her  schooling  along  masculine  lines 
with  her  feminine  conditioning  until  puberty  resolves  the 
ambiguity  and  anchors  her safely in the  feminine  posture,  if 
it works." 
<Greer,  1971:  15) 
In  the  second era of  public  feminism  the  need  to  accept  "the  feminine 
posture"  faces  severe  challenges.  Anorexia  is  one  of  the  responses to 
this new  situation which refuses to deny  individuality in femininity. 
The  anorexic  "solution",  however,  is  an  indirect  and  individuated 
response  to  a  social  issue.  Anorexic  women  cannot,  in their isolation, 
produce  a  real  or lasting solution to the  degraded social  construction 
of  the  feminine.  Their "solution"  is at  best  temporary  and  precarious. 
As  one  articulation of  the  irreconcilable social  demands  on  women,  the 
anorexic  symptom,  in  spite  of  its  ultimate  strategic  failure,  does, 
nonetheless,  offer  a  startling  illumination  of  the  lived realities of 
oppression. 
In  presenting  a  comprehensive  and  detailed  analysis  of  the  anorexic 
symptom  I  hope,  therefore,  to  suggest  a  rather  different 
interpretation  to  current  medical  and  popular  accounts.  As  we  shall 
see,  both  psychiatric  and  feminist  explanations  of  anorexia  tend  to 
undervalue  the  actual  anorexic  process  in  analysis,  focusing  on  the 
"underlying"  psychological  dilemmas  that  are  presumed  to  be  expressed 
in  anorexic  behaviour  rather  than  on  the  symptom  itself.  What  this 
tends  to  imply  is  a  rather  arbitrary  connection  between  the  meaning 
and  aims  of  anorexia  and  the  activities  through  which  those  aims  are 
- 7  -expressed.  The  nature  of  this  connection  remains  unanalysed.  Women's 
preoccupation  with  physical  appearance  in  general  and  dieting  in 
particular,  plus their domestic  responsibility for  food  "explains"  why 
anorexic  women  chose  food  and  the  body  as  "coping  strategies".  "Aim" 
and  "method"  are,  thus,  relatively autonomous. 
What  I  hope  to show  through a  detailed analysis of  what  anorexic  women 
actually do  is that  the  meanings  of  anorexia  are  expressed  in,  rather 
than  "under"  the  symptom.  Since  the  same  structure  of  meaning 
constructs  the  body,  the  self and  desire,  it is no  "coincidence"  that 
the  anorexic  conflict is expressed through the control  of appetite and 
the  attempt  to  create  a  needless  and  inviolate  body.  The 
deconstruction  of  feminine  appetite,  then,  is  the  central  anorexic 
process:  it is both aim and method. 
My  argument  will  be  pursued  in three  parts.  The  first  three  chapters 
look at existing accounts  of  anorexia,  analysing the  assumptions  which 
underly  them  as  well  as  offering  an  outline  of  how  anorexia  is 
understood.  Chapter  One  discusses  the  "discovery"  of  anorexia  by  the 
nineteenth  century  physicians ~  and  Lasegue  and  traces  the  changes 
and  continuities in dominant  understandings  of  anorexia since it first 
became  the  object  of  psychiatric  interest.  In  addition,  this  chapter 
criticises  the  widely  accepted  assumption  that  anorexia  has  always 
existed,  albeit  in  lesser  "quanti  ties",  pointing  out,  as  do  Cameron 
and  Frazer  in another context,  that: 
- 8  -"We  need  to  know  not  just  what  was  done,  but  what  it meant: 
the  same  act  does  not  always  have  the  same  significance  and 
to  interpret  the  events  of  the  past  through  the  categories 
of  the  present  is  to  make  the  error  of  historical 
anachronism." 
<Cameron  & Frazer,  1987:  21) 
Chapters  Two  and  Three  discuss,  respectively,  psychiatric and  feminist 
explanations.  Chapter  Two  looks  at  the  work  of  Arthur  ~.  Hilde 
~.  Roger  ~and  Mara  Selvini  Palazzoli.  There  are,  of  course, 
significant  theoretical  differences  among  these  four  writers.  What 
they  have  in  common  is,  however,  the  main  focus  of  the  chapter,  which 
criticizes  both  "individual  pathology"  explanations  of  anorexia  and 
the  recommendations  for  treatment  which  arise  from  it.  In  chapter 
Three  I  look  at  the  work  of  Marilyn  Lawrence,  Susie  Orbach  and  Kim 
Chernin,  suggesting that  while  they  significantly extend  the  analysis 
of  anorexia  in  sociological  terms,  their  work  is  limited  by  an  only 
partial  recognition  of  the  contradictions  of  individuality  and 
femininity. 
In  Part  Two  I  outline,  discussing  my  own  interview  material,  the 
concepts  through  which  anorexic  women  make  sense  of  their  experience. 
This  leads  on  to  the  final  section,  in  which  a  feminist  and 
sociological  analysis  of  anorexia  is  outlined.  Chapter  Five  examines 
in  detail  the  argument  that  the  body  should  be  seen  as  a  social 
construction,  relying  heavily,  though  not  uncritically,  on  Bryan 
Turner's  introductory  study.  After  a  theoretical  introduction 
historical  changes  in the concept  of  the  body,  focusing  on  the effects 
of  the gender  division and the transition from feudalism to capitalism 
- 9  -on  dominant  and  oppositional  body-concepts,  will  be  analysed.  Chapter 
Six  looks  in  more  detail  at  contemporary  understandings  of  the  body, 
with  specific  reference  to  the  construction  of  the  feminine  body 
through objectification and  the  control  of  feminine  appetites.  Chapter 
Seven  suggests  that  the  meanings  and  practices  which  construct  the 
feminine  body  are central  to  the  anorexic experience. 
The  analysis  of  the  anorexic  symptom  is  pursued  through  a  discussion 
of  anorexic  women's  responses  to  a  questionnairre  and  the  theoretical 
issues  they  raise.  Here  I  argue  that  in  anorexia  women  attempt  to 
transform  the  degraded  feminine  body,  disciplining  its  "chaotic" 
appetites  in  order  to  construct  a  desireless  anorexic  body.  The  final 
chapter  attempts  to  draw  some  preliminary  conclusions  on  the  social 
meaning  of  anorexia  and  what  it tells us  about  the  position  of  women 
in contemporary culture. 
While  historical  changes  in the  made  of  production and class divisions 
are vital  elements  in a  sociological  analysis of  anorexia,  anorexia is 
fundamentally  about  gender.  The  social  construction  of  the  gender 
division thus  takes centre stage  in  my  analysis,  and  I  make  use  of the 
contested  concept  of  patriarchy.  <see,  i.e.  Beechey,  1979;  Barrett, 
1980;  Segal,  1987;  Rowbotham,  1979;  Alexander  &  Taylor,  1980)  The 
concept  of  patriarchy  has  been  criticised  as  suggesting  that  the 
oppression  of  women  is  manoli thic  and  unchanging.  This  is  not  my 
intention,  and  I  explicitly  argue  that  the  construction  of  femininity 
- 10-and  the  social  control  of  women  vary  with  historical  change,  class 
divisions  and  racist  categorizations.  I  use  patriarchy,  then,  to 
signify the  continuing oppression of  women  as  a  gender  through changes 
in  the  mode  of  production  and  across  divisions  of  class  and  ethnic 
background,  rather  than as  a  means  of  ignoring  history.  As  Black  and 
Coward  argue: 
"The  women's  movement  takes its existence  from the  fact  that 
however  differently  we  are  constituted  in  different 
practices  and  discourses,  women  are  constantly  and 
inescapably constructed as  women. 
11 
<Black & Coward,  1981:  85) 
In  Chapter  Five  I  argue  that  the  social  construction  of 
11 woman" 
underwent  a  transformation  with  the  transition  from  feudalism  to 
capitalism.  This  definitional  change  took  place,  however,  through  a 
framework  of  continuity  which  constructs  women,  and  specifically 
women's  sexuality,  as  a  threat  to  male  order,  however  that  order  is 
constituted.  Female  "formlessness"  is differentiated  from  male  order, 
as  Genevieve  Lloyd  argues,  tracing  the  Western  philosphical 
association  of  women  with  nature  and  male  with  culture,  the 
"longstanding  associations  between  maleness  and  form,  femaleness  and 
matter".  <Lloyd,  1984:  5)  In  discussing  the  body,  the  patriarchal 
definition  of  woman  as  structureless  matter  is  central.  Mary  Ellmann 
argues that: 
"The  impression  of  woman's  formlessness  underlies  the 
familiar ...  acknowledgment  of  their  superficial  form.  It  is 
of  course  a  physiological  impression,  and  the  sexual  analogy 
is transparent:  soft  body,  soft  mind.  The  flesh  of  woman  (as 
Sade  would  put  it)  is less resistant  and  le:;;s  muscular  than 
that  of  man.  Pinched,  it bruises  more  easily.  And  if it is 
impressionable,  the  impressionable  mind  must  be  not  only 
beyond  pinching  but  beyond  form.  It  cannot  maintain  even  so 
lax a  hold  upon  itself as the  body  does.  There,  in the  mind, 
-11-all  is  liquid  and  drowning.  Solid  ground  is  masculine,  the 
sea is feminine." 
CEllmann,  1979:  74) 
It is one  aim  of  the  subsequent  discussion to trace  the  continuity  of 
the  concept  of  formlessness  in  understandings  of  "woman"  through 
changing  concepts  of  the  body.  Patriarchal  constructions  of  the 
feminine  body,  in  opposing  feminine  matter  to  masculine  form, 
understand the  feminine  body  as  weak  and penetrable but simultaneously 
as  potentially  powerful  and  engulfing.  A  social  constructionist 
approach  to  the  body  would  argue,  against  Ellmann,  that  the  body  can 
be  equally  as  "liquid  and  drowning"  as  the  mind.  It  is  the 
construction  of  the  feminine  body  as  limitless  a  patriarchal 
construction - with which the  anorexic  symptom engages. 
Since  my  argument  is that  in  anorexia  women  attempt  to  transform  the 
social  meanings  and  practices  through  which  the  feminine  body  is 
constructed,  a  detailed  analysis  of  anorexic  meanings  and  practices 
must  be  central.  Although  the  argument  is  pursued  in  the  main 
theoretically,  the  two  chapters  which  examine  anorexic  practices  and 
the  concepts  through  which  anorexic  women  make  sense  of  their 
experience  rely  on  my  own  interviews  with  anorexic  women  and  on 
replies to  a  questionnairre.  (4) 
4  There  are  also  a  number  of  autobiographical  accounts  of  anorexia  -
see  O'Neill,  1982;  Wilkinson,  1984;  Waugh,  1988;  Roche,  1984; 
Havekamp,  1978;  Garfield,  1986;  and  MacLeod,  1981. 
- 12-I  interviewed  eight  anorexic  women  and  one  bulimic  woman,  and  this 
material  forms  the  basis  of  Chapter  Four.  Here  my  intention  is  to 
start  to  uncover  anorexic  meanings,  and  I  present  the  interview 
material  in  a  modified  "case-study"  format.  One  case-study  is 
discussed  in  depth,  and  the central  concepts  which  emerge  from it are 
followed  up  in  the  words  of  five  other  women.  Here  feelings  of 
control,  powerlessness,  pride,  guilt,  pressure  and  shame  emerge  as 
central. 
In  addition  I  used  a  postal  questionnairre  in  order  to  discover  the 
exact  mechanisms  of  anorexia.  This  proved  to  be  an  excellent  way  to 
find  out  in detail  what  anorexic  women  actually  do.  Obviously talking 
about  issues  such  as  the  kind  of  food  women  eat  and  don't  eat,  how 
they  plan their eating,  and  what  binges  involve is extremely difficult 
for  anorexic  women,  and  the  anonymity  of  the  questionnairre  form 
allowed  many  of  the  respondants  to  be  remarkably  frank.  This  material 
is analysed  in Chapter  Seven.  In both chapters women's  names  have  been 
changed. 
Approximately  half  of  the  women  I  interviewed  had  attended  Anorexic 
Aid  self-help groups.  The  others either replied  to  the  questionnairre 
and  lived  near  enough to be  interviewed  or  were  introduced  by  other 
interviewees.  The  women  who  replied to the questionnairre responded  to 
an  advert  in the  Anorexic  Aid  magazine;  thirty-eight  women  replied to 
the  advert  and  in  the  end  all  but  three  completed  questionnairres. 
Obviously  this material  in no  way  allows generalised conclusions about 
anorexia  to  be  drawn:  the  sample  is  non-random  and  fairly  small.  So 
- 13-this  material  is not  intended to  "prove"  a  hypothesis,  but  is  used  to 
explore  and  exemplify  a  theoretical  argument.  A  Elizabeth  Frazer 
points  out,  with  small  samples  - and,  in  this  case,  with  non-random 
ones: 
"'findings'  have  to 
demonstrative;  and 
inappropriate". 
<Frazer,  1988:  345) 
be  seen  as 
quantitative 
suggestive 
analysis 
rather 
is 
than 
quite 
Further,  as Mica  ~points  out: 
"whatever  data  you  are  working  with it is actually  going  to 
be  subject to  your  own  translation  ...  as researchers  we  bring 
to  the  material  that  we  are  going  to translate not  only  our 
own  personal  histories  but  also  a  very  real  politics. 
Nothing  is neutral  once  we  have  put  our hands  on it and  once 
we  have  put  our  minds to it." 
<Satow,  1987:  8) 
The  words  and  writing  of  the  women  I  quote  appear,  therefore,  as 
translations  rather  than  direct  "realities".  I  chose  which  questions 
to  ask  and  I  edited  the  answers;  the  perspective  which  their  ideas 
support  is  mine  not  theirs.  From  talking  to  the  women  I  interviewed 
and  reading  their  responses  to  the  questionnairre  I  am  aware  that 
their  individual  understandings  of  anorexia  differ,  to  a  greater  or 
lesser  extent,  from  mine.  I  hope  they  will  feel  that  their  ideas  have 
been  treated  with  respect,  especially  in  cases  where  the  theoretical 
and  political gulf  between their perspective  and  mine  was  greatest. 
- 14-Chapter  One:  Anorexia  Neryosa:  the history of  the  concept 
The  term  "anorexia  nervosa"  was  coined  in  1873  by  an  English 
physician,  William  G.ull.  In  an  "aside"  in  the  Address  in  Medicine  to 
the  British Medical  Association in  1868  he  had  referred to  some  cases 
of  emaciation  occuring  without  evident  organic  cause  in  young  women, 
terming  this  "apepsia  Hysterica"  (digestive  problems  of  hysterical 
origin).  <Gull,  1868:  175)  Five  years  later  he  changed  the  term  to 
"anorexia  nervosa",  the  latter term "more  fairly expressing the  facts, 
since  what  food is taken,  except  in the  extreme  stages of  the  disease, 
is well  digested".  <Gull,  1873:  534) 
It  is  worth  quoting  Gull's  original  description  of  anorexia  at  same 
length,  as  apart  from  the  obvious  terminological  updating,  this 
description contains  mast  of  the essential characteristics of  anorexia 
recognized by  contemporary psychiatry. 
In anorexia,  for  Gull,  "the  want  of  appetite is due  to a  morbid  mental 
state",  a  "want  of  mental  equilibrium",  accuring  in  a  group  - young 
women  between  15  and  23  - who  were  well  known  to  be  "specially 
obnoxious  to  mental  perversity".  (ibid.:  535;  1874:  25)  No  signs  of 
organic  disease  were  evident  either  during  the  illness  or  in  post-
mortems.  The  patients complained  neither  of  pain  nor  hunger,  and  were 
often "restless and  wayward",  and this,  Gull  argued: 
"was ...  a  striking  expression  of  the  nervous  state,  for  it 
seemed  hardly  possible  that  a  body  so  wasted  could  undergo 
the exercise  which seemed agreeable".  <Gull,  1874:  23) 
- 15-The  treatment  Gull  advocated  was  "moral  control",  through  which  the 
patient's  "mental  equilibrium"  was  to  be  brought  back  into  balance. 
<Gull,  1873:  534-5)  ":Medical"  treatment  as  such  did  not  contribute 
much  to  recovery,  but  a  strict feeding  programme,  which  paid  no  heed 
to  the  desires of  the  patient,  was  to  be  adhered  to.  <Gull,  1874:  24) 
Gull  explains the necessity for  "moral"  treatment: 
"I  have  remarked ...  that  these  wilful  patients  are  often 
allowed  to  drift  their  own  way  into  a  state  of  extreme 
exhaustion,  when  it  might  have  been  prevented  by  placing 
them  under  different  moral  conditions.  The  treatment 
required  is  obviously  that  which  is fitted  for  persons  of 
unsound  mind.  The  patients  should  be  fed  at  regular 
intervals,  and  surrounded  by  persons  who  would  have  moral 
control  over  them;  relations and friends being generally the 
worst  attendants." 
<ibid.:  26) 
In advocating "moral"  treatment,  then,  Gull  was  not  suggesting any  new 
or  dramatic  treatment  for  anorexic  women.  The  idea that  the  mad  could 
be  cured  rather  than simply confined had  arisen  in the  second  half  of 
the  18th century and  in the next  century cure essentially came  to mean 
"moral  management".  Here,  the  complete  control  of  the  patient's 
behaviour  and  environment  by  the  physician was  intended to lead to the 
development  of self-restraint and  a  return to mental  equilibrium,  lack 
of  restraint  and  "extreme"  habits  and  behaviour  being  held  to  be 
central  in the  development  of  madness.  <Doerner,  1981;  Foucault,  1965; 
Skultans,  1979;  Scull,  1981)  Foucault  and  Doerner  both argue  that  the 
family  was  used  as  a  "moral  model"  in this treatment.  Doerner  argues 
that  "the  insane  asylum  ...  retained  the  aura  of  a  simulated  family" 
<1981:  81),  and  Foucault  suggests  that  within  asylums  "the  social 
structure  of  the  bourgeois  family"  was  reconstructed.  <1965:  257)  The 
- 16-doctor  and  the  asylum  were  to  accomplish  what  the  father  and  the  home 
had  failed  to  acheive  the  interiorization  of  bourgeois  social 
morality.  (ibid.:  257-260) 
Asked  at  the  Clinical  Society  whether  the  line  between  anorexia  and 
"real  insanity"  was  difficult  to  establish,  Gull  replied  that  "there 
was  perhaps  no  great  amount  of  hysteria,  but it could hardly  be  called 
insanity".  CGull,  1873:  535) 
At  more  or  less the  same  time,  and  independently  of  William Gull,  the 
French  phsyician  Ernest  Lasegue  introduced  the  disease  "hysterical 
anorexia"  to  the  medical  establishment.  Lasegue  sought  to 
differentiate  anorexia  from  the  large  category  of  hysterical 
disorders,  proceeding through this "somewhat  diagramatic sketch": 
"A  young  girl,  between  15  and  20  years  of  age,  suffers from 
some  emotion  which  she  avows  or  conceals.  Generally  it 
relates  to  some  real  or  imaginary  marriage  proposal,  to  a 
violence  done  to  some  sympathy,  or  to  some  more  or  less 
conscious  desire ... at  first,  she  feels  uneasiness  after 
food,  vague  sensations of  fullness,  suffering and gastralgia 
post-prandium,  or  rather  coming  on  from  the  comencement  of 
the  repast ... the  patient  thinks  to  herself  that  the  best 
remedy  for this indefinite and  painful uneasiness will  be to 
diminish  her  food.  Up  to  this  point  there  is  nothing 
remarkable  in  her  case,  for  almost  every  sufferer  from 
gastralgia  has  submitted  to  this  temptation ...  With  the 
hysterical  things take  another  course.  Gradually she  reduces 
her  food,  furnishing  pretexts ...  at  the  end  of  some  weeks 
there  is  no  longer  a  supposed  temporary  repugnance, but  a 
refusal  of  food  that  may  be  indefinitely  prolonged." 
(Lasegue,  1873:  265) 
- 17-This  course  is  then  pursued  "with  implacable  tenacity",  the  patient 
claiming  that  she  is neither  ill  nor  has  she  become  thinner.  (ibid.: 
265) 
The  central  features  of  anorexia,  for  Gull  and  Lasegue,  as  for 
contemporary  psychiatry  were,  then:  emaciation,  occuring  without 
organic  causation;  a  specific  distribution,  by  age  and  by  gender 
<although  the  class distribution was  not  noticed by  Gull  and  Lasegue); 
the  denial  by  the  patient  that  she  was  ill,  and  the  corresponding 
recognition of  a  degree  of conscious  choice in anorexia;  and  a  view of 
anorexia  as  a  non-organic  disorder.  In treatment  too,  there  are  broad 
similarities - refeeding and  "moral"  treatment  under  the  direction  of 
medical  professionals  in  the  19th  century,  and  refeeding  plus 
psychotherapy  for  modern  psychiatry  - both  courses  in  which  medical 
control  of the  environment  and behaviour of the patient is the object. 
However,  one  major  difference  should  be  noted.  Gull,  as  we  have  seen, 
suggested that the anorexic girl  had  no  appetite for  food,  and Lasegue 
argued  that  a  positive  aversion  to  food  existed.  The  contemporary 
concensus  is that  "anorexia"  - lack  of  appetite  - is  a  misnomer,  as 
the  anorexic  woman  does  still  experience  hunger,  and  her  appetite 
remains  "normal". 
After  the  initial  articles  by  Gull  and  Lasegue  appeared,  while  some 
comments  and  additions were  made  - including those  of  Charcot,  Huchard 
and  Janet  <Palazolli,  1974:  6)  - the  accepted  and  unquestioned 
- 18-definition of  anorexia  <still  very much  a  rare  "minority"  disease)  was 
theirs.  As  Palazzoli  argues: 
"By  the  turn  of  the  century  it  was  widely  agreed  that 
anorexia  was  a  mental  illness.  In  particular  most 
authorities believed that the patients'  obstinate refusal  to 
take  food  under  all  sorts  of  pretexts  and  the  resulting 
inanition,  were  the  sole  causes  of  the  severe  and  often 
fatal  organic sequelae of the disease." 
(ibid.:  7) 
This  view remained  dominant  until  1914  when  Morris  Simmonds  described 
a  case  of death from starvation in which the pituitary was  found to be 
damaged.  This  led  to  a  labelling  of  the  still  infrequent  cases  of 
anorexia  as  "Simmonds'  Disease",  and  the  term  anorexia  and  the 
acceptance  of  psychological  causation all  but  disappeared.  It  was  not 
until  the  late  1930s  that  the  distinction between  Simmonds'  Disease  -
starvation  due  to  pituitary  :malfunction  - and  anorexia  - starvation 
deliberately  chosen  - was  redrawn.  <ibid.:  7-8)  And  it  was  not  until 
the  publication  of  the  study  by  Sheehan  and  Summers  in  1949  which 
showed  that pituitary gland atrophy and  hypothalamic  symptoms  were  not 
causally  related  that  the  controversy  finally  ended.  (see  Morgan, 
1977) 
Up  until  the  1960s,  however,  anorexia  was  still viewed as a  relatively 
rare  condition,  and  it is really  in  the  last  25  years  that  the  vast 
increase  of  interest in and  work  on  anorexia  has  occured.  Hilde ~. 
for  example,  refers to anorexia as a  "new"  disease  because  of  what  she 
argues  is  a  rapidly  increasing  incidence  since  1960,  an  incidence 
which  she  relates  to  media  pressures  on  young  women  to  slim.  <Bruch, 
1978:  vii-viii) 
- 19-In  my  own  analysis  I  shall  also  treat  anorexia  as  a  "20th  century" 
phenomenon,  but,  as  the  introduction  has  suggested,  for  somewhat  more 
complex  reasons.  I  shall  argue  that  the  social  context  in  which 
anorexia  can  arise  as  a  meaningful  existential  strategy,  while 
originating  in  the  late  19th  century  with  the  first  "modern"  wave  of 
female  aspiration  to  patriarchal  individualism  - in,  especially,  the 
demands  for  education  and  political  rights  for  women  - has  only  in 
the  post-war  period  intensified  and  widened  its social  base  to  the 
extent  that  the  contradictory  pressures  of  "femininity"  and  "success" 
are felt by  the  majority of  young  middle-class girls. 
Is the  history of  the concept  the history of the disease ? 
Part  of  the  recent  proliferation of research into anorexia has been an 
attempt  to  establish  the  existence  of  cases  before  1873  by  "re-
diagnosing"  cases  of  voluntary  starvation  in  young  women  as  anorexia. 
This  strategy  can  be  seen  to  follow  from  the  idea  of  a  fixed  and 
unchanging  "human  nature",  the  dilemmas  of  which  are  seen  as 
universal.  As  Ritenbaugh  argues: 
"the  fact  that  biomedicine  does  not  include  culture  in its 
basic  explanatory  model  leads  to ...  a  redefinition  of 
syndromes  from  other  cultures  into  biomedical  terms  so  that 
potentially  important  cultural  patterns  <may)  became 
irrelevant  to  diagnosis  or  treatment."  <Quoted  in  Swartz, 
1985:  434) 
Specifically  on  anorexia,  the  current  psychiatric  view  is  that 
anorexia  has  always  existed,  but  has  only  recently  been  "discovered", 
due  to  increased  medical  knowledge  and/or  increased  prevalence.  Bruch 
-20-points  to  media  pressures  on  young  women  to  slim,  and ~  argues 
that  better  nutrition  leading  to  earlier  puberty  combined  with  20th 
century  moral  uncertainty  can  lead  to  anorexia.  <Crisp,  1974)  ~. 
~  and  Wellbourne  and  Purgald  all  argue  that  anorexia  has  in  all 
likelihood  always  existed  <Slade,  1984;  Crisp,  1974,  Wellbourne  & 
Purgold,  1984),  and  Sheila  McLeod  finds it hard to believe that  there 
have  not  always  been  "emotionally  isolated  young  girls  like  myself 
pursuing the same  lonely course".  <MacLeod,  1981:  13) 
This  view,  and  the  arguments that  back it up,  are  founded  not  only  on 
an  essentialist  but  also  on  a  behaviourist  understanding  of  human 
psychology.  All  that  seems  to  be  necessary  in this "re-diagnosis"  is 
the  presence  of starvation without evident organic cause.  The  meanings 
of  that  starvation,  and  the  possibility that  such  .meanings  refer  to 
and  change  with  specific  social  contexts  are  conspicuous  by  their 
absence. 
I  would  argue  that  two  misconceptions  are  operating  here.  Firstly, 
this view is ahistorical.  Secondly,  the distinction between  action and 
meaning  is  crucially  blurred. 
assumed  to  be  more  or  less 
Human  behaviour  and  personality  are 
constant  over  time.  The  atomized 
individualism  of  bourgeois  society  is  naturalized  as  eternally-
existing  "human  nature",  and  is seen as  inherent,  rather  than created 
in  social  relations.  Further,  it is assumed  that  all  non-organically 
based  starvation,  especially if voluntarily undertaken,  is anorexia.  I 
would  argue,  against  this  view,  that  the  meanings  entailed  in  the 
-21-control  of  food  and  the  body  can  and  do  change,  both historically and 
gender-specifically. 
It  is,  therefore,  untenable  to  argue  that,  as  a  reaction  to  the 
problems  of  female  adolescence,  anorexia  nervosa  is  a  universal 
phenomenon.  "Adolescence"  is  itself  a  historically specific  category, 
as  Philippe  ~has  shown  <Aries,  1973).  The  "adolescent crisis"  is 
a  specifically  20th  century  problem,  and  is  dependent  on  a  specific 
social  construction of  individuality. 
To  develop  and  ground  the  argument  above,  I  would  like  to  go  on  to 
look  in  depth  at  the  "pre-concept"  case  most  often  said  to  be 
anorexia,  <1>  and  then  to  consider Ball's arguement  that  anorexia  was 
a  striking feature  of  the  medieval  female  religious experience.  <Bell, 
1985) 
Anorexia  in the  17th century  ?  Richard  Morton's "Pthisiologia" 
Pthisiologia:  or,  a  treatise  of  consumptions,  written  by  Richard 
Morton,  a  fellow  of  the  College  of  Physicians,  was  published  in  1694. 
In  this  work  Morton  distinguished  somatic  and  psychological 
consumptions.  "Nervous"  consumption  was  due,  he  argued,  to "an ill and 
morbid  state  of  the  Spirits",  a  weakness  or  destruction  of  "the  Tone 
of  the  Nerves".  The  fever,  coughing  and  shortness  of  breath  of 
ordinary consumption  being absent: 
1  But  see also Baglivi,  1723  and~. 1613. 
-22-"In  the  beginning  of  this  Disease  the  state  of  the  Body 
appears  oede:matous  and  blouted  and  as  if  it  were  stuffed 
with  dispirited  Chyle;  the  face  is  pale  and  squalid,  the 
Sto:mack  loathes  everything  but  Liquids."  <Morton,  1694:  2-
4) 
The  lack  of  appetite  and  bad  digestion  occur  because  the  "morbid 
state"  of  the  nerves  hinders  the  "Assimilation,  Fermentation  and 
Volatilization"  of  gastric  juices.  This  state  of  the  nerves  can  be 
accounted  for  by  "violent Passions of  the  Mind",  drinking and  bad air. 
<ibid.:  5)  The  patient should: 
"endeavour to divert and make  his mind cheerful  by 
Exercise,  and the Conversation of his Friends. 
For this Disease  does almost  always  preceed from 
Sadness,  and anxious cares." 
(ibid.:  7) 
Also,  various "stomach medicines"  could be  prescribed.  <ibid.:  6) 
Morton  details  two  case-histories,  the first of  which  forms  the  basis 
for  the  claim that "nervous  consumption"  was  in fact  anorexia  nervosa. 
He  writes: 
"Mr.  Duke's  Daughter  in St.  Mary  Axe,  in the  year  1694,  and 
in the  Eighteenth Year  of  her Age,  in the  Month  of  July fell 
into  a  total  suppression  of  her  Monthly  Courses  from  a 
Multitude  of  Care  and  Passions of  her  Mind,  but  without  any 
symptom  of  the  Green Sickness following  upon it.  From  which 
time  her  Appetite  began  to  abate,  and  her  Digestion  to  be 
bad ...  she  was  wont  by  her  studying  at  Night,  and  continual 
poring  upon  Books,  to  expose  herself  both  Day  and  Night  to 
the  injuries  of  the  Air,  which  was  at  that  time  extremely 
cold  ... I  do  not  remember  that  I  did ever in all  my  Practice 
see  one,  that  was  conversant  with  the  Living  so  much  wasted 
with  the  greatest  degree  of a  Consumption ... like a  skeleton 
only clad with  skin." 
(ibid.:  8-9) 
-23-Morton  did  not  view  "nervous  consumption"  as  a  specifically  female 
disease.  Indeed,  in  its  association  with  sadness  and  studiousness, 
nervous  consumption  would  have  been  more  likely  to  have  been 
associated  with  the  IIta.l e  disease  of  melancholy  by  Morton  and  his 
contemporaries. 
I  would  suggest  that it is at  the  very least  tenuous  to describe this 
case  as  anorexia.  There  is  very  little  actual  evidence  on  which  to 
base  such  an  assumption;  we  are  in no  position to assume  that  the  lack 
of  appetite  which  Morton  saw as central did not  in fact  exist.  Even if 
one  were  to  accept  the  logic  of  historically  constant  illness 
categories,  unaffected  by  culture,  there  is  nothing  in  Morton  to 
distinguish  his  case  as  anorexia  rather  than  one  of  the  other 
psychiatric  conditions  in  which  lack  of  appetite  or  delusions  about 
food  feature.  <See  Morgan,  1977:  1652) 
Fundamentally,  however,  the  central  feature  of  anorexia  the 
deliberate  and  conscious  maint;{nance  of  food  control  is  not 
mentioned  in  Morton's  case  history.  It  should  not  be  "forced  in"  in 
retrospect,  and  without  it,  the  case  for  re-diagnosing  Mr.  Duke's 
daughter  as an  early anorexic  does not  hold water. 
Anorexia  in the  lllth century ?  - Bell's "Holy  Anorexia" 
In  a  review  of  Holy  Anorexia  in  the  Observer  (9/2/86),  Lorna  ~ 
tells  us  that  Bell.  "has  looked  into  the  lives  of  Italian  female 
-24-saints,  blesseds  and  venerables,  to  find  evidence  that  they  had  this 
supposedly  faddy  modern  disease".  Bell  himself  is  more  cautious, 
arguing  far  a  distinction  between  anorexia  nervosa  and  "holy 
anorexia".  He  argues: 
"the  modifier  is  the  key;  whether  anorexia  is  holy  or 
nervous  depends  on  the  culture  in  which  a  young  woman 
strives to gain control  of  her  life.  In  bath cases  anorexia 
begins  as  the  girl  fastens  onto  a  highly  valued  societal 
goal  bodily  health/thinness/self-control  in  the  20th 
century,  spiritual  health,  self-denial  and  fasting  in 
medieval  Christendom  ... Insecurity  <I  am  no  one/I  am  a 
worthless,  debased  sinner)  gives  way  to  absolute  certainty 
...  each  pursues  her  externally  different  but 
psychologically  analogous,  culturally  approved  objective 
with fanatical,  compulsive  devotion."  <Bell,  1985:  20-1) 
Looked  at  :more  closely,  then,  the  distinction  between  anorexias 
nervosa  and  holy  is  one  of  style  rather  than  substance.  Bell  sees 
anorexia  as  arising  from  an  "adolescent  crisis",  in  which  the  young 
girl  seeks  an autonomy  of  action which  her culture  proscribes.  (ibid.: 
40)  The  struggle  for  true  autonomy  in  the  outside  world  being 
unwinnable,  the  anorexic  internalizes  the  struggle  into  one  with  her 
own  body.  Although it is disguised as  a  struggle to achieve  a  socially 
valued  goal  - holiness  for  the  medieval,  thinness  for  the  modern 
anorexic  - the  real  struggle  is for  autonomy,  self-sufficiency and  a 
sense  of  self,  and  "in this sense  the  anorexic  response  is timeless." 
<ibid.:  56)  It  is,  then,  in  the  intersection  of  this  static  and 
universal  psychological  need  with changing "cultural  imperatives"  that 
the differing farms  or styles of  anorexia  are  created.  (ibid.:  21) 
Bell  identifies  numerous  cases,  from  the  12th  to  the  17th  centuries, 
of  Italian  nuns  starving  themselves,  sometimes  to  death,  but  in  any 
-25-case  to  a  degree  far  beyond  the  fasting  recognized  by  the  Church,  and 
he  argues  that  it  was  in  the  14th  century  that  this  "holy  anorexia" 
reached  its  peak.  Of  these  women,  the  most  famous,  and  the  one  which 
Bell  treats  in  most  depth  is Catherine  Benincasa,  later St.  Catherine 
of  Siena.  Her  fasting,  he  argues,  was  renowned,  became  a  model  for 
others  through  the  publication  of  her  "Life",  and  was  something  of  a 
thorn  in  the  flesh  of  her  confessors  and  the  Church  authorities,  as 
Catherine  frequently  claimed  that  she  could  not  moderate  her 
behaviour,  even  when  told it was  vainglorious  not  to.  When  ordered to 
eat,  she  did,  but  she  vomited  if even  a  mouthful  of  food  remained  in 
her  stomach,  and  for  long  periods  she  was  reputed  to  eat  nothing  at 
all.  It is from this evidence,  then,  that Bell treats Catherine as his 
paradigmatic  medieval  anorexic.  <ibid.:  23-7) 
He  suggests  that  Catherine's  anorexia  had  domestic  causes.  Catherine 
was  born  a  twin,  and  her  sickly sister Giovanna  was  sent  out  to a  wet 
nurse,  while  she  herself  was  fed  by  their  mother.  The  twin  soon  died, 
while  Catherine,  the  favoured  child,  flourished.  Further,  when 
Catherine  was  fifteen,  her  older  sister  Bonaventura  died  in 
childbirth.  Bell  surmises  that  guilt  at  the  first  death,  and  the 
realization  at  the  second  of  the  possible  consequences  of  a  dutiful 
secular  female  life  led  Catherine  to  abandon  the  world,  taking  to 
"radical  holiness"  as  an alternative  to  marriage  as  well  as  a  penance 
to  ensure  that  no  more  of  her  family  would  suffer  an  early  death. 
(ibid.:  29-46) 
-26-After  a  struggle against  her  family's  marriage plans,  Catherine  joined 
the  Sisters  of  Penance,  a  Domenican  Order  of  women  who  lived at  home 
"in  the  world"  rather  than  in  a  convent,  and  dedicated herself to  the 
religious  life.  Her  ascetic  practices  continued  and  intensified  once 
she  had  achei  ved  her  goal  of  the  religious  life.  She  continually 
limited  her  food,  often  eating  only  bread  and  water  and  sometimes 
fasting totally.  However,  it is clear from Bell's own  description that 
starvation,  far  from  being  a  goal  in  itself,  was,  for  Catherine, 
merely  one  part  of  a  life  of  asceticism.  As  Bell  himself  points  out, 
all  bodily  urges  were  for  Catherine  "base  obstructions in her path  of 
holiness"  (ibid.:  15);  however,  he  persists  in  focusing  on  her 
attitudes to  food,  glossing over her other mortifications of the flesh 
- wearing  an  iron chain round her hips which cut  into her flesh,  self-
flagellation,  drinking  pus,  and  walking  with  33  small  stones  in  her 
shoes.  Ci bid. :  19,  25,  43-4) 
This  narrow  concentration  on  Catherine's  eating  habits  shows  Bell's 
wish  to  explain  her  asceticism  as  anorexia.  Similarly,  and  somewhat 
surprisingly  for  a  religious  historian,  he  all  but  disregards  the 
religious rationale for asceticism,  arguing that: 
"Notwithstanding  the  vast  differences  between  Catherine's 
desire  to  be  united  with  God  and  the  modern  day  anorexic's 
quest  for  a  sense  of  self,  the  psychological  dilemma  is 
similar." 
Ci bid. :  28) 
Bell  explains Catherine's dilemma  as  having  familial  and  psychological 
causes  - as,  he  argues,  does  anorexia  nervosa.  The  assumption  here  is 
-27-that  the  path  from  childhood  via  adolescence  to  adulthood  is 
determined  by  an  innate  psychology  whose  effects  far  outweigh  mere 
historical  contingencies  like  belief  in the  supernatural.  However,  as 
I  mentioned  above,  this  is  far  from  being  the  case.  Aries.  for 
example,  in  his  influential  Centuries  of  childhood,  effectively 
demonstrates  that  social  childhood,  as  distinct  from  biological 
development,  is  a  cultural  construct  whose  characteristics  vary  with, 
and  are  defined  by,  the  wider  social  structure.  <Aries,  1973)  The 
category  "adolescense"  is a  relatively recent  one,  and  depends  on  the 
existence  of  an  identifiable  intermediate  period  between  the  complete 
dependancy  of  childhood  and  the  i ndependance  of  adulthood.  To  argue, 
as  Bell  does,  that  the  "adolescent"  struggle  to  define  the  self  as 
independent  of  the  family  unit  is  an  essential  feature  of  human 
development  is,  then,  both ahistorical  and misconceived. 
Further,  Bell  almost  manages  to  ignore  the  deep  and  all-encompassing 
effects  of  religious  belief  in  the  medieval  period.  As  Southern,  for 
example,  points  out,  the  medieval  church  was  "a  compulsory  society  ... 
CSouthern,  1970:  16)  Bell  argues,  however,  that  Catherine  chose  to 
join a  tertiary order  so  that  she  could  remain  with  her  family  - .. the 
only  context  that  meant  anything  to  her".  CBell,  1985:  48)  Does  this 
suggest  that  her  desire  for  union  with  God  is not,  then,  to  be  taken 
seriously ? 
Bell  seems  to  suggest  that  only  those  who  thei!JSelves  believe  in  the 
supernatural  could  give  credence  to  a  supernatural  motivation  for 
Catherine's  asceticism  - her  expressed  desire  to  transcend  the  world 
-28-and  the  flesh  and  be  united  with  Christ.  (ibid.:  29)  The  implicit 
argument  seems  to  be  that  the  real  dilemmas  of  humanity  are  those  of 
individualism,  and that although the  medieval  ascetic believed herself 
to  be  seeking  union  with  God,  this  was  in reality  but  a  cloak to  her 
true desire for "individual  autonomy". 
I  would  argue,  against  Bell,  that  it requires  not  a  belief  in  the 
supernatural,  but  a  respect  for  history  to  "take  seriously"  the 
religious  motivations  of  Catherine  and  the  other  "holy  anorexics". 
They  did  not  create  the  system  of  meanings  within  which  the  body  was 
deemed  corrupt  and  trancendence  accepted as  a  reality - rather,  these 
were  the  social  meanings  of  the  medieval  period,  meanings  in  which 
ascetic practices of all kinds were  framed.  (2)  As  Bell  himself  points 
out  of  Catherine: 
"in the  spiritual  world  her  accomplishments are  magnificent. 
She  becomes  Christ's  bride. . .  and  regularly  communicates 
with  Him,  with :Mary  and with the Heavenly Host." 
(ibid. :  20) 
One  does  not  have  to  accept  that  this "really  happened"  in  order  to 
accept it as  her  real  motivation in the  attempt  to transcend the  body. 
As  B.M:.  Bolton writes of  medieval  "holy virgins": 
"their  physical  detachment  opens  up  an  immense  capacity  for 
loving  their  Lord  and  the  renunciation  of  temporal  goads 
reveals an unassuaged desire for real  and eternal goods." 
(Bolton,  1978:  266) 
2  Medieval  constructions of the  body  are discussed in Chapter  Five. 
-29-In  short,  then,  I  would  argue  that  Bell's  account  is  fundamentally 
misconceived.  He  abstracts  from  an  entire  system of  ascetic practices 
one  which  can  be  interpreted  through 
essentially  a  modern  disease  category. 
an  analogy  with  what  is 
Ascetic  starvation  is  then 
"explained"  without  regard  to  the  context  in  which  it  arose  - the 
"well-marked ...  path  of  saintly  austerity  ... <whose) ...  rewards  are 
ultimate".  CBell,  1985:  13)  It  was  the  world,  not  just  food,  which 
Catherine  rejected.  Bell's  argument  relies  on  the  acceptance  of  a 
universal  psychological  development  process,  and  is thus  ahistorical. 
Although  there  are interesting parallels between  religious asceticism 
in  the  medieval  period  and  anorexia  as  a  modern  asceticism,  and 
although  patriarchal  constraint  is  central  to  both  the  medieval 
religious  ascetic  and  the  modern  anorexic,  anorexia  and  "holy 
anorexia"  are  not  the  same  thing. 
For  the  modern  anorexic,  the  path  is  lonely  and  the  reward 
questionable.  She  does  not  have  the  social  "back  up"  which  Catherine 
of  Siena  had,  and  the  "self"  which  is meaningful  to  her  would  be  an 
alien concept  to  a  medieval  nun.  The self is not  a  historical constant 
which  "intersects"  with an  external culture,  but rather itself derives 
its  meaning  from  and  is  shaped  by  that  culture.  This  is  what  Bell 
forgets,  assuming  as  he  does  that  the  unique  and  self-contained self 
has  always  been the proper quest  of  humanity. 
-30-Chapter  2:  The  enigma  variations:  psychiatric explanations  of  anorexia 
Introduction 
In  her  article  "Current  approaches  to  the  etiology  and  treatment  of 
anorexia  nervosa"  Kelly  M.  Bemis  outlines  four  main  psychiatric 
approaches  to  anorexia:  psychodynamic,  family  interactional, 
behavioural,  and  medical.  The  psychodynamic  approach sees anorexia as 
a  disorder  of  the  individual  psyche,  in  which  the  refusal  of  food  is 
symbolic  of  some  other,  deeper  fear  or  anxiety.  The  family 
interactional  approach  sees  anorexia  as  a  power-strategy  within  a 
system  of  family  relations,  concentrating  on  the  perceived  function, 
rather  than  the  content  of  anorexic  behaviour.  The  behavioural 
approach sees anorexia as a  learned response  which  can  be  "unlearned", 
discarding  any  attempt  to  analse  the  meaning  or  dynamics  of  anorexia. 
Finally,  the  medical  model  concentrates  on  the  somatic  elements  of 
anorexia,  research  aiming  at  the  discovery  of  an  underlying 
physiological  cause.  <Bemis,  1978) 
As  outlined  in  the  introduction,  my  own  work  will  concentrate  on  an 
attempt  to  render  anorexia  nervosa  explicable,  to  uncover  how  the 
dominant  social  conceptualisations  of  food  and  the  body  are 
transformed  in  anorexia.  Since  the  psychodynamic  approach  is  the 
strand  in  psychiatry  which  treats  explanation  of  anorexia  most 
centrally,  my  review  of  the  psychiatric  definitions  of  anorexia  will 
concentrate  on  this  strand,  with  some  coverage  of  the  medical 
approach.  The  family  interactional  approach  looks  at  function  rather 
-31-than  meaning,  and  the  behavioural  approach  concentrates  an  "cure" 
through  reward  and  punishment.  Bath,  then,  have  almost  entirely 
abandoned  the  search  for  understanding.  I  have  chosen  to  look  at  the 
medical  approach  not  aut  of  an  acceptance  of  theories  of  organic 
causation  but  because  consideration  of  the  ways  in  which  the  somatic 
components  of  anorexia  are  given  meaning  will  be  central  to  my  awn 
analysis. 
With  this  in  mind,  therefore,  I  will  focus  an  the  work  of  four 
psychiatrists- Hilde~. A.H.  ~.  Roger  Slade,  and Mara  Selvini 
Palazzoli.  Bruch  and  Crisp  are  leading  authorities  an  anorexia  in, 
respectively,  the  US  and  Britain,  and have  been working and writing on 
anorexia  since  the  early  1960's.  Bruch's  work  is  almost  entirely 
psychodynamic,  in  that  she  sees  stringent  food  control  as  an  attempt 
to  impose  in  one  area  the  personal  control  that  the  anorexic  girl 
feels  she  lacks  in  her  life  as  a  whole.  Crisp's  work  straddles  the 
medical  and  psychodynamic  approaches,  explaining anorexia as a  retreat 
into  childhood  from  both  the  physical  and  social/psychological 
consequences  of  adolescence.  Palazzoli,  an  Italian  psychologist,  has 
recently  moved  into  the  area  of  family  therapy,  but  it is her earlier 
analysis  of  anorexia,  focusing  as it does  on  the  bodily experience  of 
the  anorexic  woman,  which  I  wish  to  examine.  Lastly,  I  have  chosen  to 
look  at  the  work  of  Roger  Slade  because  it  contains  an  intriguing 
attempt  to  synthesise  notions  of  both  organic  and  psychological 
causation. 
-32-After  outlining  the  main  features  of  each  of  these  explanations  of 
anorexia,  I  shall  attempt  to  make  explicit  the  assumptions  which 
inform  them;  to  expose,  in  other  words,  what  s.mi.1h.  has  termed  "the 
invisible  judgmental  work"  of  psychiatric  theorising.  <quoted  in 
Penfold  &  Walker,  1983:  42)  I  will  argue  that  "scientific" 
psychiatric  analyses  contain  an  unquestioned  and  unanalysed  set  of 
"common-sense"  assumptions  about  "normality"  - that,  in short,  being 
"normal"  or  "sane"  means  being  able  to  function  appropriately  in  a 
bourgeois  patriarchal  culture.  Here,  "normality"  is  taken  to  be  a 
naturally  existing  fact,  rather  than  a  socially  constructed  concept. 
(ibid.:  39) 
The  dominant  definition of  mental  illness in bourgeois culture is of a 
purely  personal  and  internal  phenomenon,  resulting  either  from 
biochemical  irregularities  or  internal  psychological  "maladjustment". 
The  mentally  ill  person  cannot  adjust  to  the  normal  world  - for  a 
variety of  reasons - and  so  must  be  institutionalised and  "readjusted" 
- in  a  variety  of  ways.  Failure  to  adjust  is  seen  as  a  problem  of 
individual  deviance.  What  we  must  adjust  to  is  unquestioned,  seen, 
therefore,  as  natural,  and,  except  for  the  deviant  minority,  as 
attainable and essentially unproblematic  . 
However,  acceptable  "normal"  behaviour is by  no  means  a  gender-neutral 
standard.  Phyllis  Chesler  cites  the  Braverman  studies  to  illustrate 
this point.  <Chesler,  1974;  Braverman,  1970;  1972)  In these  studies,  a 
questionnaire  was  given to psychiatric clinicians which  consisted of  a 
list  of  behaviours  and  character  traits  which  the  clinicians  were  to 
-33-apply  to  the  standards  of  "healthy  male",  "healthy  female"  and 
"healthy adult"  behaviour.  Chesler points out: 
"<their)  concepts  of  heal  thy  mature  men  did  not  differ 
significantly  from  their  concepts  of  healthy  mature  adults, 
but  their  concepts  of  healthy  mature  women  did  differ 
significantly  from  those  for  men  and  for  adults  ....  women 
differ  ...  by  being  more  submissive,  less  independant,  less 
adventurous,  more  easily  influenced,  less  aggressive,  less 
competitive,  more  excitable  about  minor  crises,  more  easily 
hurt,  more  emotional,  more  conceited  about  their 
appearances,  less objective and less interested in  maths  and 
science". 
<Chesler,  1974:  65) 
The  implication  of  this  for  women  is  that  to  be  seen  as  mentally 
healthy they  must  adjust to  a  standard of  behaviour that is held to be 
acceptable  for  women  but  not  desirable  either  for  men  or  for  adults. 
Chesler argues  from this that "the ethic of  mental  health is masculine 
in  our  culture"  and  that  "only  men  can  be  mentally  healthy".  <ibid.: 
65;  64)  However,  that  thP.  standards  of  adult  mental  health  are 
"adapted"  for  women  does  not  mean  that  women  are  "immune"  to  the 
expectations  of  the  unadapted  adult/masculine  standard.  Women  are,  in 
effect,  caught  in a  double-bind  of  having  to fit  in  with  both sets of 
expectations - to be  an  independent,  self-contained individual  as well 
as  being  feminine,  and  thus organising their activities mainly  towards 
the  needs  of  others.  For  women,  there  is "a  double  standard  of  mental 
health".  (ibid.:  xix) 
There  is,  I  would  argue,  a  constant tension between the  bourgeois  idea 
of  the  atomized  and  self-subsistent  individual  <an  idea  developed  in 
the  context  of  patriarchy)  and  the  specific  patriarchal  demands  on 
-34-women,  expressed  in  the  concept  of  "femininity".  This  tension  is  one 
which  psychiatry,  in viewing as "natural"  and eternal the  gender roles 
and  personality  structures  of  bourgeois  patriarchy,  cannot  fully 
"see". 
In  my  discussions  of  the psychiatric explanations of anorexia,  then,  I 
will  be  focusing  on  the  underlying  assumption  that  "normality"  is 
achievable  - that  the  personal  assumption  of  the  conflicting  demands 
of  being  both  adult  and  female  at  adolescence  is a  process  that  only 
the  ill  or  deviant  individual  will  find  seriously  problematic  - and 
the  effect  of  this  on  subsequent  theorising.  As  Penfold  and  Walker 
write: 
"once  a  person  is  suspected  or  diagnosed  as  mentally  ill, 
she  becomes  someone  who  is  not  expected  to  make  sense  in 
terms  of  the social definition of rationality or normality." 
(Penfold and  Walker:  1983,  42) 
Psychiatric  explanations  of  anorexia,  thus,  start  from  the  premise 
that  anorexia  as  a  behaviour  will  not  "make  sense"  in  any  profound 
way,  and  this  severely  limits  the  extent  to  which  any  real 
understanding  can  be  developed.  Indeed,  as  we  shall  see,  analysis  of 
the  anorexic  sy.mpto111  itself  takes  a  definite  second  place  behind 
analysis  of  the  psychological  dilemmas  and  inadequacies  which  are 
presumed  to  underly  it.  These  underlying  issues,  I  will  argue,  are 
constructed  through  a  taken-for-granted  concept  of  individuality  and 
individual  development  which is ahistorical and phallocentric. 
-35-Arthur Crisp:  anorexia as biological regression 
Anorexia,  for  Crisp,  is  "a  phobic  avoidance  stance",  "a  distorted 
biological  solution  to  an  existential  problem  for  an  adolescent". 
<Crisp,  1980b:  preface,  91) 
The  phobia  for  the  anorexic  is  of  herself  at  normal  (average> 
adolescent  bodyweight.  Her  often expressed fear  of "fatness"  hides the 
change  in  meaning  of  the  word  "fat"  for  the  anorexic,  to  whom  "fat" 
equals  normal  adolescent  bodyweight.  (1972:  395;  1967:  716;  1970a: 
493)  The  anorexic  state  represents  a  "psychobiological  regression",  a 
"flight  back  into  psychobiological  childhood",  and  is,  as  such,  an 
adaptive state  which  protects  the  individual  to  whom  puberty  and  its 
attendant  "maturational  crisis"  have  been  experienced as  overwhelming. 
<1974:  530;  1970a:  454;  1979:  149;  63)  It  is  thus  the  control  of 
weight  and  shape,  not  of  eating  or  food,  that  is  central,  the  aim 
being  to  regain  and  maintain  a  sub-pubertal  bodyweight.  Crisp  argues 
that  anorexic  women,  if  they  could  eat  without  gaining  weight,  would 
do  so,  as  the  only  significance  of  food  in  anorexia  arises  from  its 
relationship to weight  and shape.  (1977:  63;  1980b:  14-5,  78) 
The  anorexic  girl,  then,  regresses  into  psychobiological  childhood  in 
order  to  avoid  the  "existential  challenge"  of  puberty.  C1980b:  48)  It 
is  puberty  that  introduces  weight  and  shape  as  meaningful  and 
threatening,  as  it  is  the  crossing  of  a  relatively  precise  weight 
threshold  which  causes  the  "qualitative  biological  and  psychosocial 
changes"  of  puberty to  occur.  <1980b:  78)  Of  central  significance  are 
-36-the  development  of  secondary  sexual  characteristics  - in  girls,  the 
development  of  breasts,  pubic  hair,  the  laying  down  of  fat  on 
buttocks,  stomach,  thighs  and  upper  arms,  and  the  menarche  - which 
result  from  increased  production  of  "sex"  hormones.  This  "normal" 
female  "fatness"  is  profoundly  significant  both  biologically  and 
socially;  biologically  in  that  it  signals  that  the  girl  is 
reproductively  capable,  and  socially  in  that  it  arouses  male  sexual 
interest.  (1980b:  38;  1979:  150) 
Concommitant  to  sexual  development  is  an  adolescent  appetite  surge, 
which provides the  neccessary energy and  growth to push the adolescent 
over  this  threshold  weight  at  which  the  biological  mechanisms  in  the 
brain  governing  sex-hormone  activity  are  "switched-on".  (1980b:  84) 
Thus,  Crisp argues,  "eating becomes  particularly equated with emerging 
sexuality  through  its  symbolic  link  ... (and) ... its  biological  primacy 
over  the  latter  <sexuality)".  (1980b:  46)  Food  control  is,  therefore, 
the  obvious  course  for  the  adolescent  who  seeks  a  retreat  from 
maturation. 
That,  then,  is the  precise nature  of this "maturational  crisis"  ?;  and 
what  is specific  in it for  girls  in general  and  "pre-anorexic"  girls 
in particular ? 
For  Crisp,  as  we  have  seen,  puberty  is  primarily  a  physiological 
event,  with  a  secondary  and  dependant  "social"  element.  Sexuality,  for 
Crisp,  emerges  at  adolescence  as  a  result  of  the  increase  in hormonal 
production;  sexual  feelings  and  urges  are  a  biological  creation. 
-37-"Adolescent  turmoil"  is "an  inevitable  accompaniment  of  the  processes 
of  post-pubertal  growth".  <1974:  532)  Puberty,  then,  as  a  primarily 
physiological  event,  "intrudes  massively  into  the  world  of  the  child 
and  demands  that  the  sense  of  self  enlarge  so  as  to  incorporate 
sexuality and  decay".  (1980b:  49)  The  adolescent  must  forge  a  sense  of 
self  which  includes  the  integration  and  control  of  sexual  and  other 
impulses,  independence  from  parents  and  a  secure  sense  of  his/her 
feelings  and  needs.  <1972:  395;  1983a)  This  is  a  time  of  change  and 
experimentation,  the  successful  resolution  of  which  results  in  "a 
well-developed sense  of the self".  <1980b:  58) 
The  "social"  element  in  puberty/adolescence  is  twofold.  Firstly,  the 
adolescent  self  must  be  developed  "in  ways  adaptive  to  the  available 
social  matrix".  (1980b:  49)  Secondly,  today' s  adolescent  is  faced, 
Crisp  argues,  with  a  permissive  society  in  which  guidelines  for 
behaviour  and  social  rules  are  lacking,  in  which  there  is 
"philosophical  and  moral  uncertainty  and  bankruptcy".  (1974:  530;  see 
also  1981-2:  213;  1979:  150;  1980b:  60-1)  Thus,  there  is a  need  for 
greater  structure  and  stronger  controls  within  the  self  <1983:  857; 
1980b:  60),  and  while  this  is  positive  for  most,  for  the  few  it  is 
problematic:  insecurity  in  values  "may  allow  the  more  robust  amongst 
us  to  develop  to  the  maximum ... <but) ...  for  the  more  vulnerable  it is 
probably  very difficult indeed".  <1979:  150) 
Thus  far, 
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successfully  negotiated.  "Modern"  is  undefined  here,  but  from  its 
-38-context  we  can  assume  Crisp  is referring  to  the  1960s  onwards.  <1967: 
715). 
For  girls,  however,  there  are  extra  problems.  As  well  as  the  more 
complex  hormonal  and  physiological  processes  involved  in  female 
pubertal  development,  there  are  specific  psychosexual  problems for  the 
female  adolescent.  Unfortunately,  Crisp  assumes  that  these  problems 
are  so  well  known  to  the  reader  that,  except  for  a  brief  mention  of 
the  risk  of  pregnancy,  he  does  not  list  or  explain  them.  <1968:  370) 
Neither  does  he  expand  on  the  "different,  and  often  less  immediately 
challenging  psychosexual  implications  of  adolescence  for  the  :male". 
<1970a:  466)  It is,  however,  safe to assume  that,  for  Crisp,  sexuality 
is  seen  simply  as  more  of  a  problem  for  girls.  It  is  these  special 
problems,  coupled  with  the  very  strong  preoccupation  among  teenage 
girls  with  weight,  shape  and  attractiveness,  which  make  the  anorexic 
retreat  from  :maturity  - in  which  the  central  motive  is,  in Eardner's 
words,  "to  stalemate  physiological  growth  in  the  sexual  sphere"  - a 
more  "fe:male"  course,  adolescent  turmoil  becoming  construed  solely  in 
terms  of  body  shape.  (1970a:  454;  1980b:  24-5,  142;  1980:  230) 
So,  having  accounted  for  the  specificity  of  the  adolescent 
maturational  crisis for  girls  in  general,  how  does  Crisp  then  account 
for  the differential  experience  of  the crisis in non-anorexic and pre-
anorexic girls ? 
His  explanation  is  twofold.  Firstly  anorexic  women's  families  can  be 
pathological  in  a  variety  of  ways;  and  secondly,  it  can  be  the 
-39-anorexic  herself  who  is deficient  in some  way:  anorexia  can  be  caused 
either by the  two  acting together,  or  by  the  second alone.  (1977:  66) 
Firstly,  then,  in  some  families  the  crisis  of  adolescence  can,  for 
Crisp,  be  termed  "the  adolescent/family  maturational  crisis".  <1979: 
151)  The  struggle  for  independence  and  the  development  of  a  sexual 
identity  can,  for  example,  rekindle  for  the  parents  old,  unresolved 
uncertainties  about  their  own  identities,  their  sexuality  or  their 
social  confidence.  Further,  in  some  families  where  the  parents  have 
agreed to stay together  only until their children grow  up,  adolescence 
threatens  the  very  cohesion  of  the  family.  C1980b:  66-9;  1977a:  232; 
1980:  229)  Such  families  have,  in  short,  "a  <so  far  as  the  present 
problem is concerned)  faulty  way  of  life"  C1980b:  137),  and  are  often 
"pathologically  enmeshed  and  on  the  defensive  against  the  outside 
world  and  its turmoil".  0983:  857)  These  "faulty"  families  can  then 
produce  a  shy,  timid and  dependent  child for  whom  growing-up  becomes  a 
process so filled with anxiety that it is avoided  in anorexia. 
It  can,  however,  be  a  purely  individual  pathology  which  makes  a  girl 
anorexic.  She  may  have  a  "major  personality  immaturity"  C1980b: 65), 
very  low  self-esteem,  be  especially  shy  or  compliant  or  sexually 
insecure  <1970a:  494;  1974:  526),  or  have  "major  psychological 
developmental  defects  and  an  absence  of  other  defense  mechanisms". 
(1977:  62-3)  This  individual  psychological  vulnerability  may  be 
exacerbated by an earlier than usual  puberty,  but  in any case  the pre-
anorexic  girl  feels  that  she  is  incapable  of  becoming  a  competant 
adult,  and  her  anxiety  is  such  that  she  retains  only  "a  marginal  or 
- 40-borderline  sense  of  the  self ...  predominantly  in  terms  of  shape". 
<1980b:  55,  35;  see  also  1970:  16;  1970a:  463)  Food  is  avoided  and 
comes  to  be  "hated  and  feared"  because  of  its  association  with 
psychosexual  growth,  and  the  anorexic  flight  back  into  childhood 
begins.  <1970a:  454) 
Crisp's  explanation  of  anorexia  logically  results  in  a  two-pronged 
treatment  strategy.  Firstly,  it  is  essential  that  the  adolescent 
regains  enough  weight  to  tip  her  over  the  point  at  which  hormonal 
development  will  be  "switched  on",  for  she  must  actually  reach 
pubertal  weight  in  order  to  re-experience  sexuality  and  get  back  in 
touch  with  "her  more  natural  psychological  self".  C1980b:  140,  84-5, 
103;  1979a:  80)  As  well  as this "re-exposure  to the  phobic situation", 
psychotherapy  must  help  her  to adjust  better to  and  engage  with adult 
life.  <1967:  716;  1980b:  preface)  Autonomy,  healthy  independence  and  a 
sense  of  mastery  over  her  destiny,  plus  the  recognition  that  her 
feelings  and  needs  are  aspects  of  her  personality  that  others  value 
can all  be  developed  through a  psychotherapeutic relationship in which 
the therapist fills a  "parental  protective role",  providing the secure 
interpersonal  relationship  that  is  neccessary  for  adolescent 
development  and  has  in all  likelihood been  missing.  (1967:  716;  1980b: 
142-7;  1983a) 
Crisp's  work  on  anorexia  is  extremely  influential;  he  has,  in  fact, 
been  the  major  British  authority  for  the  past  three  decades.  His 
- 41-account  of  anorexia,  however,  remains  unsatisfactory  in  a  number  of 
ways. 
Firstly,  of  course,  as  a  psychiatrist  Crisp  assumes  the  fundamental 
psychiatric  tenet  that  mental  illness is "soluble"  at  the  individual 
level.  Why  anorexics  should  want  or  need  to  avoid  the  "maturational 
challenge"  and  why  female  sexuality  is  especially  problematical  are 
questions  answered  by  the  definition  of  the  anorexic  girl  as 
deficient.  "Normal"  women,  it  is  implied,  face  adulthood  with 
equanimity,  in  spite  of  the  fact  that  sexuality  is  mare  problematic 
for  women.  The  socially  created role  of  20th  century  "femininity"  is 
sa  far  naturalised  as  to  disappear  as  an  abject  of  analysis.  Thus 
Crisp  cannot  fully  analyse  what  I  would  argue  are  social  institutions 
- the  role  of  women  in bourgeois partriarchal societies,  and  feminine 
sexuality  in  particular  here  because  he  views  the  process  of 
becoming an adult as universal,  ahistorical,  natural  and easy. 
Further,  the  very  notion  of  the  individual  is  only  partially 
understood,  I  would  argue,  when  personality  is  seen  as  an  inherent 
possession,  and  not  as  a  creation  of  social  forces.  Thus  the  class 
distribution  of  anorexia  nervosa,  while  noted,  is  left  unexplained. 
Why  we  should  find  sa  many  mare  deviant  girls  and  faulty  families 
among  the  middle-classes  remains  an  unanswered  question.  Related  to 
this fundamental  individualism intrinsic to psychiatric explanation is 
a  biologically  determinist  view  of  human  development  specific  to 
Crisp.  In spite  of  brief references to social  norms,  such  as  the  need 
for  women  to  be  slim and  attractive,  as  specifically  "modern"  (1974: 
-42-526)  Crisp  assumes  a  biologically  determined  and  universal  path  to 
adulthood  to  which  the  only social  and  historical  "contributions"  are 
moral  rules and prohibitions - or the lack of  them. 
His  notion  of  the  adolescent  personal!  ty' s  need  to  "enlarge"  to 
encompass  sexual!  ty  seems  to  posit  sexual!  ty  as  a  direct  product  of 
hormonal  activity,  only minimally affected by the  need to be  "socially 
adaptive".  Further,  he  assumes  the  naturalness  and  universality  of 
what  I  would  argue  is  the  currently  dominant  view  of  sexuality  as 
naturally  adult,  heterosexual  and  genital,  a  sexuality  which 
sociolgists  argue  is  the  result  of  the  channelling  of  a  fluid  human 
sexuality  through  the  conduits  of  bourgeois  and  patriarchal  values. 
C1967:  714,  718;  see Foucault,  1979;  Weeks,  1986;  Kitzinger,  1987)  For 
Crisp  there  is a  determinist  connection between  puberty,  as  marked  by 
the  pubertal  weight  threshold,  and  "adolescent  trauma"  centering  on 
selfhood  and  sexuality,  a  threshold  which  must  be  personally  and 
physically  experienced  to  be  understood.  This  determinism  does  not 
allow  for  any  consideration  of  how  the  social  construction  of 
adulthood  and  sexuality  make  sense  of  and  give  meaning  to  biological 
processes.  It  is  biologism  taken  to  the  extreme  to  argue,  as  Crisp 
does,  that  it  is  the  adolescent  body  which  "requires"  the  gender 
identity.  <1977a:  232) 
It  would  seem,  therefore,  that Crisp's theory  of  anorexia  is based  on 
an  unquestioned acceptance  of  the  norms  of  a  bourgeois  and  patriarchal 
society as naturally human  norms.  Further,  this perspective also  leads 
to  a  lack  of  recognition  of  how  these  norms  apply  differently  to 
-43-women.  Crisp  aims  to  help  the  anorexic  girl  to  "a  new  freedom  to 
explore  and  develop  herself  as  a  person".  C1980b:  147)  Being  a 
"person"  means  being  independent,  feeling that  you  own  your  own  body, 
having  a  greatly  reduced  concern  with  weight  and  shape  and  seeing 
yourself  and  your  needs  as  valued  by  others.  <1980b:  142-7;  1983a)  I 
would  - and  will,  in later chapters - question the extent to which any 
of  this  is tenable  for  women,  for  whom  dependance,  a  devalued  social 
role,  concern  with  appearance  and,  crucially  in  anorexia,  an  "open" 
concept  of  the  body  come  as  part  and  parcel  of  "femini  ty".  Indeed,  I 
will  suggest  that  individualism  itself,  while  being  presented  as  an 
asexual,  gender-neutral  category,  is thus  presented  phallocentrically, 
having  been  developed  on  a  masculine  model  of  the  individual  which  is 
itself defined in opposition to femininity. 
Finally,  and  following  on  from  the  above,  I  would  argue  that  Crisp's 
focus  on  anorexia as  an  avoidance  response  fails to  illuminate to  any 
great  degree  the  "common-sense"  categories  on  which  his  analysis  is 
based.  My  own  analysis  will  focus  on  the  social  meanings of  food  and 
the  body,  how  these  are  created  and  maintained,  how  they  are 
experienced  specifically  by  women,  how  they  are  transformed  in 
anorexia  and  how  they  change  over  time.  This  is an  approach  which  the 
psychiatric  understanding  as  a  whole  and  Crisp's  version  of  it  in 
particular  precludes.  When  the  conceptualization  of  the  body  is 
posited  as  a  universal  and  basically  unproblematic  by-product  of  a 
naturalized  sexual  development,  and  when  the  only  "meaning"  food  has 
is  limited  to  a  simple  association  with  growth  and  comfort  (1981-2: 
-44-213),  it  is  difficult  to  treat  either  as  concepts  deserving  of  real 
analysis. 
In  Crisp's  analysis  - as  in  most  psychiatric  work  - what  is  deemed 
important  is  how  anorexia  nervosa  is  caused,  not  the  meaning  and 
significance  of  anorexic  behaviour.  After,  "this  is  how  it  happens" 
explanation stops.  This  seems to me  to  be  inadequate,  both as analysis 
and,  in  Crisp's  case,  as  causal  explanation.  Anorexic  thinking  and 
behaviour  are  not  only  deserving  of  analysis  in  their  own  right,  but 
the  question  of  how  and  why  a  process so  fundamental  as  eating  can  be 
so radically transformed,  if adequately answered,  can explain not  only 
the  anorexic  conceptualizations  of  food  and  the  body,  but  will  also 
illuminate  other,  more  common  conceptualizations  and  how  these  relate 
to wider social structures. 
Further,  I  would  argue  that  it  is  impossible  to  so  definitively 
separate  "cause"  and  "effect",  as  Crisp  claims  to  do  in  arguing  that 
the  root  of  anorexia is avoidance  of  adulthood,  and  that it is not  in 
itself  an  "existentially  fulfilling"  experience.  (1983a)  I  would 
differentiate  experience  as  existentially  fulfilling  and  experience 
as  existentially  :meaningful;  Crisp  does  not  and  thus  "loses"  the 
meaning of anorexia which  ought  to be  basic to its analysis. 
The  "new''  or  transformed meanings  which  food  and the  body  come  to have 
in  anorexia  will,  in  my  own  analysis,  be  compared  with  socially 
dominant  ideas  about  food  and  the  body  in  order  to  form  what  I  hope 
-45-will  be  a  fuller  explanation  of  anorexia  than that  offered  by  Crisp's 
biologism. 
-46-Roger  Slade:  the  intervention of  the social 
Roger  ~·s  explanation  of  anorexia  is constructed in the  answer  to 
two  questions:  how  does  the  initial  impetus  to  control  food  and  lose 
weight  arise  ?;  and  how  is it then  maintained  ?  <Slade,  1984:  30)  In 
focusing  on  these  questions  Slade  argues  that  anorexia  is a  two-stage 
process. 
For  Slade,  the  answer  to  his first  question  is to  be  found  in social 
forces,  in the  combination  of  "the ethics of  body  regulation"  and  the 
female  gender role.  (ibid.:  147)  He  argues: 
"Belief  in the  value  of  hard work  and consistent application 
is deeply  engrained  in  our  culture,  as  is the  commitment  to 
achievement  through  individual  effort  and  the  idea  of 
deferring  pleasures  and  gratifications  until  satisfactory 
ends  have  been  attained.  These  are  the  values  that  were 
sanctified  by  Protestant  sects  in  the  early  years  of 
industrial capitalism." 
<1984:  135) 
Such  values,  Slade  argues,  emerge  strongly  in  the  middle-class 
family's  commitment  to  personal  achievement  sought  through  hard  work 
and  disciplined  self-control.  Further,  there  is  a  strong  connection 
between  these  values  and  body  regulation,  a  link  seen  in the  idea  of 
sport as "an ideal  mode  of training for  the  moral  and social behaviour 
that  is central  to  the  highest  concerns  of  society",  and this concern 
creates  the  potential  for  extreme  forms  of  bodily  control,  such  as 
anorexia nervosa.  (ibid.:  138;  134-9) 
Slade  then  goes  on  to  suggest  that  when  the  "ethics  of  body 
regulation",  as  described  above,  meet  the  female  gender  role  anorexia 
-47-becomes  even  more  explicable,  for  it  is  the  latter,  in  emphasizing 
compliance  and  the  need  for  women  to  be  physically attractive,  which 
causes  the  pre-anorexic girl  to  be  highly  vulnerable  to both familial 
pressures  to  succed  through  personal  effort,  and  social  pressures  to 
regulate  her  body  through food control.  (ibid.:  144) 
For  women,  the  wider  social  values  of  assertiveness,  independence, 
intellectual  prowess  and  productiveness conflict  with  the  female  role 
values  of  passivity,  dependence,  helplessness  and  being  decorative. 
:M:ost  women  adjust  to  this  conflict  by  concentrating  on  "feminine 
values",  but  the  anorexic  girl  cannot  adopt  this strategy  as she  is 
under  strong  pressure  to  succeed  educationally.  Her  pursuit  of 
educational  success  is  undermined  by  the  early  lesson  that 
assertiveness  is  inappropriate  in  women  while  being  receptive  to 
others'  needs  and  demands  is valued.  (ibid.:  174-9)  The  anorexic girl, 
Slade argues: 
"feels  obliged  to  respond  both  in  a  way  that  is generally 
considered  socially  desirable  for  males,  and  in  a  way  that 
is  considered  socially  desirable  for  females.  It  is, 
paradoxically,  because  of  her  'female'  receptivity that  she 
feels obliged to take  on  'male'  tasks." 
(ibid.:  189-90) 
Faced  with  this  confusion,  her  family's  expectations  become  her 
personal  burden,  and  she  feels  increasingly  inadequate  to fulfil  both 
those  expectations  and  the  social  expectations  of  the  female  gender 
role.  (ibid.:  185)  She  is  unable,  faced  with  these  conflicts,  to 
develop  a  coherent  sense  of  self.  For  Slade,  decision-making  allows 
the  individual  to  influence  events  outside  herself,  and  this sense  of 
-48-influential  action  is  "implicit  in  the  idea  of  what  it  is  to  be  a 
person".  (ibid.:  166)  He  argues that: 
"the  sense  of  the  self  is  generated  in  those  things  the 
person  can  do.  The  most  characteristically human  quality is 
not  only  the  capacity  to  make  decisions,  but  the  capacity, 
in so doing to create one's own  being." 
(ibid.:  166) 
The  anorexic  girl's  inability  to  act  decisively  prevents  the 
development  of  "a  stable  set  of  preferences ... <or)  core  of  personal 
values",  and  she  therefore  lacks  a  clear  or  enduring  sense  of  self. 
(ibid.:  167)  It is  in this  context  that  slimmndng,  a  common  activity 
among  teenage  girls,  assumes  special  significance  for  the  anorexic. 
Food  control  is the  one  area  of  her  life  which  seems  to  the  anorexic 
girl  to  be  amenable  to her  own  controlling influence,  and  her success 
in  this  one  area  is  what  will  eventually  trap  her  into  anorexia. 
Control  of  eating  is  reliable,  does  not  involve  other  people,  and 
becomes  the  only  part  of  her  life  which  is  "consistently  and 
uncomplicatedly  good. 
11  <ibid.:  160)  Food  control  becomes  for  the 
anorexic  girl 
11 a  last-ditch  attempt  to  retain  her  sense  of  self 
through  effective  action,  however  limited".  (ibid.:  112)  This,  then, 
is "stage  one"  of anorexia  nervosa. 
In  "stage  two",  Slade  hypothesizes that the  psychological  consequences 
of  starvation  then  work  to  change  anorexia  from  a  deliberate, 
conscious  action  into  an  "externally"  maintained  trap,  a  state  of 
being  which  escapes  the  individual's  control.  Once  the  effects  of 
starvation  on  her  thought  processes  become  established,  the  anorexic 
-49-girl  is  trapped  "in  the  grip  of  processes  that  run  away  with  her." 
(ibid.:  12)  Vhat,  then,  are  these processes ? 
Slade  argues  that  starvation  changes  the  way  in  which  people  think, 
and  that  these  changes  are  just  as  predictable  as  are  the  physical 
changes  of  starvation.  Reduction  in  the  intake  of  food,  it  is 
suggested,  produces  a  progressive  decline  in  intellectual  capacity. 
Instability  in  neural  activity  is  a  result  of  starvation  which  then 
:makes  the  conditions  for  the  proper  working  of  the  brain 
unpredictable,  and  this  instability results  in the  impairment  of  "the 
highest  mental  function  of  reason  and abstract thought".  (ibid.:  70-1; 
69)  The  capacity  to  engage  in  complex  thinking  is  progressively 
diminished;  the  world  is seen  increasingly  in terms  of  simple sets of 
categories  - black  and  white,  good  and  bad  - with  no  intermediate 
stages.  In  short,  Slade  argues,  thinking  becomes  polarized.  Her 
restricted  capacity  for  thinking  means  that  food  control  becomes  the 
anorexic's  :main  preoccupation;  in  fact,  she  is  incapable  of  being 
anything  other  than  obsessed  with  food  and  weight.  This  state  could, 
in principle,  be  viewed  either as positive or negative,  but  because  of 
the  conflict  and  confusion  which  has  characterized  her  pre-anorexic 
life,  restricted thinking is experienced by the  anorexic as a  welcomed 
withdrawal  from  day-to-day  life.  Furthermore,  the  high  value  that  she 
places  on  control  of  food  and  her  body  also  act  to  "set"  the anorexic 
girl  to interpret  the effects of  starvation in a  positive  way.  (ibid.: 
72-8) 
-50-When  weight  falls  to  between  70  and  80  %  of  average  expected  body 
weight  this  "characteristic  anorexic  way  of  thinking"  occurs,  and  it 
is here,  Slade  argues,  that the "whirlpool effect"  takes over: 
"by  severely  reducing  the  amount  of  food  she  eats,  the 
anorexic  simplifies her  thinking.  As  her  style of  thinking 
changes,  her  decision  not  to  eat  is  reinforced.  As  a 
consequence  of  this  she  grows  even  thinner  and  the  cycle 
continues.  The  more  emaciated  she  becomes  the  easier  it is 
for  her  to  make  the  decision  not  to  eat.  So  she  spirals 
downward." 
(ibid.:  77;  74) 
Slade's analysis raises  a  number  of  valid  and  interesting points.  The 
explanation in terms  of social forces of the initial stage of  anorexia 
is  useful,  especially  when  compared  to  the  biological  determinism  of 
Crisp.  However,  it is in explanations of this type that  the  need  for  a 
fully sociological  analysis  of  anorexia  becomes  most  clearly  evident. 
Slade  asserts  a  significant  "input"  into  individual  psychology  of 
cultural  values  - and  indeed,  much  psychiatric  writing  on  anorexia 
follows  this  line  - but  these  explanations  should  not  be  seen  as 
sociological.  They  represent  little more  than  a  "flirtation"  with  the 
concept  of  socially  constructed  individuality,  and  in  the  final 
analysis  revert  to  "individual  pathology"  as  the  fundamental  cause  of 
mental  illness. 
In  Slade's  analysis,  the  effect  of  social  forces  is  "grafted-on"  to 
the  individualist and  psychologistic understanding  of  personality as  a 
unique  individual  possession.  In  this perspective  culture  is external 
-51-to  the  individual  and  its  "external"  effects  can  thus  only  be 
secondary.  As  Slade  puts  it,  the  extreme  behaviour  of  the  anorexic 
:makes  it  clear  that  "the  manner  in  which  she  behaves  must  be 
explained,  not  in  terms  of  culture,  but  in  terms  of  individual 
psychological  constraints".  (ibid.:  154)  Thus,  in  spite  of  the  at 
first  glance  promising,  even  near  Marxist  argument  that  the  self  is 
created  through  activity,  it later  becomes  clear  that  for  Slade  this 
activity is itself not socially constructed but  individualistic. 
Furthermore,  his  conception  of  the  relationship  of  social  forces  and 
the  individual  is  determinist.  Part  of  the  ultimate  rejection  of  the 
notion  of  "social"  causation  for  Slade  <and  others)  is  that  not  all 
young  middle-class  women,  subject  to  more  or  less the  same  social  and 
familial  pressures,  become  anorexic.  This  assumes  a  remorseless  cause 
and  effect  relation  between  circumstances  and  behaviour,  and  does  not 
see  that  circumstances  limit  but  do  not  determine  the  range  of 
possible  behaviour.  Women  respond  to  the  pressures  of  a  patriarchal 
and  capitalist  society  in  a  variety  of  ways  of  which  the  anorexic 
response is one. 
There  is a  second determinist  element  in Slade's analysis.  Although  in 
my  own  analysis  of  anorexia  I  will  argue  that  there  are  good  reasons 
to  see  anorexia  as  a  "two  stage"  process,  the  organicist  explanation 
of  "starvation  stage"  anorexia  which  Slade  offers  is  far  from 
sufficient.  Slade  suggests  that  in  a  culture  which  values  bodily 
control  the  psychological  effects  of  starvation  on  the  brain  can  be 
interpreted positively;  however,  in themselves  these effects are  in no 
-52-sense socially constructed.  Reduced  capacity in the  "higher"  functions 
of  the  brain  is  posited  as  having  a  single  and  unitary  cause  - the 
effect  of  starvation  on  the  hypothalamus  which  determines  the 
outcome.  As  Slade  himself  points  out,  the  hypothalamus  remains  poorly 
understood;  thus,  his  arguement  remains  problematic  on  the  organic 
level  alone.  (ibid.:  34)  (1)  Further,  he  does  not  adequately argue  the 
case  for  mental  incapacity  in  "stage  two"  anorexia;  it  could, 
alternatively,  be  argued  that  it  is  not  the  ability  to  engage  in 
"complex"  thinking  but  the  will  to  do  so  which  is  lacking.  Here, 
Slade  is again  operating  on  a  simplistic  "cause  and  effect"  model  of 
experience.  Hypothalamic  malfunction  determines  reduced  thinking; 
bodily/food  control  already  exists;  therefore  the  anorexic  can  only 
think about  food.  The  meanings food  comes  to have  in anorexia,  how the 
anorexic girl  makes  sense  of  her experience  of eating does  not  need to 
be  explained.  If,  however,  we  adopt  an  approach  which  sees  the 
structure  and  concepts  of  thought  as  socially  constructed  in  a 
dialectical,  not  a  determinist,  relationship with physiological states 
which  themselves  must  be  socially  interpreted  in  order  to  be 
meaningful,  the  explanation  of  "stage  two"  anorexia  should  begin  at 
the point  where Slade's analysis ends. 
Further,  the  meanings  of  food,  eating  and  the  body  can  in  this 
perspective be  analysed as social products rather than naturalized and 
1  It  is  not  helpful,  I  would  argue,  to  pursue  this  point  further 
since,  as  a  sociologist,  I  am  not  competant  in  this  area.  While  I 
cannot  disprove  organic  theories  of  causation  in  anorexia  on 
biological  grounds,  in  Part  Three  I  hope  to  provide  bath  an  adequate 
critique  of  sociobiology  and  a  more  illuminating  sociological 
explanation of  anorexia. 
-53-accepted  as  completely  unproblematical  and  existing  only  in  one 
"natural"  form.  <See,  for  example,  Slade's  argument  that  ideas  about 
food  are  the  only  ideas  which  are  not  "conflicting  and  confused". 
Cibid.:  173))  This  would  then  allow  anorexic  food  control  to  become 
the  real  object  of  analysis.  In  later  chapters  I  will  argue  that  in 
"starvation  stage"  anorexia  food  comes  to  be  representative  of  all 
"external"  influences  on  and  connections  with  the  inner self and  that 
it is for  this reason that  food  control  dominates  "anorexic thinking". 
Here,  food rituals - what  is allowed entry to,  and kept  in,  the  body  -
are  used  to  maintain  a  rigid  psychic  boundary  around  the  self.  The 
social  meanings  of  food  are  transformed in anorexia  into  alternative, 
not  merely "reduced"  or "deficient",  categorizations. 
In  short,  then,  a  fully  sociological  analysis  of  anorexia  would  see 
the  social  construction  of  physiological  states,  and  the  alternative 
constructions  of  anorexia  as  the  objects  of  analysis.  It  is not  only 
that anorexia  exists,  but  what  it means  and  how  it is experienced that 
is important.  This  perspective further  has  the  advantage  of seeing the 
anorexic  girl  as  actively  creative  of,  and  not  simply  passively 
controlled  by her bodily functions. 
-54-Hilde  Bruch:  over-compliant daughters 
For  Hilde  Bruch,  anorexia  nervosa  is  "the  relentless  pursuit  of 
thinness".  <Bruch,  19'78:  x;  19'74:  224)  In  anorexia,  self-denial  and 
discipline  are  seen  as  the  highest  virtues,  satisfying  needs  and 
desires  as  "shameful  self-indulgence".  (1978:  x;  1974:  268)  Self-
denial  in  the  form  of  food  control  is  secondary  to  a  struggle  for 
identity  and  selfhood;  food  control  and  being  able  to  stand  hunger, 
and  indeed  training  herself  to  value  hunger,  give  to  the  anorexic 
woman  "the  feeling  of  a  personality  core"  which  she  would  otherwise 
lack.  Thinness  becomes  her  "supreme  acheivement",  the  purpose  of  her 
existence.  <1978:  x,  4-7)  The  essence  of  anorexia,  for  Bruch,  is 
therefore  not  centred  on  food  and  weight  - these  are  respectively  a 
method and  a  proof.  The  anorexic  uses starvation and the domination of 
bodily desires in her search for control,  identity and competence,  and 
uses  the resulting thinness as the  sign that  her  control  is effective. 
<19'7 4:  252) 
Bruch  argues that three areas of  "disturbed psychological  functioning" 
lie  at  the  heart  of  anorexia.  <1978:  x;  1974:  252-6;  1970:  12-15) 
Firstly,  the  anorexic  woman  has  a  "near  delusional"  body  image.  She 
will  consistently  claim  that  she  is  not,  in  fact,  thin,  and 
overestimates  both  her  own  size,  others'  sizes,  and  abstract 
distances.  (19'78:  46,  '78)  Secondly,  anorexic  women  cannot  correctly 
identify bodily stimuli,  especially hunger.  Awareness  of  hunger,  Bruch 
argues,  is  not  instinctive,  it  is  not  "innate  biological  knowledge". 
Therefore  learning  is  neccessary  for  hunger  and  indeed  all 
-55-biological  needs  - to  become  "organized  into  recognizable  patterns". 
(1969:  93;  1969a:  51) 
This  process  of  learning,  for  the  "pre-anorexic"  child,  is  to  be 
sought  in  childhood  experience  where  the  child's  needs  are  not 
correctly  recognized  by  the  mother,  who  feeds  the  child  to  her  own 
schedule,  not  on  de:mand,  and offers inappropriate  responses to "child-
initiated  cues"  be  those  responses  "neglectful,  oversolicitous, 
inhibiting or  indiscriminately  permissive".  <1969:  99)  The  child thus 
grows  up  with  no  sense  of  being  in  control  of,  or  even  properly 
recognizing,  her  own  bodily  sensations.  Because  of  this,  the  anorexic 
wo:man  suffers from  a  profound sense  of  ineffectiveness.  She  feels that 
she  is living  her  life  in  accordance  with  the  demands  of  others,  and 
has  no  confidence  that  she  could  do  otherwise.  (1980:  170;  1977:  4; 
1975:  161;  1971:  241)  Bruch  argues  that  if the  mother,  and  not  the 
child,  has  constantly  initiated  action  "her  child  :may  grow  up  living 
entirely  by  responding  to  others ...  he  will  never  know  that  thoughts, 
feelings  or  actions  originating  in  him  can  be  effective."  <1969a:  53) 
Bruch  cites  the  case  of  "Sharon",  who  dated  the  real  onset  of  her 
anorexia  to  a  class  in literature  where  a  poem  had  a  profound  effect 
on  her,  revealing  that  she  had  no  idea  how  to  be  "the  captain  of  my 
soul"  and "the :master  of  my  fate".  (1974:  263) 
The  anorexic  girl,  then,  arrives  at  adolescence  with  serious  "ego 
deficiencies".  She  experiences  her  life as  being  under  the  control  of 
others,  and  she  has  no  coherent  or self-directed identity.  <1969:  100; 
1974:  285,  376)  Adolescence,  however,  is  a  time  when  self-reliant 
-56-independence  must  be  developed,  and it is at this point that "positive 
self-assertion  becomes  unavoidable ... Cand)  the  severe  deficiencies  in 
the  core  personality  become  apparent".  <1970:  15)  The  anorexic's  ego 
simply  cannot  cope  with  the  demands  of  adolesence  and  she  withdraws 
into her  own  body  as the only place  she  feels she can control  and into 
food  control  as  a  an  attempt  to  undo  the  bodily  aspects  of 
adolescence.  (1980:  170> 
How,  then,  do  these  "ego deficiences"  arise ? 
Bruch  argues  that  the  cause  is  to  be  found  in  "abnormal  patterns  of 
family  interaction".  (1978:  106)  In  the  family  histories  of  her 
anorexic  patients the  consistant  description  of  the  anorexic  daughter 
is of  the  perfect  child  - well-behaved,  academically  successful,  and 
compliant.  Parents  often  told  her  that  "the  miserable,  angry  and 
desperate  patient  had  been  the  best,  sweetest,  most  obedient  and  most 
cooperative  child  ever".  <1978:  38)  But  behind  this  rosy  picture, 
Bruch  argues,  is a  failure  on  the  part  of  the  parents to transmit  to 
their  daughters  a  sense  of  competence  and  self-value.  The  child  is 
valued  not  as  an  individual  in  her  own  right,  but  as  someone  whose 
success  would  compensate  for  the  parents's "concealed disatisfactions 
and  disappointments" ,  especially  those  of  the  mother,  who  is often  a 
"frustrated  career  woman".  <1970:  20;  1971:  245)  As  such,  then,  the 
daughter  is  given  no  opportunity  for  "constructive  self-assertion." 
(1978:  37)  In  the  face  of  these  excessive  demands,  which  are 
intensified  by  her  overconformity,  the  anorexic-to-be  suffers  the 
anxiety  of  feeling  herself  incapable  of  living  up  to  her  parents' 
expectations  and  thus  fears  the  loss  of  their  love.  In  spite  of  the 
-57-fact  that  they  were  treated  as  "special",  they  felt  "undeserving, 
unworthy  and  ungrateful",  both  burdened  by  and  incapable  of  achieving 
the  success  expected  of  them.  0978:  39)  Frequently,  they  describe 
themselves as "blanks".  <1978:  48) 
Further,  Bruch  argues  that  anorexic  girls  had  always  resented  this 
parental  over-control,  and  anorexia  should  be  seen  as  part  of  the 
unacknowledged  struggle  for  independence  between  them  and  their 
parents.  In  short,  "they  would  rather starve  themselves  than continue 
a  life of accomodation".  <1977:  1;  2-3) 
Anorexia  can  be  seen  to  serve  two  functions  in  this  analysis.  It  is 
part of  a  very delayed attempt  at  independance,  and is also an attempt 
to  impose  a  personal  control  over  the  body.  However,  because  of  the 
underlying  and  continuing  deficient  awareness  of  and  control  over 
bodily  sensations,  food  control  itself "gets  away"  from  them,  and  is 
experienced  as  an  external  control,  as  a  "mysterious  force  that 
invades  them  or  directs  their  behaviour".  <1978:  55)  Anorexia  as  an 
adaptational  pattern  does  not  work.  0970:  21)  Therapy,  therefore, 
should  aim  to  help  the  anorexic  develop  a  strong  self-concept  and 
identity  in  which  she  feels  herself  capable  of  self-directed  action, 
self-regulation  of  her  needs  and  desires,  and  that  she  owns  her  own 
body.  She  must  be  shown  that  it  is  wrong  to  feel  ineffective  and 
devalued,  and  that  her  own  needs,  thoughts  and  actions  are  of 
"fundamental  importance".  0974:  63)  Thus,  and  only  thus,  will  the 
"golden cage"  of  anorexia  be  opened. 
-58-It  would  seem.  therefore,  that  for  Bruch  anorexia  nervosa  is  best 
understood  as  a  kind  of  hysteria  or conversion disorder,  in which  the 
physical  symptoms  are  meaningful  not  so  much  in themselves,  but as the 
manifestations of  an  underlying  psychological  disorder - the  lack of  a 
fully-developed  sense  of  self.  And  following  the  psychoanalytic 
tradition,  the  causes  of  this  disorder  are  located  in  infantile  and 
childhood experience,  centred on  the  family  unit. 
Thus  anorexia,  it is argued,  is fundamentally  a  disorder  of  the self, 
rather  than  a  disorder  of  weight,  food  or  appetite.  This  perspective 
leads Bruch virtually to  ignore  the  possible role and meanings of  food 
and  the  body  in anorexia.  Both  are  taken  as  relatively unproblematic; 
food  is simply "available"  to be  used  in the struggle for selfhood and 
control,  and its possible  social  significance is ignored,  apart  from 
a  brief  consideration  of  increased  food  intake  as  the  "fuel"  of  the 
pubertal  processes,  the  reduction of  which,  as in Crisp's analysis,  is 
used in an attempt to "undo"  physical  maturity.  <1978:  59) 
Further,  the  significance  of  the  choice  of  the  body  and  the 
manipulation  of  body-weight  as  the  main  area  of  anorexic  behaviour 
also  remains  an  uninvestigated area  of  Bruch's thesis,  thinness being, 
for  Bruch,  no  more  than  "evidence"  that  anorexic  control  is  working. 
In spite of  noting  media  pressures  on  young  women  to be  slim,  the real 
significance  of  the  anorexic  body  is,  for  Bruch,  minimal.  What  having 
an  adult  female  body  means  in  a  culture  which  simultaneously 
-59-eroticizes,  degrades  and devalues both women  and their bodies,  and  how 
the  transformation  of  the  formally  a-sexual  child's  body  into  the 
ambiguous  icon  of  the  female  body  is experienced,  are  questions  which 
are  simply  left  unasked  her  analysis  focuses  exclusiveley  on  inferred 
underlying  psychological  forces.  And  while  in  my  own  analysis  I  too 
will  focus,  as Bruch does,  on  issues of selfhood and control,  I  see it 
as  one  of  the  main  benefits  of  a  sociological  analysis  of  anorexia 
that  both  the  "underlying"  and  the  "surface"  facets  of  anorexia  can 
fully  become  objects  of  investigation,  phemomena  whose  meanings  and 
interconnections  are  not  assumed  to  be  either  prosaic  or  already 
understood. 
That  having  been  said,  what  conclusions  can  be  drawn  from  Bruch's 
analysis of the underlying psychological  causation of  anorexia  ? 
For  Bruch,  as  we  have  seen,  anorexia  is  in  essence  a  struggle  for 
identity  and  selfhood,  precipitated  when  the  onset  of  puberty  demands 
a  move  to  independance  and  maturity  of  which  the  "core-less" 
personality  of  the  anorexic  is  incapable.  Here,  I  would  argue,  Bruch 
builds  her  theory  on  an  unexplicated  and  assumed  understanding  of 
individual  personality  development  which  is  both  ahistorical,  and 
while  formally  gender-neutral,  is  in  fact  a  masculine  model  of 
development.  Thus  her understanding of anorexia is severely limited. 
Bruch's  analysis  of  anorexia  rests  on  the  concept  of  the  "integrated 
body-self",  or  "ego  synthesis",  in  which  the  body  and  the  self  are 
experienced as a  unity.  and  which is the  normal  outcome  of personality 
development.  <1969:  102;  105)  In short,  in normal  development  "a child 
-60-learns  to  think  of  body  and  self  as  occupying  the  same  space  and 
forming  a  single  functioning  unit,  separate  from  the  units  around 
him".  <1969:  103)  This  process  centres  on  the  infant's demarcation  of 
his  own  "body-self"  from  the  primary  object,  the  mother,  a  process 
which,  as  we  have  seen,  is  posited as  being  inadequately  achieved  in 
anorexia.  C1969:  105) 
Thus,  one  aim  of  therapy  in  anorexia  is  to  "clarify  the  disturbed 
interactional  patterns  so  that  the  child  can  develop  controls  from 
within  and  become  capable  of  experiencing himself as self-directed and 
as  owning  his  body".  <1971:  247)  The  body-self,  then,  is conceived  of 
as a  self-contained system of  integrated sensations,  needs and desires 
which  is  fundamentally  separate  from  the  environment,  and  in  which 
both  the  body  as  a  whole  and its needs  and sensations are experienced 
as self-directed and  owned  by  the self.  The  self-contained system must 
be  just  that  - a  system,  and  not  "a  loose  organization  of  (need) 
patterns  and  associated  desires"  in  which  incoherence  makes 
disintegration an ever-present possibility.  (1969:  100) 
Bruch's  body-self  concept  is,  as  I  think  the  summary  above  shows, 
fundamentally  confused.  The  "integrated"  body-self  can  only  be 
integrated  to  a  very  limited  degree  (i.e.  spatially)  if the  body  and 
its needs  and  desires  are  seen to  be  "owned"  by  the self.  Bruch  seems 
to  be  working  with  two  not  entirely  reconcilable  notions  here; 
firstly,  of  the  ideal  healthy  individual  who  experiences  the  physical 
as  so  entirely "natural"  and  unproblematic  that  s/he  sees him/herself 
-61-as  a  "physical"  entity;  and  secondly,  of  the  older  notion  of  the  self 
as separate from and  owning,  although contained within,  the  body. 
As  well  as  this  conceptual  confusion  the  problems  of  analysing  a 
feminine  experience  through  a  masculine  model  of  the  individual  cause 
the  analysis  to  crack  further  under  scrutiny.  In  a  culture  in  which 
the  gender  division  is  a  basic  organizational  category,  there  are 
fundamental  differences  in  masculine  and  feminine  "selfhood"  which 
patriarchal  psychiatry  obscures  by  positing  a  gender-neutral  model  of 
the individual. 
Independence,  separateness  and  being  self-contained,  both  physically 
and  psychologically,  are,  I  will  later  argue,  characteristic  of  the 
"ideal  :mart'  not  the  ideal  woman.  The  concept  of  absolute  bodily 
integrity  and  separation  is  an  unattainable  ideal  for  women,  as  is 
that  independence  which  rests  on  a  conception  of  one's  own  needs, 
thoughts  and  actions  as  of  "fundamental  importance".  (1974:  63)  For 
women,  physical  and  psychological  and  emotional  openness  is  central. 
The  dominant  notion of  the  individual  in a  patriarchal culture coexits 
with  an  ideal  of  feminine  receptiveness,  both  physical/sexual  and 
psychological/emotional,  which  relates  to  the  role  of  women  as 
"complementary"  to,  and  defined  in  relation  to  men.  This 
receptiveness,  however,  is  enforced  but  not  valued.  With  a  dominant 
concept  of  individuality  in  which  separateness  and  bodily  and 
psychological  "integrity"  are  central,  receptiveness  is  viewed  as 
weakness,  vulnerability  and  incompletion  and  is  regarded  with  a 
mixture  of  fear,  fascination and disgust. 
-62-Thus  Bruch's  uncritical  acceptance  of  a  "gender-neutral"  concept  of 
the  individual,  in terms  of  both body  and psyche,  seriously limits her 
understanding  of  anorexia.  It  leads  her  to  analyse  feminine 
receptiveness  in  anorexia,  not  as  a  central  part  of  being an adequate 
woman  in  a  patriarchal  culture,  but  as  "ego  deficiency"  arising  from 
an  "abnormal"  family.  (1978:  101;  1974:  78)  She  either  simply  does 
not,  or  chooses not  to see that "separate-unit"  psychology is far from 
being  the  gender-neutral  standard  of  her  theory.  Her  only  "solution" 
is  an  attempt  through  therapy  to  help  women  better  integrate  the 
conflicting  demands  of  individualism and  receptiveness.  Therapy,  here, 
is a  process  which  must  take  place  without exposing  the  confusion  and 
conflicts  of  these  demands  to  the  light  of  day,  lest  the  goal  of 
perfect  adaptation to the  demands  of the culture be  seen as being,  for 
women,  an  impossible  goal. 
Furthermore,  the  idea  of  the  individual  as  a  self-contained system is 
treated  in  Bruch's  work  as  universally  applicable.  Bourgeois 
individualism,  as  well  as  being  an  essentially masculine  concept,  is 
also  a  historical  concept.  I  hope  to  demonstrate  later,  through  a 
comparison  of  the  bourgeois concept  of  the  individualized and  atomized 
body  with  the  medieval  concept  of  the  fluid  and  open  body  of  the 
people,  that  conceptualizations  of  the  body  are  not static but reflect 
and  change  with  changes  in the  wider  social  structure.  Similarly,  the 
concept  of  the  individual  itself is also  a  historical  concept,  and  is 
linked to conceptualizations of  the  body. 
-63-Some  further  minor  confusions  can  be  detected  in  Bruch's  analysis  of 
anorexia.  The  idea  of  "disturbed  psychological  functioning"  - that 
anorexics  do  not  properly recognize  hunger,  and  do  not  "see"  that  they 
are  thin - is contradicted  by  the  argument,  which  we  can  also find  in 
Bruch's  work,  that  being  able  to  "stand"  hunger  and  sustain  extreme 
thinness  are  used  by  the  anorexic  as  a  sign  of  her  mastery  of  her 
body.  (1978:  x;  1974:  41)  This confusion results  from  her  attempt  to 
introduce  elements  of  biological  causation  into  an  essentially 
intrapsychic  explanation,  but  it  does  not  fundamentally  affect  the 
argument  that  anorexia  nervosa  is  a  struggle  for  selfhood  through 
bodily control. 
Further,  Bruch's  inability to  perceive  how  therapy,  which  she sees as 
wholly  beneficial,  could  be  seen  by  the  anorexic woman  as  a  threat  to 
her  precious  and  precarious  control,  leads  her,  like  Crisp  and  Slade, 
to exclude  the  possibility that "rigid"  thought  and  behaviour patterns 
could  be  adopted  as  a  defence  against  the  therapeutic  attack.  She 
therefore  argues  not  that  the  anorexic  must  be  rigid in what  she  will 
and  will  not  allow in order  to  maintain  her  anorexia,  but  that  she  is 
- as  Slade  argues  - incapable  of  any  more  flexible  thinking,  an 
assertion  for  which  there  is  both  little  evidence  and  possible 
alternative explanations.  (2) 
It would  seem,  therefore,  that  the  most  central  and  interesting 
2  In  Parts  Two  and  Three  I  will  argue  that  "anorexic  thinking"  is 
better  understood  as  a  transformation  of  dominant  understandings  of 
the  body,  rather than as a  simple "deficiency". 
-64-questions  raised  by  anorexia  remain  unasked  and  unanswered  in Bruch's 
thesis.  Why  anorexia  is so  overwhelmingly  a  fendnine  experience  is an 
issue  which  cannot  be  approached  more  than  superficially  - in  brief 
references  to  "media  pressures"  which  seem  to  exist  independantly  of 
the  real  world  - if a  phallocentric  model  of  individuality  is  to  be 
maintained.  And  the  meanings of  food  and  the  body,  both  in society as 
a  whole  and  specifically  in  anorexia  cannot  be  analysed  if they  are 
seen as,  respectively,  "natural"  and unproblematical,  and  a-historical 
and  gender-neutral  phenomena.  However,  although  I  have  suggested that 
Bruch  uses  an  over  simplified  separation  of  the  physical  and  the 
psychic  in her  analysis  and  over  concentrates  on  the  latter,  I  accept 
the  centrality  of  control  in  anorexia,  and  also  see  as  significant, 
although  for  different  reasons,  diffuse  "ego  boundaries",  and  her 
focus  on  separation  and  boundaries  in  general.  This  will  be  explored 
further in later chapters. 
-65-Mara  Selvini  Palazzoli:  the object  body 
The  work  of  the  italian  psychoanalyst  Mara  Selvini  Palazzoli  is 
similar  to  Hilde  Bruch's  analysis  in  many  ways.  Indeed,  in  her 
earliest  writings,  Palazzoli  analysed  anorexia  as  a  disturbance  of 
"body  cognition",  an  inability  to  indentify  or  distinguish  between 
different  inner states,  impulses  and desires.  This,  she argues,  arises 
out  of  a  disturbed  and  confusing 
"impervious"  to  the  child's  needs, 
relationship  with  a  mother 
which  causes  an  inadequate 
perception  of  bodily  needs  when  the  child  becomes  an  adult.  This  is 
essentially  Bruch's  thesis,  and  both  agree  that  anorexia  is deficient 
functioning  caused  by  a  faulty  relationship to the  body  as  "the  basic 
source  of experience".  <Palazzoli  1969:  256;  1967:  312) 
Palazzoli,  however,  went  on  to develop her undererstanding of  anorexia 
in  her  Self-starvation:  from  the  intrapsychic  to  the  transpersonal 
approach  to  anorexia  neryosa.  (1974)  As  the  title  shows,  while 
Palazzoli  was  developing  her  analysis  she  was  "converted"  to  family 
therapy,  which  sees the  illness of  an  individual  family  member  as  the 
outcome  of  family  "malfunctions",  with  the  family  seen  as  a  "homeo-
static  unit",  that  is,  a  self-regulating  entity  based  on  its  own 
rules.  (ibid.:  196-200;  228-231)  While  both  her  intrapsychic  and 
intrafamilial  explanations  of  anorexia  have  their  problems,  in  her 
intrapsychic  manifestation  Palazzoli  offers  some  interesting  and 
enlightening  notions  on  the  meaning  of  food  and  the  body  in anorexia, 
and it is on  these that  I  would  like to focus. 
-66-Palazzoli starts her explanation of  anorexia by  using object-relations 
theory.  She  argues  that  the  child's  original  experience  with  the 
primary  object  the  mother,  or  food  equalling  mother  is  a 
"corporeal-incorporative"  experience;  the  infant's  inability  to 
distinguish  himself  and  the  object  means  that  incorporation  is  the 
only  way  he  can  relate  to  it.  Now,  the  object  has  both  positive 
Cpleasureable,  nurturing)  and  negative  <unpleasant,  rejecting) 
aspects,  and  while  the  normal  child  in  a  satisfactory  relationship 
with  his  mother  will  gradually  learn  to  perceive  his  body  as  a 
separate  whole,  existing  outside  the  maternal  object,  and. therefore 
not  as  the  source  of  "bad"  sensations,  in  "psychopathological" 
development: 
"the  condition  of  being  'outside'  is realized in part  only. 
Most  of  the  'bad'  experiences  of  his  own  body,  which  the 
child  has  met  during  the  incorporative,  primary 
narcissistic,  phase  of  his  object  relationships,  remain 
immured  inside his body."  <ibid.:  84-5) 
It is,  therefore,  the  body  itself that the anorexic fears: 
"the  body  of  the  anorexic  does  not  merely  contain  the  bad 
object  but ... is the  bad  object ...  the  body  is experienced  as 
having  all  the  features  of  the  primary  object  as  it  was 
perceived  in a  situation of  oral  helplessness:  all-powerful, 
indestructible,  self-sufficient,  growing  and 
threatening ...  there is an  unconcious feeling that the object 
is far  too strong to be  destroyed." 
(ibid. :  87) 
The  body  is  therefore  equated  with  the  negative  and  overpowering 
aspects of  the  incorporated object. 
Puberty,  then,  is the  crucial  moment  in anorexia,  when  those  negative 
aspects  of  the  object  are  separated  from  the  ego  in  order  that  they 
-67-can  be  opposed.  Three  processes  are  at  work  here.  Firstly,  it is at 
this  time  that  an  independent  personal  identity  must  be  formed,  and 
the  anorexic  woman,  because  of  the  faulty  early  learning  which  has 
made  her  dependant  and  compliant,  feels  herself  unequal  to  this 
challenge  and  the  ensuing  trauma  "reactivates  the  overwhelming  sense 
of  helplessness  experienced  during  the  infantile  period".  (ibid.:  89; 
56;  77)  Thus  far,  Palazzoli  follows  Bruch.  From here  on,  however,  she 
moves  onto  new  ground,  using Arieti's concept  of  "concretization": 
"In  the  Freudian  view,  phobia  is  a  form  of  displacement. 
Thus  while  little  Hans  was  afraid  of  his  father,  his 
neurosis  displaced  that  fear  on  to  horses.  According  to 
Freud,  such  displacement  serves  to  conceal  a  sexual  threat, 
and  therefore  becomes  symbolic  of  what  it replaces... .  the 
displacement  is not  neccesarily  from  one  object  to  another. 
"What  happens  is  not  so  much  a  displacement  as  a 
concretization.  The  patient  lives  in  fear  of  vague  and 
intangible  threats  that  he  may  find  difficult  to  define  or 
that  he  refuses  to  recognize ... In  patients  suffering  from 
serious  phobias  the  psychiatrist  can  easily  recognize  the 
concretization  of  a  more  general  anxiety-producing 
situation  ... In  my  view,  phobia  is  the  expression  of  a 
general  psychopathological  principle,  namely  that  whatever 
cannot  be  borne  abstractly  because  it  generates  too  much 
anxiety  ... will  eventually  be  concretized.  This 
concretization  of  concepts  and  intuitions  is  not  simply  a 
reduction  of  the  abstract  to  the  concrete  level. .. but  an 
active  process.  i.e.  an  active  translation  of  the  abstract 
into the concrete." 
<quoted  ibid.:  148-9) 
It is,  therefore,  at  puberty that  what  the pre-anorexic girl fears  and 
finds  threatening  becomes  concretized  into  the  newly  developed  adult 
female  body as a  phobic  object. 
The  second  process  of  "anorexic  puberty"  is the  transformation  of  the 
earlier  psychic incorporation of  the  object  into a  physically concrete 
incorporation: 
-68-"because  of  the  development  of  the  breasts  and  other 
feminine  curves,  the  body  is  experienced  concretely as  the 
maternal  object ... <and) ...  the  patient  considers  and 
experiences  her  body  as  one  great  incorporated  object  which 
overpowers her and forces  a  passive role  upon  her." 
(ibid.:  90) 
The  pre-pubertal  sense  of  the  bad  object  as  invincible  is  also 
transformed  at  puberty,  for  now  that  the  bad  object  is  concretely 
equated  by  the  anorexic  with  her  body,  it  is  newly  amenable  to  the 
active  aggression  of  starvation.  However,  because  the  body,  like  the 
bad  object,  is  fascinating  as  well  as  overpowering,  it  cannot  be 
simply  abandoned  but  must  be  kept  under  control  and  its  growth 
prevented.  (ibid.:  90-2) 
Thirdly,  it is  at  puberty  that  what  Palazzoli  terms  the  "passive-
receptive  aspect  of  feminine  life"  is first  experienced.  (ibid.:  70) 
Not  only  is the  physical  aspect  of  puberty  experienced  as  "a  sudden, 
mysterious  and  humiliating  bodily  happening  over  which  the  poor  girl 
has  no  control",  but  the  adult  female  body  must  be  accepted  as  "an 
essentially receptive-passive  object".  (ibid.:  69-70)  Palazzoli  argues 
thus: 
"the  adolescent  girl ...  experiences  her  feminine  sexuality 
in  a  passive  and  receptive  way:  she  is  exposed  to  lewd 
looks,  subjected  to  menstruation,  about  to  be  penetrated  in 
sexual  embraces,  to  be  invaded  by  the  foetus,  to  be  suckled 
by  a  child." 
(ibid.:  70) 
The  new  woman's  body  as  a  whole,  then,  also  comes  to  represent 
concretely this passivity and  receptiveness.  It is rejected/controlled 
not  only  as  the  concrete  manifestation  of  the  negative  and 
-69-overpowering  aspects  of  the  maternal  object,  but  also  as  the  concrete 
:manifestation  of  recepti  veness/passi  vi  ty.  The  anorexic  girl  is 
attempting  to  become  an  autonomous  adult  "by  rejecting  those  aspects 
of  feminine  corporeality  that  conjure  up  the  terrifying  vista  of 
turning into a  succubus  and  passive vessell."  (ibid.:  72) 
The  body,  then,  is  ambiguously  experienced  as  both  alien  and 
persecuting  - in  its status  as  phobic  object  in  identification  with 
the  bad  object  and  with  feminine  receptiveness  - and  as  owned,  and 
thus  amenable  to  manipulation.  (ibid.:  93;  63-4)  Eating  never  having 
been  experienced as  personally controllable,  food  represents  the  loss 
of  control as well  as,  in its material  aspect,  bodily increase.  Bodily 
growth is then perceived as taking place at the expense  of  the self,  a 
self  which  is  identified  "with  an  ideal  that  is  ...  desexualised, 
a carnal  and  essentially  powerful",  "a  psychotic  ideal  of 
acorporeality",  an  ideal  which  eating  threatens.  (ibid.:  90;  150-1; 
86-7) 
For  Palazzoli,  then,  the  failure  to  perceive  bodily  signals  which 
originally,  following  Bruch,  she  saw  as central  to  the  explanation  of 
anorexia,  is  in  the  end  downgraded.  She  concludes  that  a  failure  to 
perceive  bodily  signals,  especially  hunger,  is  consequent  upon  the 
rejection of the  body  as phobic  object,  and that it is the latter,  not 
the  former,  which  is the  primary  anorexic  process.  The  anorexic  girl, 
then,  experiences  stasis:  she  must  contain  and  control  the  body 
without  destroying it;  she  must  continue to live but she  cannot  grow. 
-70-Palazzoli,  then,  while  ostensibly  following  the  Bruch  line,  in  fact 
branches  off  into  areas  Bruch  leaves  unanalysed.  One  of  the  most 
exciting aspects of  her  work  is her reconstruction of  some  of the  ways 
in  which  the  transformation  of  the  "a-sexual"  child's  body  into  the 
eroticized and  degraded adult  female  body  can  be  experienced,  that is, 
what  meanings the adult  female  body  can come  to have. 
However,  once  again the  focus  on  the  domestic  and  the  familial  as  the 
centre  of  the  female  universe  limits  the  possibilities  of  analysis, 
and  leaves  unexplored  the  social  construction  of  meaning.  The  "bad 
object"  from  this  perspective  is,  literally  - and  in  more  ways  than 
one  - the  mother.  For  Palazzol i,  as  for  Bruch,  the  root  "cause"  of 
anorexia  is  maternal  failing  - the  mother  fails  to  teach  her  child 
that  she  is a  separate  and  autonomous  individual,  and  so  the  girl,  at 
adolescence,  is  unable  to  cope  with  the  social  demands  to  begin  to 
become  an  independent  adult.  Once  again,  the  underlying  assumption  is 
that  a  "good"  mother  will  produce  a  "good"  or  "normal"  - that  is, 
non-anorexic  - daughter;  and  that,  consequently,  it is the  deviance 
of the  individual,  and  not  the  conflicting demands  of the culture that 
explain anorexia. 
The  "psychiatric  ideology",  to  use  Penfold  and  Walker's term,  .must  see 
the  masculine  bourgeois  ideal  of  the  autonomous  and  separate 
individual  as  "natural",  and  therefore  its attainment  as possible  for 
all  but  the  deviant  few,  for  if  it  does  not  it  risks  seeing 
-71-psychologically  autonomous  individuality  as  a  socially  created  and 
historically specific  concept  rather  than  as  the  universal  outcome  of 
all "normal"  development. 
Broadly  the  same  criticisms,  then,  centering  on  the  assumption  that 
becoming  a  woman  is psychologically  unproblematic  within  the  "normal" 
family,  can  be  levelled  at  Palazzoli's  work  as  were  applied  to 
Bruch's.  However,  what  is  different  about  Palazzoli's  work  is  its 
continual  threat to break  out  of  its limits,  a  threat  which  gives  her 
analysis the  potential to  be  used in non-psychiatric explanations.  Her 
explanation  of  how  the  adult  female  body  is  experienced  contains  a 
rich vein of  ideas,  two  of  which are particularly important. 
Firstly,  Palazzoli  argues  that  the  newly  developing  adult  female  body 
is  experienced  by  the  adolescent  girl  in  its  association  with  the 
"bad"  aspects  of  the  primary  object  as  "all-powerful,  indestructible, 
self-sufficient,  growing  and  threatening".  (ibid.:  87)  However, 
si111ultaneously  the  body  is  "an  essentially  receptive-passive  object" 
which  is irremediably  open  and  vulnerable  to  invasion.  (ibid.:  69-70) 
Palazzoli  explains  the  overwhelming,  powerful  aspect  of  the  female 
body  as  created  through  the  association  between  the  body-as-phobic-
object  and  the  infant's  perception  of  the  mother.  The  passive, 
vulnerable aspect is a  direct  consequence  of  anatomical reality. 
Both  conceptualisations  of  the  female  body  are,  however,  open  to 
alternative  and  wider  explanations.  The  understanding  of  female  power 
as  threatening  and  overwhelming  has  more  behind  it,  I  would  argue, 
-72-than  simply  literal  description  of  the  mother-child  relationship.  The 
"threat"  of  maternal  power  is a  threat  to the  child's separation  from 
the  mother,  a  threat  to  individual  autonomy  and  therefore  a  threat 
which  can  only  exist  in  the  context  of  an  individualized  psychology. 
Further, 
11 :maternal 
11  power  should  not  be  separated  from  feminine  power 
as  a  whole.  Fear  of  the  suppressed  power  of  an  oppressed  group  can  be 
shared  by  both  oppressor  and  oppressed,  and  fear  of  the  contained 
power  of  women  is reflected  in  the  conceptualization  of  female  power 
as  a  threatening  and  encroaching  force,  subverting  patriarchal  power 
and  patriarchal  order,  and  threatening  to  overwhelm  and  destroy 
"feminini  ty
11 
- that  is,  women's  acquiescence  to  patriarchy.  Thus  one 
aspect  of  the  social  conceptualisation  of  womanhood  is  of  contained 
power,  and this is a  concept  which although given special  emphasis  and 
transfor:mative  attention  in  anorexia,  is  "available"  as  a  social 
meaning  to  all  women,  not  merely  to  those  suffering  from  a  "deviant" 
upbringing. 
Further,  feminine  "openess"  should  not  be  viewed  as  an  anatomical 
"given".  The  i:mage  of  the  female  body  arises  not  directly  from 
physical  reality but  is created in  ideology and material  practice.  It 
is not  the  body  itself  which  makes  women  "passive  vessells",  but  how 
that  body is socially constructed.  The  idea of  the  female  body  as  open 
and  incomplete  is,  as  I  will  argue  later,  a  reflection  of  women • s 
position  as  "secondary"  to  men  and  therefore  incomplete.  As  I  have 
suggested,  the  idea  of  an  atomized  and  psychically coherent  self is a 
masculine  ideal,  and  the  notion  of  women  as  physically  open  must  be 
-73-seen  in relation to the  psychological  receptiveness  which  is a  central 
tenet of  the  feminine  role in patriarchy. 
Therefore,  while  I  would  reject  Palazzoli' s  domestic  and  anatomical 
explanations  for  the  degraded  modern  concept  of  the  female  body  - in 
anorexia,  as  in the  wider  society - as simultaneously threatening  and 
open  to  invasion,  I  do  see  these  concepts  as  central  to  any  adequate 
analysis  of  anorexia.  Such  an  analysis  would  see  anorexia  both  as  an 
attempt  to  control  and  contain  feminine  desire  and  as  a  protection 
against  the  fear  of  psychological  invasion.  In  later  chapters,  then, 
I  will  explore  in greater depth the  ideas about  the  female  body  which 
Palazzoli  so interestingly raises here. 
-74-Crisp,  Slade,  Bruch  and  Palazzoli,  then,  while  offering  varying 
analyses  of  anorexia,  share  in  common  an  individualist  slant  which 
sees  anorexia  as,  in  the  last  analysis,  a  problem  of  individual 
deviance  or  deficiency.  Thus,  the  culture  which  produces  anorexia  all 
but  disappears  from  their  accounts  of  the  illness.  This,  for  the 
feminist  as  for  the  sociologist,  is  profoundly  unsatisfactory, 
especially  in  its  downgrading  of  the  role  of  cultural  meanings  in 
anorexia. 
Two  points,  however,  arise  from  this  chapter.  Firstly,  desire  is 
obliquely  or  directly  present  in  the  work  of  all  four  writers; 
anorexic  women  are  understood  as  unable  to  accept  their  desires  and 
needs  as  "normal",  and  are  thus  unable  to  act  to fulfill  them.  It is 
this  inability  which  accounts  for  their  defective  sense  of  self. 
Desire,  thus,  is central  to  being  a  person.  Secondly,  it is suggested 
that  anorexic  women  need  to  be  "retrained"  to  independence  and 
autonomy.  Dependance,  which  is  central  to  femininity,  is  thus  a 
problem in anorexia. 
In  the  psychiatric  ideology  the  desiring self and  the  dependant  woman 
simply  exist,  requiring  no  analysis.  For  the  feminist  and  the 
sociologist  their  isolation  in  psychiatric  analysis  is  the  starting-
point  rather  than  the  end  of  theory.  In  Part  Three,  dependance  and 
desire  will  form  central  axes  of  the  analysis  of  anorexia.  In  the 
following  chapter  I  will  discuss the  work  of three feminist  writers on 
anorexia,  tracing their analyses  of  dependance  and desire in the  light 
of  feminist  theory's critique  of  the  concept  of  natural  femininity.  We 
-75-would  expect  feminist  analyses  to  locate  anorexia  in  patriarchally 
constructed  femininity  rather  than  seeing  it  as  an  incomplete 
development  of  gender-neutral  individuality.  It is to  the  question  of 
how  far this expectation is fulfilled that  we  now  turn. 
- 76-Chapter  Three:  Women's  oppression:  feminist  explanations of  anorexia 
Feminist  work  on  anorexia  is  better  known  than  it  is  plentiful.  In 
Britain,  Marilyn  Lawrence's  book  The  Anorexic  Experience  was  for 
several  years  the  only  major  feminist  work  on  anorexia.  (Lawrence, 
1984)  Recently,  however,  Susie  Orbach's  Hunger  Strike  was  published. 
Susie  Orbach  is  perhaps  best  knmm  for  Fat  is  a  Feminist  Issue,  her 
work  at  the  Women's  Therapy  Centre  in  London,  and  her  writings,  with 
Luise  Eichenbaum,  on  female  psychology.  COr bach,  1979;  Orbach  and 
Eichenbaum,  1983)  In  America  Kim  Chernin  has  developed  a  feminist 
perspective  on  the  iE;sue  of  body-size  in  her  books  Womansize:  the 
tyranny  of  slenderness  and  The  Hungry  Self:  women.  eating  and 
identity.  <Chernin,  1983;  Chernin,  1986)  Both  Chernin  and  Orbach, 
then,  developed  their  interest  in  anorexia  out  of  a  concern  with 
women,  eating  and  body-size  as  a  whole,  while  Lawrence  worked  with 
anorexic  women  as a  psychiatric social  worker. 
All  three  writers are critical  of  orthodox psychiatric explanations of 
anorexia,  and  of  psychiatric  treatment  of  anorexia.  A  feminist 
perspective  leads  them  to  analyse  anorexia  as  an  issue  of  women's 
position  in  a  patriarchal  culture.  What  I  hope  to  show  in  this 
chapter,  however,  are  the  limitations  of  constructing  feminist 
explanations  of  anorexia  without  a  fully  sociological  perspective. 
While  a  committment  to  feminism  pushes  these  theories  towards  seeing 
"psychology"  as  a  changeable,  and  therefore  social  and  historical 
phenomenon,  the  underlying  retention  of  the  bourgeois  concept  of 
"human  nature"  con,::;trains  the  extent  to  which  feminism  can  overturn 
- 77-psychiatric  ideology.  The  fundamental  assumption  that  an 
individualized  self  exists  a-priori  and  in  ungendered  form,  and  that 
the  social  structure  prevents  women  from  fully  developing  this  self 
crucially  limits  the  analysis.  Vhat  results  is  the  addition  of  a 
feminist  view  to  underlying  bourgeois  patriarchal  models  of  the  self 
and of the  body,  rather than a  feminist  critique of those  concepts. 
This creates  a  subliminal  tension  in these  analyses,  which  Orbach  and 
Lawrence  deal  with  through  suggesting  a  "two-stage"  solution  to 
anorexia  - immediate  individual  therapy plus long-term social  change  -
and  which Chernin deals with through  a  call to value  "innate"  "female" 
qualities.  Obviously,  and  especially  with  Orbach  and  Lawrence,  where 
the  aim  is  therapy  individualistic  solutions  are  appealing.  A  more 
academic  perspective encourages  less optimistic conclusions.  What  this 
thesis  argues  is  that  in  a  bourgeois  and  patriarchal  culture  women 
cannot  attain  the  socially-valued  self,  since  that  self,  far  from 
being  gender-neutral,  is  in  fact  masculine,  and  depends  for  its 
existence  on  an  opposition  with  the  receptive  feminine  self.  Thus,  I 
will  argue  that  the  central  issue  of  anorexia  is  not  how  women  are 
prevented  from fully developing  a  self  which exists in embryonic  form, 
but  exists  rather  as  a  struggle  between  the  ideologies  of 
individualism and femininity. 
In  spite  of  these  limitations,  however,  Orbach  and  Lawrence  provide 
compelling  analyses  of  anorexia  which,  from  the  sociological 
perspective,  are  a  significant  improvement  on  orthodox psychiatric and 
psychological  theories.  Orbach  and  Lawrence  discuss  the  concepts  of 
-78-control  and  bodily  and  psychic  boundaries  which  we  saw  in the  work  of 
Bruch  and  Palzzoli,  but  discuss  them  as feminists.  Thus,  they provide 
much  more  satisfactory analyses  of  the  meanings  of  these  concepts  for 
women  in  a  patriarchal  culture,  and  of  their centrality  in  anorexia. 
Chernin,  although  presenting the  sociologist  with more  problems in her 
analysis  of  anorexia,  does  raise  the  vital  issue  of  guilt,  and  makes 
some  interesting points about  anorexia as ritual  behaviour. 
This  chapter,  then,  exists  as  much  to  identify  what  feminists  have 
argued  are  the  central  issues  in  anorexia  as  to  offer  a  sociological 
critique  of  current  feminist  work,  and  the  issues  of  control, 
boundaries,  guilt  and  ritual  which  we  find  in  the  work  of  the  three 
feminist  writers  will  form  central  aspects  of  my  own  analysis  of 
anorexia. 
-79-Kim  Chernin:  mothers  and daughters 
In  Yomansize:  the  tyranny  of  slenderness  Kim  Chernin  looked  at 
cultural  pressures  on  women  to achieve  and  maintain a  single socially-
approved  body-shape.  (Chernin,  1983)  In  The  hungry self:  women.  eating 
and  identity  she  goes  on  to  look  at  eating  disorders,  including 
anorexia,  arguing  that  they  should  be  seen not  simply as illnesses but 
as a  "hidden struggle  for  self-development".  <Chernin,  1986:  xiv) 
Chernin analyses  the  issue  of  women  and eating disorders by  looking  in 
turn  at  four  main  areas:  the  search  for  "identity"  and  selfhood;  the 
daughter's struggle  to  separate  from the  mother;  food  and its meanings 
for  women;  and  the  concept  of  the  "rite  of  passage".  Obsession  with 
food  is,  for  Chernin,  a  failed rite of  passage.  She  argues: 
"a  troubled  relationship  to  food  frequently  hides  a  serious 
problem  with  female  identity  in  an  age  when  women  are 
invited by  social  circumstance  and  individual  inclination to 
extend the traditional  idea  of  what  it means  to be  a  woman." 
(ibid.:  xi) 
Extending  tradition  is  however,  far  from  easy,  and  it  is  the 
ambivalence  and  guilt  which  women  feel  as  they  move  into  "the  male 
sphere  of  self-development  and  social  power"  which  diverts the  desire 
for  change  and  self-development  into  the  stagnation  and  misery  of 
eating  disorders.  Ci bid. :  xi  v)  Chernin  then  concludes  with  ideas  on 
how  the  struggle  for  female  identity  could  be  less  destructively 
effected. 
- 80-She  argues  that it is only recently that  women  have  claimed the  right 
to  participate  in  the  public  sphere  in  such  large  numbers.  (ibid. : 
xii)  She  writes: 
"Yle  are  a  unique  generation of  women  - the  first in history 
to  have  the  social  and  psychological  opportunity to  surpass 
with ease  the life choices  our mothers  have  made.  Yle  come  of 
age,  we  leave  home,  and  we  enter  a  world  in  which  most 
social  and  political  institutions  have  thrown  open  doors 
that  for  thousands  of  years  were  closed to  women.  Therefore, 
to  many  of  us  who  have  struggled  for  these  very 
opportunities,  it comes  as  a  shock  to  realize  that  at  that 
very  moment  when  we  might  expect  to step forward and harvest 
the  fruit  of  a  profound  struggle  for  female  liberation, 
ma.ny  of  the  most  gifted  among  us  fall  prey  to  a  severe 
suffering that gradually consumes  more  and  more  of  our life 
energy  and  finally  causes  what  in  many  cases  is  a  severe 
breakdown." 
(ibid.:  12) 
It  is  in  the  present  generation,  then,  that  women  can  reap  the 
benefits  of  feminist  struggle  for  equality  with  men  after  "thousands 
of  years  of  suppression";  this,  then,  is a  "historic  moment"  in  which 
women  can  for  the  first  time  take  as  their  own  "the  rights  and 
prerogatives  of  male  society".  (ibid.:  19)  For  Chernin,  the  present 
generation  of  women  have  been  brought  up  to  take  equal  rights  for 
granted,  as a  given.  (ibid.:  28-9) 
For  Chernin,  however,  women  who  suffer  from  eating  disorders  - and 
anorexia  in  particular  - can't  say  "yes"  to this offered  opportunity. 
She  argues  that  many  women  feel  a  "terror  of  female  development",  of 
taking  control  of  their  own  lives,  and  that  eating  disorders,  which 
occur  at  times  of  underlying  developmental  crisis,  regardless  of 
biological  age,  work  subconsciously  to  prevent  movement  into  the 
public sphere.  (ibid.:  21)  Life is consumed  by  the  obsession with food 
-81-- and  this obsession is chosen  in place  of  freedom  at  a  turning point 
in both the  individual  woman's  life and women's  history as a  whole. 
Chernin  identifies  a  number  of  factors  in  this  collective  female 
refusal  of  self-development.  There  is  the  residue  of  the  historical 
oppression of women: 
" ...  these  echoes  from  history  endure;  perhaps  they  have 
entered so  deeply  into the  fabric  of our mind  and  being that 
they  sound  in  our  ears even  today,  the silent  background to 
the  silent  question  about  the  legitimacy  of  female 
development." 
(ibid.:  32) 
Further,  women  have  not  traditionally  been  seen  as  having  the  same 
developmental  crises  as  men,  and  therefore  the  culture  does  not 
contain rituals with  which to express female  development.  (ibid.:  169-
70)  But  far  and  away  the  most  vital factor  in  women's  failure  to  take 
up the promise of development  is the  mother-daughter relationship. 
For  Chernin,  the  new  opportunites  for  women  open  up  historically 
unprecedented  conflicts  between  mothers  and  daughters.  For  the  first 
time,  female  self-development  involves  a  radical  separation  from  the 
mother  - her  values,  her way  of  life,  her resignations.  The  background 
to this separation,  Chernin argues,  is a  "progressively growing crisis 
in  the  institution  of  motherhood".  <ibid.:  77;  82,  104)  In  the  20th 
century,  the  concept  of  the  neccessity  of  women  sacrificing  their 
lives to domesticity,  especially motherhood,  has  broken down  under  the 
pressure  of  women's  political  struggles.  The  "suppositions  that  were 
taken  for  truths"  - that  women  should  live  through their families,  be 
confined to the  domestic  sphere  and "give  up  the  longing for their own 
-82-development  and sacrifice it for their children"  - have  been gradually 
broken down.  (ibid.:  78-9;  125) 
Crucially,  however,  the  idea  of  neccessary  motherhood  has  not  been 
replaced  with  any  new  theories  of  womanhood,  and  without  either  the 
belief  in  domesticity as the  inescapable  and  natural  life of  woman  or 
a  viable  alternative,  the  miseries,  futilities  and  discontents  of 
domesticity  "break  ...  through  into  consciousness".  The  mothers  of  the 
post-war  era  are,  then,  profoundly  discontented.  They  have  only  the 
notion  of  "personal  fulfillment"  to  which  to refer  their  lives  - and 
they  are  inadequate  to  the  challenge.  <ibid.:  80)  New  assumptions 
about  women's  possibilities,  such as they are,  have  come  too  late  for 
them;  unable  to  accept  the  necessary sacrifice of  their  individuality 
in  motherhood,  neither  can  they  enter  the  world  of  larger 
possibilities.  There  is,  then,  "a  fundamentally  new  type  of  mother-
daughter  bond": 
"Mothers  and  daughters  of  the  modern  era  face  one 
another ...  as  beings  in  a  struggle  for  a  self  - the  older 
woman  having  already  failed  in  this  quest  as  the  younger 
starts out  on it." 
(ibid.:  81) 
For  the  younger  woman,  then,  self-development  and  self-assertion 
involve  surpassing her mother.  For  the  mother,  she  is ambivalent  about 
her  daughter's  new  opportunities:  she  wants  her  daughter  to  have  what 
she  has  lacked,  but  also  envies  and  resents  her  potential  to  do  so. 
(ibid.:  87-8)  Chernin argues: 
"there  is  a  marked  tendency  among  women  to  retreat,  to 
experience  a  failure  of  nerve,  a  debilitating inner conflict 
about  accepting  advantages  and  opportunites  denied  to  their 
mothers.  The  'Cinderella  complex',  the  fear  of  independance 
-83-from  which  they  are  supposedly  suffering,  is  in  reality  a 
pervasive  worry  about  our  mothers'  lives.  This  anguished 
concern  about  the  mother  is hidden  just  beneath  the  surface 
of  the  eating problem  ... the  contemporary struggle for  female 
identity  ... in  relation  to  this  fateful  encounter  between  a 
mother  whose  life  has  not  been fulfilled and  a  daughter  now 
presented with the  opportunity for  fulfillment." 
(ibid.:  42-3) 
It  is  guilt,  then,  which  is  at  the  centre  of  today' s  generation  of 
young  women's  refusal  to  develop.  The  daughter  is caught  between  the 
new  images  of  female  power  and  possibility  and  the  image  of  "a  fat 
mother  hiding  at  home",  and  neither  the  culture  nor  her  mother  can 
support  her.  <ibid.:  45)  The  mother,  having  retreated  from  self-
development  herself,  cannot  support  her  daughter  through  its crises, 
and  the  social  expectations  which  allow  men  to  see  "this  imperative 
developmental  task,  this  neccessity  to  face  the  father  at  the 
crossroads  and  symbolically  to  kill  him  and  take  his  place  in  the 
world"  as  a  typical  and  universal  "crisis"  do  not  extend  to  women. 
(ibid.:  51-3) 
For  women,  then,  the  idea that  "one  generation must  proceed  inexorably 
beyond  the  next"  is  alien.  Cibid.:  53;  170)  The  daughter  faced  with 
the  possibility  of  surpassing  her  mother  in  developmental  terms  is 
plagued  by  guilt,  and  blames  herself,  rather than her culture,  for  her 
mother's  wasted  life.  The  daughters  feel  as  though  they  themselves 
have  "drained  and  depleted  the  mother  with  the  intensity  of  their 
needs".  (ibid.:  64)  Here  Chernin  draws  on  the  work  of  Melanie  K.l..e..i.J:l., 
whose  work  on  the  oral-sadistic fantasies  of  infants suggests that the 
frustration  of  the  child  at  its inability  to  control  the  food  supply 
-84-lead  to  destructive  impulses  towards  the  mother.  Cibid.:  117-8;  see 
Klein:  1975)  Here,  Chernin  argues,  lie  "the  seeds  of  this  hidden 
mother-rage  and  mother-guilt  which  are,  at  present,  restricting  our 
development".  <ibid.:  118)  Klein's  idea  that  the  child's  desire  to 
appropriate  the  contents  first  of  its  mother • s  breast,  then  of  her 
whole  body,  leads to a  belief that it has really destroyed her  is,  for 
Chernin,  rather  than  being  a  universal  truth,  dependant  on  the 
oppression  of  women  in the  institution of  motherhood.  The  belief that, 
in  weaning,  the  mother  has  in  reality  been  finally  drained  dry  is 
bolstered  by  the  more  or  less  simultaneous  discovery  of  the  mother's 
relative  real  powerlessness  and  depletion  by  her  child's needs.  There 
is,  then,  a  propensity  for  daughters  to  feel  guilt  about  their 
potential  to  "surpass"  their  mothers;  the  idea  that  they  "drained" 
theri  mothers  in  reality  an  unconscious  "Kleinian  memory"  -is 
"reactivated"  in  later  crises  of  growth  and  development.  Cibid.:  64; 
78-93) 
Chernin argues: 
"the  terrible  guilt  we  see  in  a  woman  with  an  eating 
disorder,  although  it  is  usual!  y  focused  on  the  number  of 
calories  consumed  and  the  number  of  pounds  gained,  arises 
from  the  fact  that  the  woman  afflicted  with  this  obsession 
cannot  fargi  ve  herself  far  having  damaged  her  mother  in 
earliest  childhood.  Consequently,  she  cannot  allow  herself 
to  move  into  the  next  stages  of  development,  to  turn  her 
back  on  the  older  woman  and  leave  her  behind  to  the 
depletion and  exhaustion she  believes she has  inflicted upon 
her." 
(ibid. :  125) 
While  the  son,  knowing  that  he  is  to  become  like  his  father  -
u independant,  autonomous,  involved  in  the  world"  - can  accept  the 
-85-self-sacrifice  of  his  mother,  the  daughter,  being  herself  a  woman, 
cannot.  Cibid.:  126-7)  The  son  is,  then,  free  from guilt,  and  through 
"aggressive  fantsies  of  attack  upon  the  female  body"  he  can  also 
"manage"  his "mother-rage"  without  attacking himself.  <ibid.:  129)  The 
daughter,  however,  is  trapped  - her  anxiety,  guilt  and  anger  are  not 
culturally  transformed,  but  remain  "stuck"  at  the  level  of  guilt  over 
food,  eating and  growth.  (ibid.:  124;  132-6)  Eating remains "an act  of 
violence  against  the  mother"  and  this  feeling  is  reinforced  by  a 
culture  which,  Chernin  argues,  "fears  and  dislikes  large  women". 
(ibid.:  6)  Not  eatingresolves  many  guilts - principally,  however,  the 
"primal  crime"  of  imaginary matricide.  <ibid.:  132) 
This,  then,  is the cause  of anorexia: 
"the  daughters  of  our  time  are  turning  against  themselves 
...  they  torture  themselves  with  starvation  and  make  their 
bodies  their  enemies ... they  attack their female  flesh.  This 
futile  attack  upon  the  female  body,  through  which  we  are 
attempting  to  free  ourselves  from  the  limitations  of  the 
female  role,  hides  a  bitter  warfare  against  the  mother." 
(ibid.:  93) 
The  guilt  and  hidden  anger  at  the  mother  - anger,  anxiety and  loss at 
the  separation  from  the  mother  in  weaning  - is  turned  against  the 
female  body  shared with the  mother: 
"in  a  stunning  act  of  symbolic  substitution,  the  daughter 
aims  her  mother-rage  at  her  own  body,  so  like  the  one  which 
fed  her  and  through  which  she  learned  to  know  the  mother 
during the first  moments  of  her existence." 
(ibid.:  93) 
She  fears  that  food  will  turn  her  into  what  her  mother  is 
ambitionless  and  shameful:  "with  every  bite  she  has  to  fear  that  she 
may  become  what  her  mother  has  been".  (ibid.:  42)  Anorexia,  then,  is 
-86-an  attempt  to  remake  the  female  body:  it  is  "symbolic  gender 
transformation".  (ibid.:  52)  The  daugher  hopes  that  in  taking  on  the 
lean,  male  body,  she  will  "escape  from  the  mother's  destiny  without 
enduring  all  that  remorse  of  leaving  the  mother  behind",  and  will  be 
able  to  surpass  her  mother  with  the  "serenely  cruel  and  self-
referring"  attitude of  a  son.  <ibid.:  56)  This,  however,  is impossible 
- the  body  regains its natural  weight  and  contours,  and  confronts the 
anorexic  woman  with  "the  fact  of  being  fundamentally  and  irrevocably 
female".  <ibid. :  53)  She  is  trapped:  she  can  neither  retreat  nor  go 
forward. 
In  eating  disorders,  then,  women  transform  their  bodies  because  of 
guilt  over  transforming  their  lives  and  personalities.  Eating 
disorders should be  seen,  Chernin argues,  as attempts to evolve "rites 
of  passage"  in  which  the  traditional  female  identity  of  self-
sacrificial  mother  can be  transformed  and  women  can enter the culture. 
This,  she  argues,  is  the  purpose  of  "tribal"  rites  of  passage,  but 
because  the  ritual  here  is  not  recognized  socially,  it is  unable  to 
accomplish  this.  Its "self-destructive  excess"  is not  controlled,  and 
its ritual  thus  "remains  split  off  from  its collective  significance". 
(ibid.:  185;  169-186)  The  anorexic  woman  "cannot  get  beyond  these 
trappings  of  transformation"  - she  remains stuck in the repetition and 
elaboration  of  dietary ritual  without  experiencing  the  transformative 
power  of  the true rite of  passage.  <ibid.:  175;  174) 
This,  then,  for  Chernin,  is  what  is  needed:  a  collective  ritual 
through  which  a  new  female  identity  can  be  created  - "intentional 
-87-:r-itual"  rather  than  "ritualized  obsession".  Ci bid. ;  185;  204)  She 
"we  are  in  urgent  need  of  a  ceremonial  form  to  guide  us 
beyond  what  may  well  be  the  collective  childhood  of  female 
identity  into  a  new  maturity  of  female  social  development". 
(ibid.:  169) 
Only  then  will  a  "new  woman"  who  can  enter  the  public  world  without 
the  finally  impossible  transformation  into  a  "pseudo-man""  be  born;  a 
woman  in  whom  female  creative  and  nurturing  power  are  integrated  in, 
rather than separated from,  her sense  of  indentity. 
Kim  Chernin's  work  is  popular,  and  The  Tyranny  of  Slenderness  is 
particularly  well-known.  This  is  unsurprising  - her  style  is  clear, 
her  arguments  accessible,  and  her  subject  relevant  to  many  women. 
Indeed,  Chernin's  perspective  on  anorexia  is  stimulating  and  raises 
many  important  but  often  neglected  issues  - the  disjunction  between 
femininity  and  individuality,  the  "problem"  of  feminine  appetites,  the 
opposed  orientations of  men  and  women  towards the "public sphere",  and 
the  importance  of  ritual  in anorexia. 
Especially  interesting  from  the  present  perspective  are  her 
discussions,  drawn  from  Melanie  Klein,  of  women's  "inner  space".  In 
spite  of  the  fact,  as  shall  later  be  argued,  that  Chernin's  focus  on 
guilt  in  the  mother-daughter  relationship  as  the  main  explanatory 
factor  in  anorexia  is  misleading,  the  whole  area  of  the  imagery  of 
-88-women's  bodies as  empty  inner space  is central to the consideration of 
the  body  as a  concept rather than a  simple biological  given. 
The  ahistorical  character  of  her  thesis,  however,  fundamentally 
weakens  its central  arguments.  Firstly,  arguing  that  the  20th century 
sees  the  overturning  of  thousands  of  years  of  unmitigated  oppression 
of  women  is untenable.  As  Dale  Spender,  for  example,  has  argued,  many 
of  the  ideas  of  contemporary  feminism can be  traced back as far as the 
17th  century,  and  is  able  to  chart  their  emergence,  suppression  and 
reemergeance  as  "new'' .  <Spender,  1983)  Patriarchy,  and  women's 
resistance  to it,  are shaped in each period by the specific historical 
conditions  of  that  time.  It  is  historically  more  accurate  to  see 
women's  struggles  against  patriarchal  oppression  as  rising  and  being 
suppressed,  as  struggles  both  on  the  material  and  the  ideological 
levels,  rather  than  as  one  titanic  victory  over  a  monolithic  and 
unchanging  patriarchy  which  needs  only  to  be  "rounded-off"  in  the 
finishing school  of  female  psychology.  (1) 
I  do  not  wish to suggest that the  oppression of  women  is simply a  "by-
product"  of  capitalism,  however.  Patriarchy  is  a  useful  but  very 
general  concept  which  should  contain  within  it  a  wide-range  of 
historical  differentiation  in  how  women  are  oppressed,  and  how  the 
oppression of  women  as  a  gender  intersects  with  other  oppressions, 
1  To  take  only  one  example,  feminist  sociologists  have  detailed  the 
split into private-female and  public-male  worlds during the transition 
from  feudalism  to  capitalism,  pointing  out  that  that  dichotomy  is 
itself  historical  rather  than  universal.  <See,  i.e. ,Rowbotham:  1977; 
Hamilton:  1978) 
-89-principally  those  of  class  and  "race".  Chernin's  arguments  are  based 
on  an  extremely  simplistic  definition  of  the  concept  of  patriarchy. 
Her  thesis  rather  than  being  informed  by  history,  takes  it  for 
granted,  and  this  leads  her  to  vastly  underestimate  both  historical 
change  and  the  real  constraints  on  the  expression  of  female  power, 
arguing  that  neither  the  material  nor  the  ideological  constraints  of 
patriarchy  retain  any  real  cogency.  <Chernin,  1986:  60,  78-80,  90) 
Thus  Chernin  downgrades  women's  continuing  economic,  ideological  and 
political  subordination  and  pays  scant  attention  to  the  patriarchal 
control  of  the  female  body  which  must  be  central  to  any  feminist 
analysis  of  anorexia.  (ibid.:  115)  But  as  Janet  Sayers  argues,  in 
order  to  end  women • s  oppression  we  need  more  than  a  new  attitude  to 
mother-daughter relationships: 
" ...  we  have  to  do  more  than  'dream of  the future,  out  of  the 
transformed  obsessions  that  presently  rule  our  lives'  as 
Chernin  recommends.  Ci bid.  204)  We  also  have  to  take 
practical  steps  to  actualize  this dream  in reality  ...  Sadlly 
Chernin  ... fails  adequately  to  detail  the  means  whereby  the 
solution  she  advocates  to  sex  inequality  might  be  realised 
in practice." 
<Sayers:  1987) 
In  line  with  her  theory  that  equality  for  women  has  been  wholly 
achieved  for  the  present  generation,  Chernin  sees the social  controls 
on  women  which  continue  to  keep  femininity  and  domesticity  on  the 
female  agenda  as  mere  "echoes  from  history"  C1986:  32),  and  as 
relating  solely  to  patriarchy.  This  latter strand  in  her  argument  is 
best  seen  in her  treatment  of  middle-class  women  as  representative  of 
all  women,  the  issues  of  their specific  class  a.nd  gender  position  as 
issues  affecting  all  women  equally.  Indeed  it  is  the  very  fact  that 
-90-young,  educated,  white  Western  women  are  in  a  specialized  position 
both  in  terms  of  gender,  "race"  and  class  that  access  to  the 
public/male sphere has  become  an  issue for  them. 
Vomen,  for  Chernin,  then,  seem to  be  a  largely self-oppressing group 
- the  constraints  which  keep  women  from  moving  fully  into  the  public 
sphere  exist  primarily  in  the  minds  of  women  themselves  and  apply 
equally  to  all  women,  regardless  of  their  class  position  or  ethnic 
background.  There  is  a  glancing  recognition  that  women  may  not  be 
doing it all to themselves  when  Chernin writes of  the  anorexic  woman's 
"brooding,  half-conscious  sense  that  her  culture,  after  opening  the 
doors  to its most  highly  prized  institutions,  does  not  really  welcome 
female  development  at  all".  Cibid.:  187>  This  point,  unfortunately, 
remains  unexplored,  as  does  the  question  of  whether  the  culture  opens 
its doors  wider  for  some  women  than  for  others.  Guilt  is seen  as  a 
purely  internal  and  irrational  mechanism,  not  as  an  element  in  the 
social control  of  women  through which  women  "police"  themselves. 
The  "failure  of  nerve"  is  women's,  the  conflicts  psychological. 
Cibid.:  43)  To  take  one  example,  Chernin  argues  that  there  is  a 
"battle  of  opposing  imagery"  between  "the  new  image  of  female 
possibility"  and  the  traditional  image  of  mother-in-the-kitchen,  and 
that it is women's  "guilt"  at  surpassing their mothers  which  prevents 
them  from  embracing  the  new  possibilities.  (ibid. :  45)  This 
perspective  totally  ignores  the  profound  ambiguity  in  images  of 
powerful  women,  informed  by  stereotypes  of  the  wicked  stepmother  -
women's  power  is  bad  power  - or  the  pseudo-man  - powerful  women  are 
-91-unfeminine.  The  attitudes of  both  genders  towards  women  who  "make  it" 
in a  man's  world are  highly ambivalent. 
It is here  that  the  central  confusion  in Chernin's  argument  begins  to 
show  itself.  She  argues  that  women  often  feel  the  lack  of  a  "self", 
that  women  do  not  have  the  expectation  of  surpassing  and  therefore 
fully  separating  from  their  mothers  in  the  way  that  men  do,  and  that 
there is a  basic conflict  between  femininity - sublimating the self to 
live  through  others  - and  individualism  - acting  as  a  separate  and 
autonomous  person.  (ibid.:  20;  125-9)  In  spite  of  her  caveats  on  the 
need  to  take  into  account  woman-as-nurturer  this  latter  also 
presented  as  a  universal  and  ahistorical  quality  - the  model  of  the 
self  from  which  she  works  more  or  less  uncritically  is  the  atomized 
and self-contained individual  of  bourgeois and patriarchal  ideology. 
Chernin does,  as  we  have  seen,  argue  that  women  cannot,  or should  not, 
attempt  to solve their problems  by  becoming  "pseudo-men"  - here  coming 
close  to  arguing that  the  dominant  concepts  of  the  self  do  not  "fit" 
women's  experience.  However,  this  does  not  lead  her  to  question  the 
naturalness  and  universality  of  the  atomized  self,  struggling  to 
separate  from  and  supercede  the  parent.  This  struggle  is for  Chernin 
expressive  of  "basic  psychological  needs"  and is thus  an "inevitable", 
"human  necessity".  Cibid.:  169-70)  Indeed,  in  her  discussion  of  pre-
modern  "tribal"  rites  of  passage  she  argues  that 
separation/individuation  has  always  been  their  main  function.  Cibid.: 
166-71)  This  ignores,  however,  the  fundamental  distinction,  to  be 
discussed in later chapters,  between  the  pre-modern definition of  the 
-92-self  by  social  role  and  the  modern  self  as  defined  by  individualized 
"personality". 
Women's  present  position is described as  "the  collective  childhood  of 
female  identity"  (ibid.:  169),  and  we  can have  little doubt  about  what 
"a  new  maturity"  would  mean.  Although  same  traits  - aggression,  far 
example  - are  seen  to  be  male,  and  others  - nurturing,  creativity  -
as  female,  Chernin  retains  the  sense  of  the  self  acting  upon  an 
environment  from  which it is totally separated as  gender-neutral,  and 
as  something  "authentic"  which  can  be  discovered,  rather  than  as  a 
social,  and therefore historical,  construction.  Cibid.:  195-200) 
A  wholehearted  cammittment  to  the  social  construction  of  personality, 
however,  negates  the  need  to  pasi  t  a  "natural"  or  "authentic"  self 
existing  independently  of  culture,  history  and  the  gender  division. 
The  dominant  conception  of  the  self  as  a  self-contained  entity 
organised  around  a  care  of  needs/desires  which  are  satisfied  through 
the  exploitation  of  an  environment  composed  of  objects  is  masculine 
and  bourgeois,  rather than gender-neutral  and universal.  Further,  this 
construction  relies  upon,  and  is  constructed  in  apposition  to,  a 
conception  of  woman  as  fundamentally  "un-separate",  as,  indeed,  part 
of  the  environment  of  objects  through  which  the  masculine  subject 
expresses itself. 
The  institution of  motherhood,  then,  is  one expression of  the  "lack of 
self"  which  women  experience  in  the  collision  of  bourgeois 
individualism and  patriarchal  femininity.  The  mother  lives through her 
-93-children  because  responsiveness  to  the  needs  and  desires  of  others is 
central  to  patriarchal  definitions  of  feminine  personality,  but  even 
the  childless  woman  cannot  achieve  the  masculine  self.  Self-
effacement  is  not  solely  the  province  of  mothers,  and  guilt  is  not 
produced  solely  in  the  mother-daughter  relationship.  It  is  not  women 
who  confine  themselves  to  the  manipulation  of  the  body,  fearing  to 
"take  on"  the  public  world.  Rather,  patriarchal  power confines them. 
In  essence,  then,  Chernin  psychologizes  and  domesticates  a  social  and 
political  conflict  - the  control  of  women  through  patriarchal  power 
realtions.  Women's  search  for  "identity"  is  stifled  in  a  purely 
domestic  psychodrama  which  "culture"  merely  "reinforces"  from  the 
"outside",  there  being  in Chernin's thesis  no  real struggle  to retain 
culture  as  patriarchal.  The  struggle  is  seen  as  psychological  and 
domestic,  rather  than  social,  material  and  ideological,  between  the 
formal  gender-neutrality  of  the  concept  of  the  individual  and  the 
patriarchal control  of  women  through the  ideology of  femininity. 
Chernin's  analysis  of  anorexia,  in  short,  can  only  hold  water  if  we 
accept  that  the  patriarchal  oppression  of  women  is effectively  over, 
and  that  the  "masculine"  self  is  the  proper  goal  of  women.  If  we  do 
not,  we  will  be  forced  to  look  outside  of  the  mother-daughter 
relationship  to  the  wider  social  forces  which  continue  to  oppress  and 
constrain  women  - as  mothers  and  daughters  certainly,  but  also  as 
wives,  girlfriends,  workers  and  citizens.  If  we  do  so  we  liberate  the 
analysis  of  anorexia  from  its  dependance  on  a  particular  "type"  of 
mother  - the  discontented  woman  ambivalent  about  her daughter's growth 
-94-- and  the  control  of  feminine  appetite  can  be  understood  as  social 
rather than self-inflicted. 
-95-Marilyn  Lahxence:  control  and  containment 
Marilyn  Lawrence  is the  mo:::;t  widely  read  feminist  writer  on  anorexia; 
her  book  The  Anorexic  Experience  (1984)  is frequently  cited,  and  she 
has  done  extensive therapeutic  work  with anorexic  women. 
For  Lawrenc:e,  anorexia  is a  strategy  of  control  which  operates at  two 
levels.  Firstly,  at  the  physical  level,  the  anorexic  woman  tries 
through  her  eating  and  non-eating  strategies  to  gain  and  maintain 
complete  control  over  the  size  and  shape  of  her  body.  Secondly,  at the 
moral  level,  the  anorexic  woman  tries  to  gain  and  maintain  control 
over  her  needs  and  desires  through  techniques  of  self-denial.  These 
attempts  to  achieve  "perfect  and  absolute  control"  are  motivated  by  a 
feeling  of  being  out  of  control,  which  also  occurs  at  two  levels: 
physically,  as  expressed  in  the  fear  of  becoming  fat;  and  morally,  in 
seeing herself as "glutinous and debased".  (Lawrence,  1979:  93) 
Anorexic  women,  Lawrence  argues,  want  to control  what  happens  in their 
lives,  a  control  which  is  continually  undermined  by  women's  relative 
social  powerlessness.  The  reality of  this powerlessness  means  that it 
is  very  difficult  for  women  to  exert  a  controlling  influence  over 
their  actual  social  position.  Ci bid. :  93;  100)  Self-control  through 
control  of  the  body  is,  however,  possible,  and it this turning  inward 
of  the  attempt at  control  which  anorexia effects: 
"In  order  for  an  individual  to be  free to direct herself  and 
take  charge  of  her  own  actions,  it is  necessary  for  her  to 
engage  with  other  people  in such  a  way  that  the  interaction 
allows  her  this  control.  It  may  be  necessary  for  her  to 
exercise  some  power  in  relation  to  other  people.  When 
2~norexics talk about  control,  they  invariably mean  the  power 
-96-to  regulate,  command  and  govern their own  lives and  actions. 
They  generally  fail  to  do  this  by  turning  outwards  and 
engaging  with  the  world  on  their  own  behalf.  Instead,  they 
exercise  self-control,  which  we  might  understand  as  power 
turned  inwards.  The  battleground  then  becomes  an  internal 
one:  the  battle  is  fought  within the  individual  rather than 
between the  individual  and the world." 
(ibid.:  93)" 
Anorexic  women  experience  women's  relative social  powerlessness  as  "a 
total  inability to control  the environment",  and "compensate"  for this 
with  rigid  self-control.  (ibid.:  94)  This  control  of  the  self  works 
through  a  sharp definition of  boundaries: 
"Anorexics  appear  to  need  to  separate  themselves  from  the 
environment.  They  need  to  define  their  own  limits  and  set 
boundaries  around  themselves.  The  setting  of  boundaries 
around the self is a  difficult problem for  women  as they are 
at least in part regarded as an aspect  of the environment  of 
others ...  Being  very  thin  seems  to  say  to  the  world  'I  have 
sharp  contours,  I  am  not  soft,  I  do  not  merge  with  you.  I 
have  nothing  to  give  you'.  A  recovered  anorexic  vividly 
described  her  anorexic  experience ... in terms  of  'needing  to 
be  closed up for  a  while,  and very small.  Not  receptive,  not 
there for others'." 
(ibid.:  94)" 
Lawrence  argues  that  anorexic  physical  self-control  should  be  divided 
analytically  into  a  control  of  weight  and  shape,  and  a  control  of 
intake,  with  the  former  functioning  as  "tangible  proof"  that  the 
latter  is  working.  (ibid.:  95)  Self-denial,  then,  expressed  in  the 
rigorous control  of appetite,  is central to anorexia: 
"Anorexia  is  an  attempt  to  deny  appetite,  to  rise  above 
appetite and everything which appetite implies." 
(1984:  89;  see also Lawrence,  1987:  195) 
The  anorexic  woman  fears  that  "her  own  feelings,  needs  and  longings 
will  be  too  much  for  herself  and  for  other  people  to  bear".  (1984: 
100) 
-97-Anorexia  is,  then,  a  kind of  asceticism.  (1979:  94;  1984:  33)  Lawrence 
argues that  in our culture self-denial  is regarded  as  a  "'good'  thing" 
for  everyone,  but especially for  women,  who  are  "more  inherently prone 
to  badness  and  moral  weakness".  <1979:  95;  1984:  18,  33-5)  Anorexic 
women  use  "almost  precisely"  the  methods  of  medieval  female  ascetics 
"to achieve the same  ends".  <1979:  96) 
The  reasons  why  the  search  for  control  and  denial  is  instigated 
through  control  of  eating  and  the  body  are  to  be  found  in  an 
examination of the subordinate social position of  women.  Firstly,  food 
and eating are  major  female  concerns,  and anorexia can be  viewed as an 
extension of the difficulties all women  have  with eating: 
"it  (anorexia)  is  in  fact  at  one  end  of  a  continuum  of 
confused  and  conflicted  responses  which  we  as  women  have 
towards  ourselves ...  we  do  not  just  eat:  we  slim,  we  worry, 
we  weight  watch.  We  also  spend  an  inordinate  amount  of  time 
absorbed  in the  business  of  food:  feeding  others as  well  or 
instead of  ourselves,  shopping,  cooking,  and  clearing-up the 
waste ...  Food  in  our  society  ... is  regarded  as  the 
responsibility  of  women.  It is one  of  the  few  areas  of  life 
in which  we  are expected to be  in control." 
<1984:  12;  18;  28;  see also  1987:  12) 
Secondly,  the  control  and  manipulation  of  the  body  is  also  a  major 
facet  of  female  existence.  Lawrence  argues  that  appearance  is central 
to  women's  acceptibility,  and  today  sexual  acceptibilty  demands 
slimness.  (1984:  33-42)  Weight  control,  therefore,  is a  commonplace  in 
women's  lives,  both  in  the  attempt  to  conform  to  a  cultural 
stereotype,  and  as  an  expression  of  the  idea  that  if women  experience 
problems,  they  should  change  themselves  rather  than  their  society  in 
order to deal  with  them.  (1979:  94;  1984:  21)  Control  of  food  and  the 
-98-body  is accessible to  women,  and  because  of  the relative powerlessness 
inherent  in  women's  subordinate  position in society  food  and  the  body 
are  two  of  the  few areas open to female  control.  (1979:  100) 
The  attempt  to  control  eating  and  the  body  is,  then,  for  Lawrence  a 
method  or strategy of  control,  chosen partly for its existing place  in 
the culture  of  femininity  and partly through  lack of alternatives.  But 
it is merely  the  method.  Although  "the  key  feature  of  anorexia  is  an 
unshakeable  desire to control  both  food  intake  and  weight"  (1979:  94), 
for Lawrence,  following Bruch: 
"in spite of  outer appearances,  this is not  an illness 
of  weight  and appetite - the essential  problem relates 
to inner doubts and  lack of self-confidence". 
<1984:  77) 
The  underlying  conflict  of  anorexia,  then  - its  real  cause  - is  for 
Lawrence,  as  for  Bruch,  a  conflict  over  independence  and  autonomy. 
0979:  97)  At  adolescence  "issues  about  autonomy,  independence  and 
self-esteeem  ...  come  to  a  head"  <1984:  49).  The  anorexic  girl,  having 
always  accepted  the  valued  female  qualities  of  compliance,  passivity 
and  unselfishness,  has  seen  herself  through  others'  definitions  and 
lacks a  clear sense  of self.  Thus: 
"when  she  reaches  the 
independence  and  autonomy 
feel  unable  to cope". 
(ibid.:  65) 
point  in  her  life  at  which 
are  required,  she  is  likely  to 
She  can neither achieve  nor  maintain "a sense  of  herself as  a  free  and 
autonomous  person".  <ibid.:  66) 
Crucial  in this crisis are the educational pressures which  the  usually 
middle-class  anorexic  girl  faces,  where  pressure  to  do  well 
-99-academically  and  subsequently  in  a  career  conflicts  with  the  social 
pressures  on  women  to  be  carers,  "to  find  satisfaction  through 
affiliation".  (ibid.:  53;  1979:  201-5)  (2)  The  conflict,  then,  is 
between  two  courses  of  action:  pursuing  individualistic success  which 
is seen  to  involve  a  rejection  of  affiliation and  femininity;  or,  by 
defining  the  self in relation to the  needs  of  others,  abandoning this 
course  to become  fully  feminine  and therefore subordinate.  (1979:  204-
5) 
Anorexia  is a  way  to step outside this conflict,  and should be  seen as 
"a  retreat  from  independence".  (1984:  67)  The  conflict  is  social 
rather  than  individual,  as  for  Lawrence  it is  not  the  anorexic  girl 
herself  who  is confused due  to her  own  inadequacies,  but  rather the 
social  world  which  is riven with conflicts over how  adult  women  should 
behave.  (ibid.:  74)  Anorexia  is  thus  "a  disorder  which  springs  from 
the  very  midst  of  women's  experience  of  the  world".  (ibid.:  21)  In 
summary,  then: 
"One  of  the  central  elements  in anorexia  is the  tendency to 
want  to  please  and  to  comply  with  other  people's 
expectations.  It  is  when  complying  and  pleasing  others 
becomes  incompatible  with  the  demands  of  real  maturity  and 
autonomy  that  anorexia  tends  to  occur.  It is the  failure  to 
take  into  account  the  real  needs  of  the  self and  to clearly 
differentiate  these  from  the  needs  of  others  which  heralds 
the  onset  of  the rebellious symptom  in the first place." 
(ibid.:  85) 
2  Lawrence  argues  that  the  middle-class  bias  in  anorexia 
educational;  it  is  this  specific  feature  of  middle-class 
rather  than  class  position  per  se  which  fosters  anorexia. 
1984a:  201-2) 
-100-
is  in  fact 
experience 
<Lawrence, The  anorexic  girl  tries to  impose  control  - in the  only  way  that  she 
perceives  to  be  possible  - in  response  to  conflicts  and  confusions 
which  appear  insoluble.  Lawrence  distinguishes  the  aim of  anorexia  -
in  which  the  anorexic  girl  tries  to  retreat  from  confusion  and 
conflicts  between  "success"  <primarily  educational)  and  dependant 
femininity  and  the  method  used  to  achei  ve  this  aim,  which  she 
describes  as  the  attempt,  through  physical  and  moral  control 
strategies,  to construct a  "shell"  around the self: 
"we  can  think  of  the  symptoms  of  anorexia  as  a  kind  of 
protective  outer  shell.  The  shell  is  not  the  real  person, 
but  it  hides  and  protects  the  real  person.  The  important 
point  is  that  the  real  self  is  still  there, 
underneath ...  using  her  anorexia  <'Stella') ...  created  an 
outer  shell  which  was  strong  and  invulnerable.  It  did  not 
need  love,  it did not  need  friendship,  it did not  need  food. 
It  had  no  connection  with  anyone  or  anything  in  its 
environment.  It  was  complete  and  contained within itself.  It 
had declared its independance." 
(ibid. :  22-3) 
Anorexia  means  living  "within  and  behind  the  walls  of  your  solution"; 
it is "in a  real  sense  a  'No  Entry'  sign"  (ibid.:  21): 
"the  goal  is self-sufficiency,  the  achievement  of  a  steady 
state  within  a  closed  system.  Nothing  can  change.  Nothing 
must  enter. " 
(ibid. :  202) 
The  anorexic  solution,  however,  cannot  be  permanent  or  total.  :Most 
anorexic  women  eat  at  least  something.  The  body  can  never  come 
absolutely under  moral  control,  and  the  anorexic  woman  lives with  the 
constant  need  to  increase  control  by  decreasing  intake.  Lawrence 
argues thus: 
-101-"the  road  to  self-respect  through  starvation  is  an  endless 
one,  because  the  goal  doesn't  really lie in that direction." 
(1979:  98) 
The  anorexic  woman  is also terrified that  her  appetite will  overwhelm 
her  and  that  she  will  eat  uncontrollably  <ibid. :  97-9)  and  feels  as 
though  she  is "in a  state  of  siege".  <1984:  19)  Further,  the  anorexic 
process  itself  "gets  out  of  hand",  and  instead  of  the  woman  herself 
controlling  her  eating,  it seems  to  control  her.  One  of  Lawrence's 
clients described this  feeling  thus:  ":My  willpower  is stronger than  I 
am."  <1979:  100)  Lawrence  writes: 
"what  brings  anorexics  to  therapy  (and  by  this  I  mean  a 
voluntary  asking  for  help)  is  the  conviction  that  they  are 
out  of  control.  Universally  they  claim  that  they  cannot 
control  what  is  happening  to  them,  whether  this  be  over-
eating,  under-eating or  a  combination of  the  two.  I  have  two 
clients  (both  of  a  religious  disposition)  who  firmly 
believed that they  were  in the  grip of  some  evil  demon  which 
tormented  them whenever  they attempted to eat." 
(ibid.:  98)" 
The  anorexic strategy,  put simply,  does not  work: 
"it  is  a  solution  which  is  symptomatic  of  the  desperate 
situation  it  seeks  to  rectify.  It  is  a  solution  which  is 
essentially  self-destructive  and  which  seeks  to  substitute 
self-control  for  effective control  of  the  world  in which the 
woman  exists." 
(ibid.:  100)" 
Criticism  of  :Marilyn  Lawrence • s  work  on  anorexia  has  to  be 
distinguished from the earlier criticism of  psychiatric definitions of 
anorexia.  The  latter,  as  has  been  shown,  base  their  explanations  of 
-102-anorexia  on  individualistic  and  phallocentric  assumptions,  arguing 
that  anorexia  is both  explicable  and  curable  at  the  individual  level, 
and  that  the  concept  of  the  healthy,  mature  and  psychologically 
"normal"  adult  is gender-neutral.  I  have  argued that these assumptions 
are  essentially  ideological,  and  this  point  will  be  explored  further 
in later chapters. 
Feminist  theories  of  anorexia,  however,  are  developed  from  a  position 
which is potentially critical  of  these  assumptions.  Firstly,  feminists 
seek  explanations  of  anorexia  not  in  the  concept  of  the  deficient 
individual,  but  in  the  social  position  of  women  as  a  group,  arguing 
here,  as  elsewhere,  that  the  personal  is  political.  Secondly,  much 
feminist  work  on  gender  roles  argues  that  they  are  social 
constructions  rather  than  eternal,  biologically  determined  realities. 
(3)  From  both  a  sociological  and  a  feminist  perspective,  therefore,  my 
work  shares  the  feminist  critique  of  patriarchal  ideology,  and  this 
analysis will  deepen  and  develop,  rather than undermine  or reject,  the 
feminist  theories discussed. 
To  return  to  Marily  Lawrence's  work,  it should  be  clear  that  from  a 
feminist  and  sociological  perspective  her  analysis  of  anorexia 
represents  a  major  theoretical  advance.  In  seeing  anorexia  as  a 
product  of  the.  social  position  of  women,  in  pointing  out  the 
3  For  discussion  on  the  extent  to  which  this  is  the  case  see,  i.e, 
Segal:  1987;  Dworkin,  1988. 
-103-importance  of  food  and  appearance  in  the  female  gender  role,  in 
questioning  how  far  "independence"  is  a  real  possibility  for  women, 
and  in  arguing  for  a  connection  between  the  anorexic  strategy  and 
women's  relative  social  powerlessness,  Lawrence  provides  an  effective 
explanation  of  anorexia  as  a  female  condition.  After  reading  Lawrence 
we  can  see  clearly,  and  for  the  first  time,  why  the  anorexic 
experience  is meaningful  almost  exclusively to  women. 
Nevertheless,  Lawrence's  work  is  not  free  from  either  conceptual 
confusions  or  the  therapeutic  tendency  to  "individualize"  social 
phenomena.  Although  she  explicitly  argues  for  an  explanation  of 
anorexia  grounded  in  analysis  of  the  social  position  of  women,  this 
analysis  remains  largely  undeveloped,  particularly  in  its  historical 
aspect.  The  feminist  theoretical  framework  must,  I  would  argue,  be 
much  more  fully  understood  if  we  are  to  use  such  concepts  as 
"independance",  "dependance",  and  "powerlessness"  in  explaining 
anorexia. 
Further,  there  is a  crucial  ambiguity  in  Lawrence's  acceptance  of  the 
social  genesis  of  anorexia.  In  The  Anorexic  Experience  she  seems  to 
suggest  that,  although  it  is  understandable  socially,  anorexia  is,  to 
some  degree  at  least,  also  explicable  as  individual  psychological 
deficiency.  The  anorexic  girl,  not  having  "found a  way  of  being  in the 
world  which  is  both  comfortable  and  realistic",  is  unable  to  resolve 
social  confusions  in  any  more  productive  way.  (1984:  55)  The 
implication  here,  then,  is  that  conflicting  social  expectations  of 
women  - to  "succeed"  as  indi  victuals  and  to  subordinate  themselves  as 
-104-carers  to  the  needs  of  others  - can  indeed  be  reconciled  at  the 
individual  level.  What  is  needed  for  women  who  have  been  unable  to 
resolve  these  conflicts  themselves  is therapy  which  will  set  them  on 
the  way  to  that  resolution  which,  we  must  assume,  other  women  have 
already  achieved.  (1979:  100)  It  should  of  course  be  noted  that 
Lawrence  does  identify  critically  one  other  "resolution"  of  this 
conflict  giving  up  on  individual  success  to  concentrate  on 
femininity.  <1984:  54) 
Two  points arise  here.  Firstly,  as Lawrence  argues  <1979),  anorexia  is 
an  attempt,  however  unproductive,  to  resolve conflicting expectations 
central  in  the  lives  of  middle-class  women.  This  view  fits  ill  with 
her  later argument  that  anorexia represents a  "retreat"  from conflicts 
over  independence,  a  "regression"  into dependance.  <1984:  67)  Further, 
anorexia  is only  one  "resolution"  among  many,  and it is important  not 
to set  up,  albeit  jmplicitly,  a  distinction between  women  along  lines 
of  their relative  success in dealing with cultural  expectations  which, 
in varying degrees and  in various  ways,  oppress  us all as "members"  of 
the  gender-group "woman". 
Secondly  extent  to  which  individual  therapeutic  solutions  can  end 
anorexia  as  a  social  phenomenon  is questionable.  While  therapy  which 
takes  seriously the  political  issues  involved  in anorexia,  and  allows 
the  anorexic  woman  to  retain  control  of  her  life,  can  be  very 
effective,  it treats  the  "effects"  rather  than  the  "cause".  Therapy 
can help  women  as  individuals come  to terms with the reality of  social 
powerlessness  in  hopefully  less  painful  ways,  but  it does  not  attack 
-105-the  social  structure  which  produces  that  powerlessness.  If  we  accept 
the  analysis  of  anorexia  as  arising  from  women's  position  in  the 
social  structure,  we  must  surely  accept  that  therapy  can  help  women 
who  are  already  anorexic  but  cannot  prevent  other  women  becoming 
anorexic  in the future. 
Furthermore,  Lawrence's  displacement  of  the  anorexic  method- control 
of  eating  - from  the  heart  of  her  analysis is puzzling.  While  clearly 
a  dependence/independence  conflict  lies  at  the  heart  of 
~norexic eating should not  be  seen  simply as a  "method"  chosen 
because  of  its  place  in  the  lives  of  women  to  acheive  a  distinct 
"aim".  Why  and  how  this  specific  "method"  expresses  the  conflict 
between  individuality  and  femininity  are  questions  which  will  be 
central  to  later  chapters.  The  relationship  of  "method"  and  "aim" 
needs  to  be  more  rigorously  conceptualized.  There  are  good  reasons  for 
the  control  of  eating  being  "chosen"  to  express  conflicts  over 
dependance,  reasons  which  shall  be  explored  in  later  chapters.  The 
argument,  briefly,  is that the  active  pursuit of self-interest and  the 
satisfaction  of  desire  are  central  facets  of  the  bourgeois 
construction  of  the  individual.  In  patriarchal  ideology  and  practice, 
however,  women  are  constructed  as  the  passive  objects  of  the  desires 
of  the  masculine  subject,  rather  than  the  active  pursuers  of  their 
own  desires.  Feminine  desire,  feminine  behaviour,  is  constructed  as 
responsive  to,  and  dependant  upon,  masculine  action.  Independant, 
unresponsive  desire  is  expected  of  individuals  but  sanctioned  in 
women,  through,  for  example,  the  construction  of  autonomous  female 
desire  as  dangerous,  voracious  and  potentially  overwhelming.  It  is 
-106-much  more  than  lack  of  confidence  which  prevents  women  controlling 
their  awn  destinies.  Thus  independence  and  appetite,  dependance  and 
denial  are  inextricably  linked.  Indeed,  it is the  expression of  these 
links in anorexia which excites sociological  interest. 
To  return  to  Lawrence,  then;  her  analysis,  while  linking  self-denial 
and  gender,  apprehends  but  fails to adequately conceptualize the links 
between  individuality,  desire  and  gender  in  a  specifically  bourgeois 
culture  - the  links,  that  is  to  say,  between  who  we  are,  what  we 
want,  and  what  we  can  have.  The  issue  of  appetite  in  anorexia  which 
Lawrence  so  interestingly  raises  in  her  earlier  work  remains 
unfortunately undeveloped  in her later writings. 
We  need  to  look  at  feminine  appetite,  then,  as  it is  understood  in 
bourgeois and patriarchal  culture.  The  attempt to establish boundaries 
around  the  self,  too,  would  benefit  from  a  similar  treatment.  The 
notion of  the  individual  as  a  coherent  and self-contained unit is bath 
historically- and  gender-specific,  and  is  reflected  in  the  social 
construction  of  the  body.  The  pseudo  gender-neutral  ideology  of 
individualism presents the goals  of  self-contained selfhood and bodily 
integrity  to  women  as  possible,  while  simultaneously  the  ideology  of 
femininity  creates  the  feminine  self  in  response  to  the  masculine 
self,  the  feminine  body  in  relation  to  the  masculine  body,  and  thus 
continually  undercuts  any  real  possibility  that  women  will  achieve 
those  goals. 
-107-The  feminine  body  in  bourgeois  and  patriarchal  culture  is  understood 
as  incomplete.  Lawrence's  argument  that  anorexia  represents  the 
construction  of  a  psychic  "shell"  or  boundary  is  thus  a  vital 
component  in  the  development  of  theoretical  connections  between  the 
cultural  meanings  of  the  female  body  and the anorexic experience.  Yet 
Lawrence  does  not  sufficiently detail  either  how  the  anorexic  "shell" 
is constructed or  how  the  social  construction of  the  feminine  body  as 
open  makes  this construction meaningful. 
This  level  of  argument,  however,  requires  a  specifically  sociological 
perspective  on  personality  development  and  on  the  body.  From  this 
point  of  view "personality",  or  "human  nature",  and  the  body  are  seen 
as  social  constructions  rather  than  as  universal  givens,  and  thus 
incorporate  the  social  divisions  and  categorizations  of  their era.  To 
the  extent  that  definitions  of  "personality"  lack  this  perspective 
such  definitions  tend  to  be  essentialist,  in  presenting  the 
individualized self as universal,  and phallocentric,  in presenting the 
masculine self as gender-neutral. 
In  spite  of  her  feminist  perspective  Lawrence  falls  at  least  partly 
into  the  traps  of  phallocentrism and  essentialism.  Her  description  of 
the  goal  of  treatment  in  anorexia  seems  implicitly  to  accept  the 
individualized  self  as  the  model  on  which  her  patients  should  focus, 
an  acceptance  which  seems  to contain little recognition  of  either its 
historical  or its gender specificity. 
-108-There  is  confusion  in  her  work  between  the  idea  that  the  anorexic 
woman  has  no  sense  of  self at  all,  and  the  idea  that  her  "real  self" 
is  still  there  "underneath" .  Further,  the  conflicts  between 
"compliance"  and  "responsiveness"  as  gender-role  requirements  for 
women  and  the  need for the patient to act according to "the real  needs 
of  the  self",  "the  demands  of  real  maturity  and  autonomy"  <1984:  85; 
see  also  1987:  203)  are  not  theoretically  resolved.  Thus,  the 
interaction  between  femininity  and  individualism  is  never  directly 
addressed  by  Lawrence:  we  are  shown  its effects  - i.e.  in  education 
<Lawrence,  1984a)  - but  must  construe  its  nature  and  extent  for 
ourselves. 
There  is,  then,  an  underlying  ambiguity  in  Lawrence's  view  of 
individuality.  Although  her  feminism  leads  her  to  criticise  the 
effects  of  the  female  gender-role  on  personality,  she  continues  to 
maintain  that  a  "real"  self  exists  independantly  of  such  effects  -
and,  indeed,  independantly  of  any  aspect  of  social  structure.  This 
allows  her  to  argue  that  recognizing  the  "real  self"  and  its  needs 
will  solve  the anorexic crisis of  independance;  unfortunately,  it also 
allows  her  to  ignore  the  extent  to  which  self-contained individuality 
is  a  real  possibility for  women.  Lawrence's  long-term therapeutic  aim 
is  to  enable  the  anorexic  woman  "to  take  a  proper  and  reasonable 
control  of  her  own  life  ... <and)  to  become  an  effective  agent  in  her 
own  affairs"  (1984:  81),  to  encourage  her  to  see  that  she  "owns"  her 
own  body  (ibid.:  93)  and  that  she  can  act  "according  to  internal 
rather  than  external  demands".  <1987:  203)  She  seems  to  suggest  that 
women  can  simply  "decide"  - since  this  is  what  they  "really  are" 
-109-underneath  to  be  autonomous  individuals  rather  than  dependant 
accessories.  The  conflicts  between  "individuality"  and  the 
constraints  of  the  feminine  gender  role,  however,  are  not  soluble 
simply  by  adopting  a  different  perspective,  or  in  therapy  <even 
feminist  therapy)  but  require social  change. 
At  some  level  Lawrence  does  recognize  this  point,  arguing  that 
anorexia: 
"is really  an  attempt  to  hold  together  an  identity,  and  to 
avoid  the  loss  of  one  part  of  the  self  which  growing  up 
brings with it." 
<1984a:  206) 
Here  she  argues that  during  pre-puberty  a  girl  can  be  both "pretty"  -
that  is,  an  acceptable  female  and  "clever"  a  successful 
individual.  At  puberty,  however,  she  has  to  choose:  she  hits  "the 
friction-point  of  womanhood".  (ibid.:  204)  Although  in her article  on 
education  <1984a)  Lawrence  implicitly  presents  "identity"  itself as  a 
social  construction,  elsewhere  she  seems  to  see  it  as  universal, 
existing  a  priori,  "under"  the  effects  of  the  gender  division.  The 
assumption  here  seems  to  be  that  "underneath"  the  gender  division  we 
are  all  really  the  same,  and  would  remain  so  were  it  not  that 
different  "tendencies"  are  "encouraged"  in  women  and  men.  <1984:  49; 
53) 
The  ahistoricism of  Lawrence's analysis  is also evident  in the  way  she 
uses  the  concept  of  asceticism.  Lawrence  "lifts"  the  concept  out  of 
feudal  culture  and  argues  that  anorexic  women  in contemporary  culture 
use  the  same  ascetic  methods  in  pursuit  of  the  same  aims  as  did 
-110-medieval  female  ascetics,  an  argument  already  criticized  in  relation 
to the  work  of Bell. 
Lawrence's  concept  of  "selfhood"  remains  somewhat  confused.  This 
confusion  stems  both  from  a  committment  to  therapy  over  analysis  and 
from  a  too  uncritical  acceptance  of  psychiatric  definitions  of  the 
normal  individual  and  the  bourgeois  and  patriarchal  ideology  which 
creates  those  definitions.  In  spite  of  this  confusion,  however, 
Lawrence's  definition  of  anorexia  as  a  strategy  of  control,  arising 
from  a  conflict  between  independence  and  femininity,  pursued  through 
the  creation  of  a  psychic  "shell"  is,  to  date,  the  most  accurate  and 
comprehensive analysis to be  found  in the literature. 
-111-Susie  Orbach:  mothers  and  daughters  2 
Susie  Orbach's  interest  in  anorexia  is  pre-dated  by  her  work,  both 
theoretical  and  practical,  on  "compulsive  eating"  in  particular,  and 
female  psychology  in  general.  Fat  is  a  Feminist  Issue,  a  bestseller, 
argues  that  women  use  body-size  to  express  feelings  which  are 
otherwise  inexpressible.  <Orbach,  1978)  Vli th  Luise  Eichenbaum,  she 
isolates needinesss  and  dependancy  as central  issues in the psychology 
of  women.  (Orbach  and  Eichenbaum,  1983)  Both  aspects  of  her  earlier 
work  can  be  seen in her analysis of  anorexia. 
In  Hunger  Strike,  Orbach  argues  that  anorexia  consists  of  two 
processes:  the  pursuit  of  thinness,  and  the  denial  of  emotional 
neediness.  COr bach,  1986)  The  anorexic  woman  is  engaged  in  a 
transformation  of  her  body,  the  aim of which  is to  become  thin.  During 
the  illness,  however,  the  meaning  of  the  symptom changes,  and its goal 
becomes  the  control  of  eating  and  the  body,  rather  than  simply 
thinness.  It  is  the  loss  of  control  which  comes  to  terrify  the 
anorexic,  and  Orbach  argues  that  denial  of  food  and  bodily control  are 
symbolic  of  the  denial  and  control  of  emotional  needs.  Cibid.:  13-4) 
The  anorexic  woman  "speaks with her  body": 
"Her  body  is  a  statement  about  her  and  the  world  and  her 
statement  about  her  position  in  the  world.  Living  within 
prescribed  boundaries,  women's  bodies  become  the vehicle  for 
a  whole  range  of  expressions  that  have  no  other  medium.  The 
body,  offered as  a  woman's  ticket into society  ...  becomes  her 
mouthpiece.  In  her  attempts  to  conform  or  reject 
contemporary  ideals  of  femininity,  she  uses  the  weapon  so 
often  directed  agaim:;t  her.  She  speaks  with  her  body." 
(ibid.:  48) 
-112-Anorexia,  then,  is  a  language  and  a  protest:  it  expresses 
unconsciously  a  "solution"  to  problems  which  cannot  be  consciously 
articulated.  (ibid.:  17) 
Orbach  identifies  three  factors  in  the  changing  role  of  women  in 
Western society  which  determine  the  formation  of  the  anorexic  symptom. 
In  consumer  society,  she  argues,  women's  bodies  are  "the  ultimate 
commodity",  and  are,  to  women  and  to  men,  "objects  of  alienation, 
fascination  and  desire".  Cibid.:  35;  37)  Women's  bodies  and  women's 
sexuality  are  seen  "from  the  outside"  as  objects,  and  this  has  two 
effects.  Firstly,  the  manipulation  of  the  body-as-object  in  order  to 
make  it  acceptable  is  a  constant  reality  for  women;  and  secondly, 
women  cannot  have  "an  unmediated  or  purely  physical  relation to their 
bodies".  <ibid.:  361  Both  manipulation  of  the  body-as-object  and  a 
"mediated"  relationship to the  body are expressed in anorexia. 
The  second  factor  is  the  post  Second  World  War  confusion  over 
motherhood,  where  the  concept  of  biologically destined  motherhood  has 
been challenged  by  women's  increasing dissatisfaction with domesticity 
and  their  search  for  a  life  outside  the  home.  (ibid.:  37-42)  Orbach 
argues  that  for  the  mothers  and  daughters  of  this  time  confusion  and 
uncertainty about  what  a  woman  should  be  and  how  mothers should behave 
was  endemic;  anorexia,  then,  in  its rigid  control  of  the  body  "is  a 
symbolic  attempt  to  forge  a  consistency  where  little  exists,  to 
provide  a  knowable,  reliable  way  of  being  that  can  withstand  the 
demand  for change".  (ibid.:  42) 
-113-Finally,  and  relatedly,  the  mother-daughter  relationship  is  itself 
neccessarily  ambivalent.  The  mother  has  to  bring  up  her  daughter  to 
accept  an  inferior social  position,  to  subsume  her  needs  in the  needs 
of  others  and  to  live  a  "circumscribed  life",  while  at  the  same  time 
wanting  the  best  for  her.  (ibid.:  43)  Anorexia  is one  way  in which  the 
daughter  can  express  the  ambivalent  relationship  to  physical  and 
emotional  needs which she  has learned from her mother. 
Needs,  for  Orbach,  are central  both in anorexia  and  in the  development 
of  a  self.  It is the  development  of  a  core  of  needs  and desires,  both 
emotional  and  physical,  experienced  as existing within the  self  which 
creates  the  individual  as  separate.  The  knowledge  that  what  is  felt 
inside,  what  is  wanted  and  needed,  is  acceptable  and  can  be 
consistently  met  and  validated  by  the  world  outside  the  self/body  is 
what  gives  the  individual  the  sense  of  him/herself  as  a  separate, 
self-contained entity,  that  is,  "a corporeal  sense  of self",  the  sense 
of  being "a physical/mental unit".  (ibid.:  77;  76-88)  Orbach  argues: 
"the  development  of  a  corporeal  sense  of  self  is  entirely 
related to the  development  of  object relations  <relations to 
others  beginning  with  the  recognition  of  the  mother  as  a 
person,  an  object separate from oneself)". 
(ibid.:  77) 
"The  capacity to experience  oneself as  a  separate  person,  as 
a  subject  <to  individuate)  rests  on  the  gratification  of 
early dependancy needs." 
(ibid. :  45-6) 
The  security that these  needs can be  satisfied readily is central  to  a 
sense  of  self;  women  do  not  have  their  early  needs  satisfied 
consistently  and  thus  their  sense  of  self  is  uncertain.  (ibid.:  18) 
This  inconsistency  operates  both  emotionally  and  physically  - girls 
-114-are  fed  less  and  weaned  earlier  - and  creates  confusion  about  the 
acceptibility  of  emotional  and  physical  needs.  Because  her  mother  did 
not  respond  consistently  to  her  "internal  cues",  the  daughter 
experiences  them  as  insatiable.  Her  ego  does  not  "integrate"  around 
her  needs,  and  there  is  thus  no  "internal  sense  of  continuity  and 
security"  around  which  the  self  can  develop.  (ibid.:  81;  108-9;  46; 
54;  91)  The girl's self thus  remains "embryonic".  (ibid.:  109) 
She  identifies  three  "basic  demands"  of  femininity  which  undermine 
this self-development:  women  must  defer to others,  anticipate and  meet 
others'  needs,  and  seek  self-definition  through  connection  with 
another.  Being  successfully  feminine  results  in  "a  shaky  sense  of 
self",  where  women  "are  unable  to develop an authentic  sense  of  their 
needs  or  a  feeling  of  entitlement  for  their  desires".  (ibid.:  43) 
Women  take  care  of  others'  needs  and  respond  to  others'  desires  but 
are  fundamentally  unsure  and  ashamed  of  their  own  desires,  and  thus 
find  "psychosomatic  unity"  difficult  to  acheive.  <ibid.:  104) 
Paradoxically,  however,  women  must  appear  dependent,  and  thus  their 
own  needs  "thwarted and  unmet,  go  underground".  (ibid.:  44)  The  mother 
transmits  and  the  daughter  receives  the  idea  that  women' s  needs  are 
often  unacceptable,  the  mother  failing  actively  to  encourage  the 
daughter's  initiatives  or  adequately  and  consistently  to  meet  her 
early  needs.  Thus,  initiating  action  and  satisfying  desire  remains 
fraught  with  difficulty  for  women,  as  does  psychological  separation. 
(ibid.:  45)  Women  "deny,  ignore  or suppress  many  needs  and initiatives 
that  arise  internally"  and  because  of  this  "grow  up  with  a  sense  of 
-115-never  having  received  quite  enough,  and  often  feel  insatiable  and 
unfulfilled".  (ibid.:  78) 
'When  issues  of  separation  and  individuation  are  "re-evoked"  in 
adolescence,  then,  "the  struggle  for  an  identity  separate  from  the 
family  is made  on fairly shaky foundations".  (ibid.:  46)  The  fact  that 
in  puberty  her  body  changes  in  ways  she  cannot  control  "rock (s)  the 
young  woman's  already tenuous  psychic  foundations"  <ibid.:  47)  and  her 
insecurity with  her self beomes  transposed into an insecurity with the 
body,  exacerbated  by  her  mother's  inability  to  convey  unambigously 
the  "positive aspects  of  female  sexuality".  <ibid.:  79)  She  seeks  the 
external  reassurance  and control  of  dieting,  and resolves the  issue  of 
unacceptable  neediness  through  a  rigid  control  of  hunger,  a 
transformation  for  which  her  early  problems  with  eating  had  already 
prepared  her.  She  denies  and  controls her  need  for  food  as  a  metaphor 
for  her  denial  and  control  of  a  needy self.  (ibid. :  48)  Her  aim is to 
"dissassociate  herself  from  her  body,  not  to  be  in  her  body  or  to 
exist  as  a  non-corporeal  being".  The  embryonic  needy  self/body  is 
rejected,  and  a  "false"  self/body  devoid  of  needs  is  projected. 
<ibid.:89)  Orbach,  following  Winnicott,  explains: 
"The  self that  one  has  put  forward  in the expression of  need 
is  implicitly  rejected  by  the  caretaker  in  her  failure  to 
respond  appropriately  to  those  needs.  The  psyche  then 
protectively  develops  a  more  pleasing  'false self' ...  devoid 
of  the  needs  and  the  initiations  which  seemed  to  push  the 
lll.Uch-needed  caretaker away." 
(ibid.:  89) 
This concept  is extended to include  a  "false body": 
"where  the 
experience 
developing  child 
its  physicality 
has 
as 
-116-
not  had  a  chance  to 
good,  wholesome  and essentially  all  right,  it 
authentically  experienced 
fashioned  which  conceals 
insescurity  with  regard  to 
body'." 
(ibid.:  89) 
has  little  chance  to  live  in  an 
body.  A  false  body  is  then 
the  feelings  of  discomfort  and 
the  hidden  or  undeveloped  'inner 
Orbach  argues,  like  Palazzoli,  that  the  body,  in  object-relations 
terms,  comes  to  represent  the  negative  aspects  of  the  mother-as-
object,  the  aspects that  could  not  meet  the child's needs,  as well  as 
the  "bad"  needs  themselves.  The  anorexic  woman's  alienation  from  her 
body  represents her  alienation from both the  bad  object  and  her  needs. 
But  although  she  rejects  her  body,  it is at  the  same  time  "all  that 
she has".  (ibid.:  90) 
The  "unnurtured  real  self ... (is)  split  off  and  repressed",  and  the 
anorexic  woman  withdraws  from  the  disappointing  outer  environment. 
(ibid. :  89-90)  The  body  "has  come  to  represent  the  existence  and 
insistence  of  needs",  and  the  emaciated anorexic  body is "the tangible 
evidence ...  that  she  has  indeed done  away  with the  unnacceptable self". 
(ibid.:  151) 
Anorexia,  then,  is  an  attempt  to  form  a  boundary  around  the  self 
through  the  control  of  eating  and  the  body.  It  substitutes  for  the 
boundary  around  the  "stable  core"  of  internal  needs which  would "arise 
spontaneously  as  a  result  of  a  smooth  journey  through  the  process  of 
separation/individuation"  (ibid.:  176).  If  those  needs  were 
consistently  met,  as they are  for  the  non-anorexic  child,  whose  needs, 
having  been  "correctly  interpreted  in  early  childhood"  can  be  met  as 
-117-an adult  "without  undue  difficulty",  the  anorexic "solution"  would  not 
be  needed.  (ibid.:  91)  Anorexia  is  a  "so:matized  solution"  to  the 
feelings  of  uncontrollable  and  chaotic  neediness,  "a  much  needed 
defence  against  the  exposure  of  a  very  vulnerable  nascent 
1 me 
1
". 
(ibid.:  91) 
During  the  illness,  however,  the  conscious  denial  of  food  is 
transformed,  and  food  refusal  becomes  involuntary.  <ibid.:  97)  Eating 
becomes  a  dangerous  and  "illegitimate"  activity,  and food "a forbidden 
substance"  to  which  the  anorexic  wo:man  has  no  right.  (ibid.:  99) 
Orbach explains: 
"For  the  anorectic  wo:man  there  is  both  an  active  and  a 
passive  relationship  to  food.  This  is  a  complex  idea.  An 
originally active desire  or decision not  to eat or to reduce 
one's food  intake  soon  melds  into an experience  in which the 
anorexic  feels  herself  unable  to  eat ...  the  rituals  and 
regulations  that  come  to  circumscribe  her  food  intake  tend 
to  increase  in  number,  gradually  taking  on  a  life  of  their 
own  in  such  a  way  that  it  becomes  impossible  for  her  to 
envision  eating in  a  spontaneous  way.  Thus  the  origical  act 
of  deciding  consciously  to  intervene  to  reduce  her  eating 
becomes  not  so  much  a  moment  to  moment  act  of  refusal  but 
rather  the  consequence  of  the  labyrinth. of  restrictive 
practices that in effect prevent  her from eating." 
(ibid.:  100-1) 
The  denial  is never  enough,  and it is never  over;  its original  purpose 
of thinness and acceptibility is overtaken  by  the struggle not  to lose 
control.  (ibid.:  107)  Anorexia,  then,  is  "only  tangentially  about 
slimness",  the  real  function  of  which  is  to  prove  that  denial  is 
working.  <ibid.:  109-110) 
-118-The  anorexic  girl  hears  the  same  social  messages  about  the 
unacceptabilitly  of  female  desire as  do  all  women,  but  she  hears  them 
"in  quadraphonic  sound".  (ibid.:  114)  The  individual's  experience, 
Orbach  argues,  has  "social  roots",  and  the  psychoanalytic  account  of 
the  inner  world  of  the  anorexic  woman  must  be  read  in the  context  of 
the  sociological  account  of  the  position of  all  women,  in which  women 
are  food-providers 
themselves  food  in 
but  are  at  the  same  time  expected  to  deny 
order  to  maintain  a  stereotypical  body-image. 
Cibid.:  66-76)  The  anorexic  "solution"  depends  on  the  central 
importance  of  body-image  in  women's  experience;  without  this anorexia 
would  not  be  "an appropriate response  and protest".  (ibid.:  66)  Orbach 
argues  that  a  woman's  identity  is  dependant  on  her  body,  and  that 
women's  subjective experience  of their bodies is mediated  by  "cultural 
factors  outside  themselves",  by  a  "social  overlay"  of  meanings  and 
images.  (ibid.:  70)  In this,  thinness is crucial,  and  she  argues that 
the  emergence  of  thinness  as  an  ideal  for  women  precisely at the  time 
when  women,  in the second wave  of  public  feminism,  were  demanding  more 
public  space,  is no  coincidence.  (ibid.  :  75)  Bodily insecurity,  then, 
is a  reality for all  women. 
Further,  Orbach  argues  that  in  our  culture,  because  of  female 
nurturing,  "the  power  of  the  mother is deeply embedded  in each of  our 
psychologies".  (ibid.:  82)  She  uses  Dinnerstein' s  argument  that  men 
"reject  the  power  of  the  mother  through  the  political  and 
psychological  subjugation  of  women"  to  explain  "the  cultural 
propensity  to  control  women's  bodies".  (ibid.:  83)  The  desire  to 
control  the  mother  denied  to  "the  omnipotent  infantile  part  of  the 
-119-personality"  is  "somewhat  assauged"  by  the  control  of  women's  bodies 
and  female  sexuality.  Ci bid.:  84-5) 
Both  at  the  psychological  and  the  social  level,  therefore,  what  is 
needed  is  an  acceptance  of  female  desire  as  legitimate.  The  personal 
solution  to  body-image  problems  must  go  hand-in-hand  with  the 
extension  of  the  scope  of  women's  lives  and  the  transformation  of 
patriarachal  social  relations  and  the  images  of  women  they  produce. 
Cibid.:  192)  The  anorexic  woman  must  be  helped,  through  therapy,  to 
develop  a  "psychological  and  corporeal  sense  of  self  in  which  needs 
for  contact,  needs  for  hunger  and  other  physical  appetites  could  be 
acknowledged"  and  the  acceptibility of their satisfaction established. 
Cibid.:  91;  134;  165)  The  therapist's  aim is to  show that desire  and 
its  implementation  are  not  in  themselves  essentially  fearful  or 
negative,  to  provide  an  environment  of  "emotional  reliability"  in 
which  needs  get  addressed  and  are  thus  seen  as  acceptable.  (ibid.: 
170;  141).  The  anorexic  woman  will  thus develop  her  embryonic  self to 
a  level  at  which  she  can  satisfy  her  needs  in  a  self-regulated  way, 
and  acheive  psychosomatic  unity  - the  experience  of  the  body  as  owned 
and  lived in.  (ibid.:  145-53)  She  can then speak directly,  rather than 
through her  body. 
Orbach concludes: 
"The  corrective  emotional  food  then  makes  it  possible  for 
her  to  approach  the  wider  environment  differently  as  a 
potential  source  of self-expression and nurture.  In allowing 
herself  to  feel  and  to  act  she  reverses  some  of  the  key 
features  of  socialiazation  towards  femininity ...  she  becomes 
a  person  with  legitimate  desires  and  demands  which  she  can 
now  openly express." (ibid.:  179-80) 
-120-Hunger  Strike  is an  i~~ensely valuable  book.  Susie Orbach's analysis is 
thoughtful,  compassionate  and  helpful.  Especially valuable is her focus 
on  the  issue  of  "needs"  in anorexia:  locating  anorexia as an  aspect  of 
the  social  control  of  female  desire  is a  significant step forward  from 
the  individual  pathology  standpoint  of psychiatric ideology.  The  notion 
of  anorexia  as  an  attempt  to  create  boundaries  around  a  "self" 
experienced  as  fragile  or  absent,  and  of  anorexia  as  a  "two-stage" 
process,  both  of  which,  as  in  Lawrence's  work,  are  central,  and  will 
be  discussed further  in later chapters. 
There  remain,  however,  fundamental  confusions  in  Orbach's  analysis, 
which  stem  from  her  attempt  to  present  a  simultaneously  psychoanalytic 
and  sociological  explanation.  As  we  have  seen,  Orbach  notes  what  she 
terms  "the  tension  that  exists  betweeen  the  two  modes  of  inquiry  - the 
outside  and  the  inside,  the  sociological  and  the  psychoanalytic". 
(ibid.:  76)  But  if  we  look  further  we  see  not  so  much  "tension"  as 
irreconcilability.  As  Roger  Gottlieb points out: 
"psychoanalytic  theory  takes  as  its goal  the  explanation  of 
adult  behaviour  by  reference  to  unconscious  processes  formed 
in early childhood." 
(ibid.:  105) 
A  sociological  understanding  of  psychology,  on  the  other  hand,  has  as 
its  task  the  explication  of  "the  manner  by  which  the  outer  is 
reproduced  in  the  inner,  the  way  social  structures  become  mental  ones". 
(ibid.:  107) 
-121-Orbach  tries  to  maintain  the  view  that  the  "integrated  ego"  is  the 
gender-neutral  goal  of  psychological  development  in  tandem  with  the 
feminist  argument  that  "psychologies  are  gender-specific",  and  this 
confuses  both  her analysis and her therapeutic conclusions.  C1986:  108; 
29)  To  provide  a  thoroughgoing feminist  analysis of  anorexia needs  more 
than  simply  "adding-on"  the  feminist  perspective  to  existing 
psychiatric  orthodoxies.  Rather,  it requires that  "psychology"  be  seen 
within a  feminist  perspective. 
These  arguments  can  be  pursued  through  three  fundamental  issues raised 
by Orbach's analysis of  anorexia:  the constraints which the therapeutic 
aim  places  on  analysis;  the  issue  of  the  social  construction  of 
biological  "needs";  and  the  tension  between  the  concepts  of  the  social 
construction of psychology and the "universal"  self. 
Analysis  with  a  therapeutic  aim  can  too  easily  disregard  the  symptom 
itself  and  its meaning  in  the  search  for  "underlying  causes".  This  is 
the  main  difference  between  the  thesis presented  here  and  Orbach's,  as 
the exploration of the anorexic process in Part Three  will  show. 
A therapeutic  aim  pushes  the  theorist  in  the  direction  of  presenting 
anorexia  as  "curable"  on  the  individual  level.  Orbach  does  argue  that 
political  struggle  as  well  as  individual  therapy  is  needed  if  the 
social  structure  which  produces  anorexia  is  to  be  changed.  However, 
collective  feminist  action  is  heavily  downgraded  in  favour  of 
encouraging  individual  anorexic  women  to  "accept  their  needs".  Cibid.: 
141-157,  179-80,  192;  see  also  Haw  & Parker,  1977)  While  this approach 
-122-is both  worthwhi1e  and  neccessary,  it is  a  great  deal  more  problematic 
than it appears to be  here,  and it is only  on  her last page  that  Orbach 
seems  to  recognize  this.  (ibid.:  192)  For  example,  how  is  the  ex-
anorexic  woman  who  accepts  and  acts  on  her  desires  as  legitimate  to 
deal  with  a  patriarchal  society  which  emphatically  does  not  ?  In  her 
"Afterword"  Orbach  seems  to  suggest  that  such  acceptance  will  proceed 
"naturally"  from  what  she  calls the  extension  of  the  scope  of  women's 
lives  (ibid.:  192),  but  she  gives  no  clues  as  to  haw  this  is to  be 
achieved.  This  neatly  sidesteps  the  reality  of  patriarchal  power,  the 
profound  depth  of  change  any  feminist  transformation  of  society  would 
neccessitate,  and the  liklihood of resistance to such change. 
Further,  although  she  argues  that  anorexia  should  be  seen  not  as 
pathology  but  as  on  a  continuum  of  attitudes  to  food  and  the  body 
shared  by  all  women  she  goes  on  to  undermine  this  position  by  re-
presenting,  albeit  in  a  more  understanding  format,  the  idea,  so  famed 
in  psychiatric  ideology,  of  the  pathology-causing  mather.  <ibid.:  24; 
48)  In  her  suggestion that  the  therapist-as-good-mather  can  "undo"  the 
underlying  causes  of  anorexia  by  a  positive  presentation  of  female 
desire  we  are  again  working  on  the  assumption  that  mothers  "cause" 
anorexia,  and  "correct"  mothering  can  prevent  it.  (ibid.:  170-9)  This 
sits  most  uneasily  with  the  argument  that  anorexia  has  social  causes, 
and  with  Orbach's  own  criticisms of  conventional  psychiatric  treatment 
of  the  anorexic  woman  as  a  moral  child.  (ibid. :  186)  Further,  this 
position  seems  to  argue  that  the  "legitimacy"  of  autonomous  female 
desire  can  be  subjectively  accepted  by  women  as  individuals  in  a 
-123-patriarchal  culture  in  which  such  a  reappraisal  is  a  profoundly 
political  - and  dangerous  - act. 
As  we  have  seen,  Orbach argues that anorexic  women  feel  a  "particularly 
heightened  sensi ti  vi  ty"  to  socialization in  femininity  - they  hear  the 
culture's  messages  "in  quadraphonic  sound".  (ibid.:  19;  114)  Further, 
the  anorexic  woman  feels  her  needs  more  strongly.  (ibid.:  142>  So  is 
their experience qualitatively different  ?  And  if so,  ho~  and  why?  Is 
this  to  be  laid  at  the  door  of  bad  mothering  too  ?  If so,  how  do 
feminists  answer  the  contention that all that  is needed  is a  return to 
good  mothering  ?  The  need  for  a  transformation  of  social  structure 
becomes  tenuous  if  some  - that  is,  non-anorexic  - women  can  "balance" 
the  tension  between  femininity  and  living  independent  lives.  Ci bid. : 
29)  We  are  again  teetering  on  the  brink  of  individual  pathology 
arguments  which  legitimate  individualistic  solutions,  teaching  women 
how  to  "balance"  irreconcilable  social  demands  rather  than  changing 
them. 
The  second  issue  raised  is  that  of  biological  "need".  In  Fat  is  a 
Feminist  Issue  Orbach  argues  that  if  women  were  not  subject  to  social 
pressure  towards  thinness  they  would attain a  weight  that  was  "natural" 
to  them  by  listening to their body tell them what  and  how  much  food  to 
eat.  0978)  The  suggestion  here  is that  the  body  "knows"  which  foods 
and  what  quanti ties  it  needs;  without  social  interference  we  could 
regulate  eating  and  body-shape  according  to  these  internal  mes~;ages. 
This  idea  of  "natural"  appetite  existing outside  of  the  social  is also 
assumed  in  Hunger  Strike.  For  example,  Orbach  argues,  as  we  have  seen, 
-124-seen,  that  because  of  the  objectification of  the  female  body  in  modern 
Western  culture  women  cannot  have  "an  unmediated  or  purely  physical 
relation to their bodies"  (1986:  36).  She  argues  too that  the  body  has 
"basic  physical  needs  that  arise  quasi  -independantly",  needs  which,  if 
their  "internal  cues"  were  "correctly  interpreted"  in  childhood  would 
be  unproblematic  in adulthood.  <ibid.:  91;  81;  91) 
What  she  assumes  here  is that  without such objectification,  or  "wrong" 
interpretations,  unmediated  physicality  is  possible.  'We  must  assume 
that  for  men,  and  perhaps  for  properly  brought-up  women,  this  is  how 
they experience  their bodies.  In Chapter Five the notion of the  body  as 
a  social  construction  rather  than  a  simple  biological  given  will  be 
more  fully  investigated,  but  briefly,  if  we  look  at  the  body 
sociologically,  seeing  that  both  social  conceptualisations  and 
subjective  experiences  of  the  body  change  historically  and  differ  for 
different social  groups,  the  ideas of  a  purely physical  apprehension of 
the  body,  and  of  purely  physical  appetites  which  exist  outside  history 
and  social  structure,  become  questionable.  <See  Swartz,  1985  and 
Diamond,  1985)  It is  not  that  men  have  a  "natural"  relationship  with 
their  bodies  and  their  physical  "needs"  and  that  sexism prevents  women 
having  the  same,  but  that  men's  needs  and  women's  needs,  men's  bodies 
and  women's  bodies,  have  different meanings  in a  patriarchal culture. 
The  concept  of  the  body  as  a  self-contained  psychosomatic  unity  which 
expresses  itself  through  manipulation  of  the  outer  environment  around 
its own  desires is the  dominant  body-concept  of  our culture and,  as  one 
would  expect  in a  patriarchal culture,  is phallocentric.  For  women  such 
-125-psychosomatic  harmony  does  not  exist,  for  the  dominant  body-concept  co-
exists,  for  women,  with  the  "sub-text"  of  femininity.  In  this,  women's 
selves,  as  well  as  their  bodies,  are  objects  in  the  masculine 
environment,  and  their  "boundaries"  are  fluid  and  penetrable  rather 
than  self-contained  and  invasive.  This  is  the  source  both  of  women's 
"problems"  with the  body  and  men's  "ease"  with it.  Arguing thus,  we  can 
reject the notion of  a  supposedly more  "natural"  masculine  apprehension 
of  physicality as  well  as  the  presentation  of  this natural  physicality 
as the proper goal  of "maturity". 
No  experience  of  the  physical  is  possible  "outside"  of  social 
categorizations,  definitions  and  imagery.  The  acceptance  of  natural, 
gender-neutral  and  ahistorical  biological  needs  by  Orbach  is 
illustrative  of  the  lack  of  sufficiency  and  depth  of  her  feminist 
criticism  of  psychiatric  ideas.  It  is  not  only  psychology  which  is 
gender-specific;  so too is the experience  of  physical  needs. 
Finally,  an  unexplicated  confusion  between  the  notion  of  the  self as  a 
social  construction  and  the  idea  of  a  "natural"  self  - of  "human 
nature"  - can  be  detected  in  Orbach's  work  on  anorexia.  Orbach  argues 
that  psychology  is  socially  created;  and  in  her  discussion  of  the 
mother-daughter relationship she  begins  with  the  caveat  that this model 
of  parenting  and  her  comments  on it are  "time  and culturally specific". 
(1986:  42:  58) 
This historical  and sociological  focus,  however,  simply does  not  go far 
enough  it  is  added  on  to  rather  than  integrated  with  the 
-126-psychoanalytic  slant  of  her  work.  It  seems  that  it  is  only  feliiale 
psychology  which  is  truly  a  social  creation  - the  masculine  self 
remains  the  invisible  and  unanalysed  standard  against  which  the 
"problems"  of  the  insecure  female  self  are  measured,  and  the  goal 
towards  which  therapy  is directed.  Orbach  argues  that  the  "individual 
psyche  absorbs  and  interprets  cultural  values"  and  implies,  therefore, 
that the  psyche,  at least  in "embryonic"  form as "the truncated person" 
exists  outside  of  culture,  which  effects  the  self  but  does  not 
construct  it.  (ibid.:  128;  130)  She  sees  the  concept  of  a  self 
organized around  a  core  of  needs  and desires which it satisfies through 
exploitation  of  "the  facilitating  environment"  as  both  gender-neutral 
and  ahistorical  and,  thus,  a  desirable  goal.  This  is what  the  anorexic 
woman  - and  all  women  - would  be  if  their  "psychosomatic  devlopment" 
were  not  "stunted".  (ibid.:  148) 
A sociological  perspective,  however,  would suggest that this conception 
of  the  self,  and  the  related  conception  of  the  body,  is  far  from  the 
"natural"  result  of  "correct"  psychological  development.  If  we  argue 
that  the  self-contained  self  is  explicable  only  in  the  context  of 
bourgeois  individualism in  which  the  "individual"  is masculine  and  the 
environment  is there  to  be  used  and  manipulated,  we  can see  that  women 
cannot  simply  decide  to attain this form  of  subjectivity,  since  one  of 
the  conditions  of  its  existence  is  the  construction  of  a  receptive 
female  psychology  and  body-concept  as its "opposite".  Women  are  part  of 
the  "facilitating  environment"  as  objects  through  which  the  masculine 
subject  expresses  itself.  Women  do  not,  as  Orbach  argues,  "deny" 
selfhood;  rather,  it  is  denied  them  by  patriarchal  social  relations. 
-127-The  anorexic  ritual,  in  attempting  to  create  the  body  as  an 
impenetrable  barrier  through  control  of  intake  is  a  response  and  a 
resistance to those relations. 
Women's  receptive  psychology  is  not,  then,  a  result  of  "incorrect" 
development  but  is  a  result  of  the  social  control  of  women  in 
patriarchal  culture.  And  in  focusing  so  heavily  on  the  mother-daughter 
relationship,  Orbach  "psychologizes"  and  domesticates  the  social 
control  of  women,  using  much  the  same  arguments  as  Chernin,  albeit  in 
more  sophisticated  form.  Personality  is  not  created  in  one 
relationship,  but  through  all  social  relations.  There  is little  point 
in  replacing  the  isolated  oedipal  triangle  floating  in  unsocialized 
ether  with  an  equally  isolated  mother-daughter  dyad.  <See  De leuze  and 
Guattari,  1977;  Gottlieb,  1984)  It is not  just mothers  who  do  not  meet 
daughters'  needs  appropriately;  rather,  those  "needs"  are  socially 
unacceptable  and threaten patriarchal  order. 
Anorexia,  and  feminine  psychology  in general,  is better analysed  fully 
sociologically.  The  idea  of  a  mechanical  transmission of culture by  the 
mother  is partial,  an  abstraction  which  can  too  easily  be  seen as  the 
only  reality.  Other  relationships  with  women,  and,  crucially,  the 
effect  of  relations  with  men  in  general,  and  the  institution  of 
heterosexuality  in  particular  can  all  too  easily  disappear.  Orbach 
concentrates  on  mothers'  socialization  of  daughters'  into  a  denial  of 
desire  but  does not  consider sufficiently why  such denial  is neccessary 
and  how  it is maintained outside of the  mother-daughter relationship. 
-128-As  Gottlieb  points  out,  infantile  experience  - in  Orbach's  case,  the 
experience  of  the  mother-daughter  relationship  - "takes  its  social 
meaning  from  its  place  in  an  overall  system  of  social  relations". 
(ibid.:  111)  He  argues: 
"the experience  of  a  child up to age  two  or three  would  be  a 
great  deal  less  important  were  it not  reinforced  throughout 
the rest of his or her life." 
(ibid.:  116) 
Mothering,  then,  is  "at  most ... part  of  the  process  by  which  male 
domination  reproduces  itself",  rather  than  "the  primary  cause  of 
patriarchy".  (ibid.:  11'7;  94) 
Orbach  accepts  too  readily  the  psychiatric  frame  of  reference,  and 
fails  to  take  the  feminist  critique  of  gender-roles  far  enough.  Both 
these  features  of  Orbach's thesis obscure  what  is otherwise  valuable  in 
her work. 
The  work  of  Orbach  and  Lawrence  - and,  to  a  lesser  extent,  Chernin  -
represents  a  major  theoretical  advance  on  the  psychiatric  definition 
of  anorexia  as  individual  pathology.  All  three  writers define  anorexia 
as  a  cultural  phenomenon,  and  point  to  continuities,  in  their 
relationships  to  food  and  the  body,  between  anorexic  and  non-anorexic 
women.  Further,  the concepts  of  desire and dependence  which appeared so 
obliquely  in  the  work  of  Crisp  et  al  are  given  a  more  prominent 
position  and  subjected  to  a  more  rigorous  analysis  by  Orbach  and 
Lawrence. 
-129-This  theoretical  advance  is,  however,  partial,  and  is  hampered  by  an 
incomplete  acceptance  of  the  social  construction  of  the  self  and  the 
body  and,  consequently,  of  the  place  of  the  gender-division  in 
physicality  and  subjectivity.  Vlithout  a  sociological  analysis  of  the 
construction  of  desire  and  the  body  as  gendered  within  a  specific 
cultural  context  the  anorexic  symptom  canmake  only partial sense.  Such 
an analysis will  be  pursued in Part Three. 
The  theoretical  issues  involved  in a  sociological  analysis of  anorexia 
are,  however,  complex,  and are  more  easily grasped if we  have  some  idea 
of  how  anorexic  women  themselves perceive their bodies,  their appetites 
and  their  illness.  The  following  chapter,  then,  offers  an  initial 
investigation of  these  issues. 
-130-Part  Two Chapter  Four:  Anorexic  meanings 
Lucy  is  now  eighteen.  She  was  anorexic  for  one  year  between  the  ages 
of  fifteen  and  sixteen,  and  now  considers  herself  recovered.  Her 
background is middle-class. 
"I  suppose  it  started  around  January/February  1985,  and  it  got 
gradually  worse  through  the  whole  year...  It  happened  when  I  was 
fifteen,  sixteen,  you  know,  and  it was  a  real  crucial  time  as far  as 
school  was  concerned,  right  in the  middle  of  my  0-Levels.  I  mean  I  sat 
through  my  0-Levels  weighing  about  five  stone,  and  I  managed  to  get 
seven  A's  and  a  B,  you  know,  I  just can't  understand  how ...  !  gave  my 
school  a  shock,  because  I  was  sitting my  0-Levels looking like nothing 
on  earth basically  ...  !  just  wanted  to  be  thinner  and it just  got  out 
of  hand. 
I  went  on  a  diet,  you  see,  and  well  it just went  too far ... It's a  very 
fine  balance  and  if  you  go  too  far  you  really aren't  responsible  for 
what  you're  doing,  you  lose  control ... I  started  to  eat  sort  of  less, 
sort  of  cut  down  to  a  certain  level,  and  as  I  managed  - because,  you 
see,  as  you  eat  less  and  less  your  stomach  actually  shrinks  and  so 
eventually,  if  you're  persistent  enough,  what  you  do  eat  makes  you 
feel  full,  so  you  think,  oh,  I  ought  to  eat  less,  and  you  just  go  on 
like  that ...  because  your  stomach  does  shrink.  I  mean  when  I  went  in 
Cto  hospital)  my  stomach  was  about  the size of  a  walnut. 
-131-Initially when  I  went  on  the  diet,  I  mean  it was  a  success,  it  worked 
and  I  thought,  hey,  this is brilliant  ... I  would  have  a  piece  of  toast 
for  breakfast,  and  to  begin  with  I  had  sort  of  a  sandwich  and  fruit 
for  lunch,  but  then eventually  I  cut  out the  sandwich,  and  then  when  I 
got  home  from  school,  I  would  have  something  like  a  boiled  egg  and  a 
piece  of  bread,  something  like  that,  baked  beans  on  toast,  something 
that  would  be  classified as pretty light,  but  that  would  be  it really, 
apart  from  perhaps - I  used to have  hot  milk before  I  went  to  bed,  but 
that  would  be it really  ...  that  was  in the  week  days,  during the  week  I 
was  in  school,  so  that  was  moulded  round  the  school  day,  but  at  the 
weekends  I  tended  to  eat  a  bit  more,  I  used  to  eat  with  the  family, 
sort  of  Sunday  roasts  and  things  like  that,  and  that  was  at  the 
beginning.  I  just started to eat  less of  everything. 
Sweets  were  the first to go,  and chocolate  I  suppose.  After  that for  a 
long  while  it  was  just  sort  of  small  amounts  of  everything ... I  was 
eating  tiny  bits,  right  up  until  about  the  day  before  I  went  into 
hospital,  but  the  weight  was  just falling off ... I  mean  at home,  we  eat 
very  - healthily,  is that the  word  ?  I  just sort of  had little bits of 
everything  - I  remember  once  mum  cutting  up  sausage  into  tiny  little 
bits so  that  I  could eat  it,  I  was  just  like  a  little baby ... I'd try 
and  get  a  bit  of  porridge  down  me  for  breakfast,  with  some  milk  and 
some  brown  sugar  on,  something  like that.  I  don't  know  how  much,  it's 
very  blurred ...  Sort  of  bits of  bread  with  Marmite  on- I  had  glucose, 
you  know  that  powdered  glucose  you  can get  ?  Sort  of  stir that  into a 
drink,  lemon  squash or  something ... If  I  could avoid it I  would,  but  if 
my  mother  approached  me  with the  drink,  I  wouldn't  say- well,  in  the 
-132-last  day  I  probably  would  have  said  no,  but  generally  I  took  it 
because  I  knew  it was  right,  I  mean  I'm not  thick,  I  was  just ill  ...  To 
begin  with  I  ate  on  my  own,  so  that  no-one  would  see  how  little  I  was 
eating,  but  eventually  my  parents  wised  to  it  and  realised  that  I 
wasn't  eating  much  at  all,  and  I  ate  with  them ...  you  lie,  you  don't 
mean  to but  you  just  do. 
Once  I'd eaten  I'd feel  really full,  because  my  stomach  was  so  small, 
but  I  wouldn't  start  to  get  hysterical  about  it,  really.  I  would 
sometimes  get  a  bit  upset,  because  I  felt  so  full  - because  nobody 
likes feeling  bloated and full,  and  my  parents couldn't understand how 
I  could  feel  bloated  and  full  on  half  a  sausage  and  a  mouthful  of 
potato and  3  peas,  but  I  really did.  I  mean  I  don't  know  whether  I  was 
full,  but  my  mind  was  telling me  I  was  over,  and  my  mind  was  so  locked 
in that it convinced  me. 
I  wanted  to  be  a  dancer,  and  I  wanted  to  lose  weight ... it was  because 
of  the  dancing,  I  was  prancing  around  in  a  leotard  which  shows 
everything anyway ...  so  I  did,  I  lost about  half  a  stone and it looked 
really nice,  I  looked really good,  it was  great,  I  mean  I  lost it off 
my  thighs  and  my  bottom  and  it  was  just  right  and  I  should  have 
stopped  just  there,  because  I  wasn't  anywhere  near  anorexic  at  that 
point,  I  looked  fine,  but 
something,  I  just don't  know. 
I  don't  know  what  made  me  go  on, 
I  never  used  laxatives,  I  never  used  diuretics either,  I  just stopped 
eating ... early on  in the  diet,  I  would  feel  really good ... I  would  have 
-133-a  preconceived  idea  of  what  I  would  have  in the  day,  and  some  days  I 
would  be  so  hungry,  I  was  hungry  to  begin  with,  not  eating  so  much, 
Cand)  some  days  I  did  have  an  extra  piece  of  bread  or  something  like 
that  and  think it was  the  end  of  the  world ... I  was  starving,  I  really 
was  hungry,  but  I  just had so much  will,  I'm a  very willful person and 
I  just  had  so  much  willpower  I  just  fought  it all  the  time  until  it 
went,  and it did,  it did eventually. 
It  was  a  struggle,  it  was  like  a  sort  of  internal  struggle,  I  knew 
that  I  should  have  been  eating,  but  again there  was  this other force, 
mind,  whatever  you  want  to  call  it that  was  telling  me,  no,  I  don't 
need  it,  and  eventually the  thing telling me  mot  to eat  it,  the  thing 
inside  me  saying not  to eat,  took over completely,  sort of  blocked  out 
any  sense  of  reasoning at all ...  I  did try to  <start eating),  but  half-
heartedly,  I  was  too  entrenched  in  it really,  too  engulfed  by  the 
whole  sort  of  - it just  overtook  me.  I  mean  once  I'd - I  did  make  a 
few  attemtps  at  trying to  <and)  I  found  I  just couldn't,  and that  was 
the  beginning  of  the  realization that  I  needed  some  help,  to suddenly 
find  that  I  couldn't  do  what  I  wanted,  because this was  the  essence  of 
it  for  me  really,  that  I  was  doing  what  I  wanted  and  I  felt  in 
control ...  but  when  I  wanted  to  eat  more  again,  I  couldn't,  and  that 
upset  me,  because  I  want  to  be  able  to  do  what  I  want,  I  like to  feel 
that  I  can,  but  I  couldn't,  and it was  quite upsetting. 
Throughout  the  whole  Ctime),  especially in the  last few  weeks  I  was  at 
home  before  I  went  into hospital  I  was  continually being told,  look at 
what  you're  doing  to  yourself,  you're  killing yourself,  and  I  ignored 
-134-it,  really,  because  I  was  so ill  ... It surprises  me  how  long  it took to 
connect  that  I  had  it.  I  remember  someone  saying  to  me  once,  before  I 
got  really  bad,  gosh,  you've  lost  a  lot  of  weight,  better  watch  it, 
you'll  go  anorexic,  and  I  remember  saying,  oh,  what  a  joke ... It  took 
me  a  long  time  to realise  that  I  had  it,  because  part  of  the  illness 
is to try and  ignore  the fact that you  are ill and carry on,  no  matter 
how  thin or  light  you  become.  I  didn't actually start admitting that  I 
needed  some  help  until  I  was  pretty  ill,  you  know.  It  took  a  long 
time ...  But  then  towards  the  end  I  began  to  feel  -you  can  sort  of 
block it off,  it's like if you  have  a  bad cold,  you  can carry on,  and 
ignore it,  and  just carry on and go  out  and do  whatever  you're doing-
that's  what  I  was  doing  with  the  anorexia,  but  eventually  I  just 
became  so  ill that  I  couldn't  ignore  it in the  end.  I  remember  lying 
in  bed,  I  think  it  was  the  night  before  I  went  into  hospital  and  I 
just felt so ill  . . it hurt to lie in bed  because  my  bones  were  sticking 
out  - just the  most  awful  feeling ...  At  that  point  I  realised  I  needed 
help,  and  I  didn't really want  to die.  Because  I  was,  I  was  dying. 
I  couldn't  eat,  I  just couldn't  eat.  I  got  to  a  point  where  I  wanted 
to,  actually,  because  I  knew  I  was  ill,  and  I  wanted  to  - I  just 
couldn't,  I  can't  explain  it,  I  just  couldn't  ... I  felt  very  out  of 
control,  because  the  weight  was  just  dropping  off  me ... Alright,  you 
did  start  it,  but  once  you  get  past  a  certain  point,  it  is 
uncontrollable,  and  you  aren't responsible  for  your  own  actions." 
-135-"I  went  down  to  about  four-and-a-half  <stones)  which  was  just  not  on, 
you  can't  cope  with it at  home,  when  you're  that  weight,  so  I  had  to 
go  to  hospital ... I  just  lost  so  much  weight  that  I  had  to  go  into 
hospital  to  have  it put  back  on ...  about  early July  C1985)  I  went  into 
hospital  for  four  months ... it was  my  decision.  I  went  to the hospital, 
the  physician examined  me,  and  my  parents came  too.  He  spoke to  me  all 
the  time,  he  di  dn' t  really  talk  to  my  parents,  but  my  parents  were 
there at that  point.  He  said you're  very ill and you  need to come  into 
hospital  and  you  can either come  in here,  and  he  described what  he  was 
going  to  do  if  I  came  in,  put  me  an  a  nasal-gastric  tube,  blah  blah 
blah,  or  I  could  go  back  home,  and  if  I  went  back  home  I  would  have 
been  put  in  a  psychiatric  hospital.  I  didn't  really  think  of  it,  you 
know,  'I don't  want  to  go  to  a  psychiatric  hospital' -I was  just so 
weak  at  that  time,  I  just  didn't  want  to  go  any  where  else,  I  just 
wanted  to  stay  in  that  hospital,  I  didn't  want  to  go  anywhere,  so  I 
just said,  I'll stay here. 
He  explained  exactly what  was  going  to  happen  if  I  came  in  ...  he  said, 
we'll tell  you  everything that  happens,  what  we're doing,  but  you  must 
do  as  we  say,  as far as the drip is concerned.  But as far as eating is 
concerned,  he  said,  you  can eat  as  much  or as little as you  want.  If  I 
didn't  eat  anything  then  they'd  just  put  me  on  a  full-strength  drip 
all the  time,  and  if  I  did eat,  and  put  on  weight  they would  gradually 
reduce  the  drip because  I  would  be  able to  manage  by myself. 
Vlhen  I  was  first  admitted,  I  cauldn' t  eat  at all,  so  I  had  a  nasal-
gastric  tube  and  I  was  drip fed  with highly concentrated stuff,  but it 
-136-was  diluted  to  begin  with,  a  quarter  strength,  then  gradually  it  was 
half  strength  and  then  full  strength.  And  then  as  I  got  stronger  the 
amount  was  increased,  and  then  as  I  put  on  weight  the  amount  was 
decreased,  because  as  I  put  on  weight  I  began  to  feel  I  could  manage 
to  eat  again.  So  first  of  all  I  had  the  drip,  because  I  was  totally 
dependant  on  it,  but  then  as  I  managed  to  eat  mare  I  could  have  my 
drip fluid reduced.  But  I  had  my  drip throughout  the  whale  time  I  was 
in hospital really,  apart  from the  last week. 
At  first  I  was  pretty relieved actually  Cta  have  the  drip).  But  I  did 
get  frustrated  because  - I  was  still ill,  I  was  still ill in  my  mind 
when  I  came  out  of hospital,  I  still,  you  know,  thought  I  was  fat ... 
Because  I've  got  to  understand  that  I  was  very  weak  and  I  wasn't 
aware,  and  as  I  put  on  weight  it  was  like  waking  up,  it  was  like 
coming  out  of  a  deep  sleep,  well  not  a  deep  sleep  - everything  was  a 
bit blurred,  <and)  still remains  a  bit difficult to  remember ... 
When  I  was  in hospital  I  used  to  feel  - all  the  old  ladies  or  other 
people  in  the  ward  would  say,  what's  wrong  with  her  ? ,  you  know, 
because  I  was  so  thin,  cheekbones  were  out  to  here,  bones  were  out 
everywhere  really,  and  the drip  was  down  me ...  They'd find out  some  way 
or  other  - well,  perhaps they wouldn't  find  out,  but  I  felt  threatened 
- hunching  over  what  I  was  trying to  eat,  and  getting as  far  back  in 
my  chair near the wall  as possible  so  no-one  would  see ... 
-137-There  was  this  one  old  lady  on  the  other  side  of  the  ward  and  she  was 
talking to  one  of  the  others in a  loud voice,  going  on  about  this girl 
on  the  other  side  of  the  ward,  going  through  my  whole  sort  of  eating, 
what  I'd  eaten  that  day  and  I  just  felt  - that  destroyed  me  for  a 
couple  of  days,  when  my  parents  next  came  in  to  see  me  I  was  in 
tears ... 
Another  thing  I  had  to  do  in  hospital  was  write  down  how  much  I  ate. 
So  when  the  consultant  came  round  - he  used  to  come  round  three  times 
a  week- he  used to look and see ... 
'When  I  started  to  eat  in  hospital,  I  started  on  porridge,  and  soup, 
and  that  was  it.  It  was  pushed  forward  by  the  nurses  to  a  certain 
extent,  pushing  forward  things  that  were  - easy  to  get  down,  you 
know ... I  mean  you  don't  have  to  chew  them,  do  you? ... <they)  weren't 
too  sort  of  frightening,  because  food  frightened  me.  Every  time  - you 
know  these  big  metal  food  trolleys  ?  - every  time  they  came  into  the 
ward  in the  first  two  weeks  I  used  to  just  burst  into tears,  it just 
caused  me  so  much  stress  and  upset.  So  it  was  soup  and  porridge  to 
begin  with,  then  sandwiches  with  the  crust  cut  off,  that  sort  of 
thing.  I  mean,  you  really  go  back  to  being  a  little baby.  That's  the 
way  I  tackled it. 
Of  course  I  got  frustrated.  I  remember  bursting  into  tears  once  just 
after  I'd had  my  tea  on  the  ward,  'I've eaten too  much,  I've eaten too 
much',  and  the  nurse  would  say,  of  course  you  haven't,  and  would 
calmly  get  this chart  out  and  show  me  that  I  was  well  below  average 
-138-weight  and  that  I  really  ought  to  eat  a  bit  more  anyway.  <That  was) 
reason coming  back into it  ... 
When  I  reached  about  six  stone  I  was  sent  to  a  psychiatrist ...  once  a 
week  I  would ...  have  a  chat  with  him.  At  first  I  hated  him ...  he  was 
trying to get  me  to realise  why  I'd done  it,  and  I  didn't like that at 
all.  And  I  felt  he  was  sort  of  probing  into  my  personal  life,  you 
know,  he  was  asking  me  about  my  family  and  everything  and  I  didn't 
like  it  at  all.  But  there  again,  you  see,  I  was  ill,  I  was 
hypersensitive  to  those  sort  of  questions.  But  eventually,  you  know  -
we  parted the best of friends. 
One  of  the  great  boosts  for  me  actually  in  my  recovery  was  to  get  my 
0-Level  results,  because  I  suddenly realised,  hey,  I've done  something 
good.  Because  I  remember  the  doctor  came  round  the  day  the  results 
came  out  and  said  to  me  of  course  you  realise  that  you've  probably 
failed  them all ...  when  I  told  the  doctors  they  were  really  amazed.  It 
was  just  brilliant,  and  it  gave  me  quite  a  bit  of  a  buck  up,  it was 
really good. 
The  first  really  good  thing  about  it  was  that  I  wasn't  in  a 
psychiatric  ward ... I  went  into  this  general  medical  ward  which  was 
much  better  - I  mean  I • ve  no  experience  of  a  psychai tric  ward,  but 
just  from  reading  about  other  people's  experiences,  it  sounds 
horrific. 
-139-At  the  beginning  the  nurses  wrote  down  what  I  was  eating,  and  then  I 
took  over  myself  because  they  began  to  trust  me,  I  suppose.  Again,  I 
was  pretty unusual  in there because  I  didn't  become  very  devious,  or -
I  mean  I  know  a  lot  of  anorexics do,  and are  throwing  food  away,  but  I 
tried  to  be  honest,  and  eventually  I  was  doing  my  own  drip  as  well, 
getting the cartons out of the fridge  and filling it up ... 
It was  acute,  but it wasn't  chronic,  I  was  a  lot  more  receptive to the 
treatment and didn't  want to fight it,  I  was  just very  lucky." 
"I  did  improve  a  bit  in  hospital,  I  mean  I  had  to,  otherwise  if  I 
hadn't  I  would  have  left hospital  and  just stopped eating again.  When 
I  left hospital  I  was  sufficiently  well  enough  to  realise  that  I  had 
to eat ...  I  considered it  <not  eating),  but  I  knew  that it was  just,  it 
wasn't  on. 
Xy  reaction to coming  out  of  hospital  was  gosh  I'm so  glad to  come  out 
of  hospital  I'm going  to really try  and  eat  enough  to  keep  myself  out 
of  hospital  and  to  persevere.  When  I  came  out  of  hospital  it  wasn't 
uphill  all  the  way,  I've  got  to  admit,  I  did  lose  quite  a  bit  of 
weight  but  not  so  much  as  to  put  me  back  in.  I  nearly  did  but  not 
quite ... It was  quite  a  threat to  me  for  a  while. 
I  was  ill  in  my  mind,  yes,  when  I  came  out  of  hospital  it  was  a 
constant battle with reason  and  my  sick mind,  because  my  sick mind  was 
-140-saying  you  don't  need  to  eat,  you  don't  need  food,  and  my  - reason 
would  come  back  and  would  say  to  me,  of  course  you  must,  because  you 
can't survive  without  food. 
It  was  quite  strange  actually  because  my  mind  seemed  to  heal  or  get 
better  as  I  was  losing  weight  after  I  was  out.  I  still  can't 
understand  it now.  It  was  very  strange  - I  think  it was  just  down  to 
stress  and  the  different  environment,  coming  from  hospital. .. when  I 
came  out  and  was  walking  around  a  bit more  active  and  going  to school 
I  lost  a  bit  of  weight,  I  ate  about  the  same  but  I  still  lost  it, 
because  if  you  increase  your  activity level  then  you're  going  to,  but 
the  problem was  that  I  didn't have  any appetite,  so  I  had  no  incentive 
to eat any  more  to compensate,  but  eventually  my  goodness it came." 
When  Lucy  came  out  of  hospital  she  was  very  concerned  with  eating 
"normal"  portions  and  eating  what  "normal"  people  ate  but  what  was  a 
normal  portion on  the  plate  looked  enormous  and  she  continually had  to 
get  reassurance  from her parents that it was  a  normal  portion.  If  she 
was  helping herself to rice  or potatoes,  they would  sometimes tell her 
that  a  normal  portion  was  really  a  bit  more,  but  at  first  she  just 
couldn't  bring herself to eat any more. 
"It  took  a  long  time,  when  I  came  out  of  hospital  it  was  still  an 
effort,  and  I  didn't  feel  hungry  for  lii.Onths  afterwards,  months  and 
months  and  months. 
-141-Well,  it  was  strange,  I  used  to  have  meals,  have  decent  meals,  you 
know,  and  not  feel  any different  from when  I  went  to the  table to  when 
I  left  it.  And  then  I  would  get  - eventually  I  did  get  periods  of 
hunger,  real  hunger,  and  that  used  to  be  a  bit  frightening  in  a  way, 
because  I  hadn't  had  them for so  long.  I  used to- I  didn't  panic,  but 
I  felt a  bit  insecure really. 
It  wasn't  until  I  started to  recover  or  try to  put  on  weight  that  I 
started to  feel  revulsions  against  certain  foods.  I  felt  that  it  was 
wrong  to eat some  things. 
Once  I  was  recovering,  it  took  me  a  long  time  to  get  round  to  meat 
again,  a  long  time,  and  then  when  I  actually  did,  it was  minced  meat 
because it was  easier to get  down ...  and it took  me  even  longer  to  get 
round to puddings and things. 
It  happened  sa  slowly.  I  mean  you  don't  wake  up  one  day  and  think,  I 
like  food,  it happens  sa slowly that  you  don't  realise it's happening 
until  suddenly  you  realise  - suddenly  you  just  think,  oh  good,  it's 
suppertime,  and  suddenly  you  think,  gosh,  I  just  said  good,  it's 
suppertime.  It's  like  training  yourself  again ...  becoming  anorexic  is 
losing  one  of  the  basic  functions,  animal  functions,  animal  instincts 
of  being  hungry,  and this is why  I  think it's something  physical  that 
must  trigger  it,  because  it's  a  basic  innate  response,  isn't  it, 
inborn,  and  you  actually  train  yourself  out  of  it,  and  training 
yourself  back  into  it is  very  hard.  This  is  why  some  people  die, 
because  they just haven't  the  willpower  to train themselves back- OK, 
-142-you  need  willpower  to  become  anorexic,  but  you  need  about  a  hundred 
times  more  to  come  out  of it again ...  Only  you can do it,  you  see.  They 
can't do  it for  you.  You  have  to want  to do  it as well. 
I  didn't  want  to  go  back  into hospital  and  I  didn't  want  to  become  so 
ill again,  because  I  had  my  school-work to get  on with,  and  I  began to 
realise that  life wasn't  that bad after all,  and it was  worth living. 
I  still  want  to  put  on  some  weight ...  I  haven't  had  any  periods 
yet ... I'm  a  bit  worried  about  the  fact  that  I  haven't  had  a  period 
since  February  1985 ...  They'll  just come  back eventually because  I  will 
put  on  weight,  I  know  it will  happen,  but  again  you  see  it's really 
slow,  and  you  just  have  to  be  patient  with  yourself.  The  slower  it 
happens,  the  more  likely the  weight  will stay on.  If  I  go  out  with the 
specific  aim of  putting on,  I  don't  know,  half  a  stone,  it'll be  a  lot 
harder  than just letting it happen. 
I  mean  that's what  I  really want  to happen,  and  once that happens then 
I'll  know  that  I  am  categorically,  definitely,  fundamentally  normal 
weight,  you  know,  and  that'll  be  it.  And  I  know  there  won't  be  any 
real  danger  of  me  - well,  I  suppose  I  really ought  to keep  a  check  on 
it,  there  is  the  theory  that  once  you  have  anorexia  you'll  never  be 
the  same  again,  and  all  that  sort  of  stuff,  but  I  don't  think  I'll 
ever slip back again,  I  really don't.  I  honestly feel  that. 
It  wasn't  a  very  pleasant  experience,  but  I  learnt  an  awful  lot  about 
myself,  and  about  other people,  and  about  life  in general,  from it.  CI 
-143-learnt)  that  I'm not  perfect,  that  I  do  have  some  sort of  contribution 
to  make  to  the  world.  I  mean,  the  whole  thing  of  becoming  anorexic  is 
due  to  lack  of  self-esteem,  I  feel,  because  you  don't  like  yourself 
very  much,  you  want  to destroy  yourself,  and  you  have  to  like yourself 
to  keep  yourself  going.  I  mean  you  go  through  periods  of  thinking, 
gosh,  I'm an  awful  person,  but  generally  the  other  side  wins  through 
and  you  do  carry  on,  but  with  anorexia  you  think  that  you're  awful, 
and  you're  not  worth  anything  to  anybody ... (it's)  setting  yourself 
such  high  standards  that  they're  just  impossible  to  attain,  which  is 
why  it  happens  to  a  lot  of  high-achieving  people  who  seem  to  have 
everything going for  them. 
I  like  food  in general  now,  I  mean  I  feel  I'm totally cured  - I  think 
I've  made  an amazing recovery ... CI  eat)  whatever  I  feel  like really. 
I  mean  I'm a  fairly simple case  to a  certain extent." 
Lucy  describes herself as  a  "simple  case";  certainly her experience  of 
anorexia  neatly fits the  stereotype  of  the  anorexic  woman  as  an  over-
achieving  middle-class  teenage  dieter  who  "goes  too  far".  Her 
experience  also,  however,  encapsulates  the  core  meanings  of  anorexia. 
In  the  rest  of  this  chapter  I  will  compare  Lucy's  description  of  her 
anorexic  experience  and  her  explanations  of  it  with  those  of  other 
women  whose  illnesses do  not fit the stereotype so neatly.  Here  I  hope 
to  show  that  although  every  woman's  experience  of  anorexia  is  shaped 
-144-by  her  own  personal  biography,  we  can  identify  a  set  of  core 
experiences  and  feelings  whi•::h  exist for all anorexic women. 
This  definition  of  anorexia,  then,  centres  around  the  meanings  which 
women  ascribe  to  being  anorexic,  and  the  central  processes  which  all 
anorexic  women  go  through,  Focusing  on  core  experiences  and  meaninp;s 
better  describes  anorexia  than  ;:;_  stereotype  which  "excludes"  many 
women's  circumstances  and  tends  to  tri  vialise  anorexia  as  teenap;e 
girls'  excess.  In  this  chapter  an  analysis  of  the  meaninp;s  throup;h 
which  anorexic  women  make  <partial)  sense  of  the  illness  will  be 
attempted.  These  meanings  can  be  conceptualised  by  the  linked  terms 
need  and  desire,  power  and  p;e:;s.ure,  guilt and  failure.  Further,  the 
limits  of  anorexic  explanations  will  be  shmm  - most  anorexic  women 
say  that  although  they  can  Iike  suggestions.  and  can  point  to 
experiences  which  they  feel  an::  impot"tant  in  discussing  why  they 
became  anorexic,  ultimately  they  are  themselves  mystified  about  what 
their anorexia actually means,  and  how it can be  explained. 
The  task of  Part  Three,  then,  will  be  to  analyse  how  experience  which 
is  mystifying  on  the  individual  level  is  meaningful  on  the  social 
level.  A  sociological  and  feminist  account  of  how  women's  bodies  are 
constructed  through  culture  - the  meanings  and  practices  which  are 
central  here  sheds  new  light  on  the  anorexic  experience.  This 
chapter  will  show  how  anorexic  women  describe  and  explain  their 
struggle  with  appetite;  subsequent  chapters  will  argue  that  the 
anorexic  struggle  has  social  resonances  in  the  cultural  control  of 
feminine  desire,  and  will  take  up anew the  issues of desire,  power  and 
-145-self-discipline.  In the  final  chapters  a  detailed analysis of  anorexic 
practices will  be  undertaken. 
Christine  is now  twenty-five;  she  beca:me  anorexic  SlX  years  ago  when, 
in  a  way  she  cannot  underst.arsdt'  a  ~post-holi(1a~<;  cliet  t1rr:ned  into 
anorexia.  Although she  has  recovered,  she  would still describe  herself 
as anorexic in some  important  wa~3~ 
"I  • m cured of the  worst  parts of it in as much  as it doe:=n' t 
control  my  life,  and  I  do  e.at.  and  I  am  a  healthy  weig-ht, 
and  have  my  periods  back  and  that  - but  it's always  at  the 
back of  your head,  it's always  there." 
Christine identifies the sense  of pride  and  and  achievement  as central 
in her anorexia: 
"I  didn  • t  have  a  problem.  t!€•::au:E.e  I  wa::;:;  1Jappy.  1:!€cause  I  was 
thin  and  I  was  happy ...  Everybody  obviously  felt  sorry  for 
me,  because  everybody  else  knew  what  was  wrong,  but  I 
thought  I  was  terrific  ...  You  don't  feel  ill,  you  feel 
terrific,  you  feel  really wonderfuL  You've  got  energy,  the 
adrenalin  just  flows,  and  t11e  less  you  eat  the  better  you 
feel." 
On  days  when  she  ate almost  nothing,  she  felt: 
"fantastic.  It  felt  absolutely  brilliant  days  like  that, 
that's  when  you  had  your  most  energy,  that's when  you  could 
have  run  a  mile,  swum  a  mile,  done  ev·erything,  that's  when 
you  felt best.  The  less you  ate  the  better you  felt." 
Vhat  made  her feel  so great  was  her ability to resist food: 
"Sometimes  people  would  co~nt; like so:rneti:rnes  you'd  be  out 
at  a  social  event,  or at  a  friend's,  and  out  would  come  the 
cakes  and  buns,  and  they'd  all  be  sitting there  eatinR  two 
sandwiches  and  a  biscuit  and  I'd  be  there  with  my  black 
-146-coffee  and  they'd  go,  'Oh  you're  great,  I  wish  .I  was  like 
you,  I  wish  I  could say  no,  but  I  just can't resist it'.  And 
I'd  go,  'Oh  that's  great,  other  people  have  noticed  how 
wonderful  I  am,  that  I  can resist it,  and they can't.'" 
Her  standards  were  very  high: 
"I  was  only ever  proud  of  myself  when  I'd gone  for  long days 
and  done  millions  of  things  and  hardly  eaten.  Nothing  to  be 
really  proud  about,  but  nothing  else  matters  except  not 
eating,  achieving  not  eating.  And  specially  if  you'd  done 
millions  of  things that  day as well,  because  you  had  used  up 
millions  of  energy  which  means  you  actually  knew  it  was 
coming off- what  was  already there." 
The  satisfaction  of  denial  was  continually  threatened  by  hunger. 
Christine  always  felt  hungry:  "you  do,  you  deny  the  most  amazing 
hunger.  You'd  be  starved out  of  your  brain,  but  you  wouldn't  eat". 
However,  "sometimes  I  got  myself  so  hungry  that  I  did  have  to  eat,  I 
just  bad to eat."  Failing to resist brought  dire consequences: 
"Before  you  were  desperately  trying to resist it - that  was 
the  main  thing  - resist it,  overcome,  willpower  - you  had to 
have  willpower  to  fight  it and  control  it.  And  when  you  did 
give  in,  you  felt  very  bad- it had  been  a  struggle  and  you 
lost - you  felt guilty that  you  had  given  in to it,  and  you 
felt  awful  about  yourself,  that you  didn't  have  the strength 
of  character  or  willpower  to  resist  - some  little  bit  of 
food ... I  thought  if  I  ever  had  to eat  normally  I  would  just 
blow  up  like  a  balloon,  that  I  couldn't  stop,  that  once  I 
did start  I  couldn't stop,  that  was  the  main  thing.  So  I  had 
to  not  start ... If  I'd  eat  one  biscuit,  I • d  eat  the  whole 
packet  of  biscuits ... <I  can't)  eat  one,  say  that  was  nice, 
and  put it  down. " 
Resisting  food  is  a  never-ending  cycle;  it  can  never  be  secure,  the 
anorexic  woman  can't  rest  on  her  laurels  because  the  standard  of 
denial spirals ever  downward: 
-147-"You  just  always  feel  depressed  because  no  matter  how  thin 
you  get  it's not  thin enough,  and  even  when  I  was  like going 
down  to  about  6  stone,  I  still felt  I  was  fat." 
Linda  was  diagnosed anorexic at eleven,  and  between the ages of eleven 
and  thirteen she  was  hospitalized for  anorexia three  times.  She  is now 
twenty-five;  since  her  first  anorexic  episode  she  feels  that  she  has 
never  been  in  control  of  her  eating,  and  she  has  moved  between 
"compulsive"  eating and anorexia ever since: 
always  being  "on  the  fringes  of  anorexia ...  whenever  I  start 
to  lose  weight  I  want  to carry on  losing weight  - I  want  to 
capitalise  on it." 
At  the  moment,  she  is: 
"on  the  slide  downwards  again  ...  the  way  I  feel  about  food 
just now  is largely controlling me." 
Linda  feels  intensely  ambivalent  about  her  anorexia;  does  she  control 
it or does it control  her  ?  Of  her  initial experience  of  anorexia,  she 
says: 
"It  was  like  my  decision,  or  - but  then  again it wasn't  my 
decision,  because  again,  probably  with all anorexics,  things 
get  out  of  hand,  and  then  you  can't  really  help  your 
behaviour,  it's just  - it rolls  on  and  rolls  on  and  before 
you're  really  aware  of  what  you're  doing ... it's  too  late, 
and  you  just can't help yourself." 
During  her  first  hospitalization  she  was  able  to  exert  a  measure  of 
control  over  her  eating: 
"There  came  a  point  in  my  first  hospital  stay,  I  don't 
remember  when,  there  came  a  point  when  I  gave  in  ...  and  I 
started  to  eat  all  the  meals  - fully,  not  enjoying  them at 
all  and  always  it  was  an  ordeal ... I  hated  being  in 
-148-hospital,  and  it  was  my  passport  out ... I  used  to  look 
forward  to  getting  out  of  hospital ...  because  then  it 
wouldn't  be  three  meals  a  day  and  I  had  to sit down  and  eat 
them.  Then  I  could please myself." 
She  came  out  of  hospital,  immediately  stopped eating and  soon  lost  so 
:much  weight  that  her  doctor  sent  her  back  in.  She  was  powerless  to 
prevent this recurring a  second and  a  third time: 
"By  that  stage,  as  I  think  any  anorexic  would  understand, 
you're  not  in  control,  you  can't  make  decisions,  no  matter 
how  :much  you  want  to.  I  didn't  like  being  in  hospital,  I 
didn't  like  it at  all.  And  no  matter  how  much  you  want  to 
stave  off  something  that's  really  bad  your  anorexia's  in 
control  of  you,  you're  not  in control  of  it  ... It takes  over 
and  nothing,  nothing can stop it." 
At  the  time  of  the  interview,  Linda's  ambivalent  feelings  about 
anorexia  were  at  the  forefront  of  her  mind:  on  the  one  hand,  it gives 
her  a  sense  of  control  and  power;  on  the  other,  she  feels,  it 
controls her,  and this embarasses  and distresses her.  She  is unable  to 
fit her anorexia into her concept  of  herself as a  person: 
"I'm quite  a  strong  person,  I  like  people  and  I  like  life, 
and  I  am  in the grips  of something  I  don't  want  to  be  in the 
grips  of,  and  I'm embarrassed  about  that,  and  when  I  think 
about  it,  in  sort  of  dispassionate  moments,  it's  such  a 
trivial  thing,  it's such  an  unimportant  thing,  really,  food, 
to  have  such  a  control  over  your  life and  your  lifestyle.  I 
mean  I  do  understand  that,  I  do  understand  that  it  is  a 
total  nonsense  for  me  to  be  so  uptight  about  food  and  what 
I'm  eating,  and  to  think  about  it  so  much,  it's  a  total 
nonsense.  But  having  said that,  to try and  stop doing  it is 
totally impossible for  me." 
There  are  "good"  things about  being anorexic: 
"Now  my  feelings  are  sometimes  positive  feelings. 
Certainly  I'm  powerful  in  that  I'm  in  control,  it  is  a 
control  thing,  and it's me  that's controlling it,  my  eating 
and  my  limit  and  all  the  rest,  it's me  in  control  of  that 
and  maybe  in  the  end ... it's about  the  only  damn  thing  that 
-149-you  can  be  in  control  of  in  your  life  ... I  do  feel  good  at 
the  control  that  I  have,  I  feel  good  when  I  get  to  the  end 
of  the  day  and  I • m at  my  limit,  or  I'm below my  limit ... in a 
lot  of  ways  this is a  crutch for  me,  I  depend  on it, it's a 
control,  it's  a  way  of  controlling  things,  it's  a 
power  .. . all  I  can  say  is  that  there's  something  good  about 
being this thin." 
But  at the  same  time  anorexia is profoundly  disempowering: 
"To  me  it's a  question  of  the  chicken  and the  egg  thing,  in 
so  many  ways  my  food  compulsion is controlling  me . •• I've got 
such  ambivalent  feelings  towards  it,  I  hate it,  but  at  the 
same  time,  I  don't  want  to  give  it up  because  I  know,  if  I 
tried  to  give  it  up,  if I  try,  if I  do  break  out  and  eat 
something,  I'm  totally  miserable ...  I  would  be  lost  ...  just 
the  fact  that  you  have  relinquished  control  and  let  this 
'full  feeling'  happen.  I  feel  again  that  I've  relinquished 
the  control  that  I  had  over  my  body ...  you  can't  control 
anything  else,  you  can't  control  other  people,  you  can 
control  your  own  body." 
Vanessa  became  anorexic  at  thirteen,  but  she  feels  that  her  illness 
only  became  serious at  the  age  of  seventeen.  Although  she  has  always 
hoped  for  that  "miracle  cure",  at  the  age  of  twenty-nine  she  feels 
that she  is in many  ways  anorexic still. 
The  central  feeling for  Vanessa  was  ~: 
"I  couldn't  eat  - if I  ate  I  felt  guilty.  I  did feel  hungry, 
but  if  I  ate  I  felt guilty .... it was  this guilt that made  me 
not  eat,  not  the  desire  to  lose  weight.  I  didn't  have  this 
driving  overwhelming  desire  to  lose  weight.  I  couldn't  eat 
because  I  felt guilty." 
She  discovered that  she  was  anorexic  when  she  read a  "true life story" 
in the  "Jackie"  about  a  girl: 
-150-"who  felt  guilty  when  she  ate  and  I  said  to  my  mum  that's 
the  way  I  feel.  Because  I  couldn't  put  into  words  the 
terrible  way  I  felt  when  I  ate anything." 
At  first  she  could  cope  with these  feelings,  but this changed  when  she 
was  seventeen;  she  remembers  one  particular occasion: 
"I  watched  what  I  ate  all  the  time.  I  hardly  ate  sweets  or 
anything.  I  never  ate  cakes.  And  this  night  I  didn't  feel 
hungry  and  I  didn't  think  I • d  have  any  tea.  But  I  ate  an 
orange,  and  I  felt  really  guilty  after  I'd  eaten  this 
orange.  So  I  went  and  made  myself  sick.  But  I'd been  making 
myself  sick since  I  was  fourteen,  now  and  again.  Once  in  a 
while  I'd think,  that  was  too  much,  I've eaten too  much  and 
I  felt  that  bad  about it,  this terrible,  terrible guilt if I 
felt  I'd eaten too  much  I'd go  and  make  myself sick  ... I  just 
would  feel  the  compulsion  to  make  myself  sick  and  I'd feel 
better  afterwards.  But  this  night  it  was  a  driving, 
overwhelming guilt to make  myself  sick,  I  had to make  myself 
sick." 
She  was  distressed  by  the  effect  her  anorexia  had  on  her  family,  and 
tried  to  eat,  but  quite  simply  could  not:  "it  was  awful  hard  to sit 
and  see  them all  crying,  and  begging  me  to eat."  When  hospitalization 
was  first  suggested  her  family  thought  that  this  threat  would  be 
enough to  make  her eat: 
"I  went  to  bed  and  my  Aunt  Mary  came  up  and  said,  will  you 
not  eat  now  ?  And  I  said  Aunt  Mary  I  can't.  They  thought 
that  that  would  be  enough  and  I  would  promise,  but  I  just 
couldn't." 
Xedical  intervention  changed  her  behaviour  to  a  certain extent.  After 
her  first  hospitalization  she  was  treated  as  an  out-patient  on  a 
weekly  basis;  the appointments were  on Vednesdays: 
"I  used  to  go  on  the  Wednesday,  so from the  Vednesday to the 
Saturday  I  hardly  ate  a  thing,  and  then  on  the  Sunday  I 
would  kind  of  buck  my  ideas  up  a  bit  and  try  and  eat  a  bit 
for  the  Wednesday.  I'd  come  out  of  there  on  the  Wednesday 
-151-and  feel  as  though  I 
1 d  done  my  bit  for  the  week,  and  I 
deserved to have  like a  rest- a  reprieve." 
Eating  was  always  an  activity  fraught  with  anxiety  and  guilt; 
starvation was  preferable: 
"It  was  much  easier  for  me  not  eating ...  I  felt  more  in 
control  when  I  didn't  eat,  as  if  I  was  managing  my  life 
better  ... I  felt  in  control,  I  could  do  what  other  people 
couldn't ... I  liked  feeling  empty ... I  hated  having  food 
inside  me,  I  always  associated not  having  food  with  feeling 
lli.rul and ~·  " 
Vhat  was  absolutely  crucial  was  res~nsibility;  did  she  choose  to  eat 
or did she  have  to ?  In the hospital  although eating was  an  ordeal: 
"The  guilt  wasn't  so  bad  because  I  felt  they  were  making  me 
eat.  So  I  felt  OK  about  that,  because  someone  was  always 
watching  me  when  I  ate ...  I  couldn't eat unless  I  was  told to 
eat ...  I  was  glad they  didn 
1 t  leave  me  alone,  because  there 
were  a  couple  of  times  they  did  leave  me  alone  and  I  didn't 
hide  the  food  and  I  felt  so  guilty.  I  remember  getting 
hysterical  on  Saturday  afternoon  because  the  nurse  left  me 
alone  with soup and  I  ate the soup.  " 
The  real  distinction  was  between  food  eaten  for  pleasure  and  food 
eaten because it was  needed: 
"I  remember  I  had  this  desire  for  somebody  to  show  me  how 
the  body  worked,  and to show  me  that the  body  did  need  food, 
because  I  didn 
1 t  seem  to  be  convinced  it did  need  food.  I 
used  to  think  that  it  could  go  without  food,  and  I  wanted 
somebody  to  show  me  the  systems  of  the  body  and  how  it 
really needed  food." 
Anna  is  thirty-eight;  she  became  bulimic  at  thirty,  and  for  the  past 
three  years  has  swung  between  anorexia  and  bulimia.  Her  eating,  she 
-152-feels:  "consumes  your  whole  life,  it's not  just  a  part  of  your  life, 
it is your  whole  life". 
Anna  identifies  two  kinds  of  pressure  on  her.  Firstly,  she  feels  that 
other  people's  behaviour  impinges  on  her  behaviour.  She  worries  about 
her  family  worrying  about  her,  "plus  I  was  under  pressure  from them to 
eat  . .. the  conversation  would  revolve  around  trying  to  get  me  to  eat, 
and  I  found  that  a  great  pressure".  In  a  recent  relationship  with  a 
man  whom  she  had  told  about  her  eating  he  was  "very  very  protective 
and  to  me  was  becoming like  my  personal  jailor,  and protecting me  from 
myself ... I  felt  trapped,  I  felt  caged-up  and  that ...  control  was  being 
taken away  from me." 
But  the  main  pressure  on  her  self-control  comes  from  within,  from 
appetite.  Anna  distinguishes  between  hunger  and  the  pre-binge  urge  -
you  don't have  to be  hungry to binge:  it is: 
a  "compulsion",  an  "addiction",  a  "lust for  food":  "nothing 
will stop you,  nothing,  you're  like  (a)  wild animal". 
The  point  is  not  simply  to  control  the  binge,  but  to  control  the 
"temptation to do  it": 
you  think  "I  must  stop  this  now,  because  if  I  do  it  again 
I'm  not  going  to  control  it ever  again,  it'll take  control 
of  me  and  hold  on to  me  far ... life". 
Afterwards  the  shame  is  dreadful:  "self-disgust  and  recriminations". 
Being  caught  in a  binge: 
"is as  though  you  had  been  caught  in  murder",  you  feel  "so 
guilty,  so  terribly  guilty,  I'd  nearly  faint  with  guilt  at 
having  been  caught";  "the  depression  afterwards  is 
-153-absolutely  - it  really  is  nightmarish,  and  I  think if you 
have  suicidal  tendencies,  that's when  you'll  do  it." 
She  can't  eat  the  food  she  really  likes  - "forbidden  food"  - because 
if  she  ate  one  biscuit,  one  square  of  chocolate,  she'd eat  them all: 
"it's  like  one  drink  to  an  alcoholic".  Alcohol  itself  is  out  - "it 
would  weaken  my  resolve"  - that  is,  the  resolve  not  to  eat.  When  her 
resolve  holds,  she  feels  in  control;  the  less  she  eats  the  more  in 
control  she  feels.  Trying  to  control  her  bulimia  - increasing  her 
control  by  eating progressively  less  - is Anna's  explanation of  how 
she  became  anorexic:  "inside  every  bulimic is an  anorexic  fighting  to 
get out". 
She  eats  as  little as  she  possibly  can  and  then  she  feels  proud,  in 
control  and  "more  at peace".  She  feels that anorexia means  that she  is 
controlling  food,  while  bulimia  means  that  food is controlling her.  If 
she  eats  a  strictly planned  and  controlled amount  of  food  because  she 
knows  she  needs  some  nourishment  to  live,  that  is acceptable;  if she 
eats because she's hungry that  means  loss of  control: 
"I  think  that  the  central  word  is control.  When  you  are  in 
control,  everything  else  around  is  - the  quality  of  your 
life  feels  much  better  when  you're  in  control  of  whatever 
eating  disorder  you  have.  Whether  it's  anorexia,  you're 
starving  yourself,  you're  in  control  over  it,  you're  happy. 
When  it's  bulimia,  you're  not  hinging,  you're  in  control 
over  it,  you're  happier ...  when  you're  not  in  control ...  you 
hide  away,  you  become  a  recluse,  and  your  whole  life  is 
centred  on  this,  trying  to  gain  control,  and  in  doing  so, 
trying  to  control  that,  I  feel  I  cannot  control  other  parts 
of  my  life,  and  I  feel  awful.  When  I  am  in  control  I  am 
walking  a  tightrope  without  a  net  - when  I  binge,  I  fall  off 
and  there's  no  safety net  there.  And  I  feel  everything else 
just  disintegrates  round  about  me,  my  whole  life 
disintegrates  round  about  me,  my  work,  my  personal 
relations,  everything falls to pieces." 
-154-Dierdre  would  describe  herself  as  a  bulimic;  she  is  now  twenty-five 
and  was  thirteen  when  her  bulimia started,  although  she  would  not,  at 
that  age,  have  called  it  bulimia:  "I  just  knew  that  there  was 
something  wrong  with the  way  I  looked at food."  She  doesn't  understand 
"at  all"  why  she  became  bulimic,  and  feels  totally  at  a  loss  to 
control  or end it. 
She  identifies  three  distinct  stages  in  her  eating  behaviour:  the 
binge,  starving  herself  after  the  binge  to  "make  up"  for  what  she's 
eaten during it,  and eating "normally"  in between the binge  and starve 
cycle.  The  main  feelings  which  characterize  the  three  stages  are 
guilt  and  shame  when  she's binging,  control  and  recompense  when  she's 
starving,  and  a  partial  control  coupled  with  dread  of  the  next  binge 
in between: 
"You  go  through  stages  of  being  fine  for  a  couple  of  weeks, 
and  then  I  go  and  have  a  real  bad  binge,  and  that  puts  me 
down  and  I  think  well  what's  the  point  in  even  trying,  I'm 
just going to slip back." 
Christmas and Easter are particularly difficult times: 
"Well  I  fall  down  like at  Easter,  people  buy  me  Easter  eggs, 
and at  Christmas,  and  birthdays,  and  meals  out  for  different 
celebrations,  I  fall  down  then.  I  mean  Christmas  is 
absolutely  hopeless,  you  get  boxes  of  chocolates,  and  if 
I've  got  four  boxes  of  chocolates  I  would  eat  them  all  in 
the  one  go,  I  just couldn't  keep  them.  And  if I've  a  packet 
of  biscuits,  I've  got  to  eat  the  whole  packet,  I  can't  just 
eat,  you  know,  two." 
-155-During  a  binge,  she  does  "disgusting  things"  and  thinks,  "oh,  you 
horrible  person".  She  eats  in  secret,  and  although she  would  consider 
telling close friends  about  her  illness,  the  idea of  anyone  seeing her 
binging,  or  seeing  "the  results ...  two  chocolate  cakes  and  three  tins 
of  beans missing that  were  there ...  an  hour  ago",  is insupportable. 
The  central feelings  of  the  binge  are self-hatred and  disgust: 
"I  hate  my  body,  I  hate  myself for  being  so  weak  and  going 
out  and  buying  five  bags  of  chips  and  eating  them,  I  can't 
be  stronger  and  resist ... I  don't  need  these  five  bags  of 
chips,  I'm  well  fed,  I'm  healthy,  I've  got  extra  weight  I 
could  lose,  I  mean  - I  just  hate,  hate  my  body  for  a  start, 
and  hate  myself  for  giving  in to it,  and wish  I  was  stronger 
and could control it." 
But  she cannot  control it: 
"I  just  sort  of  - have  an  urge  . .. oh,  I've  got  to  have 
this  ... it's not  hunger,  it's just an  urge." 
The  urge  to get  food  is stronger  than  her  willpower,  her  eating is in 
control  of  her.  She's  decided  "so  many  times"  to  stop  and  "then just 
slipped back." 
So  Dierdre  recognizes that  she  cannot  control  her bulimia,  and sees it 
as  in  control  of  her;  in  spite  of  this,  she  blames  herself  for 
"slipping  back",  and  after  a  binge  she  eats  nothing  at  all  for  a 
certain length of  time: 
"I  would  work  out  how  much  I'd  had,  and  I'd say  well  maybe 
that's,  maybe  a  day  and  a  half's  worth  of  food,  so  I'll 
starve for  a  day  and  a  half,  and cancel  it out  that  way" 
When  starving  she  feels  good,  that  she  is  at  least  partially  in 
control: 
-156-"And  the  longer  I  can  starve  the  mare  chuffed  with  myself  I 
can  feel,  cos  then  I  feel  in  control,  whereas  when  I'm 
hinging  I  feel,  ah,  you've  got  no  control,  you're  a  useless 
person.  When  I'm  starving  I  feel  great,  I  feel  that  I'm  on 
top of  myself." 
She  envies anorexic  women: 
"it's to do  with the  control,  they've  got  more  control,  they 
can starve for  a  long  time  and  get as thin as they want." 
So  for  Dierdre  eating  is a  secret  cycle  of  discipline  and  strength  -
getting  "on  top  of"  her appetite  - and  chaos  and  weakness  - "slipping 
back";  a  cycle  which  she  feels  is  out  of  her  control  but  still  her 
responsibility.  The  "urge"  to  eat  is  overwhelming,  irresistable,  and 
"disgusting"  in  its  effects.  It  is  part  of  her  and  yet  not  part  of 
her.  Except  for  the  tenuous  periods  of  "normality",  eating  veers 
between  all  and  nothing;  between  the  virtue  of  starvation  and  the 
shame  of appetite. 
-157-Part Three Chapter  Five:  The  sociology of  the  body 
In  earlier chapters it was  argued  that  anorexia  is best  understood  as 
an  attempt  to  articulate,  at  the  level  of  the  body,  contradictory 
cultural  expectations  of  women,  and  that  anorexia  must,  therefore,  be 
analysed  in  the  context  of  bodily  meanings.  The  ways  in  which  we 
perceive  the  self  and  the  body,  the  meanings  through  which  we 
understand  them,  are  culturally  constructed,  and  thus  historical. 
Further,  historical  concepts  of  the  self  and  the  body  contain  within 
them the  central  categorizations of their culture. 
In  this  chapter,  then,  the  argument  that  our  perceptions  of  the  body 
are  imbued  with  social  meaning  will  be  pursued.  After  outlining  the 
fundamental  ideas  of  the  sociology  of  the  body,  detailed  historical 
examples  of  "body-concepts"  will  be  analysed,  showing  the  ways  in 
which  social  structure  and  body-concepts  interact.  Of  central 
significance  for  this  thesis,  of  course,  will  be  the  construction  of 
the  body  as gendered. 
The  main  task of  the  chapter will  be  to examine  the constrasts between 
feudal  and  capitalist  conceptualisations  of  the  body.  A  dominant 
feudal  body-concept,  and  a  dominant  bourgeois  body-concept  can  be 
analytically  isolated  and  shown  to  reflect  the  categories  of  feudal 
and  bourgeois culture.  However,  resistance to cultural definitions can 
also  be  found  at  the  level  of  the  body,  and  this  chapter  will  also 
explore  haw  "alternative"  body-concepts  work  with  and  transform 
dominant  bodily meanings. 
-158-The  first  historical  example,  then,  will  be  what  could  be  termed  the 
"official"  feudal  body-concept,  in  which  the  ancient  notion  of  the 
four  humours  is  combined  with  medieval  Christianity.  This 
understanding  of  the  body  will  be  contrasted  with  the  oppositional 
concept  of  the  body  which  can be  found  in medieval  popular culture. 
I  will  then  go  on  to  look at the  "high  bourgeois"  concept  of  the  body, 
focusing  on  Barker-Benfield's  analysis  of  the  male  body  as  a 
"spermatic  economy"  and  the  female  body  as  the  terrain  of 
gynaecological  exploration.  <Barker-Benfield,  1973;  1976) 
Finally,  contemporary  perceptions  of  the  body  wi 11  be  analysed.  The 
concept  of  the  body  used  in the  feminist  and  psychiatric  analyses  of 
anorexia  which  formed  the  subject  matter  of  the  second  and  third 
chapters will  be  taken  up  again,  and their somewhat  oblique  discussion 
of  the  body  will  be  expanded  by  a  consideration  of  phenomenological 
writings  on  the  body,  sociobiological  understandings,  and  the  ideas 
about  the  body  which  we  can  discover  in  the  "fitness  boom"  of  the 
1980's. 
The  meaning  of the  body  in different cultures has  formed,  of course,  a 
central  element  in  much  anthropological  work.  In  spite  of  this, 
theoretical  work  on  the  sociology  of  the  body  is,  to  say  the  least, 
thin  on  the  ground.  Ted  Polhemus  argues  that  Hertz  and ~  were  the 
first  to  emphasize  "the  relationship  of  the  physical  body  and  the 
-159-'social  body'  of  society".  <Polhemus,  1978:  9;  see  also  :Mauss,  1935  & 
1973;  Hertz,  1960)  The  relationship  of  the  body  and  society  has  only 
recently  begun to interest sociologists again. 
The  sociology  of  the  body  suggests that  we  cannot  understand  the  body 
outside  of  culture,  and  thus  contradicts  common-sense  understandings 
in  which  our  knowledge  of  the  body  is  seen  to  arise  directly  and 
uncomplicatedly  from  its  physical  reality.  As  Parveen ~  points 
out,  in  this  perspective  the  body  is "a  given  entity  and  follows  the 
laws  (of  anatomy  and  physiology);  our  bodily  experience  is  the 
perception  of  this  pre-given  entity".  <Adams,  1986:  28-9)  Thus, 
knowledge  of  the  body  varies  only  with  the  sophistication  of  medical 
technique. 
As  Adams  argues  with Beverly ~.  in common-sense: 
"the  body  is  represented  as  being 
structure,  practice  or  discourse, 
registered by  making  the  body natural 
<Brown  & Adams,  1979:  36) 
outside  any  existing 
Cas)  an  externality 
or pre-social." 
They  point  out,  however,  that "nature"  can only  be  defined in relation 
to  the  social,  as  "that  which  is  non-social", 
II  the  other  of  an 
already existing social".  (ibid.:  37;  40) 
Our  understandings  of  "nature",  then,  including  our  understandings  of 
the  body,  depend  on  an  opposition between  nature  and  culture  which  is 
itself social.  The  sociology  of  the  body  suggests  that  our  perception 
of  the  body  is  "filtered  through"  the  structures  of  knowledge  which 
categorize  social  life  in  a  particular  culture.  Knowledge,  including 
-160-knowledge  of  the  body,  is mediated through  ideology,  rather than  being 
a  direct description of  an  independantly existing reality. 
In  The  techniques  of  the  body  Mauss  argued  that  the  body  could  be 
properly  understood  only  through  a  "physio-psycho-sociological" 
analysis  which  studies  the  body  from  the  three  separate  perspectives 
of  sociology,  physiology  and  psychology.  Each  one  of  these 
perspectives  used  alone  gives  "dubious  explanations"  which  need  "the 
collaboration of  two  neighbouring sciences".  <Nauss,  1973:  77;  73;  85) 
Following  this  approach,  Polhemus  calls  for  the  "integration"  of 
physiological,  psychological  and  sociological  work  on  the  body,  so 
that  knowledge  of  each  "level ...  of  experience"  can  inform  the  others. 
<Polhemus,  1978:  9)  Accepting  that  the  body  must  be  understood 
socially,  however,  does  not,  for  Polhemus,  mean  that  we  must  "deny  the 
reality  of  its  electro-mechanical- chemical  physicality  and  its 
psychological  individuality";  sociological  understanding  of  the  body 
is  an  addition  to,  rather  than  a  substitute  for,  physiological  and 
psychological  understandings.  (ibid.:  21)  He  argues: 
"the  human  body  does  not  exist  and  is  not  understandable 
apart  from  'the social  construction of  reality'.  Our  bodies 
and  our  perception  of  them  constitute  an  important  part  of 
our  socio-cultural  heritage.  They  are  not  simply  objects 
which  we  inherit at birth,  but  are socialized  <enculturated) 
throughout  life  and  this process  of  collectively sanctioned 
bodily  modification  may  serve  as  an  important  instrument  for 
our  socialization  Cencul turation)  in  a  more  general  sense. 
That  is,  in  learning to  have  a  body,  we  also  begin  to  learn 
about  our  'social  body'  -our society." 
(ibid. :  21) 
Polhemus  hopes,  then,  to  lay the  foundations  for  analyses  of  the  body 
which  operate  at  a  more  general,  theoretical  level,  and  point:3  to  the 
-161-work  of  the  anthropologist  :M:ary  Douglas  as  one  such  example.  (ibid.: 
9-10)  Mary  Douglas  argues  that  the  body  is  a  metaphor  or  image  of 
society,  an  image  whose  "main  scope  is to express  the  relation  of  the 
individual  to the  group"  <Douglas,  1971:  389;  387)  She  writes: 
"The  body  is a  model  which  can stand for  any  bounded  system. 
Its  boundaries  can  represent  any  boundaries  which  are 
threatened  or  precarious ...  We  cannot  possibly  interpret 
rituals concerning excreta,  breast  milk,  saliva and the  rest 
unless  we  are  prepared  to  see  in  the  body  a  symbol  of 
society,  and  to  see  the  powers  and  dangers  credited  to 
social  structure  reproduced  in  small  on  the  human  body." 
<Douglas,  1966:  115) 
The  most  comprehensive  wholly  sociological  treatment  of  the  body, 
however,  is BryanS.  Turner's The  body  and society,  which is the first 
piece  of  sociology  to  focus  directly  on  the  body-as-concept.  <Turner, 
1984;  see  also  1982)  Turner  argues  that  sociology's  entirely 
legitimate  preoccupation  with  the  rejection  of  sociobiology  has 
"submerged"  the  body  as  an  object  of  analysis  in  sociology.  <Turner, 
1984:  31)  Such  a  rejection should  be  no  more  than  a  first  step;  what 
is  needed  is  analysis  of  how  we  understand  the  body  as  social 
phenomenon.  Turner attempts  to use  the  work  of  Foucault  to provide  the 
general  outline  of  this  next  step.  He  argues  that  the  body  is  both  a 
material  organism  and  a  metaphor.  (ibid.:  8)  He  argues,  following 
Marx,  that  : 
"nature  constitutes  a  limit  on  human  agency,  since,  as  part 
of  a  natural  environment,  we  are  subject  to  growth  and 
decay ... this  limiting  boundary  is  of  course  both  uncertain 
and  flexible,  because  the  limits on  human  'natural'  capacity 
constantly change." 
(ibid.:  204;  229;  241) 
-162-The  body,  then,  is  both  "social"  and  "natural".  Turner  argues  that 
:Marx  saw  nature  as  an  independent,  objective  reality,  but  as  a 
reality  which  is  transformed  through  human  labour.  The  concept  of 
"nature",  like  all  concepts,  is for  M:arxists  social,  and  as such  "can 
only  be  grasped  in  a  specific socio-historical  context".  (ibid.:  241) 
Turner  is  thus  arguing  against  the  perspective  which  would  see  the 
body  as  entirely constructed  by  ideology/  in discourse.  He  argues that 
this  would  ignore  what  he  terms  "embodiment"  - that  is,  the  personal 
sensuous  experience  of  physicality  - through  which  personal  control 
of the  body-as-environment  or  "corporeal  government"  is developed,  and 
which,  he  argues,  is "the  phenomenological  basis  of  individuality". 
(ibid.:  233;  245;  251)  The  body  is  thus,  for  Turner,  both  socially 
mediated and  individually perceived.  (ibid.:  251) 
Although  Turner suggests  some  level  of  direct individual perception of 
physicality,  he  argues  that  our  cultural  understandings  of  the  body 
are  dependent  on  social  structure.  Biology,  then,  is  for  Turner  a 
socially  mediated  classificatory system  by  which  bodily  experience  is 
organised,  rather  than  an  "unmediated  reality":  biological  "facts" 
exist through classification.  Ci bid.:  29)  He  writes: 
"Human  agents  live their sensuous,  sexual  experience via the 
categories  of  a  discourse  of  desire  which  is  dominant  in 
given  societies  ... (and  which)  is  ultimately  determined  by 
the  economic  requirements of  the  mode  of  production." 
(ibid.:  14) 
Similarly,  biological  "needs",  seen  in  bourgeois  society as  "natural" 
and  grounded  in  the  "natural"  body,  are  nonetheless  "thoroughly 
penetrated  and  consi ti  tuted  by  culture",  their  nature,  context  and 
-163-timing  being  subject  to  symbolic  interpretation and  social  regulation. 
(ibid.:  27;  39)  Human  biological  presence  "is socially constructed and 
constituted  by  communal  practices";  "biology  and  physiology  are 
themselves classificatory systems  which  organise  and  systematise  human 
experience,  and  they  are,  therefore,  features  of  culture  not  nature". 
(ibid.;  246) 
Here  Turner  follows  and  amplifies Foucault's  argument  that  the  body  is 
an  object  of  power.  (ibid. :  35)  In  Discipline  and  punish,  Foucault 
argues: 
"The  classical  age  discovered  the  body  as  object  and  target 
of  power ...  the  docile  body ... <which>  may  be  subjected,  used, 
transformed and  improved." 
<Foucault,  1979:  136) 
Turner  argues  that  Foucault's  work  can  be  used  to  point  to  the 
historicity  of  the  body.  Power  is  commonly  seen  to  repress  desire, 
which  therefore  exists  outside  of  it.  For  Foucault,  however,  power  is 
constructive  desire  is  created  by  power.  Sexuality  in  modern 
societies  is  continually  produced,  reproduced  and  examined  in, 
specifically,  medical  and  psychiatric discourse:3.  Desire,  then,  is the 
product  of  specific  historical  discourses  rather  than  "a  unified 
phenomenon".  <Turner,  1984:  48)  Turner  argue:3  that  the  same  can  be 
said  of  the  body,  but  suggests  that  in  spite  of  his  perspective  on 
desire,  Foucault  appears  to  see  the  body  as  "a  unified,  concrete 
aspect  of  human  history",  a  view  at  odds  with  his  treatment  of 
sexuality  and  desire  and  with  the  argument  that  the  body  is 
constructed in discourse.  <ibid.:  48) 
-164-Turner,  then,  chases  to  follow  what  Foucault  says  rather  than  what  he 
does.  He  argues  against  the  notion  that  culture  represses 
independently existing bodily  needs  - that there is a  conflict  between 
<rational)  civilization and  (irrational)  physical  needs  and  desires  -
and  for  an  understanding  of  the  body  developed  along  the  lines  of 
Foucault's  concept  of  desire.  The  body  for  Turner,  then,  is  also 
created  through  discourses  of  power,  and  is  created  in  order  to  be 
controlled.  (ibid.:  61-4;  83;  214)  The  body  is a  metaphor  of  society, 
and,  consequently,  illness  and  disease  are  metaphors  of  structural 
crisis.  Social  inequalities,  Turner  argues,  "are  fought  out  at  the 
level  of  a  micro-politics of  deviance  and desire".  (ibid.:  114) 
The  body,  then,  is for  Turner  "both a  natural  phenomenon  and  a  social 
product",  a  cultural  construct  as  well  as  a  biological  entity. 
(ibid.:  232).  This  perspective  allows  us  to  investigate  and  analyse 
the  meanings  contained  in  body  concepts,  whether  dominant  or 
oppositional,  in our  own  and  other cultures,  and thus provides a  basic 
structure  for  sociological  analyses  of  particular  historical  body 
concepts.  (1) 
Turner's notion of  embodiment  as "corporeal  government"  - the  argument 
that  our  sense  of  being  in  control  of  our  individual  bodies  is  the 
basis  of  individuality  - cannot,  however,  be  uncritically  accepted. 
While  I  would  accept that  the  body  exists objectively as  well  as 
1  Using  Turner's  framework  does  not,  of  course,  force  one  to reach his 
conclusions,  and  I  am  especially  critical  of  his  arguments  on 
patriarchy  (ibid.:  120-156)  and  their conclusion  that  differentiation 
of bodies by  gender is becoming  increasingly irrelevant.  (ibid.:  29) 
-165-symbolically,  it  is  questionable  whether  the  distinction  between 
"natural",  or  individually  perceived,  and  "cultural",  or  socially 
structured  sensuous  experience  is  quite  so  easily  drawn  as  Turner 
supposes.  His  argument  here  seems  to  have  something  in  common  with 
Polhemus'  suggestion,  following  Mauss,  that  the  body  has  analytically 
discrete physiological,  psychological  and  social  "levels". 
It  seems  somewhat  contradictory  to  argue  that  our  perception  of 
"personal"  sensuous  experience  is not  as  much  a  product  of  culture  as 
any  other apprehension  of  the  meaning  of  physicality,  or to argue that 
physiological  or  psychological  experience  of  the  body  can  be 
understood  outside  of  knowledge  which  is  socially  produced.  Turner 
himself  points  out  that  phenomenological  possesssion  of  the  body 
through  embodiment  does  not  always  entail  ownership,  especially  for 
women,  and  points out that  women  can  experience  their bodies as alien. 
(ibid.:  233-4)  Turner  here  undercuts  his  own  concept  of  embodiment, 
demonstrating  that  "corporeal  government"  depends  as  much  on  cultural 
as  on  biological  presuppositions.  It  is  questionable  whether  any 
"direct"  - that  is,  socially  unmediated  physical  experience  is 
possible.  This  is not  to  suggest,  of  course,  that  the  body  does  not 
physically,  biologically  or  objectively  exist:  rather,  all  knowledge 
of,  ideas  about,  and  feelings  in  that  "objective  reality"  are 
constructed  in  ideology.  This  is  what  I  understand  Brown  and  Adams  to 
be  suggesting. 
-166-It is from this perspective  on  the  sociology  of  the  body,  and  bearing 
in  mind  this difference  with  Polhemus  and  Turner,  that  the  historical 
examples  of  body-concepts in the  remainer  of  the  chapter  proceeds. 
-167-Medieval  concepts of  the  body 
How  was  the  body  understood  in medieval  culture  ?  This question can be 
discussed  in  two  parts:  firstly  in terms  of  the  "offical  version",  in 
which  the  body  fits  into  a  rigidly  classified  cosmology,  organised 
around  the  dichotomy  of  soul  and  flesh;  and  secondly  in  terms  of  the 
oppositional  body-concept  of  popular,  or  carnival  culture,  described 
brilliantly  by  Bakhtin,  in  which  the  body  is  celebrated  as  open, 
dynamic  and regenerative. 
Bakhtin  argues  that  "official"  feudal  culture  "is  founded  on  the 
principle of  an  immovable  and  unchanging  hierarchy in which the higher 
and  the  lower  never  merge",  and  in which  "hard,  well-established lines 
are  drawn  between  all  phenomena".  CBakhtin,  1968:  16~;  433)  Within 
this rigid system of  categorizations,  it was  the  doctrine  of  the  four 
humours  which  provided  the  immediate  framework  through  which  the  body 
was  understood.  The  four  humours  - black bile,  phlegm,  yellow bile and 
blood  were  held,  as  Klibansky,  Saxl  and  Panqfsky  explain,  to 
correspond to  "the  cosmic  elements  and to  the  divisions  of  time;  they 
controlled  the  whole  existence  and  behaviour  of  mankind,  and, 
according  to  the  manner  in  which  they  were  combined,  determined  the 
character of  the  individual".  <Klibansky,  Saxl  & Panofsky,  1964:  3;  1) 
This  schema,  Klibansky  et  al  argue,  remained  in force,  with ~  as 
its outstanding proponent,  for  more  than two  thousand years,  virtually 
unchanged  from  its  ancient  beginnings  through  the  Middle  Ages  up  to 
the Renaissance.  (ibid.:  10;  48;  88) 
-168-The  doctrine  of  the  humours  formed  the  basis  of  physiology  and  later 
of  psychology.  It  was  based  on  a  cosmology  in which  basic  elements  or 
qualities  were  identified,  qualities  through  which  "the  complex  and 
apparently  irrational  structure  of  both  macrocosm  and  microcosm  could 
be  directly traced"  (ibid.:  4;  3).  At  every  level- cosmos,  body,  mind 
and  soul  - four  basic  elements  could  be  identified.  For  example,  the 
four  elements  of  the  cosmos  were  earth,  air,  fire  and  water,  and  for 
the  soul,  intellect,  understanding,  opinion  and  perception. 
Equilibrium  of  the  four  qualities  was  essential  "to  any  value,  moral, 
aesthetic or hygenicN.  <ibid.:  4) 
In bodily terms: 
"each of  these  four  elements  had to  be  interpreted  in  terms 
of  a  quality which established,  as it were,  an apparent  link 
between  the  original  elements  and  the  corresponding 
components  of  the  human  body,  which  could  not,  in  their 
empirical  actuality,  be  regarded  as  pure  earth,  pure  water, 
and  so  on...  certain  real  substances  which  appeared  to 
correspond  to  those  elements  and  qualities  had  to  be  found 
in  the  human  body,  for  only  then  could  the  speculations  of 
natural  philosophy  be  reconciled with the empirical  evidence 
of medicine  and physiology." 
(ibid.:  5) 
Ve  can  trace  the  development  of  the  doctrine  of  the  humours  from its 
ancient  origins  to  the  more  complex  form  which,  when  viewed  through 
the  prism  of  Christian  theology.  Empedocles  had  described  the  human 
body  as  a  simple  combination  of  earth,  air,  fire  and  water,  a 
categorization which  was  first was  modified  by  Philistion,  head of  the 
Sicilian  school  of  medicine.  Philistion  argued  that  each  element 
possessed  a  corresponding  "quality"  - respectively,  dryness,  cold, 
heat  and  moisture.  This  new  method  led  to  many  more  differentiations, 
-169-of  quality as  well  as quantity,  and allowed  a  categorization which  v<as 
freed  from  direct  elemental  linkage  while  still  retaining  strict 
correspondences.  (ibid.:  7)  In  Of  the  Nature  of  Man,  attributed  to 
Hippocrates  or Polybus,  and  written no  later than  400  B.C.,  the  system 
was  developed  thus: 
Season  Qualities 
Blood  Spring  Warm  and  moist 
Yellow bile  Summer  Warm  and  dry 
Black bile  Autumn  Cold  and  dry 
Phlegm  Winter  Cold  and  moist 
Each  humour,  then,  was  described  by  an  elemental  relationship  between 
two  quali ti  tes,  and  each  was  dominant  in  the  body  in  a  different 
season.  The  humours  were  the  "surplus"  left  over  after  food  had  been 
converted  by  the  digestion  - what  was  indigestble.  Blood,  of  course, 
did  not  fit  this  description  of  a  surplus  humour.  The  theory  of  the 
humours,  in fact,  depended  on  "two  quite arbitrary assumptions"  - the 
inclusion  of  blood  in  the  system,  and  the  distinction  of  the  bile, 
previously  seen  either  as  one  single  fluid  or  split  into  numerous 
categories,  into  two  types,  yellow  and  black.  (ibid.:  9· 
' 
8)  Each 
humour  was  situated  in  a  different  part  of  the  body  - the  brain,  the 
heart,  the  navel  and  the  phallus,  and  had its own  means  of exit  - nose 
<blood),  ears  Cyello'r'i  bile),  mouth  <phlegm)  and  eyes  Cblack  bile). 
(ibid.:  4;  58) 
Further,  each  season  was  :matched  to  one  of  the  four  ages  of  :man  -
boyhood,  youth,  maturity  and  old  age.  Thus  were  connected  the 
elements,  the  seasons,  the  ages  of  man,  the  four  bodily  humours,  and 
-170-also  physical  types,  for,  "heat  made  a  man  tall,  cold short,  moisture 
fat and dryness thin"  <ibid.:  57;  10). 
Health  was  understood  as  the  absolutely right  combination  in the  body 
of  the  four  humours.  Since  each  humour  was  held  to  be  dominant  in  a 
specific  season,  and  since  the  absolutely  heal  thy  man  who  was  never 
ill at all  was  very  hard  to  locate,  perfect  humoural  balance  was  seen 
as  an  ideal  which  was  hardly  ever  realised.  Most  people  had  more  of 
one  humour  than perfect  harmony  required,  and were  thus predisposed to 
the  specific  illnesses  which  "their"  humour  caused.  In  Isidore  of 
Seville's phrase,  "the healthy are governed  by  these four  humours,  and 
the sick suffer from them."  <ibid.:  12) 
The  melancholy  temperament,  for  example,  related to black bile,  and to 
air,  and  thus  flatulence  and  stomach  disorders  were  caused  by  black 
bile.  The  melancholy person was  also said by  Aristotle to be  lustful: 
"For  the  sexual  act is connected with the  generation of air, 
as  is  shown  by  the  fact  that  the  virile  organ  quickly 
increases  from  a  small  size  by  inflation.  Even  before  they 
are  capable  of  emitting  semen,  boys  approaching  puberty 
already  find  a  certain  pleasure  in  rubbing  their  sexual 
organs  from  wantonness,  the  manifest  reason  being  that  the 
air  escapes  through  the  passage  through  which  the  fluid 
flows  later  on.  Also  the  effusion  and  impetus  of  the  semen 
in sexual  intercourse is clearly due  to propulsion by  air  ... 
That  they  contain  air  is  obvious  in  some  cases;  for  most 
melancholy  persons  have  firm  flesh  and  their  veins  stand 
out,  the  reason  being  the  abundance  not  of  blood  but  of 
air." 
Aristotle,  Problem XXX,1  (ibid.:  22) 
Klibansky  et al.  argue  that  "what  had  of  old  been  symptoms  of  illness 
came  gradually  to  be  regarded,  at  first  unconsciously,  as  types  of 
-171-disposition".  The  descriptions  choleric,  phlegmatic,  sanguine  and 
melancholy  could  mean  "either  pathological  states  or  constitutional 
aptitudes",  and  came  to describe character types.  (ibid.:  12;  10-19) 
Klibansky  et  al.  refer  to  the  work  of  William  of  Conches  in  arguing 
that  it  was  in  conjunction  with  Christian  dogma  that  the  idea  of 
temperaments  being  determined  by  the  humours  was  revived  after  the 
twelfth  century:  "we  might  well  speak  of  a  revival  of  the  ancient 
characterological  doctrine  within  the  framework  of  Christian  moral 
theology".  Ci bid. :  106) 
In  William  of  Conches'  Philosophia  the  doctrine  of  the  humours  was 
incorporated  into  Christian  cosmology.  He  argued  that  when  the  waters 
receded  from  the  earth after the  Flood,  moisture,  fire,  earth and  air 
"prevailed"  in different  places  and  thus  the  substances  which  created 
the  animals  arose.  This  resulted  in  the  differentiation  of,  for 
example,  choleric  animals  like  the  pig,  from  melancholic  animals  like 
the  ox  and  the  ass.  It  was  only  when  the  elements  were  equally 
proportioned that  man  could  be  created.  In the Fall,  however,  man  lost 
his  perfect  balance,  "through  the  privations  imposed  on  him  by  life 
outside  paradise".  (ibid.:  103;  102)  The  animals  could  be  melancholy, 
choleric  or  phlegmatic,  but  not  sanguine;  man,  originally  sanguine, 
had  due  to  his  corruption  degenerated  into  the  melancholy,  the 
choleric  and  the  phlegmatic.  Cibid.:  105) 
This  presentation  of  the  doctrine  of  the  humours,  Klibansky  et  al. 
argue,  served  a  double  purpose: 
-172-"first  to  trace  the  variety  and  inequality  of  men  back  to 
the  Fall,  which  destroyed  the  original  perfection and  unity; 
secondly,  to  establish  and  account  for  the  inalienable 
nobility of  hu:man  nature." 
(ibid.:  106) 
The  doctrine  of  the  humours  was  thus  fitted  into Christain  cosmology, 
and  became  "part  of  the  common  stock  of  knowledge",  although  the 
"popularization"  of  the  doctrine,  which  took  place  in  the  fourteenth 
and  fifteenth centuries,  emphasized  the  link  with  diseases  particular 
to each type,  and  how  to avoid them.  (ibid.:  113 
The  dominant  or  official  concept  of  the  body  in  medieval  culture 
relied  on  a  rigid  system  of  categorizations.  All  of  nature  was 
contained  within  the  one  system,  and  the  revival  of  the  ancient 
doctrine  of  the  humours  through  the  framework  of  Christian  ideology 
gave  to  that  cosmology  its  moral  tone.  Through  the  doctrine  of  the 
humours  the  body  fitted  into  a  sche:ma  in  which  everything  had  its 
place.  As  Southern  argues,  "Christian  medieval  theology explained the 
purpose  and  place  of  :man  in  the  universe  through  its description  of 
the  cosmos";  Bakhtin  sees  this  description  as  a  "narrow,  vertical, 
extra  temporal  model  of  the  world,  with  its  absolute  top  and  bottom, 
its  system  of  ascents  and  descents".  <Southern,  1970:  22;  Bakhtin, 
1968:  405)  The  correspondences  between  this  cosmological  system and 
the  feudal  social  structure  in  which  ascriptive social  positions from 
the  king  downward  were  fixed  and  immutable  is  clear.  Power,  like 
temperament  both  physical  and  moral,  was  fixed,  unchanging  and  based 
on  God's  order  and  the  order  of  the  cosmos.  As  Gurevich  argues, 
-173-"social  categories ...  are ...  tied  up  with,  intertwined  with,  the  cosmic 
categories in the closest possible  way": 
"Theology  represented the highest  generalisation of  medieval 
man • s  social  behaviour;  it  provided  a  general  semiological 
system  in  terms  of  which  the  members  of  feudal  society 
apprehended  themselves  and  saw  their  world  motivated  and 
explained."  It  explained  "the  irreducible  contrasts  of 
wealth  and  poverty,  dominion  and  subjugation,  freedom  and 
bondage,  privilege and deprivation". 
<Gurevich,  1985:  14;  9;  10) 
Further,  medieval  Christianity  offered  the  eventual  spiritual 
transcendence  of  worldly  ills;  as  well  as  explaining  feudal  social 
structure,  then,  it  provided  "its  sanction,  its  justification  and 
sanctification": 
"the  earthly  feudal  system is an  isomorph  of  the  hierarchy 
of  God's creatures and the  ranks of  the angels." 
(ibid.:  10;  70) 
The  doctrine  of  temperaments  took  on  a  moral  character  in  its 
Christian  revival  - the  melancholic,  choleric  and  phlegmatic  being 
corruptions  of  the  originally  sanguine.  While  all  phenomena  in  the 
universe  were  understood as having fixed places in a  single structure, 
the  structure  of  nature  was  itself  defined  through  a  fundamental 
division  between  "the  earthly  world  and  the  supernatural  world"  which 
Gurevich  describes  as  "the  ineluctable  opposition  between  the  sublime 
and  the  base".  (ibid.:  6)  Gurevich  argues  that  the  perception  of  all 
types  of  natural  phenomena  as similarly constituted  - the  "belief  in 
the  unity  of  the  universe",  "the  inseparability  of  its  various 
spheres",  the  idea  of  "the  microcosm"  as  "a replica of  the  macrocosm" 
- coexisted  with  the  fundamental  constrasts "of  eternal  and  temporal, 
-174-sacred  and  sinful,  soul  and  body,  heavenly  and  earthly"  in  the 
medieval  Christian worldview.  Cibid.:  9-10;  13) 
Here,  Gurevich argues,  we: 
"have  to  take  into account  the  changes  which  the  concept  of 
'cosmos'  underwent  in its transition  from  the  ancient  world 
to  the  world  of  the  Middle  Ages.  Antiquity  saw  the  world as 
complete and harmonious;  medieval  man  saw it as dualistic." 
(ibid.:  58) 
In  this  opposition  the  body,  after  the  Fall,  was  fundamentally 
corrupted,  linked  with  the  world  rather  than  with  heaven.  Thus,  the 
body  was  seen  in  Christian  theology  as  the  prison  of  the  soul,  the 
symbol,  as it were,  of earthly corruption. 
Turner  argues  that  in medieval  Christianity  the  body  was  seen  as  the 
seat  of  unreason,  passion  and  desire,  and  thus  as  the  cause  of  sin. 
<Turner,  1984:  36;  13)  The  flesh  was  symbolic  of  the  moral  corruption 
which threatened the  feudal  order,  and  was  to be controlled by  ascetic 
techniques,  in  which  diet  and  abstinence  were  basic  elements  of  "a 
regimen  for  the  control  of  desires".  (ibid.:  166;  36)  The  aim  of 
ascetic  regimes,  then,  was  "to  liberate  the  soul  from  the  cloying 
distractions of desire".  (ibid.:  216) 
There  was  no  firm line drawn  between sin and disease at this time,  and 
RJ  Moore  argues  that  an  imbalance  of  humours  not  only  caused  illness 
but  was  simultaneously  a  manifestation  of  sin.  Diseases,  then, 
"could  ...  be  classified  according  to  the  sins  of  which  they  were  the 
bodily expression".  <Moore,  1976:  4)  Leprosy,  for  example,  was  seen as 
the bodily manifestation of heresy;  Moore  quotes  Rhabanus  Maurus: 
-175-"Lepra  est doctrina haereticorum falsa atque  varia ... leprosi 
sunt  haeretici  Dominum  Jhesum  Christum  blasphemantes." 
(ibid. :  4) 
:M:oore  points  out  that  "the  comparison  of  heresy  and  disease  provided 
not  simply  a  casual  or  convenient  metaphor,  but  a  comprehensive  and 
systematic  model",  a  coherent system of  understanding in which "heresy 
was  to the  soul  what  leprosy was  to the  body".  <ibid.:  9;  11) 
The  body  and  the  soul,  then,  were  intimately linked,  the state  of  one 
being  mirrored  in the  condition of  the  other.  The  best conditions  for 
the  soul  were  realized in monastic  asceticism,  in which  the  world  and 
the  pleasures  of  the  flesh  were  renounced.  <Brooke,  1978:  81)  Ascetic 
rules  liberated  the  soul  for  prayer,  being,  in  Leyser's  term 
"structures  for  piety".  <Leyser,  1984:  3)  These  best  conditions,  of 
course,  were  only  realisable  for  the  few,  who  laboured  in  their 
ascetic withdrawal  from the  world as "spiritual soldiers"  on  behalf  of 
the many.  <Southern,  1970:  224)  As  Southern points out: 
"the  main  centres  of  religious  life  in  medieval  Europe 
were  communi ties  specially  endowed  and  set  apart  for  the 
full,  lifelong  and  irrevocable  practice  of  the  Christian 
life  at  a  level  of  excellence  judged  to  be  impossible 
outside  such  a  community.  The  :members  of  these  bodies  were 
known  as  viri  religiosi:  they  were  'the  religious'  in 
contrast  to  all  other  men  whether  secular  or  clerical." 
(ibid. :  214) 
Monastic  withdrawal  from the  world  was  based  on  the  idea that  life in 
the  world  could  not  be  holy.  Although since the Fall  the  perfect  life 
could not  be  lived anywhere,  the  next best thing was  the monastic life 
of  discipline,  prayer  and  self-abnegation.The  world  was  "either 
meaningless  or filled with evil"  but  the monasteries were  "replicas of 
heaven  on  earth"  (ibid.:  31;  28;  341>: 
-176-"they  were  institutions designed to stem the tide of  change. 
the  idea  of  a  changeless  society  forever  enshrined  within 
the  fleeting  shadows  of  the  world  was  written  into  their 
title-deeds  and  discipline  ...  they  were  snatching  a  small 
portion  from  the  world  of  meaningless  change  to  make  it a 
replica  of  eternity.  Outside  there  was  visible aimless  flux; 
within,  the  image  of invisible immutability." 
(ibid.:  28-9) 
Within  the  monastery  the  rule  was  all,  the  individual  nothing.  As  in 
the  feudal  order as a  whole,  every man  had his station and was  defined 
by  it;  spiritual  perfection  was  to  be  sought  through  communal 
discipline  and  acceptance  of  the  cosmic  hierarchy.  <ibid.:  33;  43; 
231) 
Withdrawal  from  the  world  was  effected  through  (usually)  poverty, 
chasitity  and  diet.  Money,  sex  and  food  were  therefore  of  the  world, 
and  Leyser  tells us  that although prohibitions varied,  fats,  meat  and 
wine  were  often  forbidden.  Rules  for  fasting  again  varied;  fasting 
could  mean  eating  one  meal  a  day,  or  eating  only  bread,  salt  and 
water.  <Leyser,  1984:  66)  Some  Orders  were  also  more  scrupulous  than 
others in the imitation of the holy poverty of Christ. 
But  although  wealth  and  overindulgence  in  food,  drink  and  physical 
comfort  as  a  whale  were  renounced,  from  the  feminist  viewpoint  the 
proscriptions  on  sex  are  the  most  interesting,  for  it  becomes  clear 
here  that  the  meaning  of  "the  flesh"  is highly  gender-differentiated. 
While  all  flesh,  regardless  of  gender,  imprisons  the  saul,  female 
flesh  more  profoundly  imprisons  the  female  soul.  Further,  female  flesh 
-177-also  endangers  the  male  soul,  since  women  and  sexual  pleasure  are 
substantially the same  thing. 
Fo;r  St.  Bernard  "every  woman  was  a  threat  to  his  chastity ...  he  saw 
vast  and  nameless  dangers  in  ... <the) ...  easy  association  of  men  and 
women".  <Southern,  1970:  314)  St.  Francis  warned  against  "the  snares 
of  female  companionship"  and  in his "Life"  it is claimed that he  never 
looked  a  woman  in the  face.  <Brooke  & Brooke,  1978:  282)  Women,  ~ 
argues,  were  seen  as  "the  instruments  of  temptation  of  the  flesh", 
being  more  wicked  and  more  lustful  than  men.  <Smith,  1978:  177;  see 
also  Thompson,  1978:  227;  Southern,  1970:  311)  Sheila Rowbotham  writes 
of  "a  repeated  male  complaint  about  the  sexual  insatiability  of 
women."  <Rowbotham,  1977:  7)  And  Eileen  Power  argues,  St.  Paul's 
conception  of  women  as  the  "instrument  of  the  Devil"  was  embedded  in 
monastic  ethics,  philosophy  and  ascetic  regimens.  Women  were  "the 
greatest  of  all  obstacles  in  the  way  of  salvation",  "the  gate  of 
hell".  <Power,  1973:  16;  10;  see  also  Brooke,  1978:  6· 
' 
Hamilton, 
1978:  52) 
The  sins  of  the  flesh,  then,  were  seen to reside  principally not  in 
male  desire but  in the  female  body,  and  male  salvation depended  on  the 
removal  of  the  object  of  temptation.  Female  salvation,  unable  to rely 
on  this  tactic,  was  a  little  more  complicated.  On  the  ideological 
level  the  Virgin  Mary  existed  as  an  alternative  ideal  for  women,  an 
ideal  which  women  could  to  some  extent  use  to  counter  their  innate 
evil  and  materiality.  <Power,  1973:  10)  However,  the  monastic  life 
-178-depended  on  wealth  and  status,  and  was  thus  even  less  available  for 
women  than for  men.  Further,  as Power  argues: 
":Monasticism  may  have  offered  a  refuge  for  some  women;  but 
the  refuge  merely  sealed the degradation of  women  in general 
by  confining  full  approbation  to  those  who  withdrew 
themselves from  the  world.
11 
(ibid.:  16) 
Those  who  could  withdraw  from  the  world  were  aristocratic  women. 
(Southern,  1970:  310)  And  these  "cloistered virgins
11
,  Hamilton argues, 
removed  themselves  from  the  world  "as objects of  temptation  for  men
11
• 
<Hamilton,  1978:  52) 
These  economic  and  ideological  constraints  on  the  religious  life  for 
women  did  not,  however,  prevent  women  trying  to  withdraw  from  the 
world.  The  Cistercian  Order  especially  attracted  women,  and  in  12th 
century  Europe  there  was  an  expansion  of  Cistercian  nunneries 
established  under  the  patronage  of  individual  men.  This  expansion, 
Southern  tells  us,  took  place 
11 Wi thout  the  slightest  notice  being 
taken  of  it  in  the  official  acts  of  the  Cistercian  Order
11  and  the 
nunneries  had  no  formal  position  in the  Order's structure.  <Southern, 
1970:  315)  Thompson  points out  that the  Cistercians "at first  ignored 
and  then barely tolerated the  ladies who  wished to share their fervour 
and  imitate their customs."  CThompson,  1978:  242) 
In  fact,  when  the  infiltration  of  so  many  women  into  the  Order  was 
offically noticed,  an effort to limit and control the female  incursion 
took  place.  <Southern,  1970:  315-8)  In  the  Premonstratensian  Order, 
too,  the  twelfth  century  saw  a  crack  down  on  women.  Abbot  Conrad  of 
Marchtal  wrote: 
-179-"We  and  our  whole  community  of  canons,  recognizing that  the 
wickedness  of  women  is greater than all the other wickedness 
of  the  world,  and  that  there is no  anger  like  the  anger  of 
women,  and  that  the  poison  of  asps  and  dragons  is  more 
curable  and  less  dangerous  to  men  than  the  familiarity  of 
women,  have  unanimously  decreed for  the safety of  our souls, 
no  less than for  that  of  our  bodies  and  goods,  that  we  will 
on  no  account  receive  any  more  sisters to  the  increase  of 
our  perdition,  but  will  avoid  them  like  poisonous  animals." 
<quoted,  ibid.:  314) 
Women's  vows  of  chasitity were  not  enough,  then,  to prevent  them  from 
being objects of temptation to their male  counterparts. 
Although  feminine  flesh  was  the  real seat of sin,  and  women's  inherent 
sinfulness  was  hardly erradicable  even  through ascetic  regimens,  this 
did  not  prevent  women  from  trying  - they  simply  had  to  try  harder. 
Women  could  define  sexual  pleasure  as  a  whole,  rather  than  their 
bodies  alone  as  the  sin,  and  indeed  Southern  argues  that  "disgust  at 
the  recollection  or  prospect  of  marriage  seems  to  have  played  a  very 
large  part  in  recommending  the  monastic  life to  women".  <ibid.:  311) 
Religious  women  renounced  marriage,  took  a  vow  of  chastity  and 
dedicated  their  lives  to  Christ.  (ibid. :  326;  Brooke,  1978:  5; 
Holdsworth,  1978:  198;  Bolton,  1978:  256) 
Women  were  allowed  only a  very  minor  role  in the  Church,  and  Southern 
argues  that  it was  women's  desire  for  a  "spiritual  importance"  denied 
them  by  orthodox  Chritstianity  which  led  to their  strong atttraction 
to  heretical  movements.  The  Beguines,  for  example,  were  an  all-woman 
movement  which  began  in  Liege  in  1210.  Their  name  derives  from  the 
heretical  Albigensians,  and  was  a  pejorative  term given  to  women  who 
rejected  marriage  for  celibacy.  <Southern,  1970:  321-2)  Women's  quest 
-180-to reject  the  world  and  the  flesh on  equal  terms with men  was  attacked 
from  both  sides;  neither  lay  society  nor  the  Church  could  accept  the 
divorce  of  the  female  soul  from the  female  body  and its desires. 
Bell  has  shown  the  lengths  St.  Catherine  and  other  female  ascetics 
went  to  to  mortify  their  flesh,  and  how  their  excesses  angered  and 
perturbed  their  male  confessors  and  the  church  authorities.  <Bell, 
1985)  BM:  Bolton  also  writes  of  Mary  of  Oignies'  "incredible  feats  of 
endurance  in fasting,  prayer  and  lack  of  sleep".  Her  contemplation  of 
the  Passion  "induced  in her  such  a  loathing  of  her  own  body  that  she 
cut  off  pieces  of  her  own  flesh  with  a  knife";  she  was  "filled with 
the  holy  food  of Christ's flesh and purified and cleansed by  his life-
giving  blood".  <Bolton,  1978:  363;  266)  And  Southern quotes  Mechthild 
of  Magdeburg: 
":My  body is in great distress. 
My  soul  is in highest bliss, 
for she has seen 
and  thrown her arms  around 
her Loved  One  all at once. 
Poor thing, 
she is distressed by him: 
he  so draws  and delights her, 
she cannot  withhold herself, 
and he  brings her into himself. 
Then  the  body speaks to the soul: 
'Where  have  you  been?  I  cannot  bear it any more.' 
And  the soul says,  'Shut  up,  you  fool, 
I  want  to be with  my  beloved; 
You  will  never enjoy me  any more  -
I  am  his joy;  he  is my  distress -
Your  distress is,  that  you  can no  longer enjoy me: 
You  must  put  up  with this distress 
For it will  never  leave  you."  <Southern,  1970:  327) 
This  feminine  "super-mortification"  can  be  directly  related  to  the 
concept  of  the  female  body  as  "super-flesh"  in  medieval  Christian 
-181-ideology.  Although  there  existed sufficient  ideological  ambiguity  for 
women  to try in numbers  to escape  the  prison  of their flesh,  this was 
an  almost  hopeless  task,  as  flesh  was  what  defined  them.  Men  could 
escape  the  flesh  by  an  avoidance  of  women;  women  were  fundamentally 
trapned. 
~ ~  In  the  extreme  physical  asceticism of  Catherine  of  Siena  we 
can see  an  attempt to purify and transcend her female  flesh:  since her 
body  was,  as  female,  intrinsically more  sinful,  her efforts to escape 
the  flesh  had  to  be  greater  than  those  of  her  male  counterparts.  No 
wonder  she  so  irritated  her  confessors  with  efforts  which  to  them 
would  have  had a  continual whiff  of futility about  them. 
The  doctrine  of  the  humours,  then,  seen  in  the  context  of  Christian 
theology,  gives  us  a  body-concept  dependant  on  rigid  hierarchical 
categorizations  in  which,  reflecting  the  cosmological  dichotomy  of 
heaven  and  earth,  the  central  defining  dichotomy  is that  of  body  and 
soul.  As  in  the  wider  feudal  culture,  only  an  elite few  could  detach 
themselves  from  the  world  of  matter,  flesh,  sin  and  flux  through 
ascetic  regimens  which  brought  them  closer  to  heaven's  changeless 
realm  of  spirit.  Spiritual  perfection  and  union  with  God  was 
achievable  only  through  transcending  the  flesh.  Membership  of  the 
elite  was  fixed  - each  person  had  his  or  her  inescapable  place  in  a 
god-given  hierarchy.  And  membership  of  the  elite  was  gender-specific; 
women's  bodies  linked them all but  irrevocably with the  world. 
-182-The  concept  of the body  in carnival culture 
Although  the  ideological  domination  of  the  Church  in the  Middle  Ages 
is often suggested - Southern,  for  example,  argues that the church was 
"a  compulsory  society"  C1970:  17),  and  Roberta  Hamilton  argues  that 
its views  "went  almost  unchallenged"  <Hamilton,  1978:  50)  - Bakhtin's 
work  shows  that  a  critique of  the  hierarchical  power  of  feudalism and 
catholic  ideology  did  exist  in  popular  culture.  His  study  of  popular 
carnival  culture  reveals  both  an  alternative  and  oppositional 
conception  of  feudal  social  structure and  a  corresponding alternative 
and  oppositional  perception of the  body.  It is to this we  now  turn. 
Bakhtin  argues,  of  Rabelais,  that  popular  sources  - idioms,  sayings, 
proverbs  "determined  the  entire  system  of  his  i:mages  and  his 
artistic  outlook  on  the  world"  <Bakhtin,  1968:  2).  His  writing  is 
"nonofficial",  in that it is isolated  from literature,  but  is at  home 
with  popular  culture.  ·This  foundation  in  medieval  popular  culture, 
Bakhtin argues,  allows  us to use  the  work  of  Rabelais as an expression 
of  that  culture.  He  argues  that  in  feudal  societies  a  "two-world 
condition"  existed,  in  which  the  popular  culture  of  humour  and 
carnival  scoffed  at  and  parodied  the  official  feudal  culture.  It  is 
here  that  understandings  of  the  body  opposed  to  that  of  Christian 
ideology  can  be  found.  The  consciousness  of  medieval  man,  then, 
contains  both  carnival  and  Christian  understandings  of  life.  (ibid.: 
3;  6;  96) 
-183-In  "official"  feudal  culture,  the  body,  occupying  a  fixed  place  in  a 
fixed  cosmos,  was  the  prison  of  the  soul.  In  carnival  culture  this 
understanding  was  overturned  through the  imagery of grotesque  realism. 
Here,  Bakhtin  argues  that  the  ideal  and  the  spiritual  are  reduced  or 
degraded  to  the  material,  physical  level,  "the  sphere  of  earth  and 
body".  (ibid.:  19).  We  must  be  wary,  however,  of  seeing  the 
degradation  of  grotesque  realism  through  modern  eyes.  In  medieval 
carnival  imagery  "degradation"  is not  a  negative  term,  but  represents 
subsumption  into  "the  positive,  regenerating  and  renewing  lower 
stratum"  in which the  body: 
"makes  no  pretence  to renunciation of the earthly  ... this is 
not  the  body  and its physiology in the modern sense of these 
words,  because it is not  individualized.  The  material bodily 
principle is contained not  in the  biological  individual,  not 
in  the  bourgeois  ego,  but  in  the  people,  a  people  who  are 
continually  growing  and  renewed.  This  is  why  all  that  is 
bodily  becomes  grandiose  exaggerated,  immeasurable ...  the 
leading  themes  of  these  images  of  bodily life are fertility, 
growth and  a  brimmming-over  abundance." 
(ibid.:  23;  19) 
Degradation  or  debasement  did  not  mean  simple  destruction  or 
befouling,  but  a  renewal  on  the  material  bodily  level  in  an 
elimination  of  hierarchical  divisions.  So,  for  Rabelais,  then,  the 
subsumption  of  the  ideal/spiritual  within  the  material  was  positively 
renewing,  drawing  it  into  the  body  understood  as  the  body  of  the 
people  in  which  death  and  rebirth  are  inextricably  intertwined,  into 
"the fruitful  earth and the  womb".  (ibid.:  21;  224) 
There  are  three  central  points  to  be  understood  here.  In  carnival 
culture  the  hierarchical  order  of  feudal  society  is  overturned;  the 
-184-king  becomes  the  peasant,  the  peasant  the  king,  and  fixed  power 
relations  are  satirised.  The  hierarchy  of  body  and  soul  is  itself 
overturned:  the  body,  from  being  the  prison  of  the  soul,  becomes  the 
locus  of  life  and  regeneration,  and  is  celebrated  rather  than 
renounced.  (ibid.:  19)  And  secondly,  the  body  in carnival  culture  is 
not  individuated  but  represents  the  community  of  all  the  people,  the 
"social  body",  in  a  "material  bodily  whole  which ...  transgressed  the 
limits of ...  isolation"  <ibid.:  23;  see  also  Gurevich,  1985:  53-4).  It 
is because  the  body  is collective that death is part of fertility and 
rewewal  rather  than  the  individual  tragedy  of  an  absolute  end. 
Grotesque  realism "discloses the potentiality of  an entirely different 
world"  and  thus  "liberates humanity  from  neccessity".  <Bahktin,  1968: 
48-9)  The  humour  which  is  fundamental  to  it  liberates  the  common 
people  from fear  of  oppression by nature,  death and  of the consecrated 
and  forbidden.  (ibid.:  90;  226)  It  represents  an  overturning  of  the 
hierarchies of  feudal  power  relations in a  critique of  the  fundamental 
separations which structure and justify them. 
The  conception  of  the collective body is expressed through the  imagery 
of  abundance,  with  "exaggeration,  hyperbolism,  excessiveness"  being 
"fundamental  attributes"  of  grotesque  realism.  Cibid.:  303)  The 
central  image  is  the  huge  size  and  appetites  of  Gargantua,  where 
images  of  gluttony  and  drunkeness  express  not  private  appetites,  but 
the  appetite  for  life  of  the  people  as  a  whole,  and  their  triumphant 
absorbtion in their environment.  (ibid.:  301-2) 
-185-Finally  1  and  relatedly  1  - carnival  body  imagery  is  essentially 
dialectic.  <ibid.:  211-2)  Bakhtin  argues  that  the  carnival  body  is 
process rather than product: 
"life  ... is  the  epitome  of  incompleteness.  And  such  is 
precisely  the  grotesque  concept  of  the  body ... (in 
which) ...  the  grotesque  body  is not  a  closed,  completed unit: 
it  is  unfinished,  outgrows  itself,  transgresses  its  own 
limits". 
(ibid.:  26) 
The  image  of  the  body  is of  "contradictory,  perpetually  becoming  and 
unfinished  being."  (ibid.:  118;  316)  Thus  parts  of  the  body  open  to 
the  outside world are stressed: 
"the  unfinished  and  open  body  <dying,  bringing  forth  and 
being  born)  is  not  separated  from  the  world  by  clearly 
defined  boundaries;  it  is  blended  with  the  world,  with 
animals,  with  objects.  It  is  cosmic,  it  represents  the 
entire  material  bodily  world  in  all  its  elements ...  as  the 
swallowing up  and generating principle." 
(ibid.:  26-7) 
Since,  then,  grotesque  realism  represents  a  collective  body,  the 
boundaries  between  body  and  world  are  seen  quite  differently  to 
boundaries  between  the  world  and  the  individuated body.  The  focus  on 
the  grotesque  body  as  open  to  the  world,  and  as  intruding  into  the 
world gives  a  central role to "that which protrudes from the  body,  all 
that  seeks  to  go  out  beyond  that  body's  confines  ...  all  that  prolongs 
the  body  and  links  it  to  other  bodies  or  to  the  world  outside". 
(ibid.:  316) 
The  common  characteristic  between  bodily  orifices  and  protrusions  is 
that  within  them  the  divisions  of  body  and  body,  and  of  body  and 
-186-world,  are  overcome.  Grotesque  imagery  ignores  the  closed  surface  of 
the  body,  then,  and  concentrates  on  "excressences ...  and 
orifices  ...  that  which  leads  beyond  the  body's  limited  space  or  into 
the  body's  depths.  Mountains  and  abysses,  such  is  the  relief  of  the 
grotesque  body;  or ...  towers  and  subterranean  passages."  Cibid.:  318; 
317) 
Grotesque  language,  then: 
"was  orientated toward  the  world  and  toward all the  world's 
phenomena  in  their  condition  of  unfinished  metamorphosis: 
the  passing  from  night  to  morning,  from  winter  to  spring, 
from the old to the  new,  from death to birth." 
(ibid.:  165) 
This  essentially  dialectical  conception  of  the  world  and  the  body, 
Bakhtin argues,  could only  be  expressed in "unofficial"  culture and in 
opposition  and  critique  of  the  founding  principle  of  offical  feudal 
culture  - "an  immovable  and  unchanging  hierarchy  in  which  the  higher 
and the  lower  never  merge",  in which there are "hard,  well-established 
lines between all  phenomena",  and  in which  the  order  of the  world  was 
static,  unchanging  and  eternal.  Cibid.:  106;  433)  The  official  view 
could  not  be  overcome  by  individual  thought,  only  by  popular culture 
as a  whole.  (ibid.:  275) 
Images  of  bodily  life  eating,  drinking,  copulation,  birth, 
defecation  - were  central  in  Rabelais'  work,  and  express  these  three 
central  features  of  degradation  as  renewal,  the  body  as  collective, 
and the body as process.  As  Bakhtin argues,  images  of eating create: 
"an  extremely  dense  atmosphere  of  the  body 
which  all  the  dividing  lines  between  man  and 
the  consuming  and  the  consumed  bowels  are 
erased ...  these  consuming  and  consumed  organs 
-187-
as  a  whole  in 
beast,  between 
intentionally 
are  fused  with the  generating  womb.  We  thus  obtain  a  truly  grotesque  image 
of  one  single,  superindividual  bodily  life,  of  the  great 
bowels  that  devour  and  are  devoured,  generate  and  are 
generated.  But  this,  of  course,  is  not  an  'animal'  or 
'biological'  bodily life.  We  see  looming  beyond Gargamelle's 
womb  the  devoured  and  devouring  womb  of  the  earth  and  the 
ever-regenerated body  of  the people."  (ibid.:  226) 
Banquet  imagery,  then,  represents  eating  not  as  a  commonplace, 
privatized  and  individualized  activity  but  as  a  popular  feast,  a 
"banquet  for  all  the  world"  in  which  eating is a  social  event  rather 
than a  biological  act.  (ibid.:  278;  281)  It is in eating that the  body 
trangresses  its own  limits  and  "is enriched  and  grows  at  the  world's 
expense".  In eating,  humanity encounters the  world: 
"here  man  tastes  the  world,  introduces  it  into  his  body, 
makes  it part  of  himself ... Cfurther) ...  Xan's  encounter  with 
the  world  in  the  act  of  eating  is  joyful,  triumphant;  he 
triumphs  over  the  world,  devours  it without  being  devoured 
himself.  The  limits between  man  and the  world are erased,  to 
man's advantage." 
(ibid.:  281) 
What  Bakhtin  and  Rabelais  show,  then,  is  the  "laughing  chorus"  of 
official  feudal  culture,  a  chorus  in  which  the  body  is  open, 
collective  and  dialectic.  (ibid.:  367)  The  point  and  counterpoint  of 
medieval  concepts  of  the  body  show  how  the  body  is  understood  and 
perceived  through  the  framework  of  worldview.  In  the  dominant 
understanding  of  the  body,  hierarchy  and  dichotomy,  the  central 
organising principles  of  Christian  cosmology,  define  the  body.  In  the 
oppositional  carnival  culture,  these  values  are  overturned,  in  a 
satire of  the  hierarchical  social  structures  which  underpin  them.  The 
body  was  seen  as  part  of  the  dialectical  cycle  of  life  and  death,  a 
-188-unitary concept  of  material  existence  which  negated the dichotomies of 
heaven  and earth,  flesh and spirit. 
-189-The  medieval  body;  flesh  and  super-flesh 
The  body-concepts  of  feudal  and  carnival  culture  come  to  us,  it must 
be  remembered,  through  the  writings,  almost  exclusively,  of  men.  We 
have  very  little  material  directly  from  women  - even  the  "Lives"  of 
Bell's  "holy  anorexics"  are  women's  experiences  translated  through 
masculine  frameworks.  It  is  difficult  to  reconstruct  with  any 
certainty  how  women  reacted  to  these  conceptualisations  of  their 
bodies,  what  acceptances,  rejections or negotiations took place. 
The  devaluation  of  women  in  Christian  ideology  was  resisted, 
certainly,  in  women's  insistence  that  they  too  could  live  the 
religious  life and  transcend  the  body.  But  the  discussion of  a  female 
perspective  on  the  medieval  concepts  of  the  body  can  really  only  be 
speculative.  What  we  Qall.  identify  are  patriarchal  understandings  of 
women  and  their  bodies. 
defined  as  "super-flesh" 
gender  difference  was 
I  have  suggested  that  women's  bodies  were 
in  theology,  and  I  would  argue  that  the 
expressed  quantitatively  rather  than 
qualitatively  both  in  Christian  and  in  carnival  categorizations.  The 
difference  between the  two  concepts  lies not  in the  structure or  form 
of  their  expression  of  the  gender  difference  of  bodies,  but  in  the 
different  value  they  place  on  flesh  and spirit.  To  put it crudely,  if 
women  equal  super-flesh,  their  value  is  decreased  in  Christian 
cosmology but  increased in carnival  imagery. 
As  we  have  seen,  in the  Christian concept the body  was  the  fundamental 
symbol  of  earthly corruption.  The  most  valued spiritual  path resisted 
-190-physical  demands  and  sought  spiritual  transcendence  - the  elimination 
as  far  as  possible  of  the  earthly  and  corrupt  in  order  to  approach 
union with the  pure spirit of God.  Xen  and women,  as  we  have  seen,  did 
not  have  equality  of  access  to  sal  vat  ion  since  the  transcendence  of 
the  flesh  was,  for  women,  an  almost  impassible  task.  Women,  through 
their  bodies,  were  tied  much  more  closely  to  the  realm  of  earthly 
corruption than were  men.  But this was  a  difference of quantity rather 
than  of  quality:  both  genders  were  linked through their bodies  to  the 
material  realm,  and far bath this link was  a  negative  one. 
Conclusions  about  the  popular  view  of  the  female  body  will  of 
necessity  be  mare  tentative.  Information  is  scarce,  and  Bahktin  has 
little  to  say  an  the  gender  division  in  carnival  imagery.  The  only 
sustained  discussion  specifically  an  women  is  his  short  analysis  of 
the  "querelle des  femmes"  - a  sixteenth century French dispute  an  the 
nature  of  women  and  marriage.  <Bakhtin,  1968:  239  ff.)  Here  he 
identifies  contradictions  in  "the  Gallic  tradi  tian"  with  regard  to 
women  between  a  profoundly  negative  Christian  attitude,  and  the 
exaltation of  womanhood  in "chivalry": 
"the  Gallic  tradition  is  a  complex  and  contradictory 
phenamenan ... it  represented ...  twa  lines  of  thought:  the 
papular  comic  tradition;  and  the  ascetic  tendency  of 
medieval  Christianity,  which  saw in woman  the  incarnation of 
sin,  the temptation of  the flesh." 
(ibid.:  240) 
Bakhtin argues that these  apposing views of  women,  although frequently 
found  intertwined,  should  be  analytically  separated  as  they  are,  in 
fact,  "profoundly alien to each ather".  <ibid.:  240)  The  unadulterated 
-191-popular  view  of  women  is,  he  argues,  neither hostile nor negative,  but 
celebrates women  as part of  the material  world: 
"woman  is essentially  related  to  the  material  bodily  lower 
stratum;  she  is  the  incarnation  of  this  stratum  that 
degrades  and  regenerates  simultaneously.  She  is ambivalent. 
She  debases,  brings  down  to earth,  lends  a  bodily substance 
to  things,  and  destroys;  but,  first  of  all,  she  is  the 
principle  that  gives  birth.  She  is the  womb ...  the  woman  of 
Gallic  tradition is the  bodily  grave  of  man.  She  represents 
in  person  the  undoing  of  pretentiousness,  of  all  that  is 
finished,  completed and  exhausted." 
(ibid.:  240) 
It  is,  then,  in  the  transition  from  the  comic  popular  view  to  the 
serious  ascetic  view  that  "ambivalence"  becomes  entirely  negative. 
When  the  material  realm as  a  whole  is devalued as that which keeps the 
soul  from  heaven,  women,  as  "essentially related"  to that  realm,  are 
devalued  with  it.  But  in  true  carnival  imagery  woman  is the  ultimate 
dialectical  image: 
"The  woman's  bowels  are  inexhaustible  and  never  satisfied. 
She  is  organically  hostile  to  all  that  is  old  ...  woman  is 
naturally opposed to eternity." 
(ibid.:  242;  241) 
A  number  of  obvious  points  need  to  be  made  here.  Firstly,  the 
"querelle"  is,  of  course,  a  dispute  between  two  masculine  views  of 
women,  and  we  can  have  no  idea  what  views  women  themselves held on the 
issue.  Neither  can  we  accurately  gauge  the  participation of  women  in 
the  generation  of  carnival  imagery  itself.  However,  I  would  suggest 
that  the  querelle  does  allow us  a  brief  glimpse  of  differences  in the 
conceptualisations  of  the  male  and  female  body  in  popular  culture 
which  the  rest  of  Bakhtin' s  work  unfortunately  obscures.  <Booth, 
1982;  Miller,  1986)  Here  again,  I  would  argue,  gender  difference  is 
-192-conceptualised  as  quantitative  rather  than  qualitative.  Women,  as  in 
the  Christian  view,  are  innately  ~  material  - more  flesh  than 
spirit. 
While  the  distinction  is  similar,  however,  its  effects  are 
dramatically  different.  With  the  profoundly  differing  views  of  the 
"degradation"  of  bodily  life  in  popular  and  ascetic  understandings, 
women's  stronger  connection  with  the  material  is  negative  in  the 
latter but  positive  in the  former.  In popular culture the  emphasis was 
on  bodily  openess  and  the  fluidity  of  boundaries  between the  body  and 
the  world.  The  womb  and  the  bowels  are  central  images  here,  both 
acting to overturn and erase distinctions between  body  and  world,  life 
and  death.  Tentatively,  then,  we  could  accept  Bahktin's  view that the 
popular  notion  of  degradation  as  positive  formed  a  "pro-woman"  strand 
in the socially dominant  masculine  view of  women  and the  female  body. 
-193-Bourgeois bodies 
Gurevich  argues  that  in  medieval  categorizations  people  were  part  of 
nature,  since  "the  laws  of  creation  are  to  be  found  in  analogy". 
<Gurevich,  1985:  57)  Consequently,  then: 
"the  elements  of the  human  body  were  identical,  it was  held, 
with  the  elements  forming  the  universe.  Man's  flesh  was  of 
the  earth,  his  blood  of  water,  his  breath  of  air  and  his 
warmth  of fire." 
(ibid.:  57) 
The  unity  of  humanity  and  nature  was  experienced  too  in  the  feudal 
mode  of production: 
"Bound  to  the  soil  by  his  work,  absorbed  in  the  tasks  of 
rural  husbandry,  man  perceived nature as an integral part of 
himself  instead of  treating it as an object  pure  and  simple 
to be  manipulated,  utilised or disposed of." 
(ibid.:  44) 
Thus,  as  Gurevich  argues,  a  "subject-object"  relationship  between 
humanity  and  nature  was  impossible  in  feudal  culture.  The  idea  of 
human  labour as "transforming"  nature  was  meaningless.  <ibid.:  54)  For 
such  a  separation to be possible the "distance"  - both ideological  and 
material  - between humanity  and the natural  environment  "would  have  to 
increase".  (ibid.:  67)  This,  of  course,  is precisely what  happens  with 
the transition to the capitalist mode  of  production,  in which  "nature" 
is manipulable  by  human  labour,  it is transformed.  As  Gurevich argues: 
"man's  practical  activity  became  more  and  more  complex  and 
his effect  on  nature  more  direct  and  purposeful,  thanks  to 
the  development  of  new  tools  and  the  invention of  machinery 
which  came  to adopt  an  intermediary position between man  and 
his natural  surroundings ...  he  detaches himself  more  and  more 
from  her  <nature)  and  begins  to  look  upon  her  as  an  object 
to be  utilised".  (ibid.:  90) 
-194-Capitalist  production  separates  humanity  from  nature,  constructing 
nature  as  outside  of  the  human  subject,  existing  in order to  be  used. 
With  the  transition  from  feudal  to  bourgeois  culture  we  see  a 
transformation not  only in the relationship of humanity to nature,  but 
also  in social  relations.  Power,  wealth  and status,  previously  vested 
in social  role,  seen as entailed in the fixed place occupied in a  God-
given  hierarchy,  come  to  be  understood  as  the  results  of  individual 
endeavour.  Black and  Coward  argue that the modern bourgeois state: 
"emerged  in  the  disintegration  of  the  relatively  diffused 
hierarchy  of  the  feudal  state.  Previously,  political 
responsibilities  and  rights  were  derived  from  particular 
status  given  in  a  very  definite  hierarchy.  The  capitalist 
state,  however,  increasingly  addressed  its  political 
representations  to  a  generalized  'citizen'  sexless, 
classless,  a  citizen of the world." 
<Black  & Coward,  1981:  83-4) 
The  notion  of  the  generalised  citizen  is  formed  in  the  framework  of 
capitalist  social  relations  which  depend  on  private  ownership  of  the 
means  of  social  production,  and  the  justificatory  ideology  of 
possessive  individual  ism.  In  feudalism,  as  we  have  seen,  people  are 
defined  by  their  place  in  a  rigidly  hierarchical  social  order.  In 
capitalism,  "free"  labour  and  private  ownership  combine  to  create  a 
social  structure in  which each  worker is forced to sell her/his labour 
power  as  a  commodity  in  competition  with  all  other  workers,  and  in 
which  each capitalist is in competition with all others in the rush to 
accumulate.  Soceity is seen as the  interaction of all these  individual 
"units"  whose  main  motivation  is  self-interest,  defined  in  terms  of 
ownership.  The  change,  as  Bakhtin  argues,  is  from  the  person  as  one 
element  in  the  controlling  hierarchy of  the  cosmos,  to the  perception 
-195-of  man  <and  I  use  the  term  advisedly)  as  the  centre  of  the  universe 
and its controller.  <Bakhtin,  1968:  366-7) 
In  bourgeois  ideology the  individual  is king.  Each  individual  acts  in 
pursuit  of  his  own  interests;  his  social  position  is  not  fixed,  but 
can  with  industrious  effort  be  improved  upon.  Each  individual  is the 
agent  of  his  own  destiny,  the  centre  of  his universe.  Consequent  upon 
these  material  and  ideological  changes  the  concept  of  the  body 
undergoes  a  transformation,  in  which  separation  and  instrumentality 
characterise  the  bourgeois  body.  The  chains  that  bound  it to  nature 
and  to the  collective  body  of  the  people  having  been  broken,  the  body 
takes  on  a  new  meaning  in  the  construction  of  nature  as  object  and 
humanity  as  subject;  it is  used  as  an  instrument  in  the  pursuit  of 
individual self-interest. 
As  we  have  seen,  Bakhtin argues that the exaggerated bodily  imagery of 
the  medieval  carnival  reflects a  collective  understanding  of  the  body 
as the  body  of  the  people.  He  contrasts this with  modern  ideas  of  the 
body  as private,  separate and  individuated,  "the goal  of egoistic lust 
and  possession".  (ibid.:  23;  19-24).  The  carnival  focus  on  the  parts 
of the  body  open to the world,  and to the processes in which  world  and 
body  intermingle is contrasted with the  modern  focus  on  the surface of 
the  body  as  an  impenetrable  barrier  between  the  individual  and  the 
environment.  (ibid.:  27;  39;  317-8)  He  argues: 
"in the  private sphere  of isolated individuals the  images  of 
the  bodily  lower  stratum  preserve  the  element  of  negation 
while  losing  almost  entirely  their  positive,  regenerating 
force.  Their  link  with  life  and  with  the  cosmos  is  broken, 
-196-they  are  narrowed  down  to  naturalistic  erotic  images." 
(ibid.:  23) 
The  modern  body  is product  rather than process - closed and  completed, 
its links with the material  degrading in the  modern  sense,  its imagery 
"of  the  finished,  completed  man,  cleansed,  as  it  were,  of  all  the 
scoriae  of  birth  and  death".  <ibid.:  25;  24-6;  113)  The  individual 
body,  then,  loses its link with the material  seen as a  whole,  in which 
it is not  individuated but  is rather 
11 a  point  of  transition in a  1 ife 
eternally  renewed,  the  inexhaustible  vessel  of  death  and  conception". 
(ibid.:  318)  In  the  popular  medieval  concept  the  body  is irremediably 
a  part  of  nature,  and thus cannot  be  seen as an  individual  possession. 
The  transition  from  feudalism  to  capitalism  is  in  bodily  terms  the 
transition from the  understanding of the body as a  part and expression 
of  nature,  to  the  body  as  the  vehicle  through  which  the  self 
expropriates and controls nature. 
Bakhtin argues: 
"the  new  bodily  canon ...  presents  an  entirely  finished, 
completed,  strictly  limited  body,  which  is  shown  from  the 
outside  as  something  individual.  That  which  protrudes, 
bulges,  sprouts  or  branches  off ... is eliminated,  hidden,  or 
moderated.  All  orifices of  the  body are closed.  The  basis of 
the  image  is  the  individual,  strictly  limited  mass,  the 
impenetrable  facade.  The  opaque  surface  and  the  body's 
'valleys'  acquire  an  essential  meaning  as  the  border  of  a 
closed  individuality  that  does  not  merge  with  other  bodies 
and  with the world." 
(ibid.:  320) 
The  modern  body  is  self-sufficient,  an 
11 individual,  closed  sphere", 
and  the  focus  of  imagery  is  on  "individually  characteristic  and 
-197-expressive  parts  of  the  body"  - head,  face,  eyes,  lips,  muscular 
system.  <ibid.:  321) 
Turner  also  takes  up  the  separation  of  the  body  from  its place  in  a 
fixed  cosmology,  and  its  transformation,  with  the  emergence  of 
capitalism,  into an individuated possession.  He  argues: 
"the  concept  of  nature  as  a  world  of  physical  objects 
independent  of  man  and  the  concept  of  man  as  a  thing-link 
phenomenon  (a  machine,  an hydraulic  pump,  or as a  cog within 
a  clock)  both emerged at a  specific point  in history,  namely 
with  the  growth  of  commodity  production  within  a  fully 
monaterized economy." 
<Turner,  1984:  232) 
The  emergence  of  the  concept  of  the  body  as  thing  or  commodity  is 
further linked to the secularization of  the  body,  in which the  body  is 
transformed  from  "the  object  of  a  sacred  discourse  of  the  flesh"  to 
the  object  of  medical  discourse  which  sees  it  as  a  "machine  to  be 
controlled  by  appropriate  scientific  regimens".  (ibid.:  36>  Turner 
gives  the  example  of  Cheyne,  who  described  the  body  as  a  hydraulic 
system  the  equilibrium  of  which  is  maintained  by  correct  inputs  and 
outputs.  <ibid.:  219> 
Xedical  theory,  Turner  argues,  was  influenced  in  the  seventeenth  and 
eighteenth  centuries  by  Descartes's  differentiation  of  mind  as  the 
defining  characteristic  of  selfhood.  The  body  was  simply  a  machine 
owned  by  the  self,  or  person-as-mind,  and  medicine  "came  to  be 
markedly  influenced  by  mathematical  and  chemical  models  of  the  body 
which  was  conceived as  a  complex  machine"  (ibid.:  77).  For  Hobbes  the 
body  was  an  "extension"  of  the  mind  and  he  argued  that  man  Cas  in man, 
-198-not  humanity)  had  "a natural right to his own  body"  <and  to the  bodies 
of his wife  and children)  <ibid.:  87-9). 
Capitalist  conceptions  of  the  body  are,  then,  instrumental.  The  self 
uses  the  body  as  an  individual  possession.  Turner  pursues  this 
argument  through  the  changing  concept  of  diet.  As  we  have  seen,  in 
medieval  asceticism dietary control  was  part  of  an  attempt  to control 
desire  and  to  overcome  the  flesh.  Turner  argues  that  with  capitalism 
desire/the  body  are  fostered  rather  than  suppressed;  the  body  must  be 
disciplined  in  production  but  encouraged  in  its  desires  in 
consumption.  This  does  not,  however,  represent  bodily  "freedom"; 
following  Foucault,  Turner  argues  that  desire  is  created  and 
controlled  through  medicalized  power,  and  must  thus  be  correctly 
channelled  into  consumption  while  being  controlled  in  production. 
(ibid.:  159-170;  200) 
Although desire and the  body  are created through and controlled by  the 
legal  and  medical  discourses  of  capitalism,  they  appear  as  "natural" 
and  the  "suppression"  of  bodily  desires at  work  and  their expression 
in the  private  sphere  are  seen  as  natural  occurances.  The  body,  as  a 
pre-given  biological  entity,  and  physical  desires,  as  naturally 
arising  from  biological  dictates  or  "needs",  exist  a-priori,  to  be 
used  by the self as it chases;  the social construction of  the  body  and 
of desire are rendered invisible. 
Diet  is  used  in  the  twentieth  century,  Turner  argues,  "in  the 
preservation  of  life  to  enhance  the  enjoyment  of  pleasures".  (ibid. : 
-199-172)  Consumption  is a  virtue  rather  than  a  sin,  and  "diet is a  method 
of  promoting  the  capacity  for  secular  enjoyments":  "to  be  complete 
persons  we  have  to  consume,  to  overspend  and  to  satiate  desire". 
(ibid.:  216;  238)  The  body  in consumer culture is,  then,  "a vehicle  of 
pleasure".  (ibid.:  172) 
In  this  section  two  constructions  of  the  bourgeois  body  are  analysed 
in  order  to  explore  the  argument  that  the  body  is  constructed  as 
separate  from,  and  acting  upon,  nature,  as  private  property, 
individualized  and  owned.  Further·,  the  construction  of  the  body  as 
gendered  forms  a  central  analytical  link  between  this  and  the 
following  chapter.  As  Black  and  Coward  argue,  the bourgeois concept  of 
the  individual  citizen  does  not  include  women.  <ibid.:  84)  The 
subsequent  argument  seeks to show that the concept  of the individuated 
body,  with  its  central  defining  characteristics  of  separation  and 
instrumentality,  refers  not  to  the  ungendered  individual  but  to  the 
masculine  subject.  The  feminine  body,  it  will  be  argued,  is 
constructed  in  oppostion  to  the  individuated  body  - as  merged,  rather 
than separate,  and as acted-on,  rather than active. 
-200-Victorian bodies 
Barker-Benfield analyses the  nineteenth century perception of the  male 
body  as  a  pseudo-economic  system  - "the  spermatic  economy".  The  male 
body  was  seen  as  a  self-sufficient system of  energies held  in balance 
by  reason.  (Barker-Benfield,  1976;  1973:  378)  Its energies  should  be 
accumulated  and  disciplined,  expended  only  in  production  - either  of 
wealth  or  of  babies  - and  any  other  expenditure  was  wasteful.  The 
proper  aim  of  a  man  was  to  "discipline  and  utilise"  his  own  bodily 
powers"  under  the  "potent  sway"  of  his  mind.  <1973:  386;  380)  He 
argues that: 
"in  working  toward  success  one  should  conserve  one • s 
energies:  having  attained  it,  one  had  to  be  eternally 
vigilant to avoid debilitating expenditure." 
(1976:  296) 
Work,  then,  used  up  physical  energy,  and the only other proper use  for 
it was  child production- the  "natural destiny"  of  sperm.  <ibid.:  267) 
He  argues  that  the  language  of  expenditure  in  19th  century 
masturbation  phobia  reveals  "an  economy  of  the  body"  in  which  the 
masculine  body  was  "an  economic  system,  whose  fundamental  orientation 
was  the  accumulation  of  resources":  "the  underlying  :model  for  the 
operation  of  the  whole  man,  psychological  and  physiological,  was 
economic."  (ibid.:  169;  195;  1973:  374) 
The  wasteful  expenditure  of  sperm  in  masturbation  or  "excessive" 
i. e.  non-procreative  - sex,  both  of  which  were  the  subject  of  major 
public  and  medical  concern  in the  second half of the century,  "drained 
-201-the  physical  vigor  otherwise  available  to  the  will",  and  first 
diverted  and  then  removed  men  from the  pursuit  of  success.  <1976:  176; 
234;  171)  Energy,  like  capital,  should  be  "developed,  restrained, 
governed,  not  abrogated,  destroyed,  unrecognized".  (ibid.:  235) 
The  masculine  bodily  economy  was  naturally self-sufficient - excessive 
"drainage"  of  sperm  upset  its  "autonomous  accumulation  of  energy". 
Cibid.:  178-9)  Amariah  Brigham explained the  system: 
"a  fundamental  law  of  the  distribution  of  vi tal 
powers ... Cis)  that  when  they  are  increased  in  one  part  they 
are  diminished  in  all  the  rest  of  the  living  economy ...  to 
increase  the  powers  of  one  organ it is absolutely neccessary 
that  they should  be  diminished in all the others." 
<1973:  375-6) 
The  proper  aim  of  man  was  "the  hoarding  and  concentration  of 
energy ... in  an  obsessively  self-sufficient  system."  (ibid.:  377) 
Spermatic  expenditure  should  be  productive,  and  there  was  much 
discussion  on  exactly  how  much  intercourse  could  safely  be  seen  as 
productive.  The  "expenditure"  of  sperm  should  take  place  only  under 
the  guiding principles of  the  spermatic economy.  C1976:  181). 
The  rules  could  be  quantified.  Barker-Benfield discusses the  anonymous 
author  of  Nocturnal  Emissions,  writing  in  the  American  Journal  of 
Psychology  in January  1904: 
"From  1895  to  1903  he  calculated  that  he  averaged  3. 43 
nocturnal  emissions  each  month.  Since  he  was  a  bachelor  and 
did  not  masturbate,  he  felt  that  this  was  an  accurate 
measure  of  permissable  expenditures,  and  while  3. 43  would 
vary  for  different  men,  it  did  represent  the  physiological 
limit  that  should  be  a  warning  to  both 
1 unmarried 
masturbator  and  married  incontinent 
1
•  His  article  is 
complete  with statistics and  a  graph."  <1973:  397) 
-202-Intercoun:;e  in  the  sunshine  was  also  recommended,  so  that  "the 
copulators  would  be  recharging  their  batteries  even  as  they  were 
discharging".  <1976:  297-8) 
We  can  see,  then,  how  the  neccessi  ty  to  accumulate  capital  and  value 
production  over  consumption  in  "high  bourgeoL::;"  culture  provided  the 
framework  of  social  :meanings  through  which  the  masculine  body  was 
conceptualized  as  a  spermatic  economy.  Further,  each  bodily  system is 
a  strictly individual  unit  - each  man  :must  conserve  and  accumulate  his 
own  energy/capital  in  a  body  which  is  fundamentally  self-sufficient. 
The  :mind  :must  discipline  and  control  the  body  in  order  that  its 
energies  can  be  used  in  production  and  accumulation.  Bodily  energies 
were  men  s  constant  capital;  they  were  owned  as  absolute  possessions, 
and  were  to  be  directed  to  work  and  the  public  sphere.  The  body  was 
the  vehicle  through which  reason acted  on the  environment. 
To  boldly  go ... :  gynaecologists as pioneers 
In  The  horrors  of  the  half-known  life Barker-Benfield argues  that  the 
nineteenth  century  view  of  women  was  of  creatures  simultaneously  :more 
like  the  angels  and  "naturally closer to  the  animal  .  0976:  85;  1973: 
382)  The  two  ideas  coexisted  in  a  "dual  view"  of  women.  One 
ideological  strand  argued  that  women  were  sexually  disinterested  by 
-203-nature  and  delicately  shrank  from  sex;  the  other  saw  women  as 
dominated  by  the  body,  especially  by  the  womb  and  the  sexual 
appetites,  to  the  extent  that  if  not  strictly  controlled  these 
appetites could "extinguish"  men  and  the social  order.  <2> 
Feminists  have  argued  that  this  dual  view  was  expressed  by  women  in 
hysterical  symptoms  - from  the  fainting fit  or  "swoon"  to the  violent 
fit  or  "paroxysm"  - as  well  as  in  explanations  for  hysteria.  <See, 
i.e.,  Ehrenreich  &  English,  1973  &  1979;  Showalter,  1981;  Skultans, 
1979;  Smith-Rosenberg,  1972)  The  swoon  was  thought  to be  caused by  the 
sexual  repression which  resulted from  women's  natural delicacy.  On  the 
other  hand,  however,  Ehrenreich  and  English  discuss  tales  of  the 
sexually  voracious  hysterical  women  who  made  unseemly  advances  to 
impressionable  young  doctors  in  the  privacy  of  medical  consul  tat  ion. 
<Ehrenreich & English,  1973:  36) 
Both  ideological  strands  motivated  the  gynaecological  surgery  of  the 
second  half  of  the  19th century,  and  Barker-Benfield argues that this 
surgery  must  be  seen  as  part  of  "a  defensive,  emergency  ideology"  in 
the face  of  the first  wave  of :modern  feminism with  its pressure  for 
female  education and  reproductive  control.  <Barker-Benfield,  1976:  84; 
239)  Gynaecology  here,  he  suggests,  functions  as  social  control:  "the 
assertion  of  male  supremacy  seems  to  have  been  a  response  to fears of 
female  encroachment."  <ibid.:  87) 
2  For  an alternative  view see Degler,  1973;  as Degler correctly points 
out,  social  prohibitions  do  not  necessarily describe actual  behaviour, 
and  we  should  not  assume  an  absence  of  resistance.  Here,  however,  it 
is the  ideology  which  interests me. 
-204-From  1870  onwards,  Barker-Benfield  argues,  America  witnessed  "a  spate 
of  gynaecological  activity ...  characterised  by  flamboyant,  drastic, 
risky  and  instant  use  of  the  knife".  Britain  followed  the  same 
pattern,  albeit  "more 
Gynaecological  journals, 
cautiously". 
professional 
(ibid.:  90; 
organisations, 
1973;  382-3) 
explanatory 
theories  and  the  invention  of  new  surgical  instruments and  techniques 
all flourished.  Surgical  treatment  of  the  "psychological"  disorders of 
women  was  central  in  this  expansion,  and  Barker-Benfield  argues  that 
"the  most  spectacularly  revealing  of  these  surgical  techniques  were 
excision of the clitoris  ...  and  female  castration".  <1976:  89> 
One  of  the  most  important  figures  in  the  new  science  of 
gynaecologicsal  surgery  was  J  Marion  Sima,  the  inventor  of  the 
speculum.  Sims'  aim was  to facilitate reproduction,  and in this aim he 
believed  himself  hampered  both  by  women's  natural  lack  of  sexual 
interest  and  the  recalcitrant  interior of  her  body.  (ibid.:  111;  116) 
He  aimed  to  effect  by  surgery  the  sexual  and  physical  openness  which 
reproduction  needed,  and  to  which  women,  he  believed,  were  naturally 
inimical.  Sims  also  brought  to  medical  attention  and  named  the 
condition  "vaginismus"  - spasmodic  and  involuntary contraction  of  the 
vagina.  <ibid.:  113)  His  cure  for  his  new  condition  was  to 
anaesthetize  woman  before  intercourse  in  one  case  two  or  three 
times  weekly  for  a  year.  Other  "Sims'  specials"  included  hymen 
removal,  incisions  of  the  vaginal  orifice  followed  by  dilation  with 
wedges  and  incision of  the cervix to "facilitate"  the passage of sperm 
and  menstrual  blood.  (ibid.:  114) 
-205-The  theoretical  background  to  his surgical  work  was  the  perception  of 
female  reproductive  organs  as  resistant  to  impregnation;  one  of  his 
theories  postulated  "a  kind  of  spermatic  rebound  from  a  recalcitrant 
canal  wall".  (ibid.:  112)  Barker-Benfield argues  that  Sims  "could  not 
construe  therapeutic action apart  from preparing women  for  pregnancy": 
Sims  contrasted  "the  sterile  unimpregnated  uterus"  with  his  "ideal 
womb"  - "open  to  impregnation  ... <having)  a  gagging,  graceful  form". 
(ibid.;  111;  113) 
It  was  the  speculum  which  made  Sims'  reputation;  as  Barker-Benfield 
puts it,  "Sims  raised himself  from obscurity to  the  dazzle  of  success 
by  the  elevation  of  women• s  organs  from  darkness  into  the  light". 
(ibid.:  94)  Speaking  of  his  invention,  Sims  presented  himself  as  an 
intrepid pioneer: 
"I  felt  like  an  explorer  in  medicine  who  first  views  a  new 
and  important territory."  (ibid.:  95) 
Sims,  then,  opened  to  masculine  penetration  by  eye,  speculum  and 
penis  the  hitherto  mysterious  feminine  interior;  Barker-Benfield 
suggests  that  Sims  saw  himself  as  Columbus,  the  vagina  as  his  New 
'World.  <ibid.:  95) 
If women's  sexlessness  legitimated  this  brand  of  surgery,  it was  the 
opposite  ideology  of  feminine  voraciousness  which  legitimized 
eli  tordectomy  and  female  castration.  Cli  tordectomy,  invented  in  the 
West  as  a  surgical  technique  by  the  English  gynaecologist  Isaac  Baker 
~.  at  first  co-existed  with and  was  then superceded  by  castration 
-206-Cin  turn  overtaken  by  hysterectomy).  The  first  recorded  castration 
took  place  in  1872,  and  from  1880  until  the  turn  of  the  century  the 
operation  flourished.  (1973:  :389)  Although  it  became  markedly  less 
common  thereafter,  women  were  still  castrated  for  psychological 
disorders as late as  1946.  Cl976:  121) 
The  aim  of  both  castration  and  eli  tordectomy  was  to  make  "rebellious" 
women  domestic  and  demure.  The  operation  was  used  to  counter  an 
increase  - real  or  imaginary  - in  female  masturbation,  "an activity 
which  men  feared  inevitably  aroused  women's  naturally  boundless  but 
usually  repressed  appetite  for  men".  Ci bid. :  120-1;  122)  Barker-
Benfield  argues  that  male  gynaecologists  "without  exception"  were 
deeply concerned with  feminine  sexual  appetite;  even  those  who  opposed 
wholesale  castration  agreed  it  should  be  used  on  women  "manifesting 
uncontrollable  desire".  (ibid. :  125;  1973:  388)  Gynaecologists 
"tested"  women  "for  indications  of  the  disease  of  desire  by  inducing 
orgasm,  manipulating  clitoris  or  breast:3".  o.nd  presented  sexual 
surgery  as  an  aid  to  feminine  self-control,  and  the  preservation  of 
feminine  fertility as  a  "nationally-owned resource".  <1976:  126;  132) 
Underlying  nineteenth  century  sexual  surgery,  then,  we  can  see  a 
perception  of  feminine  sexuality  as  potentionally  overwhelming  and  of 
the  feminine  body  as  dangerous  to  men.  In  The  Young  Man  and  Ih.e. 
Student's  Manual,  the  Rev.  John  I.Qdd_' s  popular  and  much  reprinted 
anti-masturbation  tracts,  he  describes  a  young  man  visiting  a  brothel 
as  "entering  the  door  of  woman  whose  house  is  the  gate-way  of  hell". 
-207-(ibid.:  171)  Barker-Benfield  argues  that  this  image  was  intended  to 
suggest entering the vagina in intercourse: 
"Todd  perhaps  used  a  common  image  hot,  deadly  and 
ubiqui  taus  holes  - for  both  masturbation  and  elicit  sexual 
intercourse". 
(ibid. :  171) 
Here  the  feminine  body  is  understood  as  draining  masculine  active 
energies.  Women's  uncurbed  appetites,  as  well  as  masturbation,  could 
keep  men  from  production,  success  and  wealth.  Ejaculation  weakened 
men;  both  in  masturbation  and  in  intercourse  with  women,  with  their 
"sperm-sucking  propensities".  (ibid.:  131).  The  open  genitals  of 
women  threatened  the  "closed  self-sufficiency"  of  men.  (ibid.:  128) 
The  common  association  of  sperm and  money  was  mirrored  in  the  sexual 
overtones of  women's  financial  incontinence: 
"Todd  suggested her spending action was  insatiable,  and that 
she  absorbed  man's  earnings,  man's  heart's  blood,  into  her 
own  absorbing  system" ;  her  spending  was  ' the  horse-leech 
which  continually  cries,  Give,  give,  and  which  never  says 
enough'." 
(ibid. :  194) 
In  the  sexual  and the financial  sphere,  then,  woman  could  "drain"  men 
of  sperm  and  money,  through  her  "interiorized  draining  power",  her 
"insatiable absorbtiveness",  her  "bloodsucking"  nature.  (ibid.:  195-6; 
1973:  378;  381)  The  vagina and the  womb  were  both seen as "a consuming 
mouth",  and  "the  food it demanded  was  sperm".  <1976:  271)  The  only way 
to effectively contain women's  sexual appetites outside of  surgery was 
to give  them a  little of  what  they wanted.  (1973:  379) 
-208-The  medicalized  social  control  of  women  sought  to  contain  her 
dangerous  body  and  sexuality and  return her to  her  proper status as  a 
"reproductive  machine" ,  an  "inexhaustible  and  undemanding  resource". 
(1976:  305;  198;  1973:  383)  Barker-Benfield  concludes that  the  aim of 
this  control  was  for  men  to  "assimilate  women's  power  to  the:mselves 
just  as  they  attempted  to  do  with  the  rest  of  the  resources  of  the 
earth":  women's  bodies  and  nature's  body  should  both  be  subject  to 
masculine  mastery.  C1976:  202;  1973:  382;  391) 
It is clear,  then,  that  the  contradictory notions  of  women  as passive 
domestic  beings  naturally  "shrinking"  from  sex,  and  as  insatiable 
"drainers"  of  masculine  sexual  energies  coexisted  in  Victorian 
ideology.  The  purity  of  womanhood,  argued  to  be  natural  and  innate, 
seemed  to  require  a  vast  network  of  legal,  medical  and  ideological 
controls  to  maintain  it,  controls  which  acted to  contain the  shadow-
image  of  the  delicate  female,  the  insatiable  woman.  Barker-Benfield 
argues  thus: 
"So  underlying 
sensuous,  even 
by  definition 
appetitive ...  a 
intercourse  was 
(1976:  276-7) 
men's  wish  that their  women  be  delicate,  not 
frigid,  was  the  apprehension that  women  were 
always  on  the  verge  of  being  sexually 
woman's  physical  capacity  for  sexual 
umlimited,  in  direct  contrast  to  a  man's." 
The  suppressed  and  contained  power  of  women  and  of  women's  bodies  was 
felt  to  be  dangerously  powerful  and  threatening to  men;  uncontrolled, 
women  became  "all  appetite",  their  bodies  tranformed  from  passive 
vessel  to  pump,  a  dark,  hot  and  open  space  which  perpetually 
threatened  to  engulf  and  extinguish  the  self-contained masculine  body 
-209-and  patriarchal  order  itself.  (1973;  384;  374;  293)  Men's  bodies  were 
spermatic  economies;  women's  bodies  were  simultaneously the terrain of 
productive  labour  and  of  an  uncontrolled  consumption  which  threatened 
to swallow-up the stockpiled energy of  man. 
-210-Twentieth-century bodies 
Sociobiological  explanations  define  the  twentieth  century  body.  Here, 
the  body  is presented as  a  purely biological  organism,  and  the  aim of 
discussion  is to  determine  how  organic/biological  properties,  seen  as 
innate  and  natural,  effect  social  life  and  human  behaviour. 
Sociobiology  explains  the  body  as  an  individual  possession  which  is 
the  basis  of  biological  accumulation,  with  sperm and  egg  representing 
the  constant capital  on  which that accumulation is based. 
The  sociobologists  Iriyers  and  Dawkins,  following  the  work  of  the 
biologist  W.D.  Hamilton,  argue  that  the  motivating  force  behind  human 
behaviour  is the  pursuit  of  individual  genetic self-interest:  the  aim 
is to maximise  the  reproduction of  our  "own"  genes.  Women,  they argue, 
"invest"  more  biological  matter  in  an  egg  than  men  do  in  sperm  and 
thus  naturally  immerse  themselves  in chasitity and  childcare;  men,  on 
the  other  hand,  seek to  impregnate  as many  women  as possible,  without 
being  trapped  into  childcare  and  sexual  faithfulness.  <Sahlins,  1977: 
4· 
' 
Sayers,  1982:  51-3)  Competition,  male  promiscuity,  female 
faithfulness  and  male  aggression  are  all  "explained"  in  this  handy 
system. 
There  are,  of  course,  a  number  of  problems  with  this  thesis,  as 
Sayers  and Sahlins point  out.  <Sayers,  1982;  Sahlins,  1977)  Even  if we 
accept  the  theory  on  its own  terms,  we  might  well  ask whether the  loss 
of  male  reproductive  fitness  in the  competition for  females,  plus the 
weakening  of  women's  position  by  male  mass  abandonment  might  not  be 
-211-counterproductive  to  individual  genetic  interests.  Further, 
anthropological  evidence  amply  demonstrates  that  the  gender  roles  of 
chaste  female  and  promiscuous  male  which  sociobiology  argues  are 
direct  products  of  biology  are  far  from  universal.  If  we  accept  that 
"innate"  biological  drives  shape  human  social  institutions,  how  do  we 
explain cultural diversity and historical change  in human  societies ? 
For  present  purposes,  however,  it is  the  fundamental  circularity  of 
sociobiological  arguments  which  are relevant.  Sociobiological theories 
rely  on  social  presuppositions:  it  is  only  within  a  system  based  on 
private  property that certainty of  paternity is neccessary  - in  order 
to pass  on  property  ;  and it is only within  a  free  labour system that 
trying  to  secure  help  with  childcare  would  be  either  possible  or 
neccessary.  Sociobiological  explanations of  human  behaviour naturalise 
existing  social  relations,  maintain  privilege,  and  thus  operate  as 
social control.  As  the ESSES  Sociobology Group point  out: 
"because  most  of  them  <sociobiological  arguments)  provide  a 
'natural'  explanation  for  the  existence  of  social  practices 
that  appear  unjust,  they  can  be  used  to  justify  the 
practice." 
<BSSRS  Sociobiology Group,  1984:  132) 
Sociobiological  theory  is,  however,  a  crude  instrument  on  which  to 
practise the skills of sociological critique.  The  ideology of  the  body 
as  individual  possession  reappears,  however,  in  much  more 
sophisticated  analyses.  Turner,  as  we  have  seen,  isolates  the  notion 
of  "embodiment",  which  he  defines  as  our  direct  sensual  experience  of 
-212-our  bodies  and  argues that it is our sense  of  embodiment  or  "corporeal 
government"  which  is  the  basis  of  individuality.  <Turner,  1984:  251) 
In  a  thoroughgoing  sociological  view  of  the  body  this  line  of 
reasoning  is  problematic;  why  do  we  except  "individual"  sensual 
experience,  or  embodiment,  from culture ? 
In  The  problem of  embodiment  Richard  M.  ~analyses  the  writings of 
Marcel,  Sartre  and  Merleau-Ponty  on  embodiment.  He  argues  that 
consciousness is only possible as  a  result of  embodiment,  and  that  the 
body  only  becomes  animate  organism  rather  than  mere  physical  :matter 
through  consciousness'  "intentiveness  to  it  as  its  own  animate 
organism"  <Zaner,  1971:  viii;  vii)  Zaner  seeks  to  distance  this 
understanding· from  Cartesian  dualis:m,  or  the  "mind/body  proble:m"  in 
which  the  mind  is  seen  to  exist  "in"  the  body  - he  argues  that 
consciousness  is  embodied  "by"  rather  than  "in"  the  physical  body. 
(ibid.:  vii).  He  suggests  that  his  three  chosen  writers  attempt  to 
"overco:me",  or  "undercut"  simple  mind/body  dualism  by  addressing  the 
problem  Descartes  himself  recognized,  and  which  led  to  the  original 
opposition of  mind  and  body: 
"the  peculiar circumstance  that,  though  my  mind  is not  like 
my  body,  nor  my  body  like  my  mind,  nevertheless  I  am  not 
"in"  my  body like a  boatman is "in"  his boat". 
Ci bid.:  240) 
We  act  through  the  body;  it  is  the  "means  of  having  a  world  and  of 
acting within it".  (ibid.:  240).  Objects  in the  world,  including other 
people,  only  exist  meaningfully  as  objects  which  have  a  relation  to 
the  person-in-the-body: 
-213-"objects  in the  world,  in so  far  as  they  are for  :me  only  in 
virtue of  :my  being  embodied  in the :midst  of  them by  my  body-
proper,  and  are  thus  disclosed  as  essentially  connected  to 
my  possible bodily action on and with them". 
(ibid.:  240) 
Mechanical  conceptions  of  the  body  as  matter  animated  and  owned  by  a 
:mind  conceived  of  as  separate  from  that  body  are  here  undermined.  To 
what  extent,  however,  do  such arguments affect the concept  of  the  body 
as  individual  possession ? 
One  could argue  that philosophizing at this level has effected common-
sense  understandings  very  little.  The  fine  distinction between  having 
and  being  in  a  body  is not  widely  understood.  Further,  while  Zaner's 
argument  does  undercut  the  very  crude  :mind/body  dualisms  of,  for 
example,  Cheyne,  it  remains  dualistic  itself  in  its  distinction  of 
mind  and  body.  Finally,  the  individuality  of  embodiment  is 
unquestioned:  the perception of the  body is of an object separate  from 
the  world and acting upon  it. 
This  issue  is  also  discussed  in  the  psychological  concept  of 
"separation-individuation",  as  we  saw  in Chapters  Two  and  Three.  Here 
in which  the  sense  of  the  self and the  body  as separate - first,  from 
the  mother  - is  argued  to  develop  as  the  infant  begins  to  perceive 
itself/its  body  as  having  boundaries  which  distinguish  it  from  the 
environment.  This  process  develops  through  the  baby's  gradual 
perception  that  food/the  breast  is given  and  taken  away,  and  thus  is 
not  part  of  itself.  This  process gradually extends so that  the  infant 
understands  her/himself  to  be  an  individual  entity  or  subject 
-214-distinguished  from  the  world  of  objects,  and  with  desires  to 
appropriate  or act  on  that  world  of objects which originate within the 
self and  the  body. 
In  this  view,  as  Parveen  Adams  points  out,  the  body  is  constructed 
through  libidinal  desires.  <Adams,  1986:  29)  The  development  of  a 
"secure"  identity  as  an  individual  dependss  on  the  construction  of  a 
sense  of  the  self  and  the  body  as  separate  from  the  world  - having 
strong  "ego-boundaries"  - and  in  the  ability of  the  self to act  upon 
the  separated  world  of  objects  in  order  to  fulfill  desires  and  needs 
which arise  within the self and the  body. 
An  example  of  how  the  integrated self is held to develop can be  found 
in  the  work  of  :Melanie  K.Jgin.  <Klein,  1975)  As  Janet  Sayers  points 
out,  Klein  argues  that  the  fear  of  annihilation  is  the  infant's 
primary  anxiety,  and  that  this arises from the  "death instinct".  When 
the child's wishes  - for  food,  or for  comfort  - are  frustrated  by  the 
mother,  the  child's  sense  of  itself  as  integrated  or  whole  is  so 
unformed  that  it  cannot  distinguish  the  object  of  that  hatred  <the 
mother)  from  itself,  and  thus  fears  that  it will  be  destroyed  by  its 
own  frustration.  The  defense  against  this  anxiety  is  projection, 
through which  the  mother is seen as the attacker.  Sayers explains: 
"This  gives  rise  to  persecutory  anxiety ...  against  which  the 
baby  defends  itself  by  splitting  off  and  denying  its 
experience  of  the  mother  as  frustrating  and  persecuting. 
Instead  it  idealizes  her  as  totally  good,  loving  and 
gratifying  - in  sum,  as  the  very  embodiement  of  the  Life 
instinct". 
<Sayers,  1987:  28) 
-215-This  situation,  however,  should  be  temporary.  Klein  argues  that 
integration  is  an  innate  human  tendency,  in  which  Life  and  Death 
instincts increasingly fuse,  and a  sense  of the self and the  mother  as 
whole  and  separate,  containing  both  good/loved  and  bad/hated  elements 
is  constructed.  As  the  sense  of  the  self  as  whole  develops,  the 
confidence  that  the  self  contains  within  it  the  possibilities  for 
fulfilling  its  own  needs  develops,  and  the  self  is  constructed  as 
independent  and  able  to control  its own  life without  dependence  on  an 
all-powerful  other.  (ibid.:  28-30) 
Eichenbaum  and  Orbach  also  adopt  a  perspective  in  which 
separation/individuation  is  seen  as  the  crucial  step  in  the 
development  of a  healthy personality.  They  argue that: 
"The  first two  years of life are the most  important time for 
the  development  of  the  inner  core  of  the  person,  the  psyche 
and  the  personality  together  ...  the  ego ...  Part  of  the 
appropriate  empathy  and  nurturance  is  the  ability  of  the 
caregiver to provide  a  structure,  a  containment,  and a  sense 
of  boundaries  for  the  baby ...  Because  the  baby  is  in  the 
process  of  developing  a  sense  of self and  does  not  yet  have 
any  boundaries,  the  mother  must  bring  the  boundaries  into 
the  relationship;  she  must  relate to the  baby as a  separate 
person ...  When  secure  ego  development  occurs,  we  see the  baby 
beginning  to  maintain  a  sense  of  self  even  when  its 
caregiver is not present". 
<Orbach  & Eichenbaum,  1983:  14-6). 
Developing  boundaries,  then,  depends  on  a  proper  response  to  needs  by 
the  caregiver/mother.  This  shows  the  infant  that  (inner)  needs  can  be 
met  through  the  <outer)  environment  which  is essentially  benign.  If 
needs  are  not  met  consistently,  psychological  separation is  hindered 
since  the  infant  is still "yearning"  and  has  no  secure sense  that  its 
needs  will  be  met.  (ibid.:  17).  Proper  development,  however,  gives  "a 
-216-sense  of  wholeness"  and  "authentic  experience  of  selfhood"  (ibid.: 
197).  Maturity,  thus,  depends  on  a  secure  sense  of  the  self  and  the 
body  as  separate  from  the  environment,  or  world  of  objects,  and  as 
capable  of  fulfilling  needs  and  desires  through  the  manipulation  of 
that  environment.  This  is the  result  rather  than  the  precondition  of 
development;  its acquisition,  however,  is  to  be  expected,  all  being 
well,  as the result of  a  normal  upbringing. 
Such  discussions set  formal  limits to  our  conceptions  of  the  body.  We 
can  argue  about  how  consciousness  and  matter,  mind  and  body  are 
interrelated,  but  both  mind  and  body  remain  individualised  and 
separate;  Zaner argues: 
"This  quest,  then,  in  each  of  their  works  turns  toward 
subjectivity,  or  consciousness,  or,  as  with  Marcel,  the 
human  self.  And  here  we  have  seen  that  each  of  them  is 
struck  by  a  peculiar  characteristic  of  human  being,  one  so 
fundamental  that  for  each it is considered  the  very  essence 
of  human  reality:  for  man,  to  be  is always  and  essentially 
to  be  aware  of himself as such,  to  be  able  to  withdraw  into 
himself  and put himself  into question" 
<Zaner,  1971:  242) 
Consciousness  is  fundamentally  and  naturally  self-consciousness;  the 
body  is fundamentally  and  naturally  my  body.  The  body  is a  synthesis 
rather  than  a  pre-existing  unity,  since  the  variety  of  ways  through 
which  we  perceive  the  world  - sight,  touch,  taste  - are  automatically 
united  into  the  body-as-a-whole  as  the  centre  of  perception.  (ibid.: 
254-5).  "I"  am  the  centre  of  experience,  not  one  element  in  the 
structure of the  cosmos,  or part of the collective body of  the  people: 
"My  body,  as  Sartre  stresses,  is  the  orientational  centre, 
0,  in  terms  of  which  the  world  and  its multiple  objects are 
structured and  organised."  (ibid.:  250) 
-217-Perceiving the  self/body as the  centre  of  the  universe  depends  not  on 
social  structure  and  ideology  but  on  the  phenomenological  given  that 
we  experience  our  own  body  uniquely  - and  differently  from  our 
perception of all other objects- from within.  (ibid.:  249,  259) 
Theories  which  attempt  to  distinguish the  body  as the  owned  matter  of 
the  mind  and  the  mind  as existing "in"  the  body  should not  be  seen as 
rejections  of  the  idea  of  the  body as a  possession.  Rather,  they argue 
about  how the  body  is owned  - not  about  whether  "ownership"  exists at 
all.  The  body  remains  the  vehicle  through  which 
consciousness/mind/self  acts  on  an  environment  understood  as 
fundamentally  separate  from it.  That separation is seen as constructed 
in  a  process  of  psychological  development,  however,  rather  than  as 
existing  a-priori.  And  this  physical  and  psychical  individualism  is 
seen as the basis of  the  development  of the  normal  personality. 
Similarly,  although  the  theory  of  the  unconscious  can  be  used,  as 
Lacan  does,  to  challenge  the  dominant  conception of  the  subject  as "a 
unified  self-present  subject,  an  "I"  who  exists  unproblematically  in 
and  for  itself"  <Burniston,  1978:  114)  it  is  more  commonly  used  to 
maintain  that  conception,  albeit  in  more  sophisticated  form.  The 
argument  is that  an  imposed  unity,  or  integration of  separate "parts" 
of  the  self  - conscious  and  unconscious,  Life  and  Death  instincts  -
will  occur  naturally. 
The  body,  as  Turner  argues,  is  both  "natural"  and  "cultural":  it 
exists  both  as  a  biological  phenomenon,  the  perception  of  which  is 
-218-only  possible  through  social  categorizations,  and  as  a  "natural" 
phenomenon.  (3)  Thus  the  body  as  living - or  as  "animated  organism"  -
places  its  own  strictures  on  its  incorporation  into  the  ideology  of 
possessive  individualism.  The  body  is  viewed  as  a  co:m:modity,  but  not 
as  a  co:m:modity  exactly  like  all  other,  inanimate,  co:m:modities.  As 
:ar:mm_  and  Adams  point  out,  "possession"  of  the  body  cannot  entail its 
total control.  CBrown  & Ada:ms,  1979:  47). 
Our  understandings  of  the  body  are  social,  representing  an 
articulation  of  the  social  and  the  organic.  This  is  essentially 
Turner's  position,  but  his  distinction  within  the  concept  of 
embodie:ment  between  "phenomenological"  individuality and individuality 
as  a  social  institution  remains  questionable.  This  distinction  :must 
always  be  analytical - it does not exist empirically. 
In  short,  what  is at  issue  is the  notion  that  it is part  of  "human 
nature"  to  perceive  the  body  as  individuated.  The  very  different 
:medieval  concepts  of  the  body  provide  some  evidence  that  it is  not, 
and  in  the  next  chapter  it will  be  argued  that  the  :modern  concept  of 
the  feminine  body  further  undercuts  the  equation of  individualism and 
nature,  since  the  feminine  body  is  constructed  as  part  of  the 
environment  on  which  the  masculine separated subject acts. 
3  Here  I  use  "natural"  in Marx's sense  in  which  nature is continually 
transformed  through  human  social  labour,  the "natural"  limits on  which 
are themselves transformed through the labour process. 
-219-At  this  point,  however, the  dominant  bourgeois  body-concept  can  be 
identified as  that  of  an  individuated  and  completed  possession  of  the 
self  through  which  we  pursue  pleasure  and  satisfy  our  (internal) 
desires  by  acting  on  the  <separated)  environment.  As  we  saw  in  Part 
One,  desires  are  thought  to  form  the  "core"  of  the  person.  The 
autonomous  pursuit  of  individual  interests  is,  then,  the  model  for 
both the  body  and the self. 
The fit bodyi  vehicle  or environment  ? 
The  concept  of  the  body  at  the  centre  of  the  "fitness  boom"  of  the 
1980s  also  understands  the  body  as  the  vehicle  for  the  pursuit  of 
individual self-interest. 
Fitness  and  health  are  major  issues  in comtemporary  culture.  Jogging, 
aerobics,  anti-smoking/drinking/drugs  campaigns  and  concern  with 
chemical  "additives"  to  food  all  represent  an  increased  concern  with 
bodily  health.  Originally  a  middle-class  phenomenon,  the  fitness  boom 
has  been  taken  up  by  capital,  the  mass  media,  and  the  state  and  its 
market  is  expanding.  Turner  calls  such  practices  "forms  of  secular 
asceticism"  or "calculating hedonism",  and  argues that anorexia is one 
of  them.  CTurner,  1984:  201;  205)  In  "body-maintainance"  practices 
people  are  offered  "pseudo-liberation"  through  consumption  - the  body 
is disciplined in order to  be  able to consume  more  and  comsume  better: 
"the  new  hedonism ... is  not  oppositional,  being  perfectly 
geared  into  the  market  requirements  of  advanced  capitalism 
-220-...  hedonistic  fascination  with  the  body  exists  to  enhance 
competitive  performance.  We  jog,  slim  and  sleep  not  for 
their  intrinsic  enjoyment,  but  to  improve  our  chances  at 
sex,  work  and  longevity." 
(ibid. : 112) 
The  healthy  body  is,  then,  "the  basis of  the  good  life".  <ibid.:  172) 
"Heal thy  living",  in the  words  of  "Cosmopolitan"  magazine,  allows  you 
to  "maximise  your  potential".  <Cosmopolitan,  September,  1988)  We 
become  fit for  consumption and  have  a  positive  duty to be fit: 
"personal  responsibility  for  health  through  exercise,  diet 
and  avoidance  of  drugs,  reduces  the  tax-drain  of  curative 
medical  intervention.  There  is  consequently  an  alliance 
between  the  state,  the  medical  profession  and  the  healthy 
citizen.  The  monogamous  j agger  is  the  healthy  citizen." 
<Turner,  1984:  221) 
The  social  meanings  and  "functions"  of  body-maintenance  are,  however, 
somewhat  more  complex.  An  increased concern with the body encapsulates 
two  views  of  the  body  in  an  ambivalent  fashion.  Further,  the  meaning 
of body-maintainance  is gender-variable. 
We  can  identify  a  concern  to  perfect  the  body-as-vehicle  for 
consumption  and  individuation  in  body-maintenance  strategies.  If  the 
body  is fit  the  self  can  realize  itself  more  efficiently  - do  more, 
enjoy  more,  produce  more,  consume  more,  in  short,  act  on  its 
environment  more  intensively  and  for  longer,  and  this  is  the  most 
commonly  expressed rationale  for fitness - to live longer and get  more 
out  of life. 
-221-However,  body-maintenance  strategies  also  encapsulate  a  sense  of  the 
body  as  the  "last  resort"  of  a  purely  individual  control  of  the 
environment.  If  we,  as  individuals,  are relatively powerless to effect 
social  structures  we  can  at  least  control  the  environment  of  our  own 
bodies.  This  process  can  be  characterized,  as Herzlich  argues  in her 
work  on  illness and  health as social constructions,  as a  move  from an 
understanding  of  health  as  that  which  makes  activity  possible  to 
health  as  an  activity  in  itself.  <Herzlich,  1973)  This  process  also 
represents a  move  from  the  body  as the centre "0"  from which  we  act to 
the  body as the  locus  in  which  we  act,  where  the self acts on the body 
rather than on the  world,  living in rather than  through the body. 
Both  meanings  refer  to  the  idea  of  human  agency.  As  capitalist 
production eats further  and  further  into  "nature"  as a  limit  on  human 
activity,  social  life as  a  human  creation  "emerges"  more  and  more  as 
an  issue.  We  can see more  clearly what  Turner calls the human  capacity 
for  "transformative  labour".  <Turner,  1984:  229)  The  obvious  social 
power  to  control  and  alter  the  environment,  however,  sits  uneasily 
with  the  bourgeois  ideology  of  capitalist  social  relations  as 
"natural",  that  is,  expressive  of  a  fixed  human  nature  which  is 
biological/genetic in origin  and  thus  outside  of  agency.  On  the  level 
of  the  body,  body  maintenance strategies express this contradiction in 
seeing  the  body  simultaneously  as  the  vehicle  for  expansive 
action/consumption  and  the  only  environment  over  which  the 
individualized self can exert any  meaningful  control. 
-222-For  women,  furthermore,  the  ideology  of  femininity  modifies  both these 
meanings.  Firstly,  in bourgeois patriarchal culture,  the  feminine  body 
is  constructed  as  the  environment  within  which  the  masculine  subject 
acts,  as  the  acted-on  rather  than  the  actor,  as  the  consumed  rather 
than the  consumer.  Women's  arena  for  action  is  limited  to  the  private 
sphere.  Thus,  women's  ambit  of  personal  control  is  fundamentally 
constrained,  and  in  this  context  control  of  the  body  takes  on  a 
particular  significance.  Wendy  Chapkis  argues  that  "the  exercise  of 
control  over  the  body  compensatCes)  for  a  basic  sense  of  a  life out  of 
control": 
"The  pursuit  of  beauty  is  also  one  of  the  few  avenues  to 
success  over  which  a  woman  has  some  measure  of  personal 
control.  You  can  mould  your  body  much  more  easily  than  you 
can  force  access  to  the  old-boy  networks  or  get  the  job  you 
want,  the  promotion  you  deserve,  the  salary  you  need,  the 
recognition you  are  owed." 
<Chapkis,  1986:  12;  95) 
Secondly,  as  Chapkis  argues,  fitness  for  women  means  being  fit  to  be 
looked at rather than fit to act.  She  points out that: 
"Clearly  the  appeal  of  Jane  Fonda's  Workout,  Linda  Evan's 
Beauty  and  Exercise  Book  and  Raquel  Welch's  Total  Beauty and 
Fitness Program lies in the  promise  that  they can get  you  in 
shape";  "While  muscles  may  be  in,  pretty  clearly  only 
certain  kinds  of  muscles  on  certain  kinds  of  recognizably 
feminine  bodies  are  really  acceptable.  The  model  of  the 
youthful  and  physically fit  woman  ultimately is not  a  symbol 
of  power  so  much  as it is a  symbol  of  the  beauty  of  feminine 
control  over  appetites  and  age.";  "the  final  product  should 
never  suggest  that  the ...  woman  on  display  is  anything  but 
inviting,  available and  welcoming". 
(ibid. :  9 i  13;  51) 
-223-The  feminine  body  is  constructed  as  "inviting,  available  and 
welcoming"  in  opposition  to  the  masculine  body  as  self-contained, 
active  and  invasive.  The  two  body-concepts  are  interdependent;  we 
cannot  meaningfully  discuss  them  apart.  This  chapter,  however,  has 
focused primarilly on  the  masculine  or  individual  body,  discussing the 
feminine  body  only obliquely,  as derivative of it.  In the next chapter 
this  focus  is  reversed,  and  the  construction  of  the  feminine  body  in 
bourgeois culture will  take analytical  centre stage. 
-224-Chapter Six:  The  feminine  body 
In  the  previous  chapter  the  broad  changes  in  the  dominant 
understanding  of  the  body  over  the  transition  from  feudalism  to 
capitalism were  outlined.  The  central  conceptual  shift  identified  was 
from  the  medieval  understanding  of  the  body  as  one  element  in  a 
hierarchically  interlinked  cosmology  to  the  bourgeois  perception  of 
the  body  as  instrument.  The  analysis of Bakhtin's writings was  used to 
show  that  dominant  ideas  about  the  body  can  be  challenged.  Dominant 
body-concepts  are  not  the  only ideas with significant social currency, 
but  alternative  conceptualisations  are  constructed  in  relation  to 
dominant  concepts:  the  medieval  carnival  degradation  of  the  powerful 
by  subsumption within the material  depends  on an existing hierarchy of 
elite and mass,  heaven and earth,  super-lunary and sub-lunary. 
The  task  of  this  chapter  is  to  analyse  in  more  detail  contemporary 
understandings  of  the  female  body.  I  will  argue  that  masculine  bodily 
integrity - or closure/separation - is constructed in relation to,  and 
depends  on  the  maintenance  of  feminine  bodily  openness.  Similarly, 
masculine  bodily  instrumentality  is  defined  in  relation  to  the 
construction of the  feminine  body-as-environment.  Dominant  <masculine) 
and  subordinate  <feminine)  body-concepts are  created  through  a  set  of 
oppositions  - open/closed,  active/passive,  hard/soft,  muscle/flesh  -
and  that  consequently  resistance  to  or  changes  in  one  effects  or 
undermines  the  other. 
-225-A further  conceptual  change  in body-concepts with this transition is a 
different  conceptual  relationship  between  "male"  and  "female".  The 
feudal  understanding  of  gender  difference  is  one  of  quantity:  the 
bodies  of  men  and  women  are  understood  as  flesh  in  opposition  to 
spirit,  but  women's  far  closer  identification  w1 th  the  flesh  is all 
but  inescapable.  The  radical  splitting  of  the  sexual  division  of 
labour  which  occured  with  the  transition from  feudalism to capitalism 
Csee,  i.e.,  Rowbotham,  1977;  Hamilton,  1978)  had,  of  course, 
resonances  on  the  level  of  the  body.  Vith  the  separation of  male  and 
female  experience  broadly  along  the  lines  of  the  public/private 
dichotomy,  gender  roles  polarized,  and  in the  realm of  understandings 
of  the  body  flesh,sex  and  bodily  functions  became  fundamentally 
female.  In  the  ideology  of  the  body  the  gender  difference,  then, 
becomes  a  difference  of quality:  woman  as body,  man  as mind. 
This  argument  will  be  pursued  here  through  a  feminist  analysis of  the 
body.  While  the  transition  from  feudalism  to  capitalism  sees  a 
conceptual  shift  in  the  understanding  of  the  body  as  gendered,  this 
shift  takes  place  within  the  wider  context  of  a  continuous  thread  of 
patriarchal  ideology  which  constructs  women  and  the  female  body  as  a 
threat to male  order - however that order is understood. 
To  return  briefly  to  Turner;  the  notion  of  women  as  threatening  is, 
for  him,  central.  He  argues that the  female  body is the main challenge 
to  property  and  power  it  is  what  needs  to  be  controlled. 
Consequently,  the  sociology  of  the  body  is,  in essence,  the  sociology 
of  the  control  of  female  sexuality.  <Turner,  1984:  37;  114)  He  points 
-226-out  that  in  patriarchal  social  orders  women  do  not  control  their 
bodies,  which,  as "productive  bodies"  are  possessions:  "although women 
have  a  phenomenological  possession  of  their  bodies,  they  have  rarely 
exercised  full  ownership".  Cibid.:  120;  233;  57-8)  In  patriarchy, 
then,  women  experience  their  bodies  "as  objects  which  are  ruled 
externally"  (ibid.:  233). 
For  Turner,  however,  the  term  "patriarchy"  has  a  strictly  limited 
meaning.  His  argument  is that  patriarchy has  dwindled  into "patrism"; 
since,  with possessive  individualism rights are given to people rather 
than to  fathers,  and  since,  with  capitalism,  household  property  loses 
its central  importance  to social stability  ,  property rights in women, 
too,  are  weakened,  losing  their  "systematic  legal  and  political 
backing".  <ibid.:  155;  135-141).  For  Turner  masculine  property  in 
women's  bodies  fits  into  this  history  of  the  decline  of  patriarchal 
power;  feminism  uses  the  ideology  of  possessive  individualism against 
patriarchy  and  patriarchal  property  rights  in  women's  bodies  change, 
in  response  to  this  attack,  from  a  real,  material  power  into  "a 
defensive  ideological reaction".  (ibid.:  137;  248) 
It  will  be  one  task  of  this  chapter,  then,  through  a  detailed 
consideration of  patriarchal  property rights in the  feminine  body,  its 
reproductive  power  and  its sexuality,  to  try  to  put  patriarchy  - in 
the feminist  sense - back into the  argument. 
Further,  the  second  major  absence  in Turner's thesis is the  masculine 
body.  To  equate  the  sociology  of  the  body  with  the  control  of  the 
-227-female  body  alone  is phallocentric;  in  presenting  the  female  body  as 
"the  issue"  Turner  naturalizes  the  male  body  as  the  unanalysed  norm 
against  which  the  "abnormal"  or  different  female  is  defined.  In  so 
doing,  it  is  all  too  easy  to  lose  sight  of  why  and  how  feminist 
attacks  on  patriarchal  concepts  - including that  of  the  feminine  body 
- are  resisted.  If,  as  has  been  argued,  the  two  concepts  are  defined 
in  opposition  to  one  another,  then  feminist  redefinitions  threaten 
patriarchal  power.  The  struggle  over  social  constructions  of  the 
feminine  body  cannot  be  adequately  understood  unless  the  masculine 
body  too  is  seen  as  a  social  construction.  If  the  active  male  is 
constructed  in  opposition  to  the  passive  female,  her  struggle  to 
become  active threatens  him.  If the  female  body  becomes the  instrument 
of  the  feminine  self,  it is lost  as  an  environment  for  the  masculine 
self. 
The  construction  of  gender  difference  should  not  be  seen  as  the 
definition  of  female  difference  in relation to  male  normality,  but  as 
the  creation  of  two  genders  defined  through  a  set  of  oppostions. 
1fasculinity is  a  construction  every  bit  as  "social"  and  every bit as 
contentious as femininity. 
-228-Feminine  bodies:  the  female  body  in bourgeois culture 
The  gender  division  in  the  bourgeois  body-concept  can  be  made  visible 
through an  examination  of  the  ownership  and the representations of  the 
female  body.  Here  the central  argument  is that the concept of the body 
as  the  separated  and  owned  instrument  of  the  self  is  phallocentric, 
presenting  as  human  an  understanding  which  expresses  gendered 
experience.  Analysis  of  the  perceptions  and  representations  of  the 
female  body  in  bourgeois  culture  reveals  a  partially hidden  sub-text 
of  the  feminine  body  as  unfinished,  incomplete,  and  potentially 
limitless.  Further,  this  sub-text  is  intrinsically  unstable,  being 
understood  simultaneously  as  a  symbol  of  vulnerability  and 
powerlessness  on  the  one  hand,  and  voraciousness  and  threat  on  the 
other. 
This  sub-text  is,  however,  hidden  beneath  the  formal  extension, 
beginning  in  the  late  nineteenth  century,  of  the  rights  of  the 
autonomous  individual 
individualized  body 
and,  therefore,  of  the  concept  of  the 
to  women.  This  obscures  the  continuing 
oppression  of  women,  and  places  two  fundamentally  contradictory  sets 
of  expectations  on  women's  shoulders:  to  be  independent  and  separate 
while  still  remaining  dependant  and  responsive.  For  women  there  is a 
hidden  and  unresolvable  tension  in  social  expectations,  expressed  at 
the  level  of  the  body  in the  Virgin/Whore  dichotomy,  a  representation 
which  feminists  have  long  placed  at  the  heart  of  the  patriarchal 
control  of  women. 
-229-In  this chapter  patriarchal  property rights  in women's  bodies will  be 
analysed  in terms  of the control  of  women's  reproductive capabilities 
and  sexuality.  Here  the  feminine  body  is  understood  as  a  marketable 
commodity,  and  as  part  of  the  environment  on  which  the  masculine 
subject acts. 
The  tensions  between  surface  and  interior  in  representations  of  the 
feminine  body  will  then  be  explored,  contrasting  the  ideal  of  the 
flawless  exterior  of  the  ideology  of  beauty  with  the  empty  and 
voracious  interior  of  pornography.  The  dichotomies  of  open/closed, 
Virgin/Whore,  autonomy/dependance  remain central  in the  concept  of the 
feminine  body  and define  women  as objects in relation to the  masculine 
subject,  and  as  simultaneously  representative  of  submission  and 
threat. 
-230-Wine,  women  and  song:  the  female  body  as property 
"In  contemporary  patriarchies  the  male's  de  jure  priority 
has  recently  been  modified  through  the  granting  of  divorce 
protection,  citizenship,  and  property  to  women.  Their 
chattel  status  continues  in  their  loss  of  name,  the 
obligation  to  adopt  the  husband's  domicile,  and  the  general 
legal  assumption  that  marriage  involves  an  exchange  of  the 
female's  domestic  service  and  <sexual)  consortium in return 
for financial  support." 
<Millett,  1977:  34-5) 
Kate  Millett  argues  that  the  changes  in  patriarchy  achieved  by 
nineteenth  century  Western  feminism  were  reforming  rather  than 
revolutionary,  attaining  "notable  reform  in  the  area  of  legislative 
and  other  civil  rights"  and  attacking  patriarchal  society's  "most 
obvious  abuses"  but  failed  to  "penetrate  deeply  enough 
into ....  patriarchal  ideology".  (ibid.:  64)  (1)  The  central  ideological 
tenet  of  patriarchy  - that  the  male  equals  "the  human  norm,  the 
subject  and  referrent  to  which  the  female  is 
1 other'  and 
1 alien'"  -
reasserted itself after the  feminist  challenge.  <ibid.:  46;  85) 
The  patriarchal  opposition  of  subject  - masculine  - and  object  -
feminine  - is the  main  axis  of  social  meaning  around  which  gendered 
bodies  are constructed.  Its  continuing  social  salience surrounds 
women's  "ownership"  of  their  bodies  with  ambiguity,  and  the  "second-
wave"  of  feminism  this  century  has  seen  as  central  to  women's 
oppression both the definition  of  women  solely  through the  body  and 
1  Millett  sees  "human  consciouness"  <ibid.:  63)  as  the  basis  of 
patriarchy  and  thus,  I  would  argue,  too  readily  dismisses  patriarchal 
institutions  and  material  practices,  slipping  into  idealsim.  <see 
Kaplan,  1986)  In  discussing  patriarchal  ideology,  however,  her  work 
was  pioneering and remains extremely useful. 
-231-the  control  of  women  through  patriarchal  control  of  reproduction  and 
sexuality.  Adrienne  Rid,  for  example,  writes  of  "the  implaccable 
political  necessity  for  women  to  gain  control  of  our  bodies  and  our 
lives"  <Rich,  1980:  221>.  And  Rich  further  points  out  the  hidden 
nature  of  women's  bodily oppression,  arguing that: 
"The  understanding  that  male-female  relationships  have  been 
founded  on  the status of  the  female  as the  property  of  the 
male,  or  of  male-dominated  institutions,  continues  to  be 
difficult for both women  and men." 
<Rich,  1980a:  195) 
This difficulty in understanding arises from the phallocentrism of  the 
ideology  of  individualism,  which  offers  women  a  spurious  and 
supposedly  gender-neutral  individuality  which  is continually  undercut 
by  the  ideology  of  femininity  and its construction of  the  feminine  as 
the  responsive  complement  to  the  :masculine-as-norm.  These  ambiguities 
can  be  explored through the  issues of abortion  and  ~·  In struggles 
over  abortion rights and the definition of  rape  both the status of  the 
feminine  body  as  the  passive  environment  through  which  patriarchal 
property  rights  are  expressed  and  the  hidden  nature  of  the 
articulation  of  the  discourses  of  individualism  and  femininity  are 
central. 
-232-Abortion:  a  woman's  right to choose  ? 
Control  of  their  fertility  by  women  is  a  central  issue  in  modern 
feminism.  The  campaign  for  reproductive  autonomy  was  one  of  the 
resuscitated  movement's  initial  demands,  and  was  from  the  first 
couched  in  terms  of  women's  right  to  control  their  own  bodies.  As 
"Shrew"  of  February 1971  explained: 
"Vie  de:mand  that  women  have  control  over  their  bodies.  Vie 
believe  this is denied  until  we  can  decide  whether  to  have 
children  or  not  and  when  we  have  them.  This  requires  free 
and  available  contraception  and  free  abortion  on  de:mand." 
<Quoted  in Brunsdon,  1978:  21) 
It is often popularly supposed that the  1967  Abortion Act  gave British 
women  abortion  on  de:mand,  but  in fact  it did  not,  allowing  only  for 
termination  of  pregnancy  with  the  permission  of  two  doctors  if the 
continuation  of  that  pregnancy  would  endanger  the  wo:man' s  life  or 
health.  Abortion  while  possible is not,  then,  "free  on  de:mand".  Women 
do  not  have  the  absolute right  of  disposal  over  the  contents of their 
wombs,  and this limits the extent to which  women  can be said to  own  or 
control  their bodies.  Further,  abortion rights are  by  no  means  secure; 
there  have  been  several  attempts  to  limit  access  to  abortion  since 
1967  in  Britain,  and  Adrienne  Rich  writes  of  the  American  situation 
that  abortion  law is "everywhere  in  jeopardy",  threatening  women  with 
an  "elemental  loss of  control"  over  their  bodies.  <Rich,  1980a:  196). 
As  Rosalind  Pollack  Petchesky  argues,  legal  abortion  in  Britain  and 
America  "hovers  tenuously"  in a  patriarchal culture.  <Petchesky,  1986: 
vii) 
-233-Further,  legality  has  ensured  neither  actual  access  to  abortion  nor 
its  legitimation.  As  Lynne  Segal  points  out,  in  spite  of  women's 
greater control  of their fertility: 
"we  have  yet  to  win  the  necessary  feminist  battle  to 
establish  women's  right  to  choose  to  terminate  an  unwanted 
pregnancy:  only  50%  of  women  now  manage  to  obtain  an  NHS 
abortion,  and  this  government  has  prevented  research  on  a 
new  abortion pill which  could be  taken in the early weeks  of 
pregnancy." 
<Segal,  1987:  228;  see also Oakely,  1987:  53) 
The  intense  public  debate  over  abortion  has  come  to  centre  around 
"inalienable"  rights:  the  "right"  of  the  foetus  to  life;  the  "right" 
of  women  to  have  reproductive  control;  and  occasionally  the  "rights" 
of  men  to "have  a  say"  in the decision to terminate  a  pregnancy.  Ellen 
Willis  argues  that  this  shift  in  focus  represents  "a  psychological 
victory"  for anti-abortionists.  Writing in 1979,  Willis pointed out: 
"Two  years  ago,  abortion  was  almost  always  discussed  in 
feminist  terms  as  a  political  issue  affecting  the 
condition  of  women.  Since  then,  the  grounds  of  the  debate 
have  shifted dramatically;  more  and  more,  the  Right-to-Life 
movement  has  succeeded  in getting  the  public  and  the  media 
to  see  abortion as  an  abstract  moral  issue  having solely to 
do  with the rights of foetuses." 
<Willis,  1919a:  92> 
This position,  Willis points outs,  rests on "a crucial fallacy"  - that 
the  rights  of  women  and  of  foetuses  can  be  isolated  from  each  other. 
(ibid.:  92)  Petchesky,  too,  argues· that  "the  symbolic  fetus"  and  its 
rights  as  autonomous  from  those  of  the  pregnant  woman,  has  displaced 
women  from the centre of the abortion debate.  <Petchesky,  1986:  viii) 
-234-The  rhetoric of  rights masks  the  political nature  of the struggle over 
reproduction.  That  the  rights  of  the  foetus  are  presented  as 
independent  of  women's  struggle  for  control  of  their  bodies  obscures 
the  place  of  abortion  in  the  power  struggle  over  women's  "productive 
bodies";  presenting  "foetal  rights"  as  an  abstract  moral  issue  hides 
the question  of  whose  interests are  served  by  such "rights",  and  whose 
"rights"  they curtial. 
Underlying that rhetoric lies a  debate  about  the  ownership and control 
of  women's  sexuality  and  reproductive  capacity  which  has  changed  its 
focus  from  contraception  to  abortion  as  the  political  struggle 
continues.  Partial control  of  reproduction through contraception being 
substantially  won  in  the  West,  women  now  seek  absolute  control  and 
public  acknowledgement  through  the  law  of  that  control.  The  object  of 
reproductive  control  in  contraception  is  the  unfertilized  ovum;  in 
abortion  what  is at  issue  is the  fertilized  ovum  - the  evidence  that 
a  woman's  body  has  been  masculine  "territory".  While  women  have  won 
control  over  their  "own"  biological  matter,  ownership  of  the 
fertilized  egg  is seen as  more  contentious:  in spite of  the  arguments 
from  sociobiology  that  women's  childcare  responsibilities  are  the 
result  of  a  much  great  primary  biological  "investment"  in  children, 
this greater  investment  does  not  automatically  lead  to greater rights 
- or ownership.  (see  Gallagher,  1987) 
Willis  quotes  from  an  interview  with  Ken  ~.  an  anti-abortionist 
even in cases of rape: 
-235-"You  don't  plow  under  the  corn  because  the  seed  was  planted 
with a  neighbour's shovel."  <quoted  in Willis,  1979a:  95-6) 
Women's  bodies  and  reproductive  capacities are,  in the  last,  instance 
masculine  property,  or,  as  Petchesky  puts  it,  "passive  vessels"  in 
reproduction.  <Petchesky,  1986:  xv)  She  argues  that  in  the  abortion 
debate,  as  in  the  debate  over  new  reproductive  technologies,  "it  is 
primarily  the  fetus,  or  embryo,  which  is the  object  of  intervention; 
the  pregnant  woman,  "whether as  'donor'  or  'recipient',  becomes  merely 
the  'site'."  (ibid.:  xvii)  As  Ann  Oakely points out: 
"The  specific  reproductive  definition  of  women  as  mindless 
mothers  appears to  have  emerged simultaneously with the move 
towards  a  centralized  technological  control  of  pregnancy 
which  has  taken  place  over  the  last  thirty  years ... It  has 
now  become  technologically possible  to  ignore  the  status of 
pregnant  women  as human  beings." 
<Oakely,  1987:  39;  see  also  Corea,  1985;  Arditti,  Duelli 
Klein & Minden  (eds.),  1985) 
Here  Turner's  argument  that  "family"  property  becomes  increasingly 
less  important  as  property  rights  are  lodged  in  individuals  as 
individuals rather than as fathers is again relevant.  However,  even an 
acceptance  of  the  argument  that  children  as  property  become  less 
important  in  a  fully  individualized  society  does  not  lead  us  to 
conclude  that this is the  only  "motive"  for the patriarchal control  of 
women.  Patriarchal  control  of  feminine  sexuality  as  responsive  is 
crucial  here:  women's  struggle  for  autonomous  control  of  reproduction 
can  be  interpreted as  a  struggle over  female  sexuality,  bodily control 
and  ownership  as  a  whole.  Behind  the  rhetoric of  foetal  rights lies a 
struggle  to  control  female  sexuality.  On  the  one  "side"  we  find  the 
struggle  for  abortion  on  demand,  sexual  freedom and  physical  autonomy, 
-236-in which  women  claim complete  rights  of  ownership  in their  bodies;  on 
the  other  control  through  self-policing and  fertility restrictions  on 
sexual  freedom for women. 
As  Willis  argues,  without  abortion  on  demand,  women  who  have  not 
chosen  to  be  pregnant  face  a  loss  of  control  over  their  lives  and 
bodies;  she writes: 
"However  gratifying pregnancy  may  be  to  a  women  who  desires 
it,  for  the  unwilling it is literally an  invasion ...  abortion 
is by normal  standards an act  of self-defence." 
<Willis,  1979a:  94) 
The  anti-abortionist  response  to  this  argument,  reveals,  Willis 
argues,  that  "the nitty-gritty in the  abortion  debate  is not  life but 
sex."  <ibid.:  94)  Pregnancy  is  seen  as  "just  punishment"  for  sexual 
activity  - for  women,  that  is;  women  have  "no  right  to  selfish 
pleasure  at  the  expense  of  the  unborn"  and  must  remain  "continually 
vulnerable  to  the  invasion  of  their  bodies"  (ibid.:  94)  The 
restriction of abortion,  then,  contains and controls female  sexuality. 
The  abortion  debate  is  one  area  in  which  the  tension  between 
individuality and  feminity  as  social  roles for  women  is expressed.  As 
Petchesky  argues,  the  ideology  of  individual  rights  is  part  of  what 
keeps  abortion  legal  - as  the  individual's  "freedom of  choice"  in  an 
area  of  "private  morality".  <Petchesky,  1986:  ix)  But  if the  formal 
consideration  of  women  as  individuals  helps  keep  abortion  legal,  the 
sub-text  of  femininity  continually  undermines  that  "individuality"  by 
presenting women  as masculine  property,  and threatens abortion rights. 
-237-Women  are  not  fully  "individuals"  in  the  abortion  debate,  but  the 
foetus,  ironically,  lS.  Petchesky  argues  that  images  of  the  foetus 
suspended  in amniotic  fluid  now  so "saturate"  the  debate  that  not  even 
feminists  question  their  authenticity,  and  the  distortion  and 
decontextualization  entailed  in  the  presentation  a  foetus  "as  if 
dangling  in  space,  without  a  woman's  uterus  and  body  and  bloodstream 
to support  it."  <ibid.:  x-xi) 
She  argues thus: 
"Chaste  silhouettes  of  the  foetal  form,  or  voyeuristic-
necrophilist  photographs  of  its  remains,  litter  the 
background  of  any  abortion  talk.  These  still  images  float 
like  s.piri ts  through  the  courtrooms,  where  lawyers  argue 
that  foetuses  can  claim  tort  liability;  through  the 
hospitals  and  clinics,  where  physicians  welcome  them  as 
'patients';  and  in  front  of  all  the  abortion  clinics, 
legislative  coiD.ID.ittees,  bus  terminals  and  other places  that 
'right-to-lifers'  haunt.  The  strategy  of  anti  -abortionists 
Cis)  to  make  foetal  personhood  a  self-fulfilling prophecy  by 
making  the  foetus  a  public presence". 
<Petchesky,  1987:  57-8) 
The  image,  Petchesky  argues,  1::3  neither,  as  is  suggested  by  Dr. 
Bernard  Nathanson  in  The  Silent  Scream,  the  view  "from  the  vantage 
point  of  the  victim  (fetus)"  or  the  perception  of  the  pregnant  woman. 
Rather,  it  is  the  view  of  "a  male  onlooker"  <Petchesky,  1986:  xi; 
1987:  60-3).  She  quotes  Barbara  Katz  Rothman: 
"the  fetus  in  utero  has  become  a  metaphor  for  'man'  in 
space,  floating  free,  attached  only  by  the  umbilical  cord to 
the  spaceship.  But  v;here  it=;  the  mother  in  that  metaphor  ? 
She  has  become  empty  space."  <Rothman,  1986:  114;  quoted  in 
Petchesky,  1986:  xi) 
-238-Such  imagery,  and  the  rhetoric  of  the  obstetric  "advances"  which  made 
it  possible,  eerily  echoes  the  rhetoric  and  practice  of  nineteenth 
century  gynaecological  surgery  which  Barker-Benfield  analyses. 
Petchesky  argues  that  it  presents  the  womb  "as  a  space  to  be 
conquered",  and  quotes  from  an  interview  with  Bernard  Nathanson  in 
}Jewsweek: 
"'With  the  aid  of  technology,  we  stripped away  the  walls  of 
the  abdomen  and  uterus and  looked into the  womb.'" 
equated  in Petchesky,  1987:  69) 
Similarly  Oakely  argues  that  ultrasound  acts  as  "a  window  on  the 
womb".  <Oakely,  1987:  44)  Dr.  Michael  Harrison,  discussing  the  use  of 
ultrasound techniques,  writes: 
"The  fetus  could  not  be  taken  seriously  as  long  as  he 
remained  a  medical  recluse  in an  opaque  womb;  and it was  not 
until  the  last  half  of  this century  that  the  prying  eye  of 
the  ultrasonagram  ...  rendered  the  once  opaque  womb 
transparent,  stripping  the  veil  of  mystery  from  the  dark 
inner  sanctum,  and  letting  the  light  of  scientific 
observation fall  on  the  shy and secretive fetus." 
Cquoted  in Petchesky,  1987:  69) 
Twentieth  century  obstetrical  technology,  then,  like  nineteenth 
century  gynaecological  surgery,  allows  masculine  penetration  of  the 
"dark  inner  sanctum"  of  the  feminine  body,  and  this  penetration, 
clearly,  entails control.  It allows,  as Oakely points out: 
"the  treatment  of  women  as  objects,  as  biological  systems 
manipulable  in  the  interests  of  patriarchy,  and  only  rarely 
themselves  capable  of  manipulation." 
COakely,  1987:  51) 
Petchesky  relates  such  imagery  to  "the  Hobbesian  view  of ...  human 
beings  as  disconnected,  solitary  individuals,  paradoxically  helpless 
-239-and  autonomous at  the  same  time".  <Petchesky,  1986:  xi)  Thus  "abstract 
individualism"  embraces  the  foetus  but  blanks  out  the  woman  and  the 
dependance  of  the  foetus  on  her.  It could  be  argued,  further,  that it 
includes  the  symbolic  male  foetus  in  an  individualism to  which  women 
do  not  have  full  access,  suggesting  that  although  entirely  dependent 
physically  the  foetus  and  its "rights"  take  priority  over  autonomous 
reproductive  control  for  women.  The  foetus  in  this  imagery,  as 
Petchesky suggests: 
"is  not  the  image  of  a  baby  at  all  but  of  a  tiny  man,  a 
homunculus".  The  foetus  is  "a  'baby  man',  an  autonomous, 
atomized mini-space  hero." 
<Petchesky,  1987:  61;  64) 
The  symbolic  foetus,  as  masculine,  is  represented  as  "primary  and 
autonomous";  the  pregnant  woman,  as  feminine,  is  "absent  or 
peripheral".  (ibid.:  62) 
Women's  bodies,  then,  are  controlled  as  "productive  bodies"  and  as 
feminine  bodies;  the  "abstract  individualism"  <ibid.:  63)  of  the 
abortion debate  seeks to prevent the  autonomous sexual action of  women 
as well  as to control  the "products"  of  the  female  body 
-240-Rape:  the right to say no  ? 
Feminists  working  in  the  area  of  sexual  violence  against  wo:men  have 
long argued  that  the  dominant  legal  and  popular  understandings  of  rape 
are  seriously  flawed.  Feminists  argue  that  rape,  far  from  being  the 
rare  act  of  a  psychopathic  stranger,  is  in  fact  an  extre:mely  common 
act  which  takes  to  the  "extreme  and  logical  conclusion"  "normal" 
heterosexual  relations  in  which  coercion  is  present  to  a  greater  or 
lesser  degree  in  the  majority  of  sexual  encounters.  <LRCC,  1984:  5) 
Box,  for  example,  argues  that  rape  "is not  the  opposite  to  normal  sex 
but  a  grim,  grinning caricature  of  it"  <Box,  1983:  150)  and  Clark  and 
l&Hi.a argue  that  rape  is the  "price"  we  pay for  a  coercive standard in 
heterosexual  relations.  CClark  &  Lewis,  1977)  Rape,  then,  is  one 
expression  of  a  sexual  politics in  which  patriarchal  power  is played 
out:  it  depends,  for  its  :meaning  and  existence,  on  unequal  power 
relations  which  exist  across  the  spectrum  of  the  social  relations  of 
the genders.  As  Andrea  Dworkin  argues: 
"men  are  a  privileged  gender  class  over  and  against  women. 
One  of  their privileges is the  right  of  rape  - that is,  the 
right of carnal  access to any  woman." 
<Dworkin,  1982:  40) 
Lynne  Harvie  argues  that  public  abhorence  of  the  cri:me  coexists  with 
an  underlying  and  widespread  belief  that  much  of  the  responsibility 
for  rape  can  be  found  in  the  negligent  or  provocative  behaviour  of 
women.  She  suggests  that  public  abhorrence  is  based  on  the 
stereotypical  stranger-in-a-dark-alley  rape  which  is,  in  fact, 
comparatively  rare.  CHarvie,  1986:  1)  In  the  majority  of  rapes  which 
-241-do  not  fit this stereotype  much,  if not  all  of  the  blame  is placed  on 
the  woman  attacked;  the  stereotype acts to distance  rape  from "normal" 
heterosexual  relations.  Harvie  argues: 
"the  basic  premise  is  that  'normal  men'  do  not  rape. 
Therefore  if a  woman  is raped  by  an  'ordinary  man'  then she 
herself  must  be  to blame." 
(ibid. :  19) 
Largely  because  of  this,  reporting  rates  are  low  - 8%  in  Hall's 
survey  - conviction  rates  are  very  low  and  sentences rarely  approach 
the  maximum  allowable  by  statute.  <Hall,  1985;  Chambers  &  Millar, 
1987;  Clark  & Lewis,  1977:  57)  Rape  is the  only  crime  in  which  going 
to  trial  is  a  better  option  than  pleading guilty;  sentences at  trial 
are  considerably  lower  than  sentences  from guilty pleas - the reverse 
of  what  happens  in  other  crimes  - because  rape  trials  give  defence 
lawyers  the  opportunity  to  argue  that  the  real  explanation  for  the 
attack  is  to  be  found  in  the  behaviour  of  the  woman.  <Chambers  & 
:Miller,  1987) 
Feminists  argue,  then,  that  rape  in reality  and as  ideology act  as  a 
form  of  social  control.  Susan  Griffin  describes  rape  as  a  male 
protection  racket  (Griffin,  1971;  1979)  and  Jacqueline  Dowd  ~ 
compares  the  effect  of  rape  on  women  with that of lynching on  American 
negroes  in  the  earlier  part  of  this  century  - "an  instrument  of 
coercion  intended to  impress not  only the  immediate victim but all who 
saw  or  heard  about  the  event";  both  rape  and  lynching,  she  argues, 
serve  the  political  function  of  "psychological  intimidation".  <Hall, 
1984:  341;  340;  see also Clark & Lewis,  1977:  23;  Brownmiller,  1978) 
-242-What  does  the  debate  over  the  meaning,  extent  and  function  of  rape 
tell  us  about  the  social  meaning  of  the  feminine  body  ?  Legal 
discourse  on  rape  - both  statutory  and  in  practice  - reveals  that 
sexual  autonomy  is  not  one  of  women's  rights:  women  are  the  sexual 
property  of  men.  Rape  law,  indeed,  originated as  an  explicit  property 
law,  as Clark and Lewis  point  out: 
"Under  Anglo-Saxon  law  rape,  along with  most  other offences, 
was  punished  by  orders  to  pay  compensation  and  reparation. 
If  a  woman  was  raped,  a  sum  was  paid  to either her  husband 
or  her  father,  depending  on  who  still  exercised  rights  of 
ownership  over  her,  and  the  exact  amount  of  compensation 
depended  on  the  woman's  economic  position  and  her 
desirability  as  an  object  of  an  exclusive  sexual 
relationship.  The  sum  was  not  paid  to  the  woman  herself;  it 
was  paid  to her father  or  husband  because  he  was  the  person 
who  was  regarded as having  been wronged  by the act." 
<Clark & Lewis,  1977:  115-6) 
Rape,  then,  was  initially an act  of  trespass on  a  woman's  body  as male 
property,  and  Clark  and  Lewis  argue  that it "has  not  lost  the  shrouds 
of  these  historical  origins"  (ibid.:  116).  Their  study  shows  that 
there  exists  an  informal  and  extralegal  distinction  of  women  into 
"rapable"  and  "unrapable"  categories;  to  be  a  "credible"  victim  of 
rape  women  must  be  clearly  dependant  on  one  male  "owner-protector", 
being  either  "virgins  under  the  ownership  and  protection  of  their 
fathers,  or  chaste  wives  under  the  ownership  and  protection  of  their 
husbands".  (ibid.:  117)  (2)  They  argue  that  what  this implies is that 
women  are sexual  property,  their sexuality  is owned  by the  man  they 
2  Griffin  points  out  that  "chastity"  is  not  the  only  criterion  for 
distinguising  "rapable"  and  "unrapable"  women;  black  women  tend to  be 
categorized  as  "unrapable"  regardless,  due  to  their  racist 
categorization as "impure".  <Griffin,  1971:  5-6) 
-243-are  dependent  upon,  and  that  the  value  of  :::;e:xuali ty-as-commodi ty rests 
on  its potential  for  exclusiv-e  ovrner:::hip.  Their  study  found  that  "the 
primary  determinants  of  pol ice  clss:::;if icati  on  are  variables  which 
describe  the  victim  - her  age,  her  marital  and  occupational  status, 
her  emotional  and  physical  condition  when  she  reported  the  crime". 
(ibid.:  77;  117)  The  two  most  recent  comparable  studies in Scotland  -
Investigating  Sexual  Assault  and  Prosecuting  Sexual  Assault  - found 
exactly  the  same;  it  is  the  characteristics  of  the  woman  which  form 
the  main criteria on  which  the  decision  on  whether to proceed,  and  the 
trial  itself,  hinges.  <Chambers  &  Millar,  1983  and  1987)  The  central 
criterion here  is the  woman's  "past sexual  history";  if she  is,  or can 
be  argued  to  be,  anything  other  than  a  virgin  or  a  faithful  wife  her 
"credibility"  is significantly  reduced.  Clark  and  Lewis  argue  that  in 
practice,  if  not  in  statute,  decisions  on  women's  value  as  sexual 
property lie at the  heart  of  legal  action  on  rape:  "in effect,  the  law 
is saying that  some  women  can  be  raped.  and  some  women  can't".  (Clark & 
Lewis,  1977:  92;  see also Griffin,  1971:  2J 
As  we  saw,  originally  all  women  were  treated  as  property.  Clark  and 
Lewis  explain the  modern  distinction  thu:::;: 
"Women  who  voluntarily  give  up  that  which  makes  them 
desirable  as  objects  of  an  exclusive  sexual  relationship are 
seen  as  'common  property',  to  be  appropriated  without 
penalty  for  the  use,  hm,rever  temporary,  of  any  man  who 
desires  their  services ... the  voluntary  granting  of  sexual 
access  outside  the  parameters  of  sanctified  matrimony  leads 
to  the  loss  of  sexual  and  physical  autonomy.  Once  a  woman 
parts  with  her  one  and  only  treasure,  she  never  has  the 
right to say  no  again."  !ibid.:  121) 
-244-Clark  and  Lewi::;  arg·ue  that  women  who  live  outside  of  marital  monogamy 
can  be  described  as  "fair-game",  or  "open-terri  tory  victims".  (ibid.: 
123;  94)  Rape  law  is  sti  11  in  essence  property  law,  and  does  not 
provide  women  "any  guaranteed  right  to  sexual  autonomy".  <ibid.:  124) 
As  Griffin argues: 
"One  begins  to  suspect  that  it  is  the  behaviour  of  the 
fallen  woman,  not  that  of  the  male,  that  civilization  aims 
to control."  <Griffin,  1971:  4) 
The  law  in  England  and  Wales  states  that  husbands  cannot  rape  their 
wives,  since  marriage  represents continuous  and  irrevocable consent  to 
sexual  intercourse.  (3)  Having  once  consented  to  intercourse  with  her 
husband  a  woman  has  no  legal  right  to  withdraw that  consent.  As  Sally 
Vincent  arguec::: 
"A  man  cannot  rape  his  wife  because  he  cannot  steal  what  he 
already  ownc::." 
<Vincent,  1984;  see  alc::o  Dworkin,  1982:  29) 
This  situation  is  mirrored  in  the  "extra-legal"  standards  of 
common-sens:e  and  legal  practice  which  imply  that  once  a  woman  has 
willingly  had  extra-marital  sex  she  is  unlikely  ever  to  refuse  sex 
again  - and  has  little real  right  to.  In  Investigating Sexual  Assault 
Chambers  and  Millar  quote  from  police  case  notes  on  rapes  which  were 
reported  but  not  proceeded  with: 
.. This  self-admitted  whore  came  out  of  a  close  at  about 
midnight  and  hailed  two  passing  beat  cops  and  told  them  she 
had  been  raped." 
3  Scottish  law  formally  allows  prosecutions  for  rape  in  marriage;  in 
recent  years  there  have  been  several  attempts  at  prosecution,  none  of 
which  have  as  yet  resulted  in conviction.  <ERCC:  1988) 
-245-"She  had  had  sex  on  a  number  of  occasions  in the  past"  and 
was  "a bit of  a  loose  female". 
<Chambers  & Millar,  1983:  33;  42) 
But  if  women  do  not  have  ownership  rights  over  their sexuality,  they 
do  have  responsibilities.  Women  are  responsible  for  protecting  the 
property,  and  preventing  rape-as-trespass:  Harvie  argues  that  the 
police  "see  a  genuine  rape  as  involving  a  high  degree  of  physical 
violence  and  expect  a  woman  to  fight  to  the  end  to  protect  her 
honour";  she  quotes  one  detective:  "she  didn't  resist  to  the 
last ...  then  of  course it's not  rape."  <Harvie,  1986:  20;  91)  As  well 
as  physically  resisting an  attack,  women  are  also  expected  to  prevent 
it arising  in the  first  place  by  "unprovocative"  dress  and  behaviour, 
by restricting their mobility and  by not "leading men  on".  A Detective 
Sergeant  interviewed by  Chambers  and Millar explains the argument: 
"I  think  it's a  crime  <in)  which  a  lot  of  young  men ...  can 
find  themselves  genuinely  raping  someone ...  being 
overcome ...  led  on  to  a  certain point  where  there's no  going 
back  . " 
<Chambers  & Miller,  1983:  93) 
Feminine  sexuality,  then,  acts  as  a  stimulus  to  masculine  desire; 
dominant  discourses on rape  imply: 
"that it is women  who  cause  rape  by being unchaste  or in the 
wrong  place  at  the  wrong  time  - in essence,  by  behaving  as 
though they were  free". 
<Griffin,  1971:  6) 
Women  must  police their sexuality in order to protect  themselves  from 
rape.  As  Griffin  argues,  women  thus  learn  "to  distrust ... <their)  own 
carnality".  <ibid.:  6)  Women  learn  to  fear  their  own  sexuality  and 
what  its exercise  may  provoke.  Once  it has  been aroused,  the  male  sex-
-246-drive  is seen as uncontrollable;  responsibility for  unleashing it lies 
with  women.  <Harvie,  1986:  4) 
Women,  then,  act  as  caretakers rather than  owners  of  their bodies  and 
their sexuality.  As  Clark and  Lewis argue: 
"Prior to  marriage,  a  woman's  sexuality is a  commodity  to be 
held  in  trust  for  its  lawful  owner.  Making  'free'  use  of 
one's sexuality is like  making  'free'  use  of  someone  else's 
money.  One  can act  autonomously  only with things that belong 
to ones-self." 
<Clark  & Lewis,  1977:  122) 
Women  do  not  have  rights  of  disposal  over  their  sexuality;  while 
virginity  is  property  held  in  trust,  marital  monogamy  equals 
exclusive  ownership.  However,  what  cannot  be  bought  can  always  be 
stolen.  Dominant  discourses  on  rape  construct  the  feminine  body  as 
patriarchal  property,  and  relate  rape  to  women's  sexual  behaviour. 
This  has  three  main  effects.  Firstly,  the  identification  of  women's 
sexual  behaviour  as  the  true  cause  of  rape alienates women  from their 
sexual  desires,  which they must  "self-police". 
Secondly,  women  are  alienated from their bodies which are,  in the last 
instance,  the sexual  property of others.  In rape,  feminine subjecthood 
is annihilated;  women's  bodies  are  directly treated as objects.  Diana 
Russell,  in her study of rape,  quotes one  of  her interviewees: 
"'There's  something  worse  about  being  raped  than  just  being 
beaten.  It's  the  final  humiliation,  the  final  showing  you 
that  you're  worthless  and  that  you're  there  to  be  used  by 
whoever  wants  you. ' " 
<Russell,  1975:  77) 
As  Griffin argues: 
-247-"Rape  is an  act  of  aggression  in which  the  victim is denied 
her self-determination";  she  becomes  "the  object  and  not  the 
subject  of  human  behaviour.  It is in this sense that a  woman 
is deprived  of  the status of  a  human  being.  She  is not  free 
to be." 
<Griffin,  1971:  8;  6) 
Finally,  the  obligation  to  maintain  a  physical  integrity  of  which 
virginity  is  the  only  true  expression  leads  to  a  tension  in  the 
relationship  of  surface  and  interior.  If  physical  integrity is to  be 
maintained  the  body  must  be  impregnable;  if  women  wish  to  be 
heterosexually successful the body must  yield. 
In  the  next  section  the  contradiction  between  bodily  surface  as 
impregnable  and  bodily  interior  as  receptive  will  be  explored.  This 
contradiction,  it will  be  suggested,  interacts with the  obligation  on 
women  to  construct  their  bodies  as  attractive  objects,  as,  in 
Stannard' s  term,  "articles  of  conspicuous  consumption  in  the  male 
market".  <Stannard,  1971:  123) 
-248-Surface  tension:  skin as symbolic  virginity 
"'Virgins  must  be  boring  to  go  to  bed  with'  said  Chloe, 
looking  directly  at  Simon.  'They  don't  know  first  base  from 
second. ' 'When  I  was  a  child  I  liked  popping  balloons,  and 
fuschia  buds,'  said  Simon  softly.  'I always  like putting  my 
finger  through  the  paper  on  the  top  of  the  :Maxwell  House 
jar.  I  like  virgins.  You  can  break  them  in  how  you  like, 
before  they  have  the  time  to learn any  bad habits.'" 
(Jilly Cooper,  Harriet,  1977:  22-3) 
Bahktin  argues  that  the  defining characteristic  of  the  bourgeois  body 
is the  understanding  of  its surface  as  an 
11 0paque"  and 
11 impenetrable" 
facade.  Thus  the  bourgeois  body  is  understood  as  non-merging  and 
totally  individual.  CBahktin,  1968:  320)  The  presentation  of  this 
body-concept  as  gender  neutral  is,  however,  phallocentric,  since  it 
refers  to  a  dominant  masculine  "text"  and  ignores  the  feminine  "sub-
text"  which  constructs  women's  facade  as  paper-thin.  Total  bodily 
"closure"  is a  specifically  masculine possibility.  (4)  This,  however, 
does  not  prevent  closure  being presented as a  goal  for  women.  Striving 
for  closure  is,  however,  undercut  for  women  by their simultaneous duty 
to  be  open  and  receptive.  Ywsculine  closure  and  feminine  openness  are 
not,  of  course,  equal  in  value.  Recepticity  is  fundamentally 
ambiguous,  and  represents  weakness,  vulnerability,  and,  as  we  shall 
see,  potential  voraciousness.  The  articulation  of  separation  and 
openness  is  a  basic task of  femininity;  in  feminine  bodily  self-
4  The  closed  masculine  body  is,  it  should  be  pointed  out,  a 
specifically  heterosexual  construction.  It is,  however,  a  construction 
in relation to  whose  dominance  alternative understandings are defined. 
How  the  concept  of  closure  affects  the  body  concept  of  gay  men  is an 
interesting  area  which  is,  of  course,  outside  the  scope  of  this 
thesis. 
-249-discipline  the  articulation  of  impenetrability  and  receptivity is  the 
central  task. 
The  cosmetic exterior 
One  expression  of  the  tension  between  integrity  and  openess  is  the 
obsession  with  the  surface  of  the  body,  with,  in Bardwick and  Douyan's 
term,  "the  cosmetic  exterior".  Women  construct  their  bodies  as 
attractive  objects,  as  stimuli  for  masculine  desire,  and  Bardwick  and 
Douvan  argue  that  the  function  of  the  cosmetic  exterior  is  "to  lure 
men,  to  secure  affection,  to  succeed  in  the  competition  of  dating". 
<Bardwick  & Douvan,  1971:  150-1) 
Una  Stannard  in The  mask  of  beauty,  argues that: 
"Little  girls  look  endlessly  at  beautiful  women.  They  hear 
and  read  about  them  too ... <the  girl)  compares herself to the 
media  ideal  of  beauty  and is usually found  wanting.  She  then 
begins  woman's  frantic  pursuit  of  beauty ... in  this  culture 
women  are  told  that  they  are  the  fair  sex,  but  at  the  same 
time  that  their  'beauty'  needs  lifting,  shaping,  dying, 
painting,  curling,  padding." 
<Stannard,  1971:  118-122) 
Attractiveness  is central  to  femininity,  and  is also  a  billion-dollar 
industry.  The  standards  aimed  at  are  never  really  achieved  - an 
airbrushed  and  retouched  studio  image  can  never  really  be  replicated, 
even  if  the  raw  material  of  the  5  foot  10,  size  8,  17-year-old  model 
were  not  a  world  away  from the  body  of  the  average  woman.  Beauty is an 
-250-unachievable  ideal  which  fuels  consumption.  Not  only  do  women  have  to 
spend  to  maintain  their  looks,  but  there  is  always  the  possibility 
that  the  latest  new  product  or "scientific"  cosmetic discovery will  be 
the  one  to help  them really  acheive the  unacheivable.  As  Marjorie 
Ferguson  points out  in her study of  women's  magazines,  the  ideology of 
beauty "presents the desirable as though it were  possible": 
"second  only  to  messages  of  female  obligation  to  maximise 
physical  attractiveness are promises of its attainability." 
<Ferguson,  1983:  58;  59) 
The  frantic  pursuit  of  unattainable  beauty  and the  frantic  pursuit  of 
profit  walk  hand  in  hand.  The  effects  of  this  objectification  have 
been  well-documented  by  feminists.  Ann  Oakley,  for  example,  argues 
that  women  experience  alienation  from their bodies,  expressed  in "the 
careful  watching  of  one's body  and its fabrication as a  public viewing 
object".  <Oakley,  1981:  82;  see  also Chapkis,  1986)  Women's  bodies are 
"on  show" ;  they  are  obliged  to  produce  their  bodies  as  adequate  and 
acceptable "spectacles",  as objects external  to their selves. 
Two  meanings  of  the  social  obsession with  female  appearance are,  then, 
obvious,  and  have  become,  to  an  extent,  feminist  cliches.  Women's 
bodies  provide  a  continually  expanding  market  for  capitalist 
production;  women's  bodies  are  the  "lure"  which  attracts  male  sexual 
interest.  Women  produce  the  cosmetic exterior as an object for men  and 
for capital;  the  beauty obsession colludes with femininity,  dependancy 
and  consumerism. 
-251-Some  :more  complex  contradictions  can,  however,  be  unearthed  in  the 
:messages  of  the  beauty  industry.  The  idea  of  the  pursuit  of  beauty  as 
simply  passive  acceptance  of  stereotypical  femininity  can  be 
questioned. 
"Improve  your  outline":  smooth.  firm and tight 
"With the pips of  an apricot,  women  can slow down  the seeds of time." 
<Kanebo  Sensai  Skincare)(5) 
The  cosmetic  exterior functions  both to attract and to discipline.  (6) 
While  creating  the  body  as  a  "beautiful"  object  is  geared  to 
attracting  the  interest  and  approval  of  men,  it also  constructs  a 
"finished"  exterior,  a  mask,  a  barrier.  If  we  look at beauty messages 
about  female  skin  we  can  see  that  the  dual  ai:ms  are  receptivity, 
expressed  as  softness,  and  closure,  represented  as  "flawlessness". 
Vo:men  work  on  the  skin  as  surface  from  the  outside  with  make-up, 
cleansers,  depilatories and surgery,  and from the  inside with diet and 
exercise;  the  aim  of  both  processes  resembles  with  remarkable 
exactitude  Bahktin' s  "new  bodily  canon"  - the  opaque  and  impenetrable 
bodily  surface,  cloaked  in  the  acceptable  and  expected  feminine  goal 
of being soft to the  <masculine)  touch. 
5  Quotations  in  this  section  are  taken  from  skincare  adverts  in 
women's  :magazines,  and are identified by  product. 
6  Tickner  (1976)  and  Henley  <1977)  also explore the restriction of  the 
female  body  in,  respectively,  clothing and movement. 
-252-The  enemies  of  smoothness,  firmness  and  tightness are  legion  - spots, 
wrinkles,  viens,  stretch  marks,  hard  skin,  dry  skin,  sweat,  hair  and 
flab.  Fortunately,  however,  they can all  be  dealt with- with a  little 
help,  of course. 
Preparation 
"Skin  looks  lumpy,  bumpy,  dingy  ?  Uneven  in tone and texture 
?  Don't  panic  - it's  surprising  what  a  daily  dose  of 
friction  rubbing  and  a  dollop  of  moisturiser  can  do  to 
neglected  skin.  With  a  soapy  loofah  or  friction  sponge, 
scrub  skin til it tingles,  particularly  the  areas  that  get 
rough  and  'goose-pimply' ...  a  good  scrub  like  this  bucks  up 
sluggish  circulation  and  also  gets  rid  of  any  dead  surface 
cells,  so skin not  only  feels  instantly smoother  but  is all 
set for  a  smoother suntan too." 
<Carol  Grant  "Give  your  skin  the  works"  Woman's  World  July 
'87) 
There's  a  lot  of  work  to  be  done  before  women  put  on  their  make-up. 
Although  the  focus  is  often  on  the  face,  the  entire  surface  of  the 
body  must  be  worked  on,  made  smooth  and  flawless.  Louis  Marcel's 
"Smooth  Operators"  range  is  produced  in  different  packages  for  the 
whole  body - extending right  down  to the  feet: 
"Remember  feet  ?  Those  neglected  things  at  the  end  of  your 
legs ?" 
Xoisturisers  prevent  dry  skin's  attack  on  the  smooth  surface; 
exfoliators  expunge  the  danger  of  "dead  surface  cells";  Louis  Marcel 
can eliminate hard skin from your  feet;  anti-perspirants keep you  "dry 
and  silky",  banishing  sweat  depilitories  help  you  "say  goodbye  to 
fuzz"  and  Vichy  helps  you  "fight back at  wrinkles - iron out surface 
lines- tighten up  the skin". 
-253-For  women  who  need  just that  bit  more  Biotherm and  Chanel  are  waiting 
in  the  wings  with  a  new  range  of  "scientific"  products  which  will 
actually affect muscle  "tone": 
a Chanel  Lift  Serum Antrides-Raffermissant"  with  II Plastoderm" 
will  "gradually  fill ... out  laughter  lines  and 
wrinkles ...  tone,  tighten and  smooth". 
Biotherm' s  "skin-firming  range"  hits  all  those  problem  areas  with 
"Exfoliating  Body  Scrub",  "Active  Body  Skin  Firmer", 
11 Stomach  Firming 
Treatment"  and  "28-Day  Bust  Firmer".  And  Clarins'  "Skin  Firming 
Concentrate"  both identifies and solves "the  problem": 
"Slackening  skin  ?  Be  firm  with  your  face ...  Throughout  the 
day  the  highly effective,  active  ingredients will  be  working 
to  tone  and  firm  skin  tissues,  helping  to  smooth  out  fine 
lines,  improve  the  texture  of  your  skin,  and  restore  firmer 
facial  contours." 
Approaching  the  same  goal  from  the  opposite  angle,  diet  and  exercise 
erradicate "flab";  Carol  Grant,  skin evangelist,  tells us  how: 
"Fight  the  flab.  Spare  tyre,  flabby  thighs,  bulging  tum  ?  No 
miracles  promised,  but  20  minutes  a  day  of  exercises, 
combined  with  a  quickie  diet,  will  definitely  improve  your 
outline." 
(Grant,  1987;  see also Coward,  1984:  40) 
The  surface has  been  primed;  the  next  stage  awaits. 
Presentation 
The  basic  principle  of  the  cosmetic  exterior  is a  smooth  foundation  -
from this all else flows. ~  magazine  explains: 
"The  purpose  of  foundation  is  to  provide  a  better-looking 
skin,  both  in  terms  of  colour  and  texture.  The  film  it 
-254-leaves  on  your  skin  hides  minor  blemishes  and  gives  you 
colour too." 
<"Woman",  5/9/87) 
"Even"  skin-tone  has  two  meanings:  skin  has  to  feel  smooth  <texture) 
and  look  smooth  (colour).  The  aim  of  cosmetic  labour  is  to  look  as 
though there has  been  no  work  done at all: 
"Barbara  Daly  shows  you  how  to  create  the  perfect  natural 
face ...  the  face  you  can put  on in the  morning  and stay happy 
with all day." 
<"Woman",  5/12/87) 
Elizabeth  Arden  "Simply  Perfect  :Mousse  :Make-up"  "gives  you  incredible 
coverage  to  even  out  skin  tones ...  Result  ?  A  perfect,  fine-textured 
finish  that  looks  natural,  glowing,  fresh  for  hours."  Clinique  "Pore-
:Minimizer  :Makeup"  can  go  even  furtheri  it's not  just  "flaws"  which 
disappear but pores too: 
"Women  wanted  a  make-up  that  gives  any  skin  a  flawless 
finish.  One  that makes  pores seem to disappear." 
Repair 
If all  this  still  doesn't  work,  women  can  relinquish  the  "natural" 
apricot  seed  for  electronic  technology  and  cosmetic  surgery.  If 
Plastoderm,  exercise  and  diet  can't  tone  and  firm  your  skin,  "don't 
panic"  - there's always  ":Minitone": 
":Minitone  gets  right  down  to  the  face-shaping  muscles 
beneath  the  skin  ...  the  first effect  you'll  see  is a  gradual 
lifting  and  firming  of  the  chinline.  Then,  as  the  facial 
muscles  really start  responding  the  lines  around  the  mouth 
should begin to fade." 
-255-Or  "Speedshaper": 
"Turn  belly  flab  into  a  super  flat  stomach  !  Tummy  muscles 
slack  and  out  of  shape  ?  ...  you  can  discover  the  new  method 
of  trimming  away  ugly  embarrassing flab ...  to reveal  a  brand-
new  firm,  trim and shapely body." 
Or  the  new  portable  "Stomach  Trimmer": 
"Gives  you  a  slim,  trim  stomach  in  just  5  to  10  minutes  a 
day ... Pull  up  - relax,  pull  up  - relax,  to  tone  and  firm 
those  muscles ...  whenever  you've  got  a  spare  moment  use it to 
trim that  stomach down." 
The  function  of  muscle  then,  is not  to move  or to act,  but to maintain 
the  firm,  taut  outline  - to  "keep it in".  <See  Coward,  1984:  21)  And 
if "do it yourself"  is unsuccessful,  there is always cosmetic surgery. 
Wrinkles  can  be  "filled  out"  by  "collagen"  injections  <"Sky", 
21/8/87),  and  if that  won't  fit  the  bill  you  can  always  go  the  whole 
hog  and  have  a  face  lift. 
The  perfect  end  product,  then,  is smooth,  flawless,  tight  and  firm  -
or,  impenetrable,  opaque  and  closed.  As  Ferguson  points  out,  it  is 
both sexual  and a-sexual: 
"It  is  sexual  in  defining  the  female  state 
attractive  ... it  is  a-sexual  in  offering 
perfected,  depilated,  deodorised object". 
<Ferguson,  1983:  63) 
as  pleasingly 
a  polished, 
Its  unattainabili  ty  in  reality  provides  the  impetus  for  a  continual 
proliferation  of  products,  going  progressively  deeper  into  the  body, 
-256-and  seems  to  impinge  not  at all  on  the  energy  devoted  to its pursuit. 
Real  female  skin will  always  have  "flaws"  - wrinkles cannot  be  kept at 
bay  forever,  pores  can't  really  disappear,  and  under  the  make-up 
uneven  skin-tone  lurks.  The  image,  however,  can  and  does  remain 
everlastingly flawless,  reaching its zenith in a  recent  Chanel  make-up 
advertisement  where  the  eyes  and  mouth,  sporting the "latest"  colours, 
appear  isolated  on  the  white  page  - skin  so  perfect  it  has  vanished 
altogether. 
The  perfected skin offers no  way  in;  its boundaries are firm and clear 
they  do  not  yield.  The  perfected  skin  covers  the  body  as  a 
protective  barrier,  its  image  and  its  symbolic  value  existing  to 
create  the  impenetrable  facade  of  the  bourgeois  body  for  penetrable 
woman;  the  reality,  however,  real  skin,  wrinkled,  flawed,  fuzzed  and 
sagging,  haunts the facade  like a  spectre at the feast. 
-257-The  passive vessel  ?:  virgins and  whores 
"However  justified men  may  believe  their social  position to 
be,  they  are  nonetheless  aware,  at  some  level,  that  women 
are  oppressed  and  do  not  always  accept  their  oppression 
willingly.  Misogyny  is caused  by  fear  as  well  as resentment, 
and  as  the  Orpheus  legend  tells  us,  many  men  fear  women 
deeply.  There  is  always  a  possibility that  the  submissive 
housewife  may  turn into a  bacchante  or  Medea,  or  (according 
to a  more  modern  legend),  a  'castrating'  female ...  Xen's fear 
of  women,  and  the  misogyny  it  produces,  rests  on  the 
awareness  that  women  have  good  reason  to  seek  revenge." 
<Clark & Lewis,  1977:  139) 
That  men  hate  and  fear  women  seems  almost  to  be  taken  for  granted  by 
many  feminists;  discussion of  misogyny,  further,  frequently raises the 
idea  of  female  sexuality  and  the  female  body  as  a  threatening 
environment  for  men.  <Greer,  1971;  Dworkin,  1974;  Millett,  1977)  Susan 
Lipschitz,  for  example,  argues  that  popular  images  of  prostitutes 
relate  to  "an  unconscious  image  of  a  feared,  evil  and  sexual  woman". 
(Lipschitz,  1978:  56)  Underlying  ideologies  of  female  sexual 
passivity,  it  is  suggested,  lie  deep  anxieties  about  the  social 
control  of  a  force  which  continually  threatens  disorder  and  chaos. 
Katherine  Arnold argues that  women  "are not  seen as able or willing to 
control  themselves.  They are suspected  of  harbouring desires which are 
inimical  to  the  smooth  functioning  of  patriarchal  society".  <Arnold, 
1978:  57;  see  also  Hirschon,  1978:  69)  The  message  seems  to  be  that 
female  sexuality  is  a  seething  subterranean  force  which  must  be 
brought  under  stringent  discipline  if  it  is  not  to  overwhelm  the 
social  order. 
This  message  is to  be  found  not  only  in  feminist  theory.  It  lies at 
the  heart  of  many  cultural  forms,  both  "high"  and  "popular",  as  Kate 
-258-Millett  points  out  in  Sexual  Politics.  <Millett,  1977)  To  take  one 
example:  "Fatal  Attraction",  a  currently popular  film,  owes  its appeal 
to  the  titillation  and  fascination  of  flirting  with  female  sexual 
danger.  In  the  film  wife  and  mistress  represent,  respectively, 
disciplined  and  uncontrolled  female  sexuality,  and  it is significant 
that  Alex  Cthe  mistress)  uses  a  carving  knife  as  her  weapon 
attempting  a  symbolic  "castration"  using  a  phallic  symbol  to  which 
she,  as  a  woman,  is  not  entitled  but  which,  as  the  current 
representative  of  the  archytypal  dangerous  woman,  she  usurps.  And  it 
is  interesting  that  Alex  - note  the  name  - is  finally  killed  not  by 
the  "hero"  but  by  his  wife;  the  evil  woman's  attempt  at  power  is 
defeated  by  female  virtue.  In  "Fatal  Attraction"  women  provide  both 
protection  and  threat;  the  self-policing  of  female  danger,  at  first 
undercut,  is in the  end sufficient. 
Katherine  Arnold,  it  would  seem,  is  not  entirely correct  - women  can 
be  seen  as  both  willing  and  able  to  control  themselves.  Creating  and 
maintaining  feminine  self-discipline  is  the  central  aim  of  the 
ideology  of  femininity.  CSee,  e. g.  Ferguson,  1983)  Self-policing  is 
certainly,  however,  not  sufficient  to  meet  the  danger  of  female 
sexuality,  v<hich  is also controlled by  law,  physical  force  and  through 
patriarchal  ideological  constructions  of  women  as  weak,  dependent  and 
endangered  not  only  by  sexual  violence  but  by their own  sexuality.  The 
threat,  hm;ever,  remains,  and  it  accounts  for  the  ambivalence  of 
contemporary  images  of  femininini ty;  the  virgin  and  the  whore  are 
inextricably  connected,  and  every  passive  form  casts  a  voracious 
shadow.  Following  Kate  Millett,  it  can  be  argued  that  the  latter 
-259-element  in this construction comes  to the fore  when  feminist struggles 
directly challenge the social  order. 
Underlying  both  the  discourse  of  feminine  sexual  disinterest  and 
romantic  love  lies  a  discourse  rather  than  a  reality  - of  a 
potentially chaotic  feminine  sexuality,  in which  penetration is an act 
fraught  with  danger.  While  the  behavioural  content  of  this 
Virgin/Whore  dichotomy has changed considerably this century,  its form 
remains  the  same  - discipline  threatened  by  autonomy-as-chaos.  On  the 
level  of  body-concept  this dichotomy is expressed in the perception of 
the  inside  of  the  female  body  simultaneously  as  empty,  open  and 
penetrable space,  and as dark,  dangerous and engulfing energy. 
The  feminine  object-body,  then,  has  dangerous  qualities  - it is  not 
wholly  passive.  This  is especially relevant  to the  current  discussion 
- how the  object is presented.  Eleanor Stephens is among  many  who  have 
written  on  female  passivity,  arguing that  women  "have  been  brought  up 
to  play  a  passive  role,  and,  like Sleeping Beauty,  wait  patiently for 
:Mr.  Right  to  turn  the  key  to  our  hearts  and  sexuality".  <Stephens, 
1976)  While  this is undoubtedly the case,  the construction of  women  as 
passive  objects  is only  one  side  of  the  story.  Looking  at  strategies 
of  control  does  not  make  sense  unless  we  also  look  at  what  they are 
supposed  to  control.  There  is  a  hint  of  this  in the  presentation  of 
women  as  the  stimulus  or  precipitator  of  rape,  as  an  indirect  and 
insidious  power/danger.  But  in  representations  of  sexuality,  and 
especially  though  not  exclusively  in  pornography  <Coward,  1982)  we 
find  the  most  direct  articulation  of  the  hidden  female  bodily  power 
-260-which  ideologies  of  passivity  and  practices  of  objectification exist 
to control. 
-261-Kate  Millett  argues  that  the  misogynst  representations  of  feminine 
desire  which  she  identifies in the  work  of  Miller,  Mailer  and  Lawrence 
formed  part  of  a  "counter-revolution"  to the  feminism of  the  late 19th 
and early 20th centuries.  <Millett,  1977)  Her  argument  here is in many 
ways  similar  to  Barker-Benfield's  analysis  of  the  birth  of 
gynaecological  surgery  in  the  late  19th  century,  and  has  areas  of 
agreement  with  the  feminist  analyses  of  the  new  reproductive 
technologies  and  sexual  violence  discussed above.  What  Barker-Benfield 
and  Petchesky  argue  about  medical  penetration  of  the  dark interior of 
woman  is  essentially  what  Millett  argues  about  sexual  penetration: 
that  :masculine  penetration  of  the  feminine  interior  is understood  as 
conquest. 
Barker-Benfield  and  Millett,  further,  share  in  common  the  argument 
that  this  penetration  responds  to  a  specific  feminist  threat  to  the 
patriarchal  social  order,  and  is  justified  through  a  definition  of 
women  as potentially sexually voracious.  Further,  both argue that such 
penetration  is  understood  as  an  act  fraught  with  danger:  a  heroic 
journey into the  unknown. 
Cora  Kaplan  questions  :Millett 
1 s  historical  periodization;  she  argues 
that  Millett 
1 s  "dating  of  the  disappearance  of  overt  misogyny  is 
fuzzy"  and asks  "Did it ever disappear?".  <Kaplan,  1986:  20)  She  goes 
on  to  suggest  that  Millett  oversimplifies  not  only  in  her  timing  of 
revolution  and  counter-revolution  but  also  in  her  too  close 
identification of  "author,  protagonist  and  point  of  view"  and her  lack 
of  acknowledgement  of  textual  ambiguities.  All  of  this allows  Millett 
-262-to  suggest  that  the  sexual  representations  in her  chosen texts  form  a 
conscious  and  conspiratorial  response  to  feminism.  <ibid.:  24;  29) 
Thus,  Kaplan  argues,  Millett  posits  mechanical  and  determinist 
relationships between politics and  ideology,  ideology and literature. 
Much  of  Kaplan's  critic  ism  is  justified.  It  would  be  crude  and 
simplistic  to  argue  that  their  male  characters  can  be  read  as  direct 
expressions  of  these  writers  politics  or  behaviour,  or  that  such 
representations form a  conscious anti-feminist conspiracy.  Further,  it 
is  somewhat  problematic  to  argue  that  perceptions  of  feminine  sexual 
danger  and  feminine  sexual  passivity can  slot  in and  out  of  history 
as  simple  alternatives,  since  such  perceptions  are  conceptually 
interdependent.  Millett's  position  on  these  points  is ambiguous,  and 
her  use  of  the  literary  evidence  is  somewhat  mechanical  at  times. 
However,  she  does  also  argue  that  the  sexual  representations  under 
discussion  should  be  seen  as  "power  fantasy"  rather  than  simple 
reflections  of  actual  behaviour;  she  describes  them,  indeed,  as 
"illusory".  <Millett,  1977:  21) 
Millett's  analysis,  then,  is  better  viewed  as  a  discussion  of  one 
possible  "resolution"  of,  rather than iha patriarchal reaction to,  the 
tensions  and  upheavals  feminist  struggles  cause  in  a  patriarchal 
society.  While  it is simplistic to suggest that misogyny  "appears"  and 
"disappears"  from  culture  we  can  argue  that  the  usually  covert 
perception of  feminine  sexuality as dangerous is more  directly evident 
at  times  when  feminism  seeks  to  challenge  women's  social 
powerlessness,  and  that  literature  is  one  place  where  we  might  look 
-263-for  such  evidence.  With  these  reservations  in  mind,  then,  :M:illett• s 
analysis  can  be  used  to  illuminate  the  social  meanings  of  feminine 
sexuality  and  the  feminine  body,  especially  in  showing  us  how  the 
virgin/whore  dichotomy resonates  on the  level  of  the  body. 
Before  returning  to  Millett,  however,  it  is  worth  exploring  in  more 
depth  the argument  that the  virgin/whore  dichotomy,  usually associated 
with  specifically  Victorian  values,  is  still  central  in  the 
construction  and  control  of  feminine  sexuality  in  contemporary 
society. 
-264-Nice  girls do:  a  sexual  revolution ? 
Lucy  Blarui  argues  that  since  the  last  century  there  have  been 
significant  changes  in  the  categories  through  which  female  sexuality 
is understood: 
"By  the  late  1960s,  with  its  so-called  sexual  revolution 
pre-marital  sex  <lesbianism  was  still  taboo)  was  more 
possible,  more  legitimate  for  young  women  and  girls.  As 
Vanity Fair put it in 19'71:  'Nice girls do.'" 
<Bland,  1981:  62) 
Bland,  like  Barker-Benfield,  argues  that  the  19th  century  ideal  of 
"asexual"  womanhood  "co-existed  with  other  representations,  giving  a 
highly  contradictory  construction  of  female  sexuality".  (ibid.:  5'7-8) 
She  argues  that  "the  central  polar!  ty  virgin/whore",  through  which 
female  sexuality  was  understood,  changed in focus  in the  19th century, 
suggesting  that  the  polarity  previously  seen  as  innate  in  all. women 
was  then  used to  distinguish the pure,  asexual  bourgeois wife  and "the 
impure  whore",  with  the  latter  being  "the  repository  of  those 
unacceptable  desires  and  sexual  behaviour  whose  displacement  kept  the 
virtuous  woman  and the  home  she  inhabited pure  and  unsullied".  (ibid. : 
59) 
It  would  be  more  accurate,  however,  to  see  the  virgin/whore 
distinction  as  a  differentiation  between  women  as  an  addition  to, 
rather  than  a  replacement  of,  the  idea  of  the virgin and  the  whore  in 
perpetual  conflict  for  the  possession  of  each  female  body.  Women's 
greater  moral  and  sexual  purity was  posited in spite of  their greater 
"animality",  or  domination  by  their  reproductive  capacities.  Women 
-265-were  thought  to  be  continually  under  the  threat  of  a  complete 
reproductive  "take-over",  but  were  simultaneously  held  to  be 
passionless  creatures  by  nature.  <ibid.:  58;  Ehrenreich  &  English, 
1979:  108)  What  Barker-Benfield's  work  shows,  however,  is  that 
feminine  animality could  mean  not  only domination by the  womb  but  also 
referred,  in  a  more  covert  fashion,  to  a  potentially  insatiable 
feminine  sexuality  which  underlay  even  the  bourgeois  woman's  sexless 
state. 
Bland argues that the sexual  revolution must  be  seen in the context  of 
the  Victorian  Virgin/Whore  dichotomy.  What  changed  is  content  rather 
than  form  - to  the  "new-style  virgin/whore  dichotomy ... Cof)  the 
monogamous  woman  versus  the  promiscuous".  <Bland,  1981:  62) 
Contemporary  ideas  about  feminine  sexuality  express  the  same 
polarities  of  discipline/chaos,  integrity/openess,  subject/object, 
since  female  sexuality is still created as heterosexual,  dependant  and 
responsive. 
Bland  argues  that  monogamy/responsibility  is  understood  as  the 
opposite  to  promiscuity  in  "a  reconstructed  double  standard  around 
promiscuity".  (ibid.:  62)  The  monogamous  one-man  woman  must  be 
sexually  responsible  - that  is,  faithful  - in  controlling  fertility 
and  the  "health"  risks of  non-monogamous  sex.  Here,  Bland  argues,  the 
"cleanliness/filth"  polarity central  to the  distinction  of  virgin  and 
whore  is  expressed  in  medicalised  terms.  (ibid.:  63)  Discussing  the 
"Yorkshire  Ripper"  she  points  out  that  he  used  the  polarity  very 
directly,  describing  the  prostitutes  who  were  his  main  victims  as 
-266-"scum"  and  "mucky  women";  further,  she  argues that his distinction of 
innocent  and  guilty  victims  went  more  or  less  unquestioned,  showing 
that: 
"the  motive  for  killing  prostitutes  was  self-
explanatory ... it  was  only  the  killing  of  'innocent'  women 
which  presented a  comprehension problem." 
(ibid. :64;  see  also  Warde-Jouve,  1986;  Hallway,  1981; 
Caputi,  1988) 
The  virgin/whore  dichotomy  is  still  central  to  the  construction  of 
feminine  sexuality.  Sue  ~  has  explored  its  effect  on  girls' 
behaviour.  <Lees,  1986)  She  argues that the term "slag"  is significant 
in  the  control  of  girls'  sexuality  and  behaviour;  a  "slag"  is a  girl 
who  is sexually  promiscuous,  who  sleeps with boys  she  does  not  "love", 
for: 
active  female  sexuality "is rendered safe only when  confined 
to the  bonds  of  marriage  and  wrapped in the aura of  'love'." 
(ibid.:  28) 
The  only  sure  protection  against  this  stigmatization  is to  have,  or 
quickly  get,  a  "steady"  boyfriend  Cibid.  36);  that  is,  to  validate 
<possible)  sexual  activity  by  becoming  exclusive  sexual  property. 
Girls  cannot  themselves  initiate  sex,  but  are  responsible  for  boys' 
sexual  behaviour.  (ibid.:  164)  If a  girl  is known  to  have  slept  with 
"too  many"  boys,  her  property  value  falls:  she  becomes  "second-hand", 
(ibid.:  46)  probably  sexually  voracious  (ibid.  46-8)  and  definitely 
indiscriminate;  she  is  a  girl  who  will  "go  with  anyone  anywhere". 
(ibid.:  150) 
The  term  slag,  however,  often  bears  little  or  no  relation  to  actual 
sexual  behaviour,  and  is  used  to  constrain  girls'  actions  in  non-
-267-sexual  situations too;  its "vacuousness and ambiguity"  allows the term 
to  be  used  as  a  general  mechanism  of  control.  (ibid.:  25;  34;  138-9) 
It  is  a  sanction  which,  furthermore,  operates  indirectly,  as  self-
control;  Lees argues: 
"'Slag'  is present  as sexual  censure  even  when  boys  are  out 
of  sight  and  out  of  mind.  Such  is  the  power  of  male 
dominance  that its exercise is not  dependant  on the presence 
of  the  oppressor ...  !  am  reminded  of  the  concept  of  power  as 
1 self-carried' ,  which  has  been  elaborated  by  Foucault,  a 
power  of  male  dominance  which  is  not 
1 exercised'  by  boys 
over  girls,  but  which  girls  carry  with  them  and  which 
penetrates their lives and their recreations."  <ibid.:  82) 
Although girls must  avoid being stigmatised as slags,  they must  not  go 
too  far  in  the  opposite  direction  and  be  labelled  "tight",  that  is, 
"unapproachable,  sexually  cold  - a  tight  bitch".  <ibid.:  37)  Lees 
quotes "Pat": 
" ' It's  a  vicious  circle.  If  you  don't  like  them,  then 
they'll  call  you  a  tight  bitch.  If you  go  with  them they'll 
call  you  a  slag afterwards.'" 
(ibid. :  37) 
Lees  concludes  that  in spite  of  an  increase  in pre-marital  sex,  "the 
double  standard  of  sexual  morality  is  just  as  strong  today".  (ibid. 
167)  Bland  argues  that  the  distinction  goes  "beyond"  common-sense  to 
institutional  use  - she  cites  the  centrality  of  supposed  promiscuity 
and  "moral  danger"  in  understandings  and  treatment  of  adolescent 
girls'  "delinquency".  <Bland,  1981:  64;  see  also  Hudson,  1984)  It  is 
these  categorizations  which  also  operate  in  the  area  of  sexual 
violence.  As  Hirshon  points  out,  the  social  control  of  women  is 
exerted both externally,  through social convention,  and  internally,  as 
-268-a  moral  force  expressed  in  the  concepts  of  "shame"  and  "modesty". 
<Hirschon,  1978:  67) 
Women  are  responsible  for  sexual  control,  and  can  "precipiate"  sexual 
action  through  the  "presentation  of  herself  as  promiscuous,  as 
sexually  available"  but  are  not  themselves  independently  sexually 
active.  <Bland,  1981:  65)  Bland concludes: 
"Thus,  in  effect,  women  are  not  only  held  responsible  for 
their  own  sexual  behaviour,  the  consequences  of  that 
behaviour,  the  potential  'health  risk',  the  potential 
'dysgenic'  breeding ...  they  are  frequently  also  held 
responsible for  male sexual  behaviour." 
<ibid.:  64) 
Women  do  not  - or  ought  not  to  - instigate  sexual  activity;  women 
should  function  as  sexual  stimuli  for  masculine  action,  and  are 
responsible  for controlling access to the female  body as a  stimulating 
environment.  Dominant  representations  create  women  as  sexual  objects 
for  men.  (ibid.:  65-6)  Further,  Bland  argues  that  in  <many) 
pornographic  representations,  "women's  bodies  are  used  as  objects  of 
humiliation and  loathing",  their genitals especially being "filthy and 
polluting".  (ibid.:  66) 
Dangerous bodies 
-269-The  following  discussion  of  ideas  on  sexuality  in  general  and 
pornographic  representations  in  particular  seeks  to  make  a  number  of 
points. 
Firstly,  the  central  issue  of  sexuality  remains  an  understanding  of 
man  as  subject  and  woman  as  object.  Sexual  liberation,  as  many 
feminists  have  pointed  out,  has  not  resulted  in  sexual  autonomy  for 
women,  and  women's  bodies  remain  an environment  on  which the  masculine 
subject  acts.  The  threat  of  independent  female  sexuality  and  female 
ownership  of  the  body  are,  however,  of  central  significance  in 
representations,  especially  pornographic  representations,  of  women, 
where  they  are  represented as  voraciousness  and  promiscuity.  What  has 
changed,  I  would  argue,  is  the  response  to  the  threat  of  feminine 
"openness".  In place  of  the  19th century control through denial  of  the 
existence  of  female  sexual  desire  and  sexual  surgery  we  can  uncover 
the  control  of  voraciousness  through  a  conceptualisation  of 
penetration  as  possession,  exhaustion  and  repletion.  Instead  of 
controlled  infusions  of  sperm,  feminine  sexuality  is  contained  by 
exhausting it. 
To  return,  then,  to Kate  Millett:  what  does her work tell us about  the 
perception of the  feminine  body as housing dangerous sexual  energies ? 
:M:illett  argues  that  in  "counter-revolutionary"  literature  women,  and 
especially women's  bodies,  were  defined as "a terrible void,  a  lack,  a 
deficiency of  being  within"  which  only phallic penetration could fill. 
OHllett,  1977:  263;  24-1)  One  of  the  texts  :Millett  discusses  is 
-270-Miller's  Sexus;  she  argues  that  its feminine  character::;  are  presented 
as objects,  that Miller: 
"converts  woman  to  'cunt'  - thing,  commodity,  matter.  There 
is  no  personality  to  recognize  or  encounter ...  the  perfect 
woman  is  a  floating  metonomy,  pure  cunt,  completely 
unsullied by  human  mentality". 
(ibid.:  297;  300) 
The  perfect  woman,  however,  is the  result of  phallic action;  before it 
she  has  a  will,  however  degraded  - she  acts.  Afterwards  she  is  the 
perfect  will-less,  passive  object.  In  "Sexus"  the  hero,  "Val", 
recounts  his  conquest  and  humiliation  of  "Ida",  a  friend's  unfaithful 
wife.  Ida is a  vain,  deceitful  and souless "monster"  who: 
"'lived entirely  in  the  body,  in  her  senses,  her  desires  -
and  she  directed  the  show,  with  her  tyrannical  little 
will ... Ida  swallowed  everything  like  a  pythonness.  She  was 
heartless and insatiable.'" 
<quoted  in Millett,  1977:  4) 
The  intention  of  the  episode,  is,  however,  to  show  the  limits  of 
female  insatiability  - it  can  be  conquered:  in  sex  with  Val  Ida 
1 s 
"tyrannical  little will"  entirely disappears  and  she  is totally  under 
his control: 
"'she  was  just  like  a  bitch 
panting,  gasping,  wriggling 
<quoted,  ibid.:  3) 
in  heat,  biting 
like  a  warm  on 
me  all  over, 
the  hook. 
1
" 
Ida  aims  to  control  Val  and  fails;  Val  aims  to  humiliate  her,  to 
punish  her  far  her  "nymphomania"  and  destroy  her  will,  and  succeeds. 
Millett  argues  that  "his  penis  is  now  an  instrument  of 
chastisement ... Ida's  genitalia  are  but  the  means  of  her  humiliation". 
(ibid.:  7)  Her  will  is  destroyed  in  her  reduction  to  "paroxysms  of 
-271-sensual  ca. pi  tula.tion".  (ibid. :  8)  She  is reduced  from  human  to  animal 
status.  Since,  however,  Ida.,  as  a.  nymphomaniac,  "'lived  entirely  in 
the  body,  in  her  senses,  her  desires'"  destroying  her  will  and 
removing  her  potential  to  act  independently  merely  reduces  her  to  her 
true status.  (quoted,  ibid.:  4) 
As  Andrea.  Dworkin  points out  in  Intercourse,  the assertion of will,  or 
active  and  independent  desire  cannot  co-exist  with  the  status  of 
sexual  object,  for  "objects do  not  will,  and  want,  and search,  and are 
not  subjects  in  a  human  quest  for  love  or affection or sex".  <Dworkin, 
1987:  17-8)  Ida's  independent  will  is annihilated  in  sex  - she  wants 
only  what  he  wants  - her  dependant  desires make  her  a  helpless  object. 
Dworkin  points out  that  "the  eroticism of the  female  exists within the 
bounds  of  :male  sexual  imperatives".  <Dworkin,  1981:  34)  Crucially for 
the  present  argument,  however,  this  annihilation  of  feminine  will  is 
not  easily  accomplished;  it  depends  on  an  elaboration  of  sexual  acts 
which  are  impossible  in  reality  but  realisable  in  fantasy  the 
fantasy  of  a.  "potency ...  superb and  overwhelming"  <Dworkin,  1987:  7-8) 
In  this  fantastic  resolution  of  danger,  masculine  sexuality  is, 
Millett  argues,  "clinical",  "fastidious",  a  "self-conscious 
detachment".  (Millett,  1977:  306;  297)  She  quotes Miller's "Val": 
"'except  for  the  part  of  me  that  was  in her  I  was  cool  as  a 
cucumber  and  remote  as the  Dog  Star'". 
Cquoted,  ibid.:  297) 
He  is all self-possession;  in contrast,  she: 
-272-11  'wasn't  any  longer  a  woman  in  heat,  she  wasn't  even  a 
woman;  she  was  just a  :mass  of  indefinable contours wriggling 
and squirming like a  piece  of fresh bait'". 
<quoted,  ibid.:  297> 
Afterwards: 
11  'She  went  into  a  convulsion,  delirious  with  joy  and  pain. 
Then  her  legs  slid  off  my  shoulders  and  fell  to  the  floor 
with  a  thud.  She  lay  there  like  a  dead  one,  completely 
fucked out.'". 
<quoted,  ibid.:  306) 
Feminine  sexuality is,  when  exercised autonomously,  non-human.  Xillett 
picks  random  quotations  from  Killer's  novels  which  describe  feminine 
desire as animalistic: 
"'squealing like a  stuck pig';  'like a  crazed animal';  'like 
a  she-animal'  or 'a bright voracious animal'". 
<quoted,  ibid.':  306) 
Her  "autonomy",  then,  is  not  real:  her  sexual  energies  are  not 
exercised  by  a  fully human  subject  - they control  her rather than  her 
controlling  them.  Feminine  animal  voraciousness  and  masculine  sexual 
self-possession  exist  in  the  relationship  of  nature  to  culture:  the 
latter defines itself through the subordination of  the  former. 
Phallic  penetration  takes  the  sting  out  of  feminine  desire;  its puny 
attempts  at  autonomy  destroyed,  the  feminine  body  is returned  to  its 
true  object  status.  Feminine  genitalia  is  a  "crack",  a  "wound",  a 
"gash",  "a  slimy  hole"  - "but  really  only  emptiness,  nothingness, 
zero".  <ibid.:  307-8)  If  that  emptiness  had  properties,  if  it 
independently  desired,  its status  as  passive  penetrable  object  would 
be  in  danger.  Penetration  - in  which,  paradoxically,  the  :masculine 
body  remains entirely separate and  detached  - exhausts active feminine 
-273-desire,  showing  women  that  they  really  want  to  be  Hhat  they  really 
are:  objects which exist to be  used. 
It is in pornography,  however,  that  the exploration and  resolution at 
the  ideological  level  of  the  threat  of  the  sexually  active  woman, 
expressed  in  the  concept  of  female  sexuality  as  voracious,  appears 
most  explicitly..  The  focus  here  is  on  openings:  the  mouth/throat, 
womb,  anus  and  especially  vagina.  Penetration  is  the  central  act  of 
pornography,  functioning as action,  conquest,  humiliation,  control  and 
containment.  In  Pornography;  men  possessing  women  Andrea  Dworkin 
argues  that  the  narrative  of  resistance  then  capitulation  which 
characterizes heterosexual  pornography acts to contain a  female  threat 
by  representing  female  desire  as  ultimately  responsive  rather  than 
autonomous:  what  she  really  wants  is  what  he  wants  - "the  object  is 
allowed  to  desire  if  she  desires  to  be  an  object."  <Dworkin,  1981: 
109;  128;  205)  This  is one  way  in  which  the  danger  of  feminine  desire 
is  "resolved"  - rendered  dependant  and  responsive,  women  do  desire, 
but  their  desires  conveniently  and  unthreateningly  dovetail  with 
"masculine"  desire. 
This  "resolution",  however,  is  no  longer  seen  as  sufficient.  To  the 
issue  of  what  women  want  sexually  is added  the  question  of  how  JIJUch 
they  want.  In pornographic representations the threat  of  "nymphomania" 
is  presented  as  titillation,  flirting  with  a  danger  that  the  endless 
repetition  of  pornographic  "plots"  has  resolved  a  thousand  times 
-274-b<=:!fore.  Dworkin's  analysis  shows  that  one  penetration  is  rorely 
sufficient  - variation  and  repetition  forms  the  sexual  '  -"  crescenc  .. o  01.. 
pornography.  It  is  this  feature  of  pornography  which  Kate  Millett 
notes  - the species of  fantasy  which Steven  ¥.arcus  calls "pornotopic", 
the  "shower  of  orgasms".  (:Millett,  1977:  7)  One  orgasm is never  enough 
to  "satisfy"  - insatiability needs  "a shower  of  orgasms"  to  render it 
safe through exhaustion. 
Constructing  feminine  desire  as  the  desire  of  an  object  to  be 
possessed  is  only  half  the  resolution  which  women's  "insatiablity" 
now  requires.  To  this must  be  added  exhaustion  and  repletion,  and  the 
agents  of  exhaustion are  those  staple  ingredients  of  pornography,  the 
unnaturally  large  and  inexhaustible  penis,  and  the  repetition  of 
sexual  acts  until  both  protagonist  and  audience  can  be  certain  that 
the  woman's  desires  have  been  exhausted.  In  The  Art  of  Dominating 
~.  for  example,  we  are  offered  "intimate  details  of  a  thoroughly 
submissive  female  and  the  incredible  excesses  she  requires  for  total 
satisfaction".  <quoted in Dworkin,  1981:  160-1) 
An  example  from  Dworkin's  work  on  pornography  will  clarify  the 
argument.  She  analyses  Black  Fashion  Model  by  John  Wilson.  The 
"heroine"  of  the  book  is  Kelly,  the  richest  and  most  famous  black 
model  in America,  who  although she appears  on film as "a wanton,  lusty 
woman"  is in reality  - or  so  she  thinks  - innocent.  (ibid.:  210)  The 
plot,  such  as  it is,  hinges  on  Kelly's  abduction  and  repeated  sexual 
abuse  by  two  men  and  one  woman.  The  innocent  Kelly at first  struggles 
-275-and  protests,  but  she  is ultimately  unable  to  resist  the  pleasure  of 
forced sex: 
"Kelly is  'beginning to  go  out  of  her mind  with the  powerful 
affects  (sic)  of  cunt-licking  lust  ! ' ...  an  inner  voice  with 
masochistic  urges  is  telling  her  that  she  loves  being 
forced." 
(ibid.:  212) 
Voyeurism  and  lesbian rape  form  the  hors d'oevres;  penetration is the 
entree: 
"Robert  Gray  fingerfucks  her.  He  keeps  withdrawing.  He 
spreads  the  fluid  from  her  cunt  on  his  cock  with  his 
fingers.  He  tells  her  it  excites  her.  His  monstrous  white 
shaft  is  between  her  black  thighs.  His  fingers  pinch  her 
clitoris.  He  puts  his  finger  in  her.  Robert  Gray's  'blood-
filled  cock  would  soon  be  ramming  into her  body' ...  when  his 
cock is buried in her belly she feels as though she is being 
stretched  apart.  She  loves  it  ...  She  is hopelessly  impaled". 
(ibid. :  213) 
The  excitement  comes  from  her  continual  attempts to resist - at first 
to  resist  the  acts,  then  to  resist  enjoying  them.  Of  course,  both 
prove  impossible:  her  "hot  little  gash  seemed  to  gape  in  greedy 
desire".  Robert  Gray,  by  contrast,  remains  completely in control  - he 
can  stop  and  start at  will  and  keep  going  for  as  long  as  he  chooses, 
indeed,  until  Kelly  "finally  goes  limp ..  her  body  was  beaten  and 
bruised and satiated from the ravishment".  (ibid.:  214) 
Unsurprisingly,  however,  it  soon  becomes  clear  that  she  is  not  yet 
wholly satiated.  The  final  course is a  black man  with a  penis "too big 
for  any  natural  orifice"  (ibid.:  214).  Robert  Gray  - now  not  quite 
"monstrous"  enough,  it  would  seem  - having  dealt  with  her  vagina, 
"Bart  Kurtis"  takes over: 
-276-11  He  makes  her  suck ...  His  cock  keeps  sticking  at  the  bottom 
of  her  throat.  She  feels  lust ...  Bart  lunges viciously in her 
throat  but  she  is  sucking  with  wild  abandon.  Her  pain  is 
horrible  but  her  lust  is overwhelming." 
(ibid.:  214) 
Anal  rape  finishes Kelly's humiliation: 
11 It  is  like  a  crucifixion,  "the  nail  pounding  into 
her ...  defiling  her  asshole".  Then  she  starts to  get  excited 
and  like it  ...  Kelly  cums  and  cums  and cums." 
(ibid. :  215) 
In  her  discussion  of  Whip  Chick,  a  story  of  female  sadism,  Dworkin 
argues that "in fantasy,  the  male  can experiment  with the consequences 
as  he  imagines  them  of  loss  of  power  over  women".  (ibid.:  35) 
Experimentation  with  fear  and  danger  does  not  rely  on  the  explicit 
presentation  of  feminine  sexuality  as  openly  sadistic.  What  the 
discussion  of  Black Fashion Model  shows is that even the superficially 
innocent  one-man  woman  presents  a  threat;  all  feminine  desire  is 
dangerous  and  must  be  made  dependant,  its  active,  willed  elements 
removed  and  its  potential  exhausted.  As  Dworkin  points  out,  ~ 
Fashion  Model  is  a  profoundly  racist  text;  its "heroine",  as  a  black 
woman  in  a  white  milieu,  is  doubly  powerless  as  well  as  doubly 
sexualized.  In  spite  of  this,  her  "desire"  is  dangerous,  and  must  be 
exhausted. 
Independent  female  desire,  even  when  not  openly  sadistic  and 
castrating,  by  its very  existence still threatens the  gender  order  of 
subject  and  object,  actor  and  environment.  On  the  level  of  the  body 
insatiability  and  the  threat  of  disorder  rest  in  bodily  orifices  -
-277-hot,  gaping  and  greedy  "gashes".  Represented  as  fundamentally  open 
and  penetrable,  openness  lS  the  bodily  locus  of  weakness, 
vulnerability  and  incompletion,  the  passive  orifices  through  which 
women  are  conquered  and  possessed  by  the  active  male  - as  The  Art  of 
Dominating  women  tells  us,  "' fucked  by  a  big  dick  until  there  was 
hardly  a  hole  left'".  (ibid.:  163)  However,  the  deeper  meaning  of 
openness  and  incompletion,  seldom articulated,  is  what  makes  conquest 
to  the  point  of  exhaustion  neccessary.  Feminine  incompleteness  1s 
ambiguously  constructed  so  that  masculine  desire,  represented  by  the 
penis,  is all  that  is  needed  to  complete  it  - but  this  completion  is 
far  from  secure.  The  pornographic  fantasy  of  the  inhumanly  large  and 
inexhaustible  penis  shows  us  the  insecurity  of  masculine  conquest  and 
ownership  as  well  as  the  definition  of  feminine  bodily  openness  as 
weakness.  The  other  side  of  penetration  is,  as  Dworkin  describes,  the 
fear  of  being  engulfed  in  "the  burying,  enveloping,  suffocating, 
killing  quality  of  sex  with  a  woman"  CDworkin,  1987:  24),  in  "the 
voracious  cunts  of  pornography"  CDworkin,  19<'31:  224) 
-278-The  feminine  body;  objectification,  discipline and  chaos 
The  definitions  of  active/masculine  and  passive/feminine  operate  in  a 
dependant  opposition;  if one  changes,  both  change.  As  Dworkin  argues, 
"the first rule  of  masculinity is that  whatever  he  is,  women  are not." 
<Dworkin,  1981:  50)  Feminine  desire  must  be  contained  by 
responsiveness,  and  the  danger  of  independent,  active  and  autonomous 
feminine  desire  controlled  in  reality  by  stringent  sanctions  and 
social  disgust,  and  resolved  in  fantasy  by  annihilation  of  the  will 
and exhaustion of desire.  Women's  empty  inner space  must  be  policed in 
actuality  and  filled  up  in  fantasy.  Women's  bodily  appetites,  if not 
controlled,  threaten  chaos.  As  Dworkin  argues,  "in  the  male  sexual 
framework  the  sadistic  whore  whose  sexuality  is  murderous  and 
insatiable  ultimately  ... is  also  the  exquisite  victim,  fulfilled 
through  annihilation."  (ibid.:  176)  She  is  fulfilled;  she  wants  no 
more;  she  wants  only  what  he  chooses  to  give.  Penetration  equals 
conquest  and  possession,  but  a  conquest  and  possession  so  insecure 
that they must  be  forever  repeated. 
Feminine  desire  responds  to  something  outside  of  itself,  while 
masculine  desire  comes  from  within  and  satisfies  itself  through  the 
responsive  feminine  environment.  The  masculine  body  is  complete  in 
itself.  The  feminine  body  is empty until filled by  men.  And  emptiness 
represents both weakness  and danger. 
Women,  however,  strive  to  be  both  female  and  human.  Thus,  they  must 
act,  but  still respond.  They  must  be  independent  but  still  dependant, 
-279-active,  but  not  too  active,  passive,  but  not  too  passive,  self-
contained  but  still  open.  The  ultimate  irreconcilability  of  acting 
like  a  woman  while  thinking  oneself  an  individual  is expressed  on  the 
level  of  the  body  in  the  struggle  to  impose  an  impenetrable  cosmetic 
facade  and  an  autonomous  sexuality  - a  sexual  boundary  - on  a  body 
whose  definition  centres  on  orifices:  the  open  mouth  of  advertising, 
the  voracious  vagina  of  pornography,  the  Freudian genitalia as  wound, 
the  inner space  of Erikson's psychology. 
The  struggle  is  to  contain  the  desire  and  the  chaos  which  those 
orifices  symbolize,  to  remain  on  the  right  side  of  the  virgin/whore 
divide,  and  to  show  that self-control is possible  and  adequate.  Women 
:must  safeguard  their  bodies,  their  emotions  and  their  sexuality  as 
masculine  property,  as  caretakers  of  objects  produced  for  masculine 
consumption.  They  must  maintain  a  physical  integrity  which  the 
definition  of  their  bodies  as  open  continually  undercuts.  The  smooth 
surface  must  look  impenetrable  but  can  never  really  be  impenetrable. 
The  i:mpossi bility of  ever  really  becoming  "persons"  must  stay  hidden 
in the continual  struggle to be both person and  woman. 
As  we  saw  in  Chapters  Two  and  Three,  reconciling  individuality  and 
independence  with  femininity  and  responsiveness  in  the  "correct"  way 
is  presented  by  psychiatry,  and,  to  a  lesser  extent,  by  feminist 
therapists,  as the  ultimate  cure for  anorexia.  The  next chapter argues 
that  articulating  the  demands  of  individuality  and  femininity  is 
-280-precisely  what  the  anorexic  woman  aims  to  do  through  her  control  of 
eating  and  appetite  which  she  describes  in exactly  the  terms  used  to 
describe  feminine  sexuality  as  animalistic  and  potentially 
overwhelming.  She  does this during,  rather than after,  the illness.  In 
this  chapter  the  definition  of  the  female  body  in  bourgeois  culture 
has  been  shown  to centre around the concepts of  object,  discipline and 
~;  in  the  final  chapters  the  articulation  of  these  concepts  in 
anorexia will  be  analysed. 
-281-Chapter Seven:  The  anorexic  symptom 
Nicky  Diamond  argues  that  our  ideas  about  the  body  "are  not  simply 
references  to  properties  of  anatomy,  but  produce  a  social  phantom 
body-anatomy  which  is  structured  in  form  and  inscribed  with  magical, 
imaginary  properties".  <Diamond,  1985:  57)  Some  "imaginary properties" 
of  the  feminine  body  were  analysed  in  the  previous  chapter  which 
attempted to outline the  dominant  social  meanings which construct that 
body  in bourgeois patriarchal culture.  There  the three central axes  of 
meaning  were  explored. 
Firstly,  the  feminine  body  is  created  as  an  object  on  which  the 
masculine  subject acts,  and  which  he  owns;  women  maintain their bodies 
as  objects  through  dietary,  cosmetic  and  behavioural  practices  as 
caretakers rather than  owners.  Thus  Turner's assertion that  women  have 
a  "phenomenological  possession"  of  their  bodies  sits  uneasily  with 
women's  alienation  from  their  bodies  as  the  objects  of  masculine 
sexual  desire  and  the  site  of  personally  uncontrolled  reproduction. 
Secondly,  self-control  is,  as  we  have  seen,  an  essential  feature  of 
femininity  and  of  women's  relationship  with  their bodies:  women  watch 
what  they  eat,  how  they  dress,  talk,  sit,  walk  and  behave.  Finally, 
there is the  other side  of  the coin of self-control  - fear  and disgust 
at the appetites which  neccessitate that control:  women's potential to 
overwhelm the boundaries of femininity and restricted feminine  space. 
Diamond  goes  on  to  argue  that  the  ideas  about  the  body  "in  social 
circulation"  are actively constructed,  rather  than passively accepted: 
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production".  Ci bid.:  54)  In  this chapter  anorexia  will  be  analysed  as 
a  "site  of  image  production".  I  will  analyse  the  reproductions  and 
reworkings  of  the  concepts  of  the  body  which  take  place  in  anorexia 
through the  concepts of objectification,  discipline and chaos. 
In  anorexia  feminine  self-control  takes  on  new  dimensions.  "Weight 
watching"  becomes  the  major,  and  eventually  the  sole  activity  of  the 
anorexic  woman.  This  chapter  will  examine  the  ritualized  eating 
pattern  through  which  anorexic  self-control  is  effected,  primarily 
through analysis of  the  responses to a  questionnairre  completed  by  35 
anorexic  women.  What  will  be  argued  here  is  that  anorexic  rituals 
attempt  to  create  secure  defenses  against  appetite,  and  that  the 
ultimate  goal  is  the  construction  of  the  body  as  desireless  and 
inviolate.  Eating  nothing  - allowing  nothing  into  the  body  - is, 
therefore,  the end towards which anorexic rituals aim. 
The  enemy  of  anorexic  control is appetite.  Appetite is the chaos which 
makes  discipline  so  necessary;  appetite  is  the  danger  from  which 
ritualized eating tries to protect the self;  and appetite is the force 
which  undermines  and  makes  so  precarious  anorexic  self-control. 
Through  an  analysis  of  anorexic  women's  descriptions  of  eating  I  will 
argue  that  the  concept  of  feminine  insatiability  is  translated,  in 
anorexia,  from  sex  to  food,  and  the  characterization  of  feminine 
desire  as  non-human  intensified.  Further,  the  danger  that  feminine 
desire  will  encroach  upon  masculine  space  is expressed  internally  in 
the  anorexic  body  as  appetite  (feminine)  threatening  self 
-283-(masculine).  Thus  a  public  and  social  inter-gender conflict,  in  which 
feminine  desire  is  understood  as  threatening  patriarchal  order,  is 
transformed into a  private and  individualized intra-gender struggle. 
Here  the  central  argument  is  that  in  anorexia  the  body  and  its 
appetites  are  transformed  in  an  attempt  to  eradicate  desire.  This 
splitting process is defined  by  anorexic  women  in  a  variety  of  ways  -
either  the  body,  food,  or  the  anorexia  itself  come  to  be  seen  as 
alien.  Further,  the  distinction is one  of  oppression and  control;  the 
conscious  strategy  of  not  eating  comes  to  control  and  oppress  its 
creator.  The  sense  of  control  by  an  external  force  is  mirrored  in 
hospitalization,  where  the  anorexic  woman  becomes  the  object  of 
medical  control.  Women's  bodily  alienation  and  objectification,  then, 
are  transformed  in  anorexia  with  the  construction  of  an  absolute 
opposition  between  appetite  and  "self".  Here  the  body  is split  into 
two:  the  desiring  body,  in  which  appetite  is  lodged;  and  the 
desireless body,  which needs nothing and  wants nothing. 
In  anorexia  the  social  construction  of  the  feminine  body  through 
objectification  and  the  discipline/chaos  dichotomy  is  taken  to  its 
logical  conclusion.  Socially these  meanings are primarily expressed as 
sexual,  with  a  secondary  expression  in  dietary  self-control  versus 
"naughty"  indulgence  as  especially  meaningful  for  women.  In  anorexia 
control  and  insatiability  centre  primarily  around  food  and  eating, 
with  a  secondary  expression  in  sexuality.  This  reversal  can  best  be 
explained  as  accessibility  in  the  privatized  reworking  of  the 
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controllable.  The  sexual  body,  as an object,  is not. 
Anorexia,  however,  does  not  simply  express  and  transform  social 
meanings  - it  also  attempts  to  resolve  their  contradictions.  The 
anorexic  women  aims,  through  a  ritualized  eating  pattern,  to  create 
the  surface  of  the  feminine  body  as  an  absolute barrier and  the  body 
itself  an  an  absolute  object.  In  anorexia  the  concept  of 
receptivity/penetrability  as  weakeness  and  incompleteness  is overcome 
by  creating the  body  as a  self-contained object  which takes in nothing 
from  the  external  environment.  Food,  here,  represents  external 
intrusion:  the  aim  is  to  eliminate  it  completely  and  create  a  pure, 
empty  and static inner space  free  from contamination. 
The  anorexic  "shell",  then,  functions  in  two  senses:  to  prevent 
intrusion  and  to  contain  emptiness.  A  barrier  constructed  in  ritual 
"non-eating"  completes  feminine  incompleteness  by  allowing nothing in, 
signifying  bodily  integrity  by  the  end  of  penetrability.  Feminine 
bodily  openness,  however,  means  more  than  simple  weakness. 
Penetrability  represents  both  incompleteness  and  voraciousness,  and 
both  meanings  are  reworked  in  anorexia  in  the  split  between  the  body 
as desiring  enemy  and  desireless ally.  Hunger  in anorexia is symbolic 
of  all  desire,  and  the  insatiability of  feminine  desire  is expressed 
in  anorexia  by  the  construction  of  appetite  as  a  force  which  must  be 
eliminated  if  it  is  not  to  destroy  the  "self".  The  barrier-body  in 
anorexia  aims,  then,  at  desirelessness  and  needlessness.  Not  just 
food,  but  the  desire  for  food  is  dangerous  and  threatening:  the 
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continually  threatens  the  elimination  of  appetite  by  its  longing  to 
take  in,  to encompass. 
The  ultimate  aim  of  anorexia  is the  destruction  of  the  desiring  body 
in  which  dangerous  appetite  is  lodged,  and  its  replacement  by  the 
object-body.  The  aim  is  to  create  the  body  as  an  absolute  object  -
inviolate1  complete  and  inactive  - wholly  owned  and controlled by  the 
self.  The  irony  of  anorexia  is that  the  object-body  comes  to  control 
the  self.  As  we  shall  see,  in "second stage"  anorexia starvation as  a 
conscious  strategy  is  itself  transformed  into  an  oppressor  - the 
anorexic  woman  feels powerless to stop a  process she herself  began. 
Before  going  on  to  look  in  detail  at  the  questionnairre  responses, 
however,  it will  be  helpful  to  consider  the  theoretical  issues  they 
raise.  This  can  be  initially  approached  through  a  consideration  of 
Turner's analysis of  anorexia. 
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four  "tasks"  in relation to the  body:  the  reproduction of  populations 
through  time;  the  regulation  of  bodies  in  space;  the  restraint  of 
desire  through  disciplines;  and  the  representation  of  the  body  in 
social  space.  <Turner,  1984:  2-3;  91)  Here  illnesses,  he  argues, 
especially  those  of  subordinate  groups,  are  "cultural  indications  of 
the  problem of control"  (ibid.:  2-3).  He  argues thus: 
"since  the  government  of  the  body  is in fact  the  government 
of  sexuality,  the  problem  of  regulation  is  in  practice  the 
regulation  of  female  sexuality  by  a  system  of  patriarchal 
power." 
(ibid.:  91) 
"the  control  of  bodies  is essentially the  control  of  female 
bodies". 
(ibid.:  249) 
For  Turner,  certain  characteristic  illnesses  are  associated  with  the 
four  dimensions  of  the  social  control  of  bodies.  Women's  illnesses 
especially  are  diseases  of  dependancy:  "the  medical  problems  of 
subordinates  are  products  of  the  political  and  ideological  regulation 
of  sexuality"  Ci bid.:  92).  And  this  dependency  is  reinforced  and 
legitimated  in  treatment.  In  this system,  then,  anorexia,  as  well  as 
being  a  disorder  of  dependency  is  a  disease  of  presentation, 
associated  with  the  fourth  dimension  of  the  regulation  of  bodies. 
(ibid.:  95)  He  argues  that  in  modern  societies the  representation  of 
the  body/self  is  a  particularly  acute  issue,  since  it is  no  longer 
lodged  in  fixed  social  roles  but  is  symbolically  highly  flexible 
Cibid.:  92;  see  also  174);  anorexia thus  becomes  "an anxiety directed 
at  the  surface  of  the  body  in  a  system  organized  around  narcissistic 
consumption"  Ci bid.:  93). 
-287-As  middle-class  women  enter  public  society  in  the  twentieth  century 
female  illnesses become  increasingly presentational,  and are  "symbolic 
of  anxieties  about  the  surface  of  the  body"  (ibid.:  108).  Anorexia 
"most  dramatically  expresses  the  ambiguities  of  female  gender  in 
contemporary  Western  societies",  in  that  it  expresses  both  the 
"representational crisis"  of  the  individual  in late capitalism through 
the  modern  view  of  beauty  as  thinness  and  the  struggle  of  women 
against  dependency.  The  anorexic  woman  suffers  from  "protective 
parenting in the confines of  the privatized family".  (ibid.:113) 
Anorexia  and  bulimia  are,  then,  "two  individualized  forms  of  protest 
which  employ  the  body  as  a  medium  of  protest  against  the  consumer-
self".  Cibid.:  180)  Turner suggests that anorexia is a  struggle within 
the  middle-class  family  "where  over-protected  <girls)  seek  greater 
control  over  their  bodies  and  therefore  their  lives",  an  ascetic 
control  through subordination of the flesh which paradoxically results 
in  the  dominance  of  the  body  when  eating,  dieting.  food  and  getting 
rid  of  food  become  "all  consuming  passions".  (ibid.:  184)  Further, 
anorexia  entails  a  "contradictory"  sexual  symbolism.  The  anorexic 
woman  rejects sexuality  by  her  suppression  of  menstruation  but  at  the 
same  time  conforms  to  cultural  norms  of  female  attractiveness  in  her 
pursuit of  thinness.  (ibid. :  185) 
Refusal  to  eat  is,  then,  for  Turner  "an oppostion to parental  feeding 
which  gives  the  child  some  control  over  bodily  functions".  (ibid.: 
191)  He  argues  that  the  "anorexic"  family  is  characterized  by  the 
contradictory  demands  it  places  on  its  daughters.  While  competitive 
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the  independence  through  which  success  might  be  gained,  is  promoted. 
The  "overpowering,  dominant  mother"  brings  up  her  children  to fulfill 
her  interests  rather  than  their  own,  and  thus  inadequately  prepares 
the child for adolescensce  by stifling individuation.  (ibid.:  192) 
The  anorexic  daughter  chooses  her  illness  as  a  defence  against  this 
confusion.  On  the  one  hand,  she  "gives  in"  to  compliance  by 
suppressing  sexuality  and  maturity  through  her  suppression  of 
menstruation  and  adoption  of  "a  permanently  childlike  body  and 
attitude  to  the  mother".  On  the  other,  she  gains  a  sense  of 
independent  control  through  her  control  of  food  and  her  body  - "this 
is  her  peculiar  compelling  path  to  selfhood".  <ibid.:  193)  It  is, 
then,  the  mother's  control,  effected  through  nurturing,  which  the 
anorexic  woman  seeks  to  escape  - since  the  anorexic  family  has  a 
dominant  mother  and  a  father  who  is either weak  or absent,  it "suffers 
from matriarchal  not  patriarchal  control"  (ibid.:  196;  195) 
However,  once  she  has chosen  anorexia,  biological  processes take  over: 
"it  becomes  increasingly  difficult  to  control,  interupt  or  redirect 
the  process  of  weight  loss,  absence  of  appetite,  overactivity, 
insomnia  and  amenhorroea"  <ibid.:  193).  As  well  as this,  the  logic  of 
denial  leads to  a  "moral  spiral":  "the  anorexic  pattern of  asceticism 
requires  obligations  which  cannot  be  met  so  that  lapses  into  self-
indulgence  are  regarded  as  imperfections  which  drive  her  into further 
reinforcements of  the  regimen".  (ibid.:  194)  The  anorexic woman  chases 
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results in "the  dominance  of  nature  over culture".  (ibid.:  202) 
For  Turner,  however,  anorexia is not  wholly explicable in the familial 
context  .  He  argues  that  a  feminist  perspective  which  points  to  the 
control  of  women's  bodies  through  the  ideals  of  beauty  and  thinness 
and  their  commodi tization  is  valuable  in  that  it  locates  anorexia 
historically  and  socially  as  an  illness  which,  like  hysteria  in  the 
nineteenth  century  and  depression  in  the  twentieth,  expresses  "the 
structural  limitations"  placed  on  women  who  are  at  the  same  time, 
especially  in  the  middle-class,  expected  to  be  both  feminine  and 
"successful  in  the  public  domain".  <ibid.:  196)  Anorexia,  then, 
results  both  from  matriachy in the  family  and  patriarchy  in the  wider 
society.  <ibid.:  197-8;  see  also  200;  203)  There  is "a  contradiction 
between  the  achievment  orientation  within  the  home  and  the  public 
restraints on female  success outside".  <ibid. :  201) 
This  is  an  interesting  if  somewhat  confused  analysis  of  anorexia. 
Firstly,  it works  from  a  number  of  questionable  assumptions  about  the 
illness  itself.  Turner  appears  to  assume  that  ammenhorroea  is  one  of 
the  main  conscious  aims  of  anorexia,  and  that  it  expresses  a 
suppression of sexual  maturity.  Not  only is it unlikely,  as Wellbourne 
and  Purgold  point  out,  that  the  "pre-anorexic"  girl  knows  enough about 
biology  to  realise  that  starvation  will  stop  menstruation  before  she 
embarks  on  the  anorexic  process,  but  further,  ammenhorroea  can in fact 
-290-lead  to  the  "discovery"  of  anorexia  when  the  anorexic  woman  becomes 
concerned  about  her  lack  of  periods  and  goes  to  the  doctor. 
<Wellbourne  &  Purgold,  1984:  35-6)  Further,  Turner  posits  a  rather 
simplistic  and  biologistic  link  between  menstruation  and  sexuality; 
menstruation  is only  one  of  the  signs,  both social  and  biological,  to 
which  an  adolescent  girl  must  adjust  herself  in  attaining  adult 
feminine  sexuality. 
Turner  also  accepts  rather  unquestioningly  for  a  sociologist  the 
psychiatric  explanation  of  anorexia  as  a  "biological  take-over",  in 
which  the  body  rather  than  the  woman  maintains  the  illness.  It  is 
unfortunate  that  his  more  promising  idea  of  a  "moral  spiral"  is  not 
expanded.  He  argues,  quite  wrongly,  that  anorexia  entails  loss  of 
appetite,  and  thus  suggests  that  remaining  anorexic  is  a  not 
particularly difficult process.  The  existing literature,  as well as my 
own  material,  contradicts  both  these  assumptions.  He  thus  needs  to 
explain only  why  the  anorexic girl begins,  and not  why  she persists in 
her  illness.  This  is  one  reason  why  his explanation  of  anorexia  as  a 
disease  of  presentation  is  advanced,  since  her  anxiety  about  self-
presentation  and  the  cultural  valuation  of  feminine  thinness  provide 
ample  explanation of  why  so many  women  diet.  We  seem almost  to be  back 
again with anorexia as "dieting gone  too far". 
Even  more  alarming,  however,  is his almost  wholesale  acceptance  of the 
Bruch  theory  of  pathological  families,  which  was  criticized  above. 
Again  we  find  the  implication that  in  a  "proper"  family  - presumably 
one  with  a  dominant  father  and  a  weak  mother  ?  - the  conflicts  which 
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and  career  success  achievable.  Although  Turner  argues  that  family 
structures  are  "determined"  by  social  structure,  and  mentions  in 
passing that  the  "dominant  mother"  is herself  a  product  of  patriarchy, 
this  social  perspective  is  added-on  to  the  Bruch  thesis  rather  than 
used to criticize it. 
If  we  accept the  ideological  contradictions  between  independence  as 
individuals  and  dependence  as  women  which  produce  anorexia  as  a 
central  feature  of  women's  social  experience  in  a  patriarchal  and 
capitalist  society  we  would  expect  to  find  expressions  of  that 
contradiction both in the  family  and  in the  wider society.  As  Boskind-
Lodahl  points out: 
" ...  the  feeling of  not  having any identity is not  a  delusion 
or  a  misperception  but  a  reality  which  need  not  be  caused 
solely  by  the  stereotyped  protective  mother  but  by  other 
cultural,  social  and  psychological  pressures  as  well." 
<Boskind-Lodahl,  1976:  347) 
There  are,  then,  alternatives to attributing "achievement  orientation" 
to  the  "pathological"  family  with  its  domineering  mother  and  "public 
restraints"  - does this mean  femininity ?  - to "outside"  society. 
Turner  downgrades  the  issue  of  desire  in anorexia  by  defining it as a 
disease  of  presentation.  Of  course,  this  analysis  allows  anorexia  to 
fit very neatly into his four-point  plan;  however,  if the  plan did not 
encourage  an either/or choice  between the regulation of  desire and the 
representation  of  the  body,  anorexia  could  usefully  be  analysed  as 
expressing  both.  Turner  himself  argues  that  anorexic  women  "suppress" 
sexuality  but  also  argues,  rather  contradictorily,  that  an 
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sexual  expression  through  personal  choice.  Quite  how  anorexia  can  be 
seen to  make  the  body  "a  vehicle  of  desire"  is not  clear.  But  because 
Turner  thinks  that  anorexic  women  are  not  hungry  he  ignores  the 
continual  struggle  with  the  desire  for  food  which  is  central  in 
anorexia.  Further,  he  sidesteps  the  whole  issue  of  what  sexual 
"choice"  can really mean  for  women  in a  patriarchal culture. 
Turner  has  followed  Foucault  throughout  his analysis of  the  body,  but 
he  seems  not  to  see  the  potential  of  this  perspective  for  analysing 
the  differences  between  masculine  and  feminine  experiences  of  desire 
in  bourgeois  culture.  Foucault  argues  that  it  is  simplistic  to  see 
structures  of  power  as  suppressing  a  natural  and  inherent  sexuality; 
rather,  sexualties  are  produced  through  power/knowledge.  <Foucault, 
1979;  1980)  We  could  use  this  perspective  to  argue  that  masculine 
desire is produced as active,  feminine desire as responsive.  Thus,  for 
men  being fit for  pleasure is being fit to act;  for  women  it is being 
fit  to  be  acted  on.  Further,  such  a  perspective  could  be  used  to 
prevent  us  treating  masculine  sexuality  as  the  unanalysed  norm  from 
which  feminine  sexuality  deviates.  If  we  see  desire  as  a  socially 
created  force  rather  than  a  socially repressed  natural  appetite  then 
we  can  see  that  masculine  as  well  as feminine  sexuality,  male  as  well 
as female  bodies,  are regulated and controlled by culture. 
Presentation is vital  and anxiety producing specifically for  women,  as 
women  must  produce  desirable  bodies,  but  so  also  is the  self-control 
of  feminine  sexuality  as  responsive  rather  than  active.  Here  the 
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formal  gender-neutrality  of  the  ideology  of  inddi  vidual  ism  suggests 
that  women,  as  well  as  men,  can  be  independent,  active  and  pleasure-
seeking.  However,  this  is  undercut  for  women  by  the  ideology  of 
femininity  which  represents  women  as  dependent.  Desire,  therefore,  is 
fundamental  but  problematic  for  women,  who  must  reconcile  as  persons 
and  as  bodies  these  contradictions.  Anorexia  is  one  such  attempt  to 
reconcile  the  irreconcilable  at  the  level  of  the  body,  and  is  thus 
explicitly a  disease  of desire as well  as a  disease of  presentation. 
Turner's  general  perspective  on  the  sociology  of  the  body  can 
nevertheless  be  used  without  neccessarily  reaching,  on  anorexia  at 
least,  quite  the  same  conclusions.  It is to  such  an  analysis  that  we 
now  turn. 
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The  need  to  achieve  a  sense  of  mastery  or  control  has  been  seen, 
particularly  Hilde  Bruch  and  Marilyn  Lawrence,  as  central  to  the 
development  of  anorexia.  Bruch  locates the  need  for  control  in faulty 
upbringing,  Lawrence  in a  social structure which denies women  autonomy 
in  many  areas  of  their  lives.  We  can  now  look  at  anorexic  women's 
views  of  control,  the  ritualized  eating  pattern  through  which  the 
attempt  to  maintain  control  is  organised,  and  the  threat  of  chaos 
against  which  the  attempt  struggles,  and  which  explains,  for  anorexic 
women,  its neccessity. 
In  the  questionnairre,  I  asked  the  women  to  explain,  if  they  coUld, 
why  they  became  anorexic.  Their  explanations  were  offered tentatively 
in  the  main,  against  a  background  of  uncertainty  not  infrequently 
amounting  to  bafflement.  However,  the  need  to exert  some  control  over 
something  in  an  environment  in  which  the  woman  feels  powerless  was  a 
dominant  explanatory strand.  (1) 
The  conscious  aim  of  the  control  of  food  and  weight  is  achievement; 
through that control  mastery,  power  and success will,  it is expected, 
1  The  other  main  explanation  was  that  the  anorexia  was  her  way  of 
coping  with  "deeper"  difficulties  and  problems,  usually  seen  as 
familial;  while  not  a  direct control explanation the  two  are obviously 
related. 
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to  the  people  she  feels  are  trying  to  dominate  her.  The  question, 
then,  was  "Why  do  you  think  you  became  anorexic?": 
"Throughout  my  childhood,  I  had  done  exactly  what  was  asked 
of  me,  and  was  held  up  to  be  the  'perfect'  child.  At  about 
1'7,  there  was  conflict  about  my  future  (school,  college, 
career  etc.)  and  I  gave  in  to  parents'  wishes,  but  started 
my  own  social  life,  with  my  first  sexual  encounters,  and  at 
this time,  the dieting also began." 
<Sophie) 
"I  felt  my  younger  sister  was  the  apple  of  my  <warring) 
parents'  eye  and that  I  was  a  failure.  I  had to take  a  stand 
and control  so:mething." 
<Sheila) 
" ...  a  streak  of  perfectionism  ...  probably  family 
expectations,  fear  of  growing  up,  academic  pressures,  and 
the  need  to  do  something  well  all  played  a  part ...  Often  I 
still feel  I  somehow  have to  be  slimmer  than all  my  friends. 
This is irrational  I  know." 
<Irene) 
"an  excessive  case  of  self-discipline ...  a  need  to  control 
something  when  my  whole  future  <career,  relationships,  etc.) 
broke  down  and  a  move  away  from  home  which  coincided  with 
all this." 
<Andrea) 
"I  felt  unsafe  and  insecure  in  a  big  and  threatening 
world ...  the  anorexia  was  a  way  of  coping  and  an  escape  from 
a  world that  I  felt  I  couldn't cope  with." 
<Jane) 
"I. .. felt  that  only  being  super-slim  and  attractive  would 
warrant  my  success as a  person." 
<Barbara) 
The  cause  of  the  sense  of  powerlessness,  which  leads  to  control  is 
explained most  often as parental  control  and expectations,  but also as 
pressure  from  friends,  the  school,  the  anorexic  woman • s  own  high 
expectations of herself and "the  world"  itself. 
Feminists  <and  others)  have  argued  that  the  family  is  the  primary 
location  of  the  social  control  of  women,  the  social  institution  in 
which  patriarchal  constraints  are  transmitted  and  are  most  directly 
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argue  that  the  family  is  the  only source  of  patriarchal  control  and 
the  "cause"  of  the  oppression  of  women.  Rather,  the  family  is  one 
institution  through  which  patriarchal  social  control  operates;  the 
expectations  and  worldviews  of  friends,  school  and  the  culture  in 
general,  the  sexual  division  of  labour  and  the  institution  of 
heterosexuality all  produce  and  reproduce  the  ideology  of  femininity. 
It is perhaps  understandable,  though,  that  in an individualist culture 
explanations  of  powerlessness  should  be  sought  in  personal  and 
familial  relationships  rather  than  in  a  social  structure  which 
constrains  women's  power,  economically,  psychologically,  socially, 
sexually and politically. 
Once  a  need  for  control  has  been identified,  how  is that need acted on 
?  For  the  respondents diet is the  obvious arena of  control  for  women  ; 
the  questionnairre  responses  simply  take  it  for  granted,  and  not 
surprisingly also take thinness as a  feminine  ideal as read: 
"The  only  independence  I  could have  was  to be  independent  of 
food  and no-one  could make  me  change." 
<Anne) 
"I  became  anorexic  as  a  result  of  dieting  which  I  couldn't 
stop.  However  much  weight  I  lost  I  just wanted to lose  more. 
I  am  5'  6~"  tall,  amd  my  goal  weight  was  6  stone  <I  never 
achieved  this  weight)  I  felt  more  attractive  the  slimmer  I 
became,  and felt  more  confident and controlled.  I  felt  I  was 
displaying  supreme  self-control.  The  slimmer  I  became  the 
more  successful  in everything  I  felt." 
<Paula) 
"I  needed  to  have  something  in  my  life  which  I  was  in 
control  of ... I  felt  that  by  limiting  my  food  intake  I  was 
gaining  a  sense  of  power." 
<Frances) 
"I  feared  failure  and felt  my  life was  out  of control.  All  I 
could  control  was  my  weight.  I  think those  are  the  reasons 
but  therapy  might  lead me  to new  possibilities." 
<Patricia) 
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self-control,  and  as  well  as  expressing  the  value  of  restraint  for 
women,  in dieting the  body  is also worked  on as a  :major  element  in the 
construction  of  a  "cosmetic exterior".  The  concern with eating and  the 
body  shows  what  areas  of  their  lives  women  can  control.  Women's 
involvement  with  food  shows  the  extent  and  the  nature  of  the 
responsibilities of  the  female  role.  Ardener describes this as women's 
"petty  time-consuming  activity"  <Ardener,  1978:  16>;  part  of  the 
powerlessness  of  women  lies in their restriction to activities seen as 
trivial. 
In  the  previous  chapter  we  looked  at  the  importance  of  "beauty"  in 
femininity,  and  the  role  which  dieting  plays  in  its achievement.  But 
food  is more  generally women's  business.  As  Rhian 1ll.l.ia argues,  "from 
an  early  age  girls  are  taught  to  cook  for  and  how  to  serve  food  to 
men".  <Ellis,  1983:  165)  And  as Murcott  points out,  cooking is women's 
responsibility: 
"cooking  is  securely  anchored  as  the  responsibility  of 
women  as wives  and  mothers ...  the kitchen was  their  domain." 
CMurcott,  1983b:  181> 
It  is not,  :M:urcott  points  out,  that  men  never  cook;  as  Oakley  also 
found  in her studies of  housework  <Oakely,  1974),  men  "help"  with what 
is primarily  a  female  responsibility.  However,  "it is always  women  who 
daily,  routinely,  and  as  a  :matter  of  course  are  to  do  the  cooking". 
CMurcott,  1983c:  82) 
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issues of  male  authority";  women  cooking for  men  expresses men's  power 
over  women's  time  and  labour,  and  Ellis  quotes  a  remark  from  the 
Dobash study of  marital  violence to illuminate her  point: 
"She' 11  have  my  tea  ready  when  I  go  into  this  house,  not 
when  she  feels  like  it."  <Ellis,  1983:  166;  169;  Dobash  & 
Dobash,  1980) 
Food  is  women's  responsibility,  then,  but  women's  responsibility  as 
subordinates.  M:urcott  found  in  her  research  that  women  cook  mainly 
according  to  their  husband's  preferences  rather  than  their  own,  and 
argues  that  "their  responsbili  ty  in  this  sphere  is  tempered  with 
references  to  their  husband's,  not  their  own,  choice ... in  a  literal 
expression  of  wives'  deference  to  husband's  authority".  CMurcott, 
1983c:  79-80;  89)  Although  buying,  preparing,  cooking and serving food 
is  women's  work,  women  do  not  control  their  labour;  Murcott  argues 
that  while  women  are  responsible  for  doing  the  work  of  cooking,  "they 
are  answerable  to  the  person  in  whom  the  power  to  delegate  is 
originally vested"  (ibid.:  89) 
Food,  then,  is  one  of  the  ways  in  which,  in  Gamarnikow  and  Purvis's 
phrase,  men  are  "the  recipients  and controllers of  female  servicing". 
<Gamarnikow  & Purvis,  1983:  3;  see also  Imray  & Middleton,  1983:  23) 
For  women  cooking  is primarily  a  service  for  others,  principally  men 
and  children.  M:urcott  found  that her respondents felt that cooking for 
onself  was  not  worth  the  time  and  effort,  and  that  when  women  are 
alone  they: 
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bar  of  chocolate  or  packet  of crisps later in the evening or 
a  snack." 
<Murcott,  1983c:  84) 
A  "proper"  dinner  - a  cooked  meal  of  meat,  potatoes,  vegetables  and 
gravy  is  prepared  primarilly  for  other  people;  the  labour  it 
neccessitates  is not  worth  it for  women  alone.  Murcott  concludes  that 
"if  husbands  and  children  are  absent,  women  alone  will  not  'cook', 
indeed  many  may  not  even eat".  (ibid.:  85;  80-4)  Food  for  women,  then, 
expresses the  priority of  others'  needs  and wants rather than personal 
desire.  Cooking  is  labour  for  others;  the  dictates  of  personal  taste 
is unimportant;  and dieting is normal. 
With  this  in  mind,  the  "choice"  of  anorexic  women  to seek control  of 
themselves  through  control  of  their  eating  is  perhaps  as  obvious  to 
the  reader as it is to  them.  Once  diet has been "chosen"  as the way  to 
achieve  mastery  and  success,  a  complex set of rituals around  food  and 
eating  specifically,  and  the  body  and  its environment  generally,  are 
developed. 
Mary  Douglas  defines  ritual  as  "an  attempt  to  create  and  maintain  a 
particular  culture,  a  particular  set  of  assumptions  by  which 
experience  is  controlled"  <Douglas,  1966:  128)  Ritual  frames 
experience;  "the  marked-off  time  or  place  alerts  a  special  kind  of 
expectancy ...  framing  and  boxing  limit  experience,  shut  in  desired 
themes  or shut out  intruding ones".  (ibid.:  63) 
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differentiated  from  modern  ritual  acts  not  on  grounds  of 
sophistication  or  the  "real"  knowledge  of  scientific  truth,  but 
because  primitive  societies  possess  and  express  a  unified  culture, 
while  modern  cultures  are  fragmented.  (ibid.:  2;  35;  68-9)  In 
primitive  cultures  "the  same  set  of  ever  more  powerful  symbols"  is 
used  in every context;  what  is included and  excluded,  what  is seen  as 
dangerous  or  polluting  is  the  same  for  the  whole  society.  In  modern 
societies,  experience  is  fragmented,  rituals  express  different 
inclusions  and  exclusions  and  create  "a  lot  of  1 i ttle  sub-worlds, 
unrelated".  (ibid.:  69) 
:Modern  justification  for  purification,  or  dirt  avoidance  rituals  as 
caused  by  "hygiene"  is  often,  Douglas  argues,  based  on  "fantasy" 
(ibid.:  69);  the  fundamentals  of  modern  cleanliness  rituals  were 
established  before bacteriology.  Douglas  argues thus: 
"if we ...  abstract pathogenicity and  hygiene  from our notions 
of  dirt,  we  are  left  with  the  old  definition  of  dirt  as 
matter  out  of  place ...  where  there  is dirt  there  is system. 
Dirt  is  the  by-product  of  a  systemmatic  ordering  and 
classification  of  matter,  in  so  far  as  ordering  involves 
rejecting  innappropriate  elements.  This  idea  of  dirt  takes 
us straight into the field of  symbolism". 
(ibid.:  35) 
Dirt,  then,  represents  disorder,  matter  out  of  place;  its elimination 
is  thus  "a  positive  effort  to  organise  the  environment"  in  order  to 
conform to  the  dominant  categorizations of  experience;  "our  pollution 
behaviour  is the  reaction which  condemns  any  object  or  idea  likely  to 
confuse  or  contradict  cherished  classifications".  Ci bid.:  36)  Ritual, 
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Pollution dangers strike when  form has been attacked.".  (ibid.:  104) 
This  understanding  of ritual  can fruitfully be  used in the analysis of 
anorexia.  Three  features  of  Douglas'  thesis  are  especially  relevant: 
ritual,  she  suggests,  frames  and  controls  experience  through  the 
inclusion  of  what  is  safe  and  valued  and  the  exclusion  of  what  is 
dangerous  or  polluting;  it  does  this  by  defining  as 
polluting/dangerous  that  which  crosses  the  lines  between  order  and 
disorder;  and  in  modern  societies  rituals  express  the  fragmented 
experience  of  discrete  social  groups.  In  anorexia,  the  ritual 
practices  with  which  women  surround  the  act  of  eating  function  to 
allow  into  the  body/system  "safe"  food  and  exclude  "dangerous"  food. 
The  restricted  list  of  allowed  food,  the  control  of  time,  place  and 
manner  of  eating  impose  order  on  a  threatened chaos  of appetite  which 
is most  directly present  in the act of eating. 
Douglas  argues  that  "transitional  states"  are  dangerous  because 
transition  is  "neither  one  state  nor  the  next,  it  is  indefinable". 
Cibid.:  96)  Eating  in anorexia  is precisely such  a  transitional state 
- between,  on  the  one  hand,  emptiness  and  purity  and,  on  the  other, 
fullness  and  shame,  between  the  denial  of  appetite  and  surrender  to 
it.  The  order  which  anorexic  rituals  impose  on  each  act  of  eating is 
an  attempt  to  control  the  formlessness  of  appetite.  Now,  while  it 
would  be  wholly  innacurate  to  define  "normal"  or  non-anorexic  eating 
as "unritualized",  it is clear that anorexic eating is ritualized in a 
profoundly  different  fashion  than  the  norm.  While  "non-anorexic" 
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- we  do  not  eat  only  when  we  are  hungry  nor  consume  exactly  what  we 
want  - it does  all  ow  for  some  "responsive"  eating  - snacks  or  eating 
between meals.  Non-anorexic  eating is disciplined,  for  example,  by  the 
structure of  the  working  day,  but it also allows some  flexibility.  For 
the  non-anorexic  the  world  will  not  come  to  an  end  by  eating  between 
meals,  or  by  eating something  new  or  unusual.  For  the  anorexic  woman 
all  eating  is  dangerous  and  transitional,  and  ri  tualization  is  an 
attempt  to  make  it progressively  safer  by  divesting  it  as  far  as 
possible  of  sponteneity  and  response  to  desire.  It  is,  in  fact, 
appetite or  the  desire  for  food  which,  by  virtue  of  its formlessness, 
is dangerous.  The  anorexic  woman  fears  that  once  she starts to eat she 
will  be  unable  to stop.  The  daily plan  of  eating the  same  food  in the 
same  place  at  the  same  time  in  the  same  way  reduces  the  possibility 
that the chaos of appetite will disturb her  order. 
If  it  were  simply  that  all  food  was  wholly  negative  the  anorexic 
dilemma  would  be  simple  and  fatal.  Appetite,  however,  is  both 
dangerous  and pleasureable.  At  the start  of  the  anorexic  process  only 
certain  foods  are  defined  as  polluting  usually  "fattening"  or 
"forbidden"  foods.  Foods  defined  in  the  dominant  discourses  of 
nutrition  and  diet  as  allowable  and  virtuous  are  "safe"  - that  is, 
non-polluting.  The  distinction  here  is  between  food  as  fuel  and  food 
as  pleasure.  Thus  far,  anorexic categorizations follow dominant  social 
ideas about  food,  albeit  far  more  rigidly.  But  the  category  of  "safe" 
food is difficult to maintain. 
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hunger  is  too  great  to  be  wholly  contained  by  the  exclusion  of  the 
conventionally "forbidden".  Douglas  argues that  "the quest  for  purity" 
pursued  through  a  rejection  of  disorder  is paradoxical;  experience  is 
not  amenable  to "logical  categories of  non-contradiction",  it does  not 
"tidily fit into accepted categories".  She  argues that absolute purity 
in  experiential  categories  is  impossible,  and  that  we  must  either 
accept  this,  or  blind  ourselves  to  the  inadequacy  of  our  concepts  to 
totally contain experience.  (ibid.:  162;  163). 
For  the  anorexic  woman,  purity  in food  categories can  never  be  wholly 
maintained,  for  it is not  the  inherent  properties  of  the  food  itself 
which  are  dangerous,  but  her  desire  for it.  She  can  reduce  the  danger 
of  that desire  by  eliminating the  foods  she  desires most,  but  she  can 
never  totally  eliminate  the  desire  expressed  as  hunger.  As  she  eats 
from  a  more  and  more  restricted  list  of  foods,  appetite  attaches 
itself to  originally  less dangerous  foods  which  themselves  must  then 
be  eliminated.  The  aim is to reduce  the  danger  by cutting out more  and 
more  foods;  the  "dangerous"  category,  therefore,  continually expands 
while  the  safe  category  contracts.  Ultimately  the  aim  of  anorexia  is 
to  eat  nothing  at  all,  and  the  fact  that  few  women  ever  attain this 
does  not  make  it less  of  an  ideal.  For  most  the  rituals are  far  from 
perfect;  they  lessen  the  danger  of  appetite  rather  than  abolish  it. 
Host  anorexic  women  are forced  to accept  that not  eating at all is not 
a  real  possibility:  the  aim  of  anorexia  is  not  death,  but  the 
establishment  of  complete  physical  integrity  through  the  abolition  of 
desire. 
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to  perceive  complexities  and 
11 gray"  areas,  <see  Chapter  Two  above) 
anorexic  women  do  tolerate  ambiguity.  But  this  tolerance  is  never 
comfortable.  No  matter  how  little  they  eat,  or  how  virtuous  and 
pleasure-free  their  allowed  foods, 
perpetually threatens their control. 
hunger  still  remains  and 
The  central  difference  between  anorexic  ritual  and  ritual  as  Douglas 
defines it is that the  latter is collective and public in both meaning 
and  practice,  while  the  former's  collective meaning  is hidden  and  its 
practice private. 
The  previous  chapter  suggested  that  when  patriarchal  power  is 
threatened,  female  desire  is  defined  as  dangerous  and/or  polluting. 
Indeed,  Douglas  notes this,  arguing that when  patriarchy is secure,  it 
is maintained  by  sanctions rather than pollution rules.  When  dominance 
is  threatened,  the  sense  of  its  precariousness  is  expressed  through 
definitions  of  danger  and  pollution.  She  argues  that  this  "Delilah 
complex"  - the  idea that  women  and  female  sexuality weaken  and  betray 
men/society  - occurs  in  cultures  where  women  do  have  the  power  to 
weaken  men,  in  the culture "at  war  with  itself".  <ibid.:  140-154)  It 
was  suggested  in  the  previous  chapter  that  the 
11Delilah  complex"  is 
currently a  dominant  strand in sexual  politics. 
For  the  anorexic  woman  dangerous  sexuality  and  its  potential  to 
overwhelm  is  transformed  into  desire  for  food,  an  arena  in  which 
control  and  containment  is,  as  we  have  pointed  out,  both  accessible 
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danger  of  feminine  desire  is  socially  created  and  maintained  in 
ideology  the  anorexic  woman  maintains  her  transformed  definition  of 
danger  alone.  Collective  danger  is  not  counteracted  by  collective 
ritual  in  anorexia;  rather,  collective  danger  is  counteracted  by 
individual  practice.  This  is  why  Douglas'  argument  that  formlessness 
is  seen  both  as  dangerous  and  potentially  creative  of  new  order 
Cibid.:  94-5)  is not  applicable  in anorexic  ritual,  where  the  danger 
of  formlessness  and  the  protective  order  of  ritual  occur  in  the  one 
body. 
In anorexia the threat of formlessness,  or a  chaos  of  appetite,  is not 
a  threat  to  the  self  from  "outside",  but  operates  within  the  self, 
where  its  social  power  appears  as  individual.  It  is  the  anorexic 
woman's  integrity  which  desire  will  destroy,  since  that  integrity 
rests  on  the  absence  of  desire.  Operating  against  social  definitions 
of  the  feminine  body  as  incomplete,  this  construction  is  inherently 
precarious.  The  struggle  between  feminine  desire  and  patriarchal 
order,  carried  on  internally,  represents  only  danger,  devoid  of 
creative potential. 
The  anorexic  system is a  system at war  with itself.  The  struggle takes 
place  inside  one  body  which represents both  order and chaos.  In social 
ritual,  the  fear  of  dangerous  impurities  entering  the  social  system 
express  a  fear  of  danger  from  without  Cibid.:  121-2);  in  anorexic 
ritual  the  impurity,  as appetite,  is internal  and  can  only partially 
be  externalised as food  in order that it can be  resisted.  Mary  Douglas 
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represent  the  categorical  limits  of  any  set  of  relations,  and  its 
orifices  indicate  "its  especially  vulnerable  points".  <ibid.:  115; 
121)  In  anorexic  ritual  the  woman  is trying to construct  and  maintain 
a  bounded  system  through  the  exclusion  of  appetite,  defined  as 
dangerous  and  polluting and  partially externalized as  food.  The  mouth 
is  where  danger  can  get  in,  and  the  "bloated"  stomach  is  where  the 
pollution  is  evident  to  the  anorexic  woman  and,  she  believes,  to 
others.  But  because  what  is polluting  comes  from  within,  resisting it 
is both difficult and contradictory. 
Douglas  argues  that  in  small  persecuted  minority  groups  "social 
conditions  lend  themselves  to  beliefs  which  symbolize  the  body  as  an 
imperfect  container  which  can  only  be  made  perfect  if it can  be  made 
impermeable".  Cibid.:  158)  This  is  precisely  what  anorexic  women  are 
trying to  do,  but  since appetite continually undercuts the  impermeable 
body,  this strategy cannot  succeed. 
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All  the  respondants  had  a  list of  specific  food  and  drinks,  sometimes 
as  small  as  one-item,  that  they  would  allow  themselves  to  eat.  <See 
also  Wellbourne  &  Purgold,  1984:  3)  Further,  they  also  have  a 
prohibited  list  - foods  and  drinks  they  would  rarely,  ideally  never, 
eat.  The  categories  for  the  most  part  fall  into  line  with  what  is 
currently  considered  nutritionally  good/healthy/wholesome  - ie  fruit 
and  vegetables,  bran,  wholemeal  bread,  yoghurt  and 
bad/unhealthy/"empty"  of  nutritional  value  - cakes,  sweets,  fried 
foods,  fats,  fizzy  drinks,  sugar.  As  well  as  the  discourse  of 
nutrition,  or  food  as  duty,  the  discourse  of  diet,  or  "slimming" 
foods,  is  important  in  anorexic  categorizations  - diet  coke,  low-fat 
cheeses,  krispbreads,  slim  soups,  skimmed  milk,  Outline  and  that 
staple  of  all  diets,  black  coffee,  all  figure  prominantly.  Although 
reliant  on  wider  social  categorizations  of  food,  anorexic  catgegories 
are  both  much  more  rigid,  and  subject  to  erratic  transformations. 
<Palmer,  1980:  74) 
Cultural  rules  and  meanings  are  transformed  in  anorexia,  and  to 
understand  the  transformations  we  must  first  take  a  brief  look at the 
dominant  cultural  meanings  of  food.  Anne  Murcott  argues that practices 
and  ideas about  food  should  be  seen as "part and parcel  of  the culture 
and  structure  of  the  societies  in  which  they  occur".  <Murcott,  1983a: 
1)  She  argues  that  cooking  and  serving  food  refers  to  social 
relationships,  and  cites  the  priority  of  men  in  food  distribution as 
an  example.  Food  and  eating,  too,  have  symbolic  significance as  well 
as  a  material  and  social  organization.  Ci bid. :  2-4)  She  identifies 
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"right"  food  for  the  "right"  occasion  "conveys  a  message  that  the 
proprieties are  being observed".  Cibid.:  2) 
Paul  Atkinson,  too,  identifies  food  as  a  "code"  in·  which  "cultural 
oppostions,  puzzles  and  paradoxes  may  be  expressed,  and  may  achieve  a 
symbolic  resolution".  <Atkinson,  1983:  10)  Food  and  ideas  about  food 
convey  meanings  - including  virtue,  propriety  and  nature  - and  in 
eating  we  ingest  symbolically  as  well  as  concretely,  taking  in  the 
qualities  seen  to  reside  in  the  food  as  well  as  the  food  itself. 
(ibid.:  10;  see  also  Twigg,  1983:  26)  Atkinson  analyses  "health 
foods"  to  explore  the  meanings  encapsulated  in their  imagery,  finding 
that  "naturalness"  is central,  He  argues  that  the  main characteristic 
of  health food  is that it is seen as natural  as  opposed to artificial, 
simple  as  opposed  to  adulterated  - pure  and  whole.  Health  food  is 
healthy  because  it is natural.  <Atkinson,  1983:  12-4)  Atkinson argues 
that  this  imagery  is  part  of  a  wider  ideological  strand  which 
contrasts modern  urban society with a  more  "natural"  past  - the  "urban 
pastoral  dream"  of  a  past  era  in  which  self-sufficiency,  personal 
autonomy  and  control  were  possible  in  a  less  complicated  way  of 
living.  <ibid.:  15) 
Through  the  expression  of  "health"  and  "virtue"  in the  "natural",  our 
culture  expresses  an  oppostion  of  nature  and  culture,  here  through 
food.  (ibid.:  12)  As  Twigg  points  out,  raw  food  "in its freshness  and 
newness ...  stands  for  an  uncorrupted  reality  prior  to  the  distortions 
and  evasions  of  civilisation".  CTwigg,  1983:  29)  Eating  health  food, 
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and  the  urban  reality.  Eating  health  food  equals  eating  nature, 
simplicity,  wholeness  and  purity,  and  gives  the  sense  of  personal 
control  which  is  central  to  all  body-maintenance  strategies.  We 
express  cultural  disatisfactions  by  the  rejection  of  "artificial" 
food,  and  resolve  the  disatisfaction  by  eating  "natural"  food. 
<Atkinson,  1983:  14-7) 
What  is  healthy  about  health  food  is  far  more,  then,  than  mere 
"nutritional"  value.  In  the  nature/culture  opposition  nature  is seen 
as  virtuous,  and  eating  natural  food  is  "a  morally  desirable  act". 
(ibid.:  16)  Eating  nature  means  eating  virtue  and  moral  superiority. 
Eating the  unnatural  can mean  decadent self-indulgence. 
Eating  as  self-control  versus  eating  as  indulgence  is  a  central 
opposition  in  anorexia.  One  strand of  anorexic  food  categorization is 
precisely in line with what  Atkinson identifies - food as either "good 
for  you"  or  "bad  for  you"  as  defined  by  its  degree  of  healthiness. 
Anorexic  "safe"  food  is  often  health  food,  but  these  wider  social 
categories are  not  simply adopted wholesale  by  anorexic  women.  Not  all 
healthy  food  is  safe:  Atkinson  argues  that  milk  and  honey  are 
"classic"  natural  foods,  conveying  purity  <ibid.:  11),  but  whole  milk 
is  commonly  excluded  in  anorexia  as  "fattening".  Eating  health  foods 
in anorexia is the translation of  a  positive value  - taking in nature, 
health,  purity  and  virtue  - into  a  negative  value  - not  taking  in 
pleasure.  Here  the adulteration of  food  which is not natural  lies more 
in its attempt  to make  food  more  exciting and pleasureable than in the 
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avoid. 
Food  in  anorexia  is  separated  into  two  strictly separate  categories. 
"Safe"  food,  which  is  nutritionally  valued,  low  calorie,  and  not 
"fattening",  is  sanctioned  as  either  doing  the  body  good  ("health" 
foods)  or  at  least  not  causing  any  harm  ("diet"  foods).  "Dangerous" 
food,  food  which  is  off  the  list,  is  dangerous  because  it  is  food 
consumed  only  for  pleasure.  Because  its  only  value  is  pleasure,  it 
does all harm and  no  good.  The  aim is to eat  food as fuel: 
"I  wanted foods  that were  light and didn't fill  me  up." 
<Jane) 
"They  <allowed  foods)  are  crispy  and  tasty,  but  light,  and 
do  not  :make  me  feel  heavy and full." 
<Sophie) 
Here  Dally and ~·s  distinction of  hunger  and appetite is relevant. 
Dally  and  Gomez  define  hunger  as  a  physical  response  to  a  disparity 
between  food  intake  and  energy  output,  and  argue  that  hunger  develops 
"when  physiological  changes  in  the  body  signal  that  more  fuel  is 
needed ... (it  is)  basically  concerned  with  energy  balance".  <Dally  & 
Gomez,  1980:  14)  Appetite,  along  with  habit,  determines  choice  and 
pleasure  in food;  it "dictates what  food  we  fancy  or reject ...  appetite 
anticipates  pleasure  - from  the  meal  or  from  the  next  mouthful". 
(ibid.:  13)  Hunger  is a  physical,  appetite  a  mental  force.  (ibid.:  14) 
Hunger  is  concerned  with  nutritional  requirements,  but  in  appetite 
food  is  imbued  with  symbolic  powers  and  can  give  symbolic 
satisfactions: 
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and  superstition;  with  love,  power  and  prestige;  with 
happinness  and  also with misery." 
(ibid.:  14-17;  see also  Palmer,  1980:  78-9) 
It is not  only hunger  and appetite  which motivate  us to eat,  however: 
"Much  of  our eating depends  on  habit and routine quite apart 
from  whether  we  feel  hungry.  We  eat  either because  everyone 
else  is  doing  so,  or  a  meal  has  been  prepared  at  home,  or 
because  we  are  due  for  a  break  from work." 
<Dally  & Gomez,  1980:  22-3) 
Dally  and  Gomez  posit  hunger  as  primary,  appetite  and  habit  as 
secondary  - appetite  and  routine  are  built  onto  an  already  existing 
hunger  which  has to  be  satisfied  before the  secondary forces come  into 
play. 
Nicky  Diamond  is critical  of  the  idea  of  a  "natural  hunger  mechanism" 
or  "natural  appetite".  <Diamond,  1985:  46;  57)  She  argues  that  the 
social structuring of  eating  transforms physical  needs and that hunger 
is  "patterned  by  social  response",  gastric  juices  being  produced  in 
accordance  with  regular  food  intake  and the capacity of the stomach to 
take  in  food  by  regulated  amounts.  She  concludes that "the experience 
of  'hunger'  cannot  be  freed  from  meanings,  since  it is  meaning  that 
defines  the  experience  as  such."  (ibid.:  58)  Dally  and  Gomez  see  the 
desire  to eat  as  biological  with  a  social  "overlay"  which affects but 
does  not  create  it;  Diamond,  on  the  other  hand,  argues  that  hunger, 
appetite and  routine are  all socially structured. 
From  the  sociological  perspective,  and  bearing  in  mind  our  earlier 
criticisms  of  sociobiological  reasoning,  the  latter perspective  seems 
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because  it  corresponds  to  a  widely  accepted  "common-sense"  view  of 
eating  in  which  hunger  equals  "need"  and  is biological,  and  appetite 
equals  desire  and  is  social  and/or  psychological.  This  common-sense 
view is also expressed  in anorexia,  where  a  distinction between  hunger 
as  physical  need  and  appetite  as  desire  can  be  detected  in  the 
distinction  between  safe  and  dangerous  foods.  Food  which  can  be 
defined as serving nutritional  "need",  empty  of  pleasure is  Cat  first) 
allowable;  food  which  socially  or  personally  is  defined  as 
pleasureable and  "empty"  of nutritional value  must  be  eliminated. 
Although  the  specific  categorizations  are  to  an  extent  subject  to 
transformations  dependant  on  individual  biography  Ccf  Palmer,  1980: 
23;  Atkinson,  1983:  11),  there  is  a  great  deal  of  similarity  in 
anorexic  women's  allowed  lists.  I  asked  my  respondents  what  they  ate, 
and  why  they chose those particular foods: 
Fiona  eats fruit,  wholemeal  bread  and  "'Light'  philadelphia 
cheese  (in  limitation)",  black  and  decaffinated  tea  and 
coffee and  mineral  water;  "The fruit  makes  me  feel  clean and 
fresh  and  so  do  the  drinks.  The  bread  and  cheese  are 
consumed to keep  my  parents happy." 
"I  eat  more  or  less  the  same  each  day ...  two  tablespoons 
yoghurt  and  a  banana,  two  crispbreads  and  tomato,  lettuce, 
two  tablespoons cottage cheese,  an apple,  cornflakes." 
<Laura) 
" ...  even  now  as  I  recover ...  I  tend  to stick to  low  calorie 
food  and  drinks.  I  eat  bran,  oats,  vegetables.  fruits  and 
things  that  I  can  calorie  count ...  at  my  worst  I  ate  one 
Farley's  rusk  per  day  for  weeks.  As  I  declined  I  ate  All 
Bran,  cottage cheese,  meat,  fish and vegetables  .. I  know  they 
are  low  calorie  foods,  I  know  how  to  keep  charge  of  my 
weight.  It  means  that  they  take  longer  to  eat  and  make  me 
feel  full.  I  feel  better  about  eating  them  as  I  don't  feel 
guilty." 
<Anne) 
Tracy  eats  low  calorie  foods  and  drinks,  salad  and  fruit  -
"I  don • t  feel  so  threatened  by  the  prospect  of  eating  food, 
if it is low in calories." 
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pasta- "It has  nothing to  do  with  taste.  It is just  I  know 
their calorie content  and  feel  safe  with  these  foods.  There 
are  loads of  things  I  have  never tried,  I  wouldn't feel  safe 
with them  ...  they feel  1 ike  unknown  terri  tory." 
I  asked  the  women  to describe  what  they  would  eat  in a  typical  day if 
they kept to plan,  and  how  they  would  then feel: 
"Breakfast -coffee 
Lunch - 1  sachet slim soup.  1  small  apple 
Supper- 1  sachet slim soup.  1  chinese  leaf  (1  oz.) 
Evening  - 1  shape  yoghurt 
Bed  - 1  small  apple 
<Sundays:  1  slice toast for  supper  instead of  soup) 
Relieved  and  calm but  hungry ... I  stick to  a  rigid timetable 
and panic if I  am  out  and can't eat at exact times." 
<Patricia) 
Sharon  eats  two  meals  daily,  either  one  meal  of  all-bran, 
fruit  and  yoghurt  and  one  of  vegetables,  or  two  of 
vegetables- "I rarely,  if ever,  eat  what  I've not  planned." 
"1  weetabix  and  l4  pint  skimmed  milk,  1  low-fat  yoghurt  and 
apple,  5  oz.  jacket potato and  bowl  of salad. 
On  a  high." 
<Margaret) 
"I  eat  the  same  food  every  day  and  I  drink  the  same  drink, 
no  change,  except if  I  am  having  a  binge: 
Daily:  5  tins Diet  Coca  Cola 
4  apples 
2  oranges 
8  Krispbread  with shape  cheese 
3  black coffees 
Sometimes  1  bowl  of  bran with water. 
I  like these  foods  and drinks  because  they are  not fattening 
and  do  not  have  any  carbohydrate  in  them and  above  all  they 
feel  safe to me." 
<Karen) 
I  asked  what  food  the  women  rarely  or  never  ate,  and  why  this should 
be  so: 
Sarah  never  eats  full-fat  milk,  oranges,  tuna,  cheese, 
butter,  bread,  cakes  - "They  make  me  frightened  - that  I've 
done  something  wrong  eating  them  - 'forbidden'  foods  to 
mother  and  sister.  They  see  it  as  a  sin  to  eat  them  and 
instant fatness." 
Sharon  never  eats  fats,  meat,  fried  food,  carbohydrates, 
sweet  things  or  alcohol  - "I  feel  that  they're  unhealthy  <I 
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I  avoid eating them." 
Tracy  never  eats milk,  cakes  or sweets- "I feel  threatened. 
I  feel  they will  make  me  fat." 
The  allowed  foods  require  minimal  cooking  in  any,  and  very  little 
preparation.  Karen  eats cottage  cheese  and  apples  because  "I  like  the 
taste  of  cottage  cheese  and  apples plus they are  low calories and  come 
in small  sizes".  One  reason for  cooking is to enhance  the  pleasure  of 
eating;  here  food  is  the  result  of  creative  labour,  is  intended  to 
produce  pleasure  for  others,  and  expresses  women's  domestic  role. 
Pleasure  in  eating  being  precisely  what  the  anorexic  is  trying  to 
eliminate,  preparation and cooking are excluded from anorexic eating. 
I  asked  if  the  women  had  favourite  foods,  and  if they  did,  did  they 
eat  them  ? : 
Beatrice's  favourites  are  hard  cheese,  grapes  and  milky 
coffee;  grapes  are  a  "safe"  food,  coffee  sometimes 
allowable;  cheese  is  the  real  danger  - "I'm  careful  with 
hard  cheese  - eat it just  on  Friday and  Sunday  evening  when 
I'm  at  my  mother-in-law's  as if I  have  it  in  my  home  I'd 
never  be  able  to  leave  it alone  until  I'd eaten  the  lot.  I 
allows myself  a  treat on these days  and feel  'safe'." 
"Toast  and  marmalade.  Roast  meat  and  roast  potatoes.  Fruit 
crumble.  Greek  yoghurt.  Chips.  Once  a  year,  at  Christmas,  I 
have  meat.  Once  a  week  I  have  a  piece  of  toast.  The  rest  -
never." 
<Patricia) 
Even  after  women  feel  they  have  recovered  from anorexia  <in  so  far  as 
they  see  recovery  as  possible  ),  they still rigorously restrict their 
favourite  foods  strictly.  Anne  now  eats some  of  the  food she  likes but 
never  eats  deserts;  Sarah  eats  her  favourites  - egg.s,  butter  and 
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respectively.  (2) 
Food  that  gives  pleasure  is  dangerous  food;  the  aim  is to  eliminate 
the  pleasure  with  which  it  is  associated  by  eliminating  the  food 
itself: 
Alicia  never  eats  biscuits,  cake,  crisps,  alcohol,  fried 
food,  cereals  and  chocolate  - "I  have  completely  got  out  of 
the  habit  - I  cut  them  out  of  my  diet  years  ago  and  now 
refuse  them automatically.  I'm also  petrified of  eating  too 
much  carbohydrate." 
"At  first  I  wouldn't  allow myself  to enjoy  food,  but  then it 
really  did  become  sickening  and  abhorrent.  I  can't  remember 
what  I  enjoyed before  I  was  ill." 
<Jane) 
"I have  got to the point where  I  have  no  favourite  foods." 
<Zoe) 
"I'm not sure what  a  hungry  feeling is any  more." 
<Verity) 
Annette  never  eats  "milk ...  and  most  food";  "I  never  ever 
fancy  them.  I  never  seem to feel  like anything." 
The  safe  category  contracts  as  the  dangerous  category  expands;  the 
distinction  between  "hunger"  and  "appetite"  loses  its  force  as  the 
"forbidden"  expands to take in all food.  C3)  The  ultimate aim,  usually 
unfullfilled,  is to eat nothing at all: 
"Before,  I  was  pleased  (if  she  ate  to  plan)  but  must  make 
more  effort  to  eat  less  and  look  for  ways  to  cut  down  and 
this  I  did gradually by reducing meals  and then cutting them 
out  one  by  one." 
<Anne) 
I  asked  the  women  what  they  would  do  if they  could eat  nothing at all 
and yet stay healthy - would  they do  so,  and  how  would this feel  ?: 
2  For  a  discussion of recovery see  Hsu,  1980. 
3  Crisp  points  out  that  in  his  experience  carbohydrates  are 
first,  and  then  progressively  more  and  more  types  of  food. 
1970a:p467) 
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cut  out 
<Crisp, "Yes- wonderful  ! ! !" 
<Zoe) 
"Yes.  Clean." 
<Celia) 
"Yes- fantastic- so alive,  healthy  and clean." 
<Fiona) 
"Yes.  It would  have  felt  a  great relief and  freedom." 
<Jane) 
"Yes,  this  would  be  the  answer  to  my  dreams  !  I  feel  elated 
even  now  just  thinking  about  it.  I  really feel  my  body  does 
not  need  food  and  can  function  on  what  I  allow  it  ... I 
wouldn't  eat  even  if  I  didn't  put  weight  on.  There  is 
nothing  I  would  crave to eat  1 " 
<Annette) 
"I  would  love  to  abolish  food  and  eating  and  yet  stay 
healthy.  I  would  feel  in control  and not guilty." 
<Paula) 
"It  would  be  the  best  solution  to  the  problem,  no  more 
worrying  about  weight  or  calories  or  food  at  all.  When  I 
starve  myself  I  always  want  to  continue  as  long  as 
possible." 
<Barbara) 
"Yes.  I  always  look  forward  to  the  time  when  energy  can  be 
obtained  through  tablets  of  a  certain  calorie-value  thus 
avoiding  any  contact  with  food  or  cooking  and  planning 
food." 
<Andrea) 
In  reality,  the  nearest  the  anorexic  woman  can  get  to  this  ultimate 
state is to reduce  her  intake  of  food,  and consequently her weight,  to 
as  low  a  level  as  possible.  In  this closest  approximation,  she  feels 
wonderful: 
"elated  and  triumphant"  <Patricia);  "such  an  ego-
booster  ! ...  happy,  proud,  feel  successful,  feel  completely 
in  charge  of  everything"  <Frances);  "GREAT ...  thin and  clean 
at  4  stone  13  lb."  CCelia);  "elated and very triumphant ...  my 
blood  pressure  is high  which  gives  me  headaches  but  I  feel 
fine".  <Annette) 
:Most  anorexic  women  do  eat,  at  least  a  little,  and  cope  with  the 
anxiety  of  eating  in  a  variety  of  ways.  Some  get  rid of  the  food  as 
soon  as possible.  Marie  exercises after eating,  to "burn up"  the  food, 
-317-Annette  while  eating  minized  her  panic  by  working  out  how  many 
laxatives she  would  need  to  take,  and  what  was  the  best  thing to take 
them  with,  in  order  to  get  the  food  out  of  her  body,  and  Hannah 
writes: 
"Before  I  eat  <or  ate)  I  felt afraid that  I  had held out  too 
longi  while  eating  my  main  idea  was  how  I  could  get  rid  of 
the  food  in one  way  or  another  - and  this thought  filled  my 
head until  I  felt empty  again." 
Una  explains  that  while  binging  she  felt  that  she  must  keep  eating 
until  she  could  vomit i  if she  didn't  she  was  "obsessed  with  the  idea 
of the  food  being absorbed by  my  body".  Sheila writes that: 
"I  just  regurgitate  stuff  sometimes  and  spit it out  without 
chewing.  What  is  regurgitated  goes  in  fads/cycles.  At 
present it is peanuts and  'Lion'  bars." 
When  Frances  has  food  in  her  stomach  she  is  really 
frightened- "it has to be  got rid of as soon as possible." 
For  the  women  who  don't  or can't  bring  themselves  to  purge  or  vomit, 
and  in  cases  where  what  is eaten  is the  allowed  daily  minimum,  food 
that  stays  in  the  body  is  hemmed  in  and  controlled  through  a 
ritualized eating  pattern.  The  most  common  ritual  which  emerged  from 
the  survey  was  eating exactly  the  same  foods,  in the  same  amount,  in 
the  same  order  and  usually  at  the  same  time  and  in  the  same  place 
every day: 
"Every  day  I  eat  exactly the  same  food  and  exactly the  same 
amount  (I)  eat  exactly  the  same  amount  of  Krispbread  and ... 
cut the  same  amount  of cheese to put  on the  Krispbread." 
<Eve) 
"I  break  certain  shapes  of  crisp  bread  etc.  off  to  eat.  I 
arrange  my  food  <which  is the  same  every  day)  in  the  same 
way  on  the  plate,  and  eat  it in  the  same  order,  at  exactly 
the  same  time." 
<Sophie) 
"Eating  at  a  set  time,  in  the  same  place  and  exactly  the 
same  food  each day." 
-318-<Margaret) 
"My  eating  pattern  is  so  rigid  and  controlled.  I  don't 
consciously plan,  but  I  automatically eat virtually the  same 
food  each day." 
<Polly) 
Similarly,  Wellbourne  and Purgold quote  "Della": 
"Barriers  of  time  lock  in  on  you.  Clench  you  in  their  iron 
fists.  You  cannot  eat  if  it  is  not  the  right  time 
exactly." 
<Wellbourne  & Purgold,  1984:  25) 
Controlling the anxiety by "thought-rituals"  also featured: 
"I  always  keep  recalling  it  <her  plan)  to  my  mind  just  to 
check  I  haven't eaten anything  I  might  have  forgotten." 
<Lynne) 
"I  organize  my  eating as  the  day  unfolds;  counting calories 
after every  mouthful  and  giving  myself  a  calorie  intake  for 
each  day ... I  have  to  keep  a  constant  watch  on  my  eating 
during all  hours  that  I'm awake.  I'm often  too  exhausted  to 
feel  any sense  of  achievement until  the  following  day  when  I 
can look back and think:  'Yesterday was  a  'GOOD'  day.'" 
<Andrea) 
"'Staple'  foods ...  somehow  they  seem safe.  There  was  a  time  I 
would  mentally  break  down  everything  I  ate  into  the 
equivalent  'staples'  - calculating if I'd just eaten more  or 
less than if I'd had,  say,  my  usual  bowl  of  muesli,  or piece 
of bread and cheese." 
<Irene) 
The  actual  process  of  eating  is  also  ritualised;  food  is  separated 
into  tiny  and  precise  quanti ties,  eaten  in  small  mouthfuls,  chewed 
with extreme  thoroughness or timed: 
"I  cut  my  ryvi  tas  up  into  five  bits  each 
lasts  while  I  read  one  page  of  a  book. 
vegetables followed  by  fruit.  I  only eat  in 
<Beatrice) 
slice.  Each  bit 
I  then  eat  my 
bed." 
"I eat  by  the  clock - still very  much  the  same  type  of  food 
for each meal." 
<Laura) 
"I  tend  to eat  things  in exactly  <the)  same  order  and  I  do 
cut  up  bread  into  fingers.  I  have  to  have  the  same  plates, 
cup and cutlery." 
<Alicia) 
-319-"I  used  to  have  to  eat  at  set  times  and  cut  my  apple  in 
quarters,  then  take  each  piece  and  cut  paper  thin slices to 
eat as slowly as possible." 
<Carol) 
Celia  chews  every mouthful  seven times,  Yvonne  cuts her  food  into tiny 
portions  and  pushes  it  around  her  plate,  and  Sarah  eats  "tiny 
mouthfuls"  and  chews  her  food  "to an absolute pulp".  Jane writes: 
"I  would  cut  food  into  very  small  pieces,  take  very  small 
mouthfuls,  and take  a  very  long time chewing .. I  used to time 
how  long it took to eat certain things,  eg  a  pot  of  yoghurt, 
then  I  had to keep to these times." 
The  "point"  of  this  behaviour  is two-fold.  Firstly,  as  we  have  seen, 
food  for  the  anorexic  women  is dangerous,  and  its principal  meanings 
centre  around  the  chaos  and  insatiability  of  appetite.  Rituals  of 
content,  time,  place  and  method,  therefore,  impose  order  on  chaos  and 
act  to  contain  its threat.  Secondly  the  rituals  postpone  the  actual 
act  of  swallowing;  they  make  eating  unlike  "ordinary"  eating  since 
ingestion  is  allowable  only  as  part  of  a  ritualized  pattern  which 
encompasses  the  total  environment  of  the  "meal".  The  ultimate  aim  is 
not  to  swallow at all,  and  the ritualized eating pattern attempts  the 
closest  possible  approximation  to  this  goal.  Sometimes  it comes  very 
close: 
"CU  would  feel  as  if  I  was  going  to  vomit.  Sometimes  I 
would  have  to force  myself  to swallow after chewing the  food 
for  a  long time." 
CMarie) 
Anorexic  eating rituals,  then,  connect  not  only  to  the  direct  act  of 
swallowing  but  to  the  total  "food  situation",  as  Polly  and  Sharon 
explain: 
-320-"They've  <her  rituals)  varied  over  the  years  - but  they 
apply  both  to  my  surroundings  when  I  eat  <eg  clean,  warm, 
comfortable  etc.)  and  to  the  actual  food  <eg  biscuits  whole 
not  broken;  cheese  cut  into  neat  slices,  everything 
'perfect').  I  try  to  keep  these  rituals to  a  minimum,  even 
to  the  extent  of  deliberately  not  washing  my  hands 
because  they are  a  nightmare." 
11  I  do  cut  food  into  very  small  pieces.  I  always  wash  up  any 
dirty  dishes  and  pots  (used  in  preparation)  before  I've 
eaten.  Also,  I  like to drink  a  large  glass  of  diluted  fruit 
juice while  I  eat  - it can take  up to forty-five  minutes  for 
me  to  complete  eating  a  one-course  meal.  I  almost  always 
have  a  cup  of  coffee  once  I've  cleared  away  all  the 
utensils." 
Getting herself ready for the day also formed part  of  Irene's rituals: 
"I  did  have  other  'rituals'  though  - silly things  like  the 
way  I  dressed,  or  the  order  I'd do  things  when  I  got  up  in 
the  morning." 
As  we've  seen,  exercise  after  eating  figures  in  anorexia,  and  many 
anorexic  women  also  weigh  themselves  frequently,  often  daily,  and 
sometimes  more:  Paula  weighs  herself  every  two  hours,  Yvonne  twelve 
times daily. 
Although  food,  weight  and  eating  are  the  principal  areas  of  anorexic 
ritualized  control,  the  body  as  a  whole  is  treated  as  a 
11 protected 
zone".  (4)  I  asked  women  about  their feelings  about  sexuality  - which 
is  a  common  feature  of  the  literature  on  anorexia  - and  also  about 
physical  intimacy/touching  as  a  whole.  :Many,  possibly  most,  anorexic 
women  not  only  avoid  sex  but  prefer  not  to  be  touched  at  all.  The 
avoidance  of  sex  is  borne  out  by  the  literature  Cie  Hsu,  1980:  1044; 
Anderson,  1977:  14),  and also by  the responses to the  survey,  which 
4  I  am  indebted  to  Caroline  0' Toole  of  Glasgow  Anorexic  Aid  for  her 
suggestion  that  I  asked  respondants  not  simply  about  sex  but  about 
touching  and closeness as a  whole. 
-321-also  suggested  that  anorexic  women  prefer  not  to  be  touched  at  all, 
and  like  to  have  "space"  around  their  bodies.  Out  of  the  thirty-five 
women  thirty either disliked or feared sex,  or described themselves as 
having  no  sexual  feelings during  the  anorexia: 
"I  was  very afraid of  sex and thought  of it as something bad 
and  wrong." 
(Jane) 
" <I)  used  to  split  off  from  myself  during  sex  with  my 
husband,  couldn't  be  both  a  good  little girl  and  a  mistress 
at the  same  time." 
<Marie) 
"I  have  become  very  cold  and  hate  being  touched,  I  have  no 
sexual  desires." 
<Sandra) 
"(anorexia)  completely  numbs  those feelings". 
<Anne) 
Some  explicitly  categorized  sex  as  heterosexual,  some  talked  in  the 
abstract,  and  none  defined sex as involving other women. 
With  only  six  exceptions  the  women  either  disliked  or  feared  non-
sexual  touching too: 
"I feel  threatened,  sometimes almost  claustrophobic" 
<Irene) 
"I  cannot  cope  with  anyone  coming  close  or  touching  me  even 
if  someone  touches  me  on  the  shoulders  or  back,  the 
emotional  pain hurts  I  cringe so  much  I  want  to curl  into a 
ball  and hide  I  feel  like barbed wire." 
CEve) 
Some  women  saw  their avoidance  of  physical  contact  as  imposed  on  them 
by  the  illness,  and  wrote  poignantly of their wish that they  could let 
people  get close to them: 
"I  resent  people  being  physically  close  to  me,  but  I  yearn 
for  one  special  person to hold me  and comfort  me." 
<Frances) 
" ... I  like  space  around  me.  I  used  to  be  a  very  cuddly 
person and hate  being so detached." 
<Norma) 
-322-If  the  elimination  of  physical  pleasure  is  the  central  aim  of 
anorexia,  and  the  body  is created at  the  symbolic  level  as  need-less 
and  involiable,  then  physical  detachment  is  neccessary.  In  anorexia 
eating  and  food  become  symbolic  of  all  desires  and  their  objects. 
Desire  as  a  whole  is crystallized into  the  desire  for  food,  the  arena 
in  which  satisfaction/fulfillment  of  desire  is  most  possible  for 
women. 
The  ultimate  aim  and  purpose  of  anorexia  is  the  denial  of  appetite, 
and at  the height  of  anorexia,  when the illness can still be  seen in a 
wholly  positive  light,  denial  is  itself  equated  with  pleasure, 
achievement,  mastery  and  virtue,  with  hunger  becoming  the  internal, 
and  emaciation  the  external,  "sign"  of  that  denial  (cf  Palmer,  1980: 
21): 
"If  I  didn't  eat  I  felt  very  high  and  full  of  energy,  very 
proud of myself  for  having self control." 
<:Marie) 
"Absolutely great- a  huge  sense of achievement." 
<Fiona) 
"I feel  completely happy,  confident,  able to go  out  and talk 
to  people  - I  feel  in  total  control.  I  feel  as  if  I  have 
achieved something." 
<Eve) 
"I  do  so  less  and  less  (eat)  because  the  vague  sense  of 
satisfaction  is  both  short-lived  and  far-outweighed,  when 
faced  with  fat  and  food  or  a  sense  of  virtue  and  tautness 
and  no  food ... it's a  fairly easy choice." 
<Sheila) 
Vellbourne  and  Purgold  argue  that  it is  this  sense  of  achievement 
which  explains  why  anorexic  women  keep  on  and  on  losing  weight  long 
after the original target  weight  has been reached.  Losing weight  comes 
to  mean  control,  success  and  competence,  while  weight  gain  means 
-323-failure.  Consequently,  the  "target"  is  progressively  lowered. 
CWellbourne  &  Purgold,  1984:  31)  This,  then,  is the  "moral  spiral"  of 
anorexia. 
-324-Danger 
In  spite  of  what  one  reads  in  the  psychiatric  literature  of  the 
stubborn  invincibility  of  anorexia,  the  anorexic  woman's  "wilful  and 
covertly triumphant  pursuit  of  thinness"  <Casper  et all,  1980:  1030), 
the  denial  and  control  of  anorexic ritualized eating,  which gives such 
a  sense  of  safety.  power  and  virtue,  is,  in  fact,  highly  precarious. 
This  state  is  only  ever  achieved  temporarily,  and  even  when  on  an 
anorexic  "high"  the  anorexic  woman  feels  the  threat  of  insatiability 
lurking around  her.  The  threats to her control are two-fold but  of far 
from  equal  value.  The  subsidiary  threat  - the  interference  of  other 
people  - will  be  briefly discussed before turning to  hunger itself as 
the principal  harbinger  of  doom.  The  threat of control  by  others  also 
figures  in  the  discussion  of  the  anorexic  woman's  perception  of 
herself  as  the  object  of  medical  control;  her  sense  of  control  by 
parents,  friends  and  social  values  in general  before the  onset  of  the 
illness  has  been  discussed  above.  It  is  this  sense  of  persecution, 
coupled  with  the  function  of  anorexic  ritual  in  excluding  disorder, 
rather  than  "retarded  cognition"  or  "limited  thinking"  which  in  fact 
make  the  anorexic  woman  stick  rigidly  to  her  eating  pattern.  <Crisp, 
1972:  405) 
Anorexic  women  are  immensely  anxious  about  situations  in  which  they 
have  to  eat  with  other  people,  or,  even,  worse,  have  to  eat  a  meal 
someone  else has prepared: 
"If  I  have  to  go  out  and  eat  more  than  my  'ration'  I  feel 
very  depressed,  fat,  miserable  and  resentful ... to  keep  my 
friends  I  have  to  eat  normal  meals  at  least  once  in  ten 
days.  That  is a  great  source  of conflict and resentment,  and 
-325-is  an  area  where  I  feel  I  am  out  of  control,  though  I 
attempt to control  how  much  they give  me  and  what." 
<Patricia) 
"Sometimes  I  can't stand eating  (especially if forced  to eat 
something  because  it's sociable  to  eat  different  courses  in 
someone' s  home)." 
<Andrea) 
" ... I  have  a  husband  who  has  to  be  deceived  in  order  for 
life  to  carry  on  peacefully";  she  would  be  completely  in 
control  of her eating- "but people try to interfere". 
<Annette) 
When  asked  if  she  would  give  up  eating entirely if it were  possible, 
and  how  this would  feel,  Margaret replied: 
"Yes  - terrific  as  there  would  be  no  pressure  on  me  by 
others to eat for  my  health's sake." 
Other  people,  then,  are  perceived  by  anorexic  women  as  a  threat  to 
their  control  of  food;  what  is seen  as  concern  by  family  and  friends 
is seen  as  interference  by  anorexic  women.  As  Wellbourne  and  Purgold 
point  out,  the intervention of others is experienced by  anorexic  women 
as  "assaults  on  anorexic  integrity".  <Wellbourne  &  Purgold,  1984:  96) 
The  principal  threat  to  the  control  of  food  intake,  is,  however, 
appetite itself.  Wellbourne  and Purgold argue  thus: 
"the sufferers feel  that  if their control  slipped just  once 
and  they  ate  food  not  sanctioned  by  their private  rule-book 
they would  'lose control'  or  'go to pieces'." 
(ibid.:  3) 
They  live,  then,  "in a  state of constant anxiety lest a  momentary  loss 
of  control  may  lead  to  ...  disintegration".  <ibid.:  94)  And  it is  in 
this  context  that  the  "tricks"  and  deceptions  of  anorexia  <Dexter, 
1980:  326-7)  are meaningful. 
-326-Only  six  of  the  women  who  replied  to  the  survey  felt  that  they  were 
totally  in  control  of  their  eating.  Every  "meal"  is  an  ordeal;  fear 
and  ambivalence  are its characteristics: 
"<When  eating  I  am) ...  sometimes  extremely  panicky  <always 
take  the  phone  off  so  I  can  get  through  the  ordeal).  other 
times  I  feel  desperate  and  eat  too  fast  and fill  up  quickly. 
I  think  about  food  from  the  moment  .I  wake  at  5. 30  - 6  a.m. 
until  bedtime  at  about  11.  I  am  anxious to eat and basically 
enjoy the  tastes when  I'm eating but  often get  very full  and 
feel  I  shouldn't  have  eaten it." 
<Sandra) 
"Tense,  guilty,  frightened  of  retribution  and  disease ... I 
look  forward  to  eating,  though  with  apprehension.  While  I'm 
actually eating  I  usually  feel  good  about  the  food  at first, 
and about  the  nourishment  it's giving  me.  But  gradually as  I 
eat,  guilt  takes  over,  and  I  feel  over-indulgent,  bloated 
and miserable." 
<Polly) 
"Tremendous  tension,  should  I,  shouldn't  I,  very  guilty at 
every mouthful.  No  sense  of  enjoyment at all." 
<Lynne) 
"I usually  wind  up  thinking,  'I love  this,  I  hate this,  why 
am  I  doing this?"  and stop then and there." 
<Sheila) 
Sheila  adds  that  before  she  eats  she  feels  "frantic  for  food",  while 
eating  she  feels  simultaneous  satisfaction  and  guilt,  and  afterwards 
"remorse  and  panic" .  Sarah  writes  that  before  she  eats  she  feels 
"something  like  terror  - it  feels  like  it  is  doing  the  wrong  thing 
eating it and  wanting it".  Each  day  represents a  "battle"  with food  in 
which  eating is staved  off  until  the  evening.  The  struggle is between 
the terror of eating and  the  pleasure of  food,  of giving herself  "what 
I  wanted and  needed". 
Eve  also  expresses  the  struggle  between  needing  food,  which  can  be 
acceptable,  and  wanting to eat,  which is not: 
"Before  I  eat  anything  I  always  contemplate  whether  I  really 
need  to  eat  it  because  I  feel  so  good  when  I  am  empty. 
-327-During  eating food  I  always  feel  guilty and  think about  how 
many  calories  the  food  I  am  eating  contains.  After  I  have 
eaten  I  always  worry  and  say  to  myself  'maybe  I  have  eaten 
too much'." 
Any  pleasure  that  remains  is,  as  Norma  writes,  "soon spoilt  by  guilt, 
was  I  eating too  much ...  would  I  stop eating?" 
No  matter  how  small  the  amount,  and  how  rigidly controlled the  eating 
becomes,  anxiety  remains.  Asked  how  she  feels  when  eating  to  plan, 
Verity  writes  that  she  feels  "in  control  but  still  disatisfied, 
leading  on  so  you  keep  cutting  down  looking  for  the  day  when  being 
thin  is  going  to  make  you  happy."  The  plan  does  not  in  itself 
represent  sufficient  security  1  and  keeping  to  it  is  in  any  case 
difficult: 
"I  feel  angry  with  myself  because  most  times  I  haven 
1 t 
intended to eat and then  I  find myself eating something." 
<Fiona) 
"If it's my  'safe'  foods  OK.  If not  - my  heart's beating ten 
to the  dozen and  I  feel  panic stricken- unless  I'm having a 
binge  and  know  I'm going  to get  rid of it later- but  while 
I'm eating  I'm telling myself  what  a  disgusting pig  I  am  and 
wonder  what  damage  I'm doing to my  health." 
<Beatrice) 
"I  lose  control  regularly  despite  all  my  efforts to  combat 
it." 
<Andrea) 
Having  "given  in"  to  extra-plan  eating,  the  danger  of  the  loss  of 
control  can  be  symbolically contained  by  some  by  getting the  food  out 
of the  mouth  as soon as possible: 
"Sometimes  I  swallow  quickly  just  to  get  it  over  and  done 
with." 
<Irene) 
" ...  I  want  to swallow it to get it out  of the  way" 
<Lynne) 
" ... it's something  I've got to swallow as fast as possible" 
<Margaret) 
-328-More  typically,  however,  this  is  no  real  solution;  even  if  the  food 
can  no  longer  be  tasted in the  mouth  it is still felt  in the  stomach; 
almost  all  the  women  reported  feeling  simultaneously  over-full  and 
hungry  after eating.  The  almost  inevitable  choice  of  word  to describe 
this  feeling  is "bloated".  Being  bloated  is both  an  internal  sign  of 
over-indulgence  to  the  anorexic  woman,  and,  it  is  thought,  a  very 
obvious  external  sign  to  other  people.  The  guilt  and  depression  that 
the  anorexic  women  has  "over-eaten"  can  become  unbearable;  some  women 
take steps to get rid of  the evidence.  I  asked the  women  how  they felt 
with food  in their stomachs,  and  how  they dealt with their feelings: 
Margaret's  "solution"  is  no  solution  at  all  -"Guilty  and 
that  I've to  remove  it by  some  means  or other as quick as  I 
can. 
"I  feel  about  nine  months  pregnant.  My  stomach  feels  so 
bloated  I  think  that  people  must  notice  Therefore  I  have 
to get it out  as soon as possible  ! 
<Annette) 
"I  feel  when  I've eaten that  I  look fat  and bloated and  want 
to get rid of  the feeling by  taking laxatives etc." 
<Sandra) 
" ...  sometimes if  I  feel  too bloated  I  make  myself sick." 
<Eve) 
"I  used  to feel  guilty,  bloated, 
absorbed,  longing  for  it  to  go. 
empty." 
<Norma) 
obsessed  by  the  food  I  had 
I  felt  better  when  I  was 
"Bloated.  Worried  that  I  might  gain  weight.  Feel  a  lack  of 
control.  Sometimes  the  feeling  is  so  intolerable  I  have  to 
go  and  vomit,  though  this  usually  only  happens  when  I  have 
eaten more  than  just fresh fruit  and  vegetables." 
<Paula) 
The  act  of  eating  is  the  arena  in  which  the  precarious  nature  of 
anorexic  control  is most  directly  experienced.  Rigid  planning  and  the 
ritualizations which  surround  eating serve to create a  partial control 
which  alleviates but  only  rarely contains  hunger.  The  fear  of  a  chaos 
-329-of  appetite  is  the  context  in  which  anorexic  food  control  is 
meaningful;  Paula  when  eating feels: 
"··.worried that  I  might  gain weight  and worried that  having 
started to eat,  I  may  be  unable  to stop." 
Norma  writes  that  when  she  managed  to  eat  to  plan  - "I 
remember  feeling  great  temporarily  (mentally>  but  still 
hungry,  and  terrified  of  having to eat  more,  to  let  go  and 
eat." 
The  fear  of insatiability surrounds eating: 
Sophie  fears  "that it will  go  totally out  of  control,  and  I 
will  not  be  able to stop." 
And  Lynne  writes  - "I  feel  if  I  let  go  of  my  controls, 
anarchy  would  set  in,  and  my  body  would  rebel  - Would  I 
suddenly  turn  into  a  ten  stone  animal  ? ...  what  I  worry 
about,  is  the  'full'  feeling,  when  you  ought  to  know  you 
have  had  enough  food,  I  don't  seem to  be  able  to  recognize 
that  feeling.  So  I  feel  if  I  started  to  eat  when  would  I 
stop ?" 
Norton quotes a  patient saying much  the same  thing: 
"If  ever  I've  been  forced  to  eat  anything  on  my  plate,  I 
feel  myself  getting  bigger  and  bigger,  expanding  like  a 
balloon."  <Norton,  1983:  312) 
The  loss  of  control  which  so terrifies anorexic  women  centres  around 
eating and getting "fat",  but it can  be  extended  to  cover  other areas 
of their lives: 
"I  felt  that if I  let  go  the  control,  then  everything  would 
fall  apart  and  be  chaotic,  and  I  would  be  completely 
overwhelmed  by it all." 
<Jane> 
Marie  feels that if she  gave  up  trying to control  her eating 
"I wouldn't  be  in control  of anything then". 
"If  I  broke  that  control,  would  self-control  in other  areas 
go  also  ?  I  felt  it would  and  therefore  clung  to  control 
over food." 
<Hannah) 
-330-The  denial  of  firstly  pleasure  and  subsequently  of  appetite  itself, 
which  is the  ultimate  aim  of  anorexia,  can  give  intense  satisfaction 
but  is always  insecure.  I  found  little evidence  of  what  Casper  et al. 
describe  as  the  anorexic  woman's  "unusual  ability  to  suppress  or 
tolerate  hunger  feelings".  <Casper,  1980:  1030)  Again this would  seem 
to  be  a  case  of  psychiatry taking for  granted as true  what  is part  of 
the  anorexic  defence  against  psychiatric  intervention.  The  anorexic 
control  envied  by  others  and  struggled  over  in  the  psychiatric 
encounter is maintained  only  with  extreme  difficulty and  in  a  context 
of  constant  set-backs.  Falling  into  chaos  is  both  a  real  experience 
and  a  psychic terror.  It is to this loss of control that  we  now  turn. 
-331-Twenty-five  of  the  women  said  that  they  used  to,  or still did  binge. 
Only  one,  however,  described  herself  as  bulimic.  For  the  others, 
binging  is  part  of  anorexia,  the  other  side  of  the  coin  of  control, 
what  makes  it neccessary,  and what  endangers it. 
Psychiatric  opinion  is divided  on  whether  bulimia  and  anorexia  should 
be  considered  "different  entities"  <Vigersky  & Andersen,  1977;  Chiodo 
&  Latimer,  1983),  whether  they  are  essentially  the  same  disorder 
<Wellbourne  &  Purgold,  1984:  2)  or  whether  bulimia is a  "sub-group"  of 
anorexia.  <Casper et al,  1980:  1030;  Garfinkel et al,  1980) 
Casper  et al.  set the scene for the debate  by arguing that; 
"the  occurence  of  bulimia  <rapid  consumption  of  large 
amounts  of  food  in  a  short  period  of  time)  is a  perpelxing 
phenomenon,  because  its  presence  contradicts  the  common 
belief  that  patients  with  anorexia  are  always  firm in their 
abstinence  from  food." 
<ibid.:  1030) 
In  their  study,  47%  of  the  respondents  admitted  to  hinging,  and  they 
suggest  that,  while  bulimia  was  neglected  in  the  older  psychiatric 
literature,  "those  who  looked for it have  generally found  it".  <ibid.: 
1031;  1034;  see  also  Morgan,  Wellbourne  &  Purgold,  1983)  Casper  et 
al.  argue  that  "bulimics"  can  be  distinguished  from "fasting patients" 
chiefly  by  a  stronger  appetite  and  a  lesser  capacity  to  tolerate 
hunger,  characteristics which  lead to "impaired control"  in eating and 
in  their  lives  in  general.  (ibid. :  1034;  1030-4)  However,  they  are 
further  distinguished  by  being  older,  are  more  "extrovert",  and suffer 
-332-more  depression,  anxiety,  guilt and  obsession with food.  Cibid.:  1031-
5)  They  argue  that  bulimia  is  associated  with  a  longer  illness, 
repeated  hospitalizations,  and  "a  less successful  social  adjustment". 
(ibid.:  1034) 
These  findings  lead  Casper  et al.  to  hypothesize  that  bulimia  may  be 
"a  sign  of  chronicity",  or,  that  to  become  bulimic  the  patient  may 
need  greater "physiological  and  psychological  maturity",  or,  and  this 
is their preferred thesis,  that  bulimia  may  represent  "a  more  serious 
psychopathology".  (ibid.:  1034-5).  They  argue  that  for  these  more 
disturbed  women,  binging is "emotionally soothing"  Cibid.:  1034),  and, 
followed  by vomiting,  forms: 
"a  complex  defensive  maneover  in  which  food  is 
employed  to  relieve  profoundly  disturbing 
feelings,  and thoughts." 
Cibid.:  1035) 
abnormally 
impulses, 
This  analysis  is  remarkable  for  its  mixture  of  perspicacity  and 
obfuscation.  Initially  Casper  et  al.  sense  that  the  presence  of  a 
significant  amount  of  binge/vomiting  in  patients  defined  as  anorexic 
threatens the  idea that anorexia  involves a  transcendence  of  appetite. 
This  insight  could lead to a  recognition  that anorexia is rarely,  and 
then  only  temporarily,  a  transcendence  of  appetite,  and  is  more 
correctly  seen  as  an  extended  struggle  with  appetite,  in  which  the 
ritualized control  of  eating  is  the  weapon  and  hunger  the  enemy.  And 
in  arguing  that  "fasters"  cherish  hunger  and  obtain  from  it "a  sense 
of  mastery"  they  come  close  to  recognising  that  anorexia  is far  from 
easy  and  "triumphant"  but  is  in  fact  a  desperate  struggle  with  a 
-333-powerful  internal  enemy.  (ibid.:  1034;  1030)  Instead,  however,  the  old 
answer  of  a  particular  psychopathology  is  invoked  to  explain  that 
while  "fasting patients"  can  "suppress"  "deny"  "ignore"  or  "tolerate" 
appetite  - in  short,  transcend  it  - the  especially  disturbed  and 
unsuccessfully adjusted bulimic is "just"  a  failed anorexic. 
Similarly,  although  they  note  that  bulimics  have  been  ill  longer  and 
hospitalized  more  often,  the  explanation  of  bulimia  as  a  development 
of  anorexia  is  given  short  shrift.  Al thought  they  point  out  that 
whether  or  not  the  women  binge,  they  still  experience  "a  similar 
perpetual  fear  of  not  being  able  to  stop  eating"  (ibid.:  1034)  this 
does  not  lead them to see  the fear  of  insatiability and the  fantasy  of 
hinging as just as important as the actual  binge. 
This  point  is taken  up  by  Vellbourne  and  Purgold,  who  argue  that  what 
defines anorexia is a  characteristic way  of  thinking,  in which  fear of 
weight  gain,  and  control  of  weight,  rather  than  emaciation,  are 
central.  <Vellbourne  &  Purgold,  1984:  25-9)  They  argue  thus  that 
bulimics  are  anorexics,  that  there  are  "no  characteristic  bulimic 
ideas".  (ibid.:  6)  All  anorexics,  as they point  out,  are interested in 
food,  and  feel  that  their appetite  is "too  powerful",  "insatiable  and 
demanding"  and  "must  at  all  costs  be  curbed".  (ibid.:  3)  This 
"anorexic  thinking"  can  lead  to  either  starvation  or  binge/vomiting 
and "effectiveness"  is the  only real difference.  <ibid.:  6) 
The  fear  of  hinging  was  an  ever-present  worry  to  the  women  in  the 
survey,  and it is this which  inspires anorexic control.  The  reality of 
-334-buli~ia could  ~ore plausibly  be  explained  by  the  realisation that  the 
i~ense  difficulty  of  ~intaining  anorexic  control  ~eans  that  the 
longer  the  illness  the  ~ore  likely  it  is  that  control  will 
periodically  slip.  (See  Pal~er,  1980:  29).  And  since  control  of 
appetite  is  the  central  aim  of  anorexia,  it  is  not  surprising  that 
depression,  anxiety and guilt accompany its loss. 
Further~ore,  if  we  look  at  psychiatric  intervention  fro~ the  anorexic 
perspective,  it  ~ght be  argued  that  buli~a could  well  be  a  response 
to  the  disruption  of  control  which  hospitalization  entails.  Buli~a, 
defined  as  binging  and  vomiting,  is better  seen  as  an  expression  of 
the  "disturbing  impulses"  of  controlled appetite  than relief  of  those 
impulses.  The  idea  that  women  who  binge  experience  stronger  hunger 
than  those  who  do  not  is based  on  the  women's  response  to psychiatric 
questioning  and  does  not  consider  how  careful  wo~n are  about  what 
they  reveal  to  such  questioners.  Denial  of  hunger  is,  of  course,  one 
of  the  ~in anorexic  strategies  in  ~intaining  control  when  other 
people  intervene  in their eating.  Further,  the  argu~nt that  bulimics 
suffer  fro~ "i~paired control"  contradicts  the  argu~nt that  they  are 
naturally hungrier  - is it that they have  less control  or is what  they 
are trying to control  a  stronger  i~pulse ? 
In  the  discussion  and  analysis  of  anorexic  wo~n'  s  descriptions  of 
binging  which  follows  I  hope,  then,  to show that the binge as an ever-
present  threat  to  anorexic  control  is  a  central  feature  of  anorexia. 
The  fear  of  insatiability  which  necessitates  that  control  beco~s a 
reality in the  binge.  The  question  of  how  much  women  actually eat  in a 
-335-binge,  while  it  is,  as  we  saw  in  Chapter  Four,  experientially 
significant  for  women  is  not  an  element  which  meaningfully 
distinguishes  groups  of  anorexic  women.  Rather,  it is the  meaning  of 
the binge,  however  large  or small it might  be,  which is important. 
I  asked  the  women  whether  they  ate  different  foods  during  a  binge, 
and,  if so,  how  they  would  explain their choice: 
"I  drink  fruit  squash.  I  eat  mostly  sweet  things,  sometimes 
crisps  and  occasionnally  I'll cook  some  meat  but  not  often. 
Usually  it's  marmalade  out  of  the  jar  (about  *  lb.), 
mincemeat  <1  lb.),  2  litres ice-cream,  ~packet biscuits,  ~ 
cake,  ~ lb.  cheese,  ~ lb.  pickle,  a  swiss roll  - this  would 
be  fairly  typical.  Sometimes  I  vomit  and  return  to  the 
kitchen again." 
<Paula) 
"I  drink  gallons  of  milkshake,  I  eat  ice-cream,  cakes, 
pastries,  pork pies,  chips,  sweets,  chocolates,  bread,  roast 
potatoes.  I  can eat half a  loaf of bread,  15  fish fingers,  6 
fried  eggs,  2  platefuls  of  chips,  4  doughnuts,  6  chocolate 
cakes,  2  large  bars of  chocolate,  10  bars  of  Mars  bar etc., 
I  litre of  ice-cream,  and probably more. 
Because  they  are  foods  I  forbid  myself  on  my  days  of 
dieting." 
<Tracy) 
" ...  for  me  a  binge  usually consists  of:  4  caramel  chocolate 
bars,  liquorice toffees,  cream cakes,  ~ loaf of  bread. 
Because  these  foods  are  really  naughty  - full  of  fat  and  I 
never  allow  myself  these  things,  so if I  binge  I  might  as 
well  lose control and eat all the worst  things possible." 
<Eve) 
Binge  foods  - muesli,  whole  milk,  butter  and  sugar  mixed 
together,  jam,  raisins,  orange  JUl.ce,  bread  and  butter  -
"something to do  with  them being forbidden,  'naughty'  - in a 
desperate  attempt  to  be  nicer  to  myself  - to  make  up  for 
something,  someone  - possibly  my  mother ...  for  not  being 
accepted as  my  own  person as  I  am." 
<Sarah) 
All  but  one  of  the  women  who  binged  ate  mostly,  although  not 
exclusively,  carbohydrates  and  sweet  things.  <See  Boskind-Lodahl, 
1976:  351-2)  The  main  explanation  given  for  this  was  that  these  are 
-336-"forbidden"  foods  the  rest  of  the  time,  but  the  accepted  psychiatric 
explanation  of  a  purely  physical  craving  was  expressed  by  two  of  the 
women: 
"I  think  it is  because  I  crave  these  foods  and  yet  forbid 
myself  to eat them." 
<Fiona) 
" ...  before  a  binge  I  would  have  a  deep  craving  <like  an 
addiction)  and  I  felt  I  just had to eat  them." 
<Karen) 
Practicalities  also  constrain  the  choice  of  binge  foods;  Frances 
explains  her  choice  of  foods  as  being  "easy  to  eat/swallow  and  when 
mixed  with  enough  fluid,  are  easy  to  bring  back  up".  Barbara  • s 
explanation also centres  on  convenience: 
"They're always  convenient,  easy to eat and read,  or eat and 
watch  TV.  Can  take  them  to  my  room.  Quick  to  prepare,  no 
cooking  involved." 
The  choice of  food  that needs cooking,  or any  amount  of  preparation is 
as  rare  in  binges  as  in  the  anorexic  plan.  Barbara's  explanation 
reveals  a  further,  central  facet  of  binges:  in spite of  the  fact  that 
forbidden  and  pleasure-laden  foods  are  being  eaten,  the  attention  is 
directed  away from the  taste of  the  food.  As  Palmer argues,  in a  binge 
food  is eaten  "rapidly  and  avidly  but  with  little pleasure".  <Palmer, 
1980:  26) 
I  asked the  women  if they ate  in a  different  way  when  hinging: 
"All  the  food  is laid  out  and  I  just  attack it;  tearing at 
the  packaging  like  an  animal.  My  hands  are  working  all  the 
time  to  get  handfuls  of  food  into  my  mouth,  working 
systematically  through  everything  until  I  just  cannot  eat 
another thing." 
<Carol) 
-337-"In  a  mad  panic  to  stuff  the  food  down  me  as  quickly  as 
possible,  hardly tasting or chewing it." 
<Fiona) 
"Yes  I  used  to eat  without  even noticing  I  was  doing it - my 
eyes  fixed  on  the  TV  or staring into space.  I  used to eat so 
messily too that it would  make  me  furious  with myself." 
<Una) 
"I  feel  like  an  animal,  dipping  in  with  my  fingers  or 
tipping  the  carrots  into  my  mouth.  I  usually  crouch  down  by 
the  fridge to do  this." 
<Sandra) 
"When  I  feel  a  binge  coming  on  I  feel  so  tense  I  eat 
anything  without  even  tasting  it,  at  very  high  speed, 
towards  the  end  of  the  binge  I  am  usually just throwing  the 
food  into  my  mouth  and  even  into  my  face  with  such  speed 
that sometimes  I  swallow things whole,  uncooked,  frozen." 
<Eve) 
"I  never use  knife  and  fork  and  a  plate at  the  table  - just 
a  spoon  and  my  hands.  I  certainly eat  very  fast  and  hardly 
chew it,  just swallow it." 
<Paula) 
"Like  a  maniac  that  hasn't  eaten  in years  !  I  ram  one  food 
after  another  into  my  mouth,  hardly  having  time  to  butter 
the  next slice of  bread beforehand." 
<Tracy) 
The  main  characteristics of  binge eating which  emerge  from the survey, 
then,  were  ~.  animalistic  manner,  and  a  sense  of  compulsion.  The 
women  ate as fast as they possibly could,  in a  manner they describe as 
irrational,  usually animalistic  - "like a  scavenging animal"  <Sophie), 
"like  a  wolf"  <Una)  - ,  and  with  compulsion  but  not  pleasure  - "I eat 
quickly  almost  in  a  panic  - don't  really  taste  it"  <Laura),  "(I) 
cannot  stop"  (Sophie).  Although  they  are  giving  themselves  what  is 
usually  denied  them,  indulgence,  I  would  argue,  does  not  equal 
pleasure.  Rather,  they  fear  being  at  the  mercy  of  their  appetite, 
which  they  feel  unable  to  control.  The  binge  is unstoppable;  it ends 
only  when  the  food  runs  out.  Cooking,  preparation,  laying  the  table 
and  relishing  the  meal  are  all  conspicuous  by  their  absence.  The 
opposite  of  denial  in anorexia is compulsion and chaos,  not  pleasure. 
-338-Boskind-Lodahl  argues  that  women  gain  pleasure  from  being  out  of 
control  in  the  binge,  and  that  shame  and  guilt  come  afterwards. 
CBoskind-Lodahl,  1976:  351-2)  She  argues: 
"the  binge  brings  about  a  union  between  the  mind  and  the 
body.  One  gives  one's  self  to  the  food,  to  the  moment 
completely.  There is a  complete  loss of  control  Cego>.  It is 
an  absolute  here-and-now  experience,  a  kind  of  ecstasy." 
(ibid.:  352) 
But  far  from  union  and  ecstasy the  binge  means  failure  and  surrender. 
Anorexia  is an attempt  to  create a  self,  or ego,  out  of  the control  of 
need;  in the  binge  control  is swallowed  up  and  destroyed  by  appetite. 
Boskind-Lodahl  argues  that  "bulimarexic"  women  are  involved  "in  a 
struggle  against  a  part  of  the  self  rather  than  a  struggle  towards  a 
self"  (ibid.:  352),  and  implies  that  the  "unification"  of  the  two 
"halves"  in  the  binge  is  therefore  pleasurable.  Unity,  however,  is 
impossible  for  anorexic  women;  either  the  controlling  ego  or  the 
insatiable  flesh  can  dominate,  but  they  cannot  be  integrated,  since 
the  dominance  of  the  former  over  the  latter is the  point  of  anorexic 
control. 
Boskind-Lodahl  implies,  Leslie  Swartz  argues,  that  the  "pleasure"  of 
the  binge  comes  from  "the  woman's 
1 natural 
1  wish  to  be  in  tune  with 
her  body's  desires".  Boskind-Lodahl  suggests  that  "the  body  is 
'correct 
1  in  its  desires  whereas  the  mind  is  warped"  in  trying  to 
block  "the  forces  of  nature".  <Swartz,  1985:  431)  Similarly,  Orbach 
and  Eichenbaum  see  binging  as  an  assertion  of  "natural"  desires  and 
argue  that  the  binging  "part"  of  the  anorexic  woman  is  the  part 
therapists  can  work  with  in  the  return  to  normality.  (ibid. :  431; 
-339-Orbach  &  Eichenbaum,  1983:  90)  This  biologistic  reasoning  is 
irrelevant  if  one  interprets  both  "mind"  and  "body"  as  aspects  of 
social  relations.  The  anorexic  woman  while  hinging is not surrendering 
to  "nature"  - unquestionably  good  and  virtuous  - but  to  an  appetite 
which  both she  and her culture define as dangerous and disgusting. 
What  hinging  in  its extremity  reveals  is the  insatiability  which  the 
anorexic  feels  to  be  an  ever-present  danger.  Wellbourne  &  Purgold's 
"Della"  writes that: 
"breaking  out  of  control,  out  of  the  order  means  no  order. 
To  break  out  of  the  strictly-imposed  regulations  means  one 
has  no  limits.  It  means  that  one  will  move  to  the  extremes 
of  human  indulgence." 
<Wellbourne  & Purgold,  1984:  25) 
The  binge  is  a  furtive  business  conducted  in solitude;  the  terrifying 
possibility  of  being  "caught  in  the  act"  of  insatiability is,  as  far 
as possible,  eliminated: 
"I  had  to  be  alone  in  a  room  with  the  curtains  closed  so 
that  no  one  could possibly see me." 
<Paula) 
But  any eating has  the character of  a  guilty and secret activity.  <See 
also  Dally  & Gomez,  1980:  17)  Out  of  the  35  respondants,  31  preferred 
to eat  alone  if at all  possible.  Beatrice  only eats at  night,  in bed, 
"away  from  others";  Annette  writes that "no  one  must  see  me  swallow"  -
before she eats she worries "in case  anyone  catches me".  Fiona writes: 
"I  find  now  that  I  can  only  force  myself  to  eat  in  the 
presence  of  my  parents  but  I  hate  this  and  if  I  see  them 
watching  me  eat,  I  stop  immediately and  become  embarassed.  I 
cannot,  however,  eat  in front  of  other  members  of  my  family 
or in front  of  my  friends." 
-340-Vli th  food  inside  them  anorexic  women  feel:  "afraid,  dirty  and  weak" 
<Karen);  "bloated,  guilty,  greedy  and  a  failure"  <Una);  "greedy and as 
though  I  am  guilty of  some  misdeed"  <Fiona).  When  they are alone,  this 
is bad enough.  In front  of others it is insupportable: 
"CEating)  In front  of  my  family:  guilty- bact' 
<Sarah) 
"When  I  eat  and  have  food  in  my  mouth  I  feel  dirty,  guilty 
and  fat.  If  someone  is  present  - which  I  cannot  help 
sometimes  - my  mouth  feels  as  if it is numb  and  paralysed 
and  I  have difficulty chewing or opening  my  mouth." 
CEve) 
Eating is a  sin.  When  it is indulged in both the internal  judge  of the 
anorexic  conscience,  and  the  external  judge  of  others'  opinion  punish 
it  with  guilt  and  shame.  The  anorexic  women  feels  caught  out,  her 
hidden  insatiabil  ty  revealed.  The  "bloated"  stomach  is  symbolic  of 
"fat":  the sign of  insatiability. 
Well bourne  and  Purgold  argue  that  "fat"  for  anorexic  women  equals 
"moral  decay";  being  fat  means  being  "lazy,  greedy,  selfish,  sloppy, 
stupid,  unattractive,  uncaring,  untidy  and  disgusting".  <Wellbourne  & 
Purgold,  1984:  4)  I  asked  the  women  how  they  would  feel  if they  were 
very fat: 
"I  often  imagine  being  very  fat  and  I  would  have  to  hide 
away  in  bed  for  protection.  This  would  be  the  only  way  I 
could  hide  my  body  away  from  people  again  I  would  not  be 
able  to cope." 
<Eve) 
"Awful,  I  would  hide myself  from the world." 
<Celia) 
"It  would  be  absolutely  awful.  People  would  always  be 
looking  at  me.  I  feel  as  though  I  would  get  in everybody's 
way.  I  feel  as though  my  bust  would stick out too much." 
<Annette) 
-341-Similar  feelings  emerge  at  the  prospect  of  reaching  the  weight  deemed 
medically correct for  their height: 
"I  would  be  full  of  self-loathing.  I  would  be  depressed.  I 
wouldn't  be  able  to  face  people  for  fear  of  their reactions. 
I  would  just  hide  away,  disgusted  with  myself  for  being  so 
fat." 
<Frances) 
"Couldn't stand it.  Would  hide  away  and not  let people see." 
<Lisa) 
Being  at  the  approved  weight,  or  heavier,  means  that  the  secrecy  and 
shame  of  the  act  of  eating  extends  to  cover  the  whole  body;  the 
"evidence"  in  both  cases  - food  and  fat  - must  be  concealed.  The 
bloated  stomach  is  the  representative  of  fat-as-sign  for  the 
controlled anorexic  woman: 
"I  think  I  dislike  having  food  in  my  stomach  more  than 
having  it  in  my  mouth.  I'm  always  worried  it  will  make  my 
stomach  rounded  and  hence  feel  'heavy'  and  bloated  after  a 
meal." 
<Andrea) 
Asked  if  they  wanted  to  change  anything  about  their  bodies,  most 
focused  on stomach,  hips and  thighs: 
"I'd like to  be  thinner all  over  but  in particular  I'd like 
my  tummy  to be  less pronounced.  It sticks out." 
<Carol) 
Anne  wishes  she  had  "no  bulging  stomach".  It's here  that  food  is seen 
to wreak its worst effects: 
"I  feel  heavy,  self-conscious,  frightened  of  putting  on 
weight,  scared  of  my  stomach  being  bloated,  unhappy  that 
I • ve  succumbed ...  Once  I  have  eaten  them  (forbidden  foods) I 
feel  dirty  and  heavy,  and  fatter  than  ever  - it's as  if  I 
can  almost  feel  the  fat  from  them  piling  itself  up  on  my 
hips and thighs etc." 
<Barbara) 
"I  have  always  feared  becoming  fat,  when  I  was  afraid  that 
my  body  would  never stop expanding."  <Una) 
-342-Thinness  is  a  physical  demonstration  of  denial;  fat  is  the  sign  of 
indulgence: 
"To  me,  control  and  thinness  go  together.  Being  even  a 
little overweight spells excess and  indulgence." 
<Andrea) 
The  stigmata  is  always  there,  however,  even  if  its external  sign  is 
absent.  Lisa  writes  that  if  she  were  very  fat,  she  would  feel  "more 
honest,  but  ugly".  And  Sheila explains  why  she  "eats"  only  coffee  and 
diet drinks: 
"Terrified  of  getting  even  fatter  than  I  am  and  therefore 
hating  myself  even  more  - feel  so  bulbous  and  insecure  fat. 
Slimmer  I  have  confidence  and  I  love  feeling  'empty'. 
Terrified  too  of  other  people  realising  how  fat  I  really 
am." 
This,  then,  is the  central  irony of  anorexia  - even  when  the  anorexic 
woman  is thin "outside",  she is "really"  fat "inside".  Every time  she 
eats this awful truth hovers around her,  waiting to be  revealed. 
-343-Object 
The  feminine  body  is  socially  created  as  the  object  on  which  the 
:masculine  subject  acts,  and  women  act  as  "caretakers"  rather  than 
owners  of  their  bodies.  Further,  women's  relationship  to  the  body-
object  is  a  relationship  of  hidden  alienation,  concealed  both  by  the 
idea  of  the  body  as  a  "given"  in  nature,  and  by  the  formal  gender-
neutrality  of  the  ideology  of  individualism.  The  previous  chapter 
explored  these  issues  through  sexuality  and  reproduction;  in  this 
section,  and  in  the  concluding  chapter  the  transformations  of  and 
negotiations  with  the  object-body  which  anorexic  women  :make  are 
explored. 
A further  aim  of  this  section  is to  point  to  ways  in  which  anorexic 
women  feel  themselves  and  their  bodies  to  be  the  objects  of  the 
control  of  others,  especially  the  medical  establishment.  This 
experience  of  powerlessness  contrasts  sharply  with  perceptions  of 
anorexic  women  as  domestic  tyrants.  However,  if  we  accept  analyses 
which see  anorexia as itself a  strategy of  control  we  can see clearly 
why  attempts  to  make  her  eat  - benign  or  otherwise  - appear  to  the 
anorexic  woman  as threats to her control. 
The  alienation  of  the  self  from  the  body,  and,  especially from  bodily 
appetities  is  expressed  in  a  usually  obscurely  but  occasionally 
clearly  perceived  split  between  the  desiring  and  the desireless  body. 
As  argued  in  Chapters  Two  and  Three,  anorexia  can  be  described  as  a 
two-stage  process,  in which  the  symptom is at first consciously set in 
-344-motion  by  a  strongly perceived self  which  imposes  control  on  appetite 
but  subsequently "escapes"  the  conscious control  of  the anorexic  woman 
and  "takes her  over".  Anorexia  itself,  then,  comes  to  be  perceived  as 
a  force  separate  from,  but  internal  to  the  anorexic  woman.  "The 
anorexia"  controls  her  behaviour;  she  is powerless  in  the  face  of  her 
illness  and  cannot  reverse  the  process  which  she  herself  set  in 
motion. 
Noelle  Caskey,  discussing  the  work  of  Hilde  Bruch,  points  out  that 
none  of Bruch's patients felt that they could control  her  illness: 
"at  a  certain  critical  point  during  the  process  of  weight 
loss,  something  at  once  alien  and  interior  to  them  took 
over." 
<Caskey,  1986:  184) 
This alien something is described variously:  "a dictator who  dominates 
me",  "a  ghost  who  surrounds  me",  "the  little  man  who  objects  when  I 
eat".  <Bruch,  1978:  55-6)  The  dominant explanation for this process in 
psychiatry  is,  of  course,  biological  - organic  processes  "take-over" 
and  the  search  for  meaning  is  abandoned.  <see  Slade,  1984;  Bemis, 
1978:  611)  From  a  sociological  perspective  in  which  "organic" 
processes  are  understood  as  created  in  frameworks  of  social  meaning, 
the  anorexic  woman's  sense  of  powerlessness clearly must  be  related to 
social  structure,  and  in  the  present  context  to  definitions  of  the 
feminine  body  as  an  object  and  of  feminine  desire  as  potentially 
overwhelming  the  social  order.  Anorexia,  thus,  starts  from  social 
meaning,  and  transforms,  rather  than  creates  ex  nihilo  an  existing 
definition of the feminine  body  and of  feminine  desire. 
-345-Rejecting  the  "pathologizing"  of  anorexia  puts  meaning  back  into  the 
anorexic  experience.  If  "madness"  is  not  abstracted  from  social 
structure  by  describing it as meaningless and  incomprehensible  we  must 
locate  it  within  the  same  material  and  ideological  structures  which 
shape  "sanity".  The  rigid  demarcation  of  "normal"  and  "abnormal" 
serves political  and  ideological  functions;  I  do  not  want,  however,  to 
follow the critical strand which  would  describe anorexia as  "the same 
but  more"  of  what  every  woman  experiences in a  patriarchal culture. 
The  anorexic  experience  does  not  simply  intensify  the  conflicts 
between  desire  and control,  dependence  and  automomy  which characterize 
women's  experience  of  their  bodies  and  their  relationship  with  food. 
Rather,  anorexic  women  transform the  categories  through  which  female 
experience  is  created  in  an  attempt  to  resolve  at  the  level  of  the 
body  the  contradictory  demands  of  individuality  and  femininity  which 
all  women  face  in a  patriarchal and bourgeois culture. 
Through  an  analysis  of  my  own  survey  material  as well  as  the  existing 
literature,  it can  be  shown  that  the  sense  of  impersonal  control  in 
anorexia centres not  on  a  "biological  take-over"  but  on the desire for 
food,  seen either as  a  property  of  the  body  or as  a  force  in its own 
right.  The  controlling  force  is  variously  conceptualized  as  food, 
appetite,  the  body  or  the  anorexia  itself,  but  appetite  is  the 
primordial  reality underlying all these  categories.  Seen  as  an  active 
force  rather  than  inanimate  material,  food  takes  power  from  the 
intense  desire  of  which it is the  object;  the  body  controlles through 
appetite  - it,  rather  than  the  self,  desires  food;  and  the  anorexia 
-346-controls  as  negative appetite  - it is the  resistence  to  desire  which 
gives the  illness-as-active-force its power. 
The  end  of  anorexia  is,  then,  the  complete  overturning  of  the 
conscious  will  which  began  it.  The  self  shrinks  from  omnipotence  to 
become  the  object  of  a  force  outside  of  its power.  The  anorexic  woman 
cannot  understand  what  is  happening  to  her;  she  is  a  mystified  and 
powerless  object  of  what  she  herself set  in motion,  the  victim of  her 
own  creation. 
In  anorexia  the  controlling  force  can  be  conceptualised  as  wholly 
magical  or  supernatural,  as Bruch's  work  shows.  In  my  own  survey  this 
was  rare,  but  Andrea  did  explain  how  she  feels  during  a  binge  in  a 
very similar manner: 
"I  usually  feel  possessed  by  some  evil spirit who  drives  me 
back into the kitchen in search for  more." 
And  Lynne  writes  that  as  well  as  feeling  the  characteristic  tension 
and anxiety of anorexic eating,  she also feels excited: 
" ...  because  to  me  food  is something magical  which has hidden 
powers  of  making  me  feel  good  sometimes  <when  I  resist)  and 
bad  when  I  eat it." 
Here  it is  the  "magic"  of  food,  rather  than  her  own  willpower,  which 
gives satisfaction;  but  the  magic is far  from being positive: 
"I  begin  to  panic,  I  want  to  'shove'  the  food  down  before 
it  does  me  any  more  harm,  I  feel  very  scared  just  looking 
at it." 
Caskey,  too,  comments  on  food  as  magically  malevolent  in  anorexia. 
After  pointing  out  the  nutritional  expertise  common  to  many  anorexic 
women,  she  goes  on to argue that; 
-347-"Once  food  is  inside  the  anorexic ...  her  attitude  toward  it 
undergoes  a  considerable  change.  It is no  longer a  matter  of 
numbers  or  chemical  composition;  suddenly  food  is 
metamorphosed  into  a  dark  dragging  force  that  threatens  to 
take  over  the  anorexic,  to sink  her  under  suffocating  waves 
of  unwanted  flesh.  To  anorexics,  food  seems  to  linger 
ominously  in her  body;  it has  a  living presence  inside  them 
which  overpowers them and  which  they resent." 
<Caskey,  1986:  183) 
Sometimes  the  body  itself resists the  malevolance  of  food.  June  speaks 
of her fear  of literally choking  when  she  has food  in her  mouth: 
"I felt as if there  was  a  lump  blocking it and  not  allowing 
the  food  in  ...  my  mouth  and  throat  were  dry  and  choaked,  I 
felt  I  couldn't  swallow,  I  could  not  taste  the  food.  It 
seemed to be stuck in my  mouth." 
Zoe  and  Lynne  also  express  an  unwilled  physical  resistence  to 
appetite: 
"Sometimes  it's a  terrible  effort,  my  jaw  aches,  I  eat  and 
eat  and  still  the  plate  is  full,  Sometimes  I  cannot  eat 
another  mouthful.  Sometimes it seems  like there are  bugs and 
insects in the food" 
"If  there  is just  enough  <food)  to  quell  my  raging  hunger, 
then  that  is  OK,  but  if  I  can  feel  food  actually  'sitting' 
in my  stomach then it feels very uncomfortable,  and it plays 
on  my  mind." 
The  resistence  to  food  and  its  powers  is  here  located  in  the  body 
rather  than  being  a  conscious  strategy  of  the  self.  There  is  a 
struggle  going  on  here  different  to  the  conscious  war  of  self  and 
appetite  which  we  saw earlier.  Here  the struggle is between  two  forces 
separate  from,  but  contained  in  the  self  - the  irrisistable  force  of 
magically evil  food  and the  immovable  object  of  the resisting body. 
-348-One  of  Hilde  Bruch's  patients  also  expresses  an  understanding  of  her 
body  functioning  independently  of  conscious  control;  indeed,  for  her, 
it is the  .mind which is "weak",  the  body strong: 
"My  body  could  do  anything  - it could  walk  forever  and  not 
get  tired.  My  mind  was  tricky  but  my  body  was  honest.  It 
knew  exactly  what  to  do  and  I  knew  exactly  what  I  could  do. 
I  felt  very  powerful  on  account  of  my  body.  My  only weakness 
was  my  mind." 
<Bruch,  1973:  95) 
Hunger  escapes  conscious  control  as  anorexia  progresses  and  becomes 
ever  more  an  alien  force.  The  questionnairre  asked  if  the  women  felt 
that  they  were  in  control  of  their  eating,  and  as  we  have  seen, 
security of  control  in anorexia is fundamentally precarious;  the slide 
from  you  controlling it to it controlling you  is remorseless: 
<Are  you  in control  of  your eating ?) 
"Yes/No  I  feel  I  am  in  control  but  also  completely 
controlled by  it." 
<Alicia) 
"Occasionally,  but  usually  I  feel  that  food  is controlling 
me ... If I  gave  up  trying  to  control  my  eating,  I  might  as 
well  give  up everything else,  as food  would  totally dominate 
my  life."  <Lisa) 
"It felt  completely  out  of  control.  I  was  trying to control 
it,  but it felt as if it was controlling me  instead." 
<Jane) 
"No  - I  wish  I  were  - I  often  feel  it's more  in control  of 
me." 
<Irene) 
Appetite  comes  to  be  understood,  then,  as  something  apart  from  the 
real,  resisting self: 
"<I  feel)  like  I'm in  a  war.  Knowing  I  shouldn't really eat 
but  wanting  the  food,  its comfort,  its taste etc.  It's like 
fighting  an  addiction.  I'm  constantly  battling  with  myself, 
like  having  one  part  of  my  mind  arguing  with  the  other  all 
the time." 
<Barbara) 
"When  I  eat  normally  I  feel  I  am  not  Eleanor  but  somebody  I 
don't  even  know  myself.  I  am  someone  I- hate  when  I  eat 
-349-normally ...  there  is something frantic takes over- truly not 
.me  then." 
The  self  is  either  controlled  by  "anorexia"  or  through  the  split 
between "hungry self"  and "real self": 
"I  feel  totally  at  the  mercy  of  Anorexia,  like  a  cancer 
which  has  grown  in  me,  and  at  times  seems  to  be  winning." 
<Lynne) 
"Bulimia  seems  to  me  an  almost  logical  counterpart  to 
anorexia.  It  is  in  control,  not  you,  as  in  fact  anorexia 
was,  and is an extreme." 
<Norma> 
"I  never  feel  in any danger  of  hinging,  and  I  adhere rigidly 
to  my  restricted  eating  pattern.  But  this  'control'  is  an 
illusion,  because  in fact  my  'willpower'  only  operates  in  a 
negative  and  .masochistic  way,  and  I  feel  powerless  to 
reverse it.  I'm 'programmed'." 
<Polly> 
"I  don't  care  if  I  kill  myself  endeavouring  to maintain  the 
weight  'I' choose." 
<Annette) 
And  Sophie  explains the  process as a  split between  her "rational  mind" 
and the part that wants to be  very thin. 
Well  bourne  and Purgold quote  "Della": 
"Food  assumes  a  major  role  in  one's  life,  it  dominates 
all  activities.  Food  and  control  encircle  the  self  and  the 
self  struggles  helpless  under  its  command.  Knowledge  of 
the  self  is  confused.  You  do  not  know  if  you  are  this 
strictly  imposed  control,  or  if it is  dominating  you.  You 
do  not  know  who  you  are  or  what.  You  act,  but  you  don't 
know  if it is  you  acting  or  the  control ...  Your  true  status 
and  identity are lost." 
<Wellbourne  & Purgold,  1984:  18) 
For  "Della"  the  struggle is between  "the rational,  intellectual  mind" 
which  knows  that  bodies  need food  and the "irrational,  emotional  will" 
which starves the body: 
"the  self  is  battered  in  the  conflict  of  wills.  Is  it  :my 
self  that  blindly  shouts  'no'  to  any  offer  of  food  that 
-350-is  not  yoghurt,  banana,  apple  or  muesli  ?  Or  is  it  my 
self that struggles to assert itself and fails ?" 
(ibid.:  24-5) 
Finally,  the  appetite-as-oppressor  can  be  seen  as  lodged  in  the  body, 
which is wholly distinct  from and struggling with the self: 
"My  body  craves for  food." 
<Tracy> 
"At  adolescence,  I  was  very conscious of  my  body,  aver  which 
I  felt  I  was  losing  control.  I  enjoyed  the  feeling  of 
control  which  vomiting  gave  me ... Cnow)  I'm not  really  aware 
of  it  belonging  to  me.  I  don't  think  about  my  body  and  it 
doesn't seen to belong to me." 
<Alicia) 
Zoe  talks  of  her  experience  as  an  infant  as  though  speaking  about  an 
inanimate  object: 
"My  mother  was  very controlling,  terrified of  'spoiling'  the 
baby,  she  fed  it by  the  clock  and  then  when  she  did feed  it 
still tried to force it to take  more  than it wanted." 
The  struggle  with  the  appetitive  body  can  be  physical  as  well  as 
psychic.  <See,  i.e.  Well bourne  &  Purgold,  1984:  71-5)  Twelve  of  the 
women  who  filled in the  questionnairre  had tried to hurt  or damage  the 
bodies which  tormented them: 
"For  a  period  of  a  few  months,  about  12  years  ago,  I 
scratched  my  face  consistently with a  needle." 
<Polly) 
"When  I  was  ill  I  used to scratch and  cut  myself.  I  used to 
bang  and  hit  my  head  against  a  wall.  I  would  let myself  get 
really cold  and  not  bother to put  on  warm  clothes,  and would 
generally neglect  myself." 
<Jane) 
"I  often hit myself  hard  in the places where  I  would  like to 
loose  weight  causing  myself  to  receive  large,  conspicuous 
bruises." 
<Fiona) 
"Stubbed  out cigarette ends  on  my  wrist,  when  I  was  fat." 
<Celia) 
-351-Annette  at sixteen used  to cut "tiny pieces"  out  of  her  arms,  and also 
ate  "Weed  killer.  Rat  poison.  Lead.  :Mercury.",  arguing  that  "all  of 
these  are  supposed to ruin  your  stomach but  I  don't think  I  could have 
taken  enough". 
In anorexia  the  concepts  of  feminine  desire  as dangerously threatening 
patriarchal  order  and  the  masculine  self  and  of  femininity  as  self-
discipline are  translated from sexuality to eating,  and  from an inter-
to  an  intra-gender  process.  The  struggle  between  "male"  rationality 
and  "female"  sensuality is played  out  in the anorexic body  through the 
radical  splitting  of  appetite  from  the  conscious control  of  the  self. 
The  anorexic  woman  then  becomes  the  object  of the appetite she set out 
to eliminate. 
When  the  anorexic  women  encounters  the  medical  establishment  her 
carefully  created  and  maintained  control  is  taken  away  from  her  and 
she,  her  body  and  her  eating  become  the  objects  of  "real"  external 
forces  in  the  final  irony  of  anorexia.  I  am  reminded  here  of  Elaine 
Showalter's  comments  on  the  treatment  of  female  "hysterics"  in  the 
nineteenth  century,  where  she  argues  that  the  "benign,  protective  and 
custodial"  Victorian asylum recreated within its walls the restrictive 
lives  from  which,  on  the  outside,  its  women  inmates  had  fallen  ill. 
CShowalter,  1981:  321) 
-352-Similarly,  the  social  powerlessness  and  lack  of  control  of  her  own 
life  which  leads  a  woman  into  anorexia  is  recreated  in  its  medical 
treatment,  which,  as  GF:M  Russell  points out,  is rarely specific but  is 
best  understood  as  "a  general  management".  <Russell,  1977:  280)  One 
such  general  managment  regime  is described  by  Julie  Dexter,  a  student 
nurse,  as  involving  bed-rest,  close  supervision  of  meals  and  drug 
treatment  to  suppress  "hyperactivity"  (Dexter,  1980:  327)  Some 
psychiatrists  do  recognize  the  power  struggle  between  doctor  and 
anorexic  patient,  but  the  justification  of  the  risk  of  death  allows 
even  the  most  perceptive  to  take  her  hard-won  control  away  from  the 
anorexic  woman.  <See,  i.e.  Vellbourne & Purgold,  1984:  24)  (5) 
Russell  recognizes  that  compulsory  admission  has  its  drawbacks, 
retarding  the  development  of  trust  between  patient  and  staff;  he 
recommends  that  women  be  "persuaded"  to  come  into  hospital 
voluntarily.  Once  "trust"  has  been  established,  the  patient  is 
encouraged  to  voluntarily  hand  over  control  of  her  eating  to  staff. 
But  in  any  case,  confined  to  the  ward,  and  with  nurses  present  at 
meals,  discarding  food  is difficult.  <Russell,  1977)  Bhanj i  argues 
that  there  should  be  "no  undue  emphasis  on  restrictions  and 
supervision",  but  rather  weight  gain  plus  "elucidation"  or 
"correction"  of  "the  pathological  attitudes  underlying  the  illness". 
<Bhanji,  1980:  324) 
5  For  differing  views  on  the  risk  of  death  in  anorexia,  see  Norton, 
1983:  318;  Vellbourne  & Purgold,  1984:  9;  ~. 1980:  1042. 
-353-Restriction  and  supervision  is,  however,  precisely 
hospitalization means  for anorexic  women  (6): 
"Each  time  I  was  admitted to hospital,  I  was  weighed,  put  on 
bed  rest,  I  had  my  belongings  taken  away  from  me  and  told  I 
would  be  rewarded if I  put  on  weight  to  target  weight ...  as 
soon  as  I  was  discharged  I  immediately  got  back  down  to the 
weight  I  was  before  I  went  into  hospital  because  I  was  so 
frightened of  how  I  felt and  looked at their target weight." 
CEve) 
"When  I  reached  5  stone  4  lb.,  my  GP  decided  I  should  be 
hospitalized.  Words  just  cannot  convey  my  bitterness  over 
what  happened  there ...  The  only  'question'  they  seemed  to 
consider  was  whether  what  I  was  doing  was  'deliberate'  or 
not.  They  forced  food  down  me,  telling  me  how  wicked  I  had 
been for  vomiting.  They  told me  I  could leave  when  I  reached 
6¥.!  stone.  So,  I  behaved  like  an  angel,  soon  reached  6¥.! 
stone,  and  was  allowed  to  leave  - but  I'd  been  eating 
everything  I  could  lay  my  hands  on  in  order  to  leave  - the 
nurse  said  excitedly  'look  at  your  chart  - your  weight 
1 s 
going  up  and  up  - soon  it  will  hit  the  roof  ! 
1
•  This 
petrified me.  Of  course,  the  only  reason  I  wanted  to  leave 
was  so that  I  could  loose  all this unwanted  weight  - and yet 
I  felt  so guilty,  so  out  of  control,  so confused." 
CUna) 
"I  was  a  voluntary  patient  until  I  was  sectioned,  because  I 
would  not  eat  meat  and  wanted  home ...  The  more  I  ate  and 
gained weight,  I  was  allowed special privileges,  eg,  getting 
a  bath,  hair  washed,  visitors,  up  to  watch  TV  etc ... It  was 
dreadful.  I  was  fattened  up  to  8  stone,  then released,  when 
they  thought  I  had  recovered  after  I  had  cooperated,  and 
said what  they wanted to hear." 
<June) 
"Loss  of  privileges  eg  no  clothes,  no  baths,  no  visitors 
unless  I  ate.  Force  feeding  by  nursing  staff  very 
forcefully  and  aggressively.  Insulin  injections.  The  worst 
treatment  of  all  was  ECT.  M:y  psychiatrist  knew  how  much  I 
hated  this  and  so  if  I  did  not  eat,  and  continued  to  lose 
weight  I  was  threatened  with  further  ECT ... I  only  gained 
weight as  I  knew  that  would  be  the  only way  I  would get  out 
what 
6  Though  most  of  the  women  in  the  survey  were  to  say  the  least 
critical  of  the  treatment  they  received,  as  we  saw  in  Chapter  4,  if 
the  woman  can  bring  herself  to  hand  over  control  of  her  eating 
willingly  it can  be  quite  a  relief:  "I  was  desperate  to  come  out  of 
the disorder.  I  was  relieved that the doctor told  me  to indulge ...  " 
CNorma)  And  psychotherapy  in  general  was  significantly  more  highly 
valued than treatment  which  concentrated mainly  on  weight  gain. 
-354-of  hospital." 
<Paula) 
The  end  of  anorexia is objectification:  either appetite or the  symptom 
itself  come  to  control  the  anorexic  woman  as  a  force  simultaneously 
internal  and  alien.  She  is responsible  for  it,  but  cannot  control  it: 
she  is its object,  powerless to  change  course.  The  end  of  anorexia  is 
precisely  the  reverse  of  its  original  aim  to  transcend  feminine 
appetite  and  eliminate  its  threat  to  the  "self".  The  anorexic  woman 
intended  to  be  a  fully  individual  subject,  acting  on  her  environment 
through  the  vehicle  of  the  needless  and  inviolate  anorexic  body. 
Instead,  the  anorexic  body  remains a  mirage  which  she continually sees 
in  front  of  here  but  never  reaches.  In  the  end,  her  individual 
trensformation  of  the social  meanings  of  the  feminine  body  is no  such 
thing:  the object-status of  femininity is reasserted.  It returns,  with 
a  vengeance. 
-355-Chapter  Eight:  The  anorexic  body 
"I  would  describe  myself  as  being  kind  of  surrounded  with 
glass  - a  kind  of  nole  me  tangere  kind  of  thing ...  I  was 
painfully  turned  in  on  myself  and didn't  want  human  contact, 
whether  it was  touching  or  whether  it was  emotional,  I  just 
didn't  want  any  kind  of  human  contact." 
<Linda) 
"M  B-L:  'Now  be  the  food  and  tell  your  body  what  you  are 
doing  and  why.' 
'Anne':  'I'm your  food  and  I'm going into you  now- stuffing 
you  - making  you  disgusting  - fat.  I 
1 m  your  shame  and  I'm 
making  you  untouchable.  No  one  will  ever  touch  you  now. 
That's what  you  want  - that  no  one  will  touch you. 
1 
She  looked  up  in surprise." 
<Quoted  in Boskind-Lodahl,  1976:  350) 
Anorexia  is "'a structure  of  facades  constructed  to  hide  a 
central  hole  of  non-being'". 
<Quoted  in Wellbourne  & Purgald,  1984:  72) 
"I  know  that  it  <anorexia)  is always  there  to  be  used  as  a 
last  resort  and  a  fina1  act  of  defiance  against  the  too-
closely-impinging  world  which  may  threaten  to  engulf  or 
annihilate me." 
<MacLeod,  1981:  160) 
"In the  war  against  my  own  body,  fatness was  nat  the  only or 
even  the  most  important  enemy ...  I  began  to  get  off  on  not 
eating,  to  enjoy  starvation  as  an  end  in  itself. .. ' I'  was 
the  mystical,  starving  self,  in  battle  against  the  base 
instincts.  I  would  refrain  nat  just  from  eating  but  even 
from  drinking  water.  Calories  were  only  the  enemy's  foot 
soldiers;  the  enemy  I  was  fighting  against  was  my  body,  my 
instincts,  my  desires.  And  I  almost  wan." 
<Valverde,  1985:  33) 
Anorexia  transforms  the  social  meanings  of  the  body.  It works with two 
opposing  body-concepts:  the  "individual"  (masculine)  body  as  complete 
in  itself,  the  owned  instrument  of  the  individual  self  or  subject, 
used  to  act  an  an  environment  external  to  the self  and  the  body;  and 
the  feminine  body  as  alienated,  incomplete  and  acted  on,  a 
passive/receptive  object  which,  paradoxically,  has  a  simultaneously 
-356-voracious  potential  to  overwhelm.  The  individual  <masculine)  body  is 
"an  active,  working  thing";  the  feminine  body  is  "a  passive  vehicle 
intended  to  provide  gratification",  which  exists  in  order  to  be  used, 
to  be  consumed.  <MacLeod,  1981:  166;  165-6)  Anorexia  aims  at  an 
individualized  transformation  of  the  degraded  feminine  body  into  an 
anorexic  body  which  is  owned,  inviolate  and  needless.  The  anorexic 
body,  as  a  possession,  is  intended  to  be  the  body  of  an  active 
subject;  the  anorexic  symptom  intends  the  transformation  of  the 
feminine  body-object  from  its status as  the  environment  on  which  the 
masculine  subject  acts  to  that  of  an  object  amenable  to  personal 
control.  Its success  in achieving this intention is,  as  we  have  seen, 
uncertain  and  temporary:  both  bodily  integrity 
instrumentality  prove  to  be  elusive.  Desire,  however, 
points out,  goes  beyond the possible.  <Diamond,  1985:  59) 
and  bodily 
as  Diamond 
Anorexia  begins  as  an  attempt  to  control  the  feminine  body  in  which 
voracious  feminine  appetites  are  lodged.  The  feminine  body,  sexually, 
is  the  object  of  the  action  of  others;  in  eating,  however,  feminine 
appetite  is,  it is thought,  under  personal  control.  Desire  for  women 
means  responsiveness  - taking  in.  The  anorexic  body,  thus,  takes  in 
nothing;  nothing  invades  what  Wellbourne  and  Purgold  call  "the 
anorexic  fortress".  <Wellbourne  &  Purgold,1984:  56)  The  ritualized 
eating  pattern  shuts  out  progressively  more  and  more  food;  the 
avoidance  of  physical  contact  creates empty  space  around  the  anorexic 
body.  It  becomes,  in  Caskey's  term,  "a protected  zone"  <Caskey,  1986: 
184)  in  Douglas's,  an  "impermeable ...  container"  <Douglas,  1966:  158) 
-357-and  in  Sheila  MacLeod's  "cold,  untouched  and  untouchable".  (MacLeod, 
1981:  118) 
The  anorexic  body  is empty  inside,  and  emptiness  means  being clean.  It 
is not  contaminated  by  external  things,  but  is pure.  "Safe"  food,  food 
as  fuel,  is  originally  distinguished  from  food  as  pleasure;  in  the 
logic  of  denial  the  distinction,  as  we  have  seen,  collapses  and  all 
food  is  seen  as  contamination.  Food,  as  MacLeod  argues,  acts  in 
anorexia as a  metaphor  for "all foreign substances": 
"I  remember  feeling  swollen  and  polluted  after  consuming 
what,  to  others,  would  have  been  a  negligible  amount  of 
food." 
(ibid.:  116;  70) 
Desire,  for  women,  is constructed  as  responsive:  it means  opening  up 
to allow intrusion.  Desire,  for  the  ostensibly gender-less individual, 
is constructed  as  a  move  outwards  to  satisy  internal  needs;  the  body 
remains  whole  as it moves  out  into the  world.  Feminine  desire entails 
the  inclusion  of  the  alien,  and  expresses  the  status  of  women  as 
acted-on  environment  rather than active subject.  The  central criterion 
of  the  subject  is  his  ability  to  satisfy  his  desires  through  his 
action  on  the  separate  world  of  objects;  he  invades  and  manipulates 
that  environment,  it  does  not  invade  him.  Invasion  entails  loss  of 
subjecthood;  if  you  are  acted  on,  you  are  an  object,  not  a  subject. 
Objectification means  the annihilation of  the self. 
In  anorexia  the  experience  of  feminine  bodily  openness  is centred  on 
the  mouth.  By  not  eating a  barrier is formed  between the anorexic self 
-358-and  the  threatening  world  against  which  the  open  feminine  body  has  no 
defences.  The  refusal  to  eat  is  a  denial  of  feminine  responsiveness; 
it  protects  against  the  invasion  which  threatens  to  annihilate  the 
self.  The  anorexic  body  is  a  "fortress"  ;  it is a  "shell"  (Lawrence, 
1984:  22);  it  contains  and  protects  the  self  in  a  way  the  feminine 
body  can  never  do. 
Desire,  for  women,  is  understood  as  voracious;  feminine  desire 
threatens patriarchal  order,  it threatens to encompass  the  (masculine) 
subject,  it  threatens  chaos.  The  masculine  subject,  as  an  active 
subject,  is  defined  by  difference:  it  is  not  the  passive  feminine 
object.  Masculine  penetration  completes  the  incomplete  feminine;  at 
the  same  time,  however,  feminine  incompleteness  threatens  to  engulf 
the  intruder.  When  women  threaten  to  become  active  subjects,  the 
patriarchal definition of  personhood is undermined.  Anorexic  women  are 
engaged  in the  project  of  integrating the  individualized  or  masculine 
self  and  the  anorexic  body,  a  body  which  is  closed,  complete,  non-
feminine.  Voracious  feminine  appetites,  however,  threaten  the 
anorexic  body,  and  must  be  eliminated.  Feminine  appetite  is  chaotic; 
it threatens  an  end to the  dualism of subject and object.  "Fat"  is the 
external  sign of  voracious appetite;  it intrudes into masculine  space. 
Food  is  an  external  form  of  appetite,  while  the  desire  for  food  is 
internal.  Food  in  anorexia  is  appetite  made  concrete.  Starvation, 
then,  has  two  meanings;  it  intends  to  eliminate  both  appetite  and 
intrusion: 
"' I  dream  of  the  perfect  day  when  I  have  no  appetite,  no 
thought,  no  desire,  or temptation for  food  or to eat.'" 
-359-<Quoted  in Abraham & Llewellyn-Jones,  1984:  37) 
Anorexic  emptiness  has  a  dual  meaning.  Not  eating  means  that  nothing 
is taken  in;  not  wanting  to  eat  means  that  the  desire  to  take  in  is 
also eliminated.  The  annihilation of  appetite closes and completes  the 
open  and  incomplete  feminine  body  around  an  empty,  pure  and  static 
inner  space.  It  cannot  be  acted  on;  it  offers  no  way  in;  it is  no 
longer  open  to  the  invasion  of  others.  Neither  does  it threaten  to 
engulf the self.  From within this void the  "real"  self can emerge: 
"The  clearer  the  outline  of  my  skeleton  became,  the  more  I 
felt  my  true  self  to  be  emerging,  like  a  nude  statue  being 
gradually hewn  from some  amorphous  block of  stone." 
<MacLeod,  1981:  79-80) 
Anorexic  metamorphosis,  however,  is  an  individual  and  private 
transformation  of  social  meaning;  what  the  anorexic  woman  really 
struggles to  contain is not  her  own  appetite  but  feminine  desire.  The 
individual  woman  cannot  negate  a  social  meaning;  in  the  end  it comes 
to control  her,  either as appetite,  or  as  denial.  The  core  process  of 
anorexia  is  denial;  but  since  the  anorexic  woman  is  trying  as  an 
individual  to eliminate  a  social  creation,  she  can  never  deny  enough 
or  be  thin  enough  to  contain  its threat.  This,  then,  is  the  "moral 
spiral"  <Turner,  1984)  of  anorexia.  She  continues  to  elaborate  her 
rituals  of  denial  in  a  never-ending  spiral,  and  can  never  finally  or 
securely reaches the  place  where,  with personal  control  of  her body  as 
an object,  she might  begin to act as a  subject. 
-360-The  empty  and  inviolate anorexic  body is the  ideal end of the anorexic 
process;  few  anorexic  women  ever  reach  it.  Existence  in  the  anorexic 
body  is  grasped  momentarily  but  continually  slips  away.  The  road  to 
the  anorexic  body  has  two  detours,  both  dead-ends.  In  the  first, 
appetite  controls  the  anorexic  woman  directly.  Characterized  as  non-
human,  it  overwhelms  the  self  in  binges  and  fantasies  of  binges. 
Anorexia  here  is the  continual  attempt  to impose  denial  on  an appetite 
perceived as  unstoppable,  as,  in Caskey's term,  a  force  "at  once alien 
and  interior".  (Caskey,  1986:  184)  Here,  "fat"  in  general  and  the 
"bloated"  stomach  in  particular  are  signs  of  the  failure  of  anorexic 
discipline  in  the  face  of  an  appetite  which  is alien to  the  anorexic 
woman  but  which  is  nevertheless  her  responsibility.  Wellbourne  and 
Purgold quote  "Petra": 
"
1 It 
1 s  the  feeling  of  how  dirty  you  are  inside  that  makes 
you  feel  it  must  show  outside,  which  may  account  for  the 
fact  I'm not  happy  unless  I  am  slim enough to see  my  bones, 
1 the real  me 
1 
•  '  " 
CQuoted  in Wellbourne & Purgold,  1984:  110) 
Flesh,  then,  is  appetite  made  concrete:  it  is  "something  swollen, 
polluted,  dirty."  <MacLeod,  1981:  69)  Flesh is the  feminine  body;  the 
skeleton  contains  the  anorexic  self.  Anorexia  aims  at  the 
transcendence  of  appetite;  its most  common  outcome  is  a  never-ending 
struggle with appetite and its sign,  flesh. 
In  the  second  anorexic  detour,  appetite  controls  indirectly.  The 
symptom  itself,  not-eating,  negative  appetite,  comes  to  control  the 
anorexic  woman;  she  feels herself to be  powerless to end a  process she 
herself  began.  Sheila MacLeod  writes: 
-361-"I didn't  know  what  I  was  doing:  I  just felt  compelled to do 
it."  (ibid.:  10) 
And  Vellbourne  and Purgold's "Della"  explains: 
"'You  do  not  know  if  you  are  this strictly  imposed  control, 
or  if it is dominating  you.  You  do  not  know  who  you  are  or 
what.  You  act,  but  you  don't  know  if it is you  acting or the 
control.  Both  come  from  within  and  mingle  together  in  an 
inseparable fusion.'" 
<Quoted  in Vellbourne  & Purgold,  1984:  18) 
The  denial  which  she  participates  in  is  itself,  of  course,  a  social 
construction.  Feminine  self-discipline  is  the  self-policing  of 
feminine  desire,  and  is  one  element  in the  social  control  of  feminine 
desire.  Like  appetite,  then,  denial  is  a  social  force;  what  the 
anorexic  woman  struggles  with  is  not  her  own  denial  but  a  form  of 
social  control.  Her  original  resistence  to  her  incorporation  in  the 
degraded  feminine  body  rises  up,  and  with  phantom  substantiality, 
controls its creator. 
The  reality  of  anorexia,  then,  entails  a  re-obj ectification  of  the 
feminine  body,  which  becomes  the  object  either  of  interior-but-alien 
appetite  or  interior-but-alien  anorexia.  (1)  The  anorexic  woman 
thinks,  accepting  the definition of  the  body as  individual  possession, 
that  her  body  is the  one  thing  she  can  control.  The  object-status  of 
the  feminine  body  is,  however,  ultimately,  inescapable.  The  subject  in 
bourgeois patriarchal culture is a  consuming subject:  acting to satisy 
1  My  argument  here  is  indebted  to  ~·s incisive  analysis  of 
schizophrenia,  in  which,  following  Marx,  he  suggests  that  the 
position  of  the  human  subject  as  the  object  of  capitalist  social 
relations  is  transformed  and  reexperienced  in  schizophrenic 
"withdrawal".  <Gabel,  1975;  see,  especially,  p.  146;  Marx,  1954:  77) 
-362-its  desires,  in  its  own  self  interest,  is  what  defines  it;  i twants, 
therefore  it  is.  Women,  as  the  environment  of  the  masculine  subject, 
have,  ultimately,  no  wholly  separate  environment  within  which  to  act; 
they  are  part  of  the  world  of  objects.  Women  ought  to  desire  to  be 
possessed  as  objects.  Possessive  desire  as  subjects  is  constructed, 
for  women,  as  non-willed,  non-human.  It  is  not  controlled  by  a  true 
subject  and  thus will  overwhelm,  rather than express,  the self. 
There  is,  then,  a  fundamental  internal  limit  to  the  gender-neutral 
individuality at  which  anorexia  aims.  Women  cannot  desire as subjects; 
women  are  objects;  women  are  bodies.  In anorexia  women  are the objects 
of  a  socially  constructed  feminine  voraciousness;  or  they  are  the 
objects  of  the  social  control  of  feminine  voraciousness.  They  cannot 
be  wholly  subjects.  Desire  as  active  defines  the  self;  anorexia  aims 
to  eliminate  desire,  and  in  so  doing  eliminates  the  self.  The 
desireless anorexic  body contains nothing: 
"towards the climax of  the  disease,  there was  very little of 
me  left,  in  more  than  the  physiological  sense."  <MacLeod, 
1981:  108) 
Anorexia  is an  attempt  to  resolve at the  level  of  the  individual  body 
the  irreconcilable  demands  of  individuality  and  femininity  in  a 
bourgeois  patriarchal  culture.  Because  it works  with  largely  hidden 
social  meanings it works  indirectly. 
-363-Kim  Chernin  has  argued  that  patriarchal  culture  has  opened  its doors 
to  women  in  response  to  feminist  pressure.  CChernin,  1986)  In  Chapter 
Three  this claim,  which  owes  more  to  bourgeois  ideology than to actual 
practice,  was  criticised.  The  "equal  opportunities"  culture  suggests 
that  women  can  now  compete,  as  individuals,  for  wealth,  status  and 
power.  The  ideology  of  bourgeois  individualism conceals the structural 
constraints  on  i ndi  vi  dual  achievement.  In  its  gender  neutral 
incarnation  the  masking  of  the  reality  of  class  relations  extends  to 
mask  the  reality  of  gender  relations:  we  live  in  the  era  of  "post-
feminism". 
Post-feminist  theorists  claim  that  the  individualistic  pursuit  of 
self-interest  is  now  as  open  to  women  as it is to  men.  White  middle-
class  women,  because  of  their  specific  location  in  gender,  class  and 
ethnic  relations,  are  the  special  objects  of  post-feminist  ideology, 
since  a  relatively  privileged  class  position  combines  with  the 
benefits  of  being  white  in  a  racist  social  order  to  allow  them 
increased access to career success and  public position.  But  the closer 
they  get  to  independence,  the  more  directly  its  inherent,  gendered, 
limits are experienced. 
White  middle-class  women  who  reach  adulthood  in  the  equal 
opportunities  culture  must  personally  reconcile  this  contradiction; 
they  must  create a  sense  of self in which  individuality and  femininity 
can  coexist.  Anorexia  is  one  attempt  at  such  a  reconciliation. 
Feminism  brings  the  contradiction  into  the  light  of  political 
discourse  partially  and  fitfully;  feminist  analyses  give  some  women 
-364-the  opportunity  to  directly  and  collectively  grapple  with  the 
continuing  realities  of  patriarchal  oppression.  But  femininism's 
alternative  social  analysis  exists  in  a  social  order  which  bourgeois 
patriarchal  ideology  already  structures  and  makes  sense  of.  Feminist 
explanations  and  resistances  are  continually  undermined,  and  a 
bourgeois and  patriarchal  individualism reasserted. 
Vellbourne  and  Purgold's  proto-feminist  analysis  of  anorexia  provides 
an  example  of this.  They  argue  that: 
"the  pressures and  demands  of ... 'society'  on  young  women  are 
more  confused  and  internally  self-contradictory  than  the 
equivalent  pressures  and  demands  on  young  men ...  adult 
autonomy  is  acquired  in  different  ways  and  to  different 
degrees  by  boys  and  by  girls  and ...  the  acquisition  of 
autonomy  by  girls  gets  a  more  mixed  reception  from  adult 
observers." 
CWellbourne  & Purgold,  1984:  114;  117) 
This  situation,  however,  is  not,  for  Wellbourne  and  Purgold,  an 
outcome  of  a  patriarchal  social  order.  They  argue  that  such  pressures 
arise  from  "the  social  imperatives  of  yesteryear"  affecting  "parental 
policy".  Ci bid.:  115)  It is  an  outdated  and  faulty  upbringing  rather 
than  the  social  control  of  women  which  leads  the  "pre-anorexic"  girl 
to  feel  that  she  has  no  "personal  rights".  (ibid.:  112)  Therapeutic 
intervention will  give  the anorexic  women  what  "most  of  us  who  are  not 
anorexic"  ha'>lei  that  is,  a  "central  'core'  self"  which  allows  us  to 
regulate  and  prioritize  individual  needs  and  the  demands  of  others. 
Ci bid.:  120)  It  will  teach  the  anorexic  woman  that  autonomy  is  both 
possible  and  acceptable.  (ibid. :128) 
-365-The  argument  that  autonomy  and  femininity  are  not  reconcilable  is 
presented only to be  explained  away  as  outmoded tradition and familial 
pathology.  The  dilemma  which  the  anorexic  woman  feels  is  not  "real"; 
it is  one  which  the  more  competant  upbringing  that  "most  of  us"  have 
had  resolves  naturally  as  we  reach  "maturity".  <ibid.:  128)  Even  in 
more  fully feminist  analyses  of  anorexia  individual  therapy  which  will 
"re-nurture"  women  into  true  individuality is suggested as  a  solution 
to  the  anorexic  dilemma.  If,  however,  we  understand  anorexia  as  an 
individualized  "solution"  to  a  cultural  contradiction  we  can  see  more 
clearly  that  its ultimate  strategic  failure  is explained  by  its very 
individuation.  We  cannot  fully understand the  anorexic  symptom  without 
an  analysis  of  the  structures  of  social  meaning  and  social  practices 
in  bourgeois  patriarchal  culture;  only  a  collective  feminist 
engagement  with  those  meanings  and  practices  as  social  can  transform 
the subjection of women  which leads to anorexia. 
-366-Appendix I'd like to ask  you  questions  on  4  topics- about  your  anorexia,  when 
you  had  it,  how  you  were  treated,  etc.;  about  food  and  eating;  about  how 
you  feel  about  your  body;  and about  how  you  think anorexia fits into 
your  life. 
If there are  any questions you  don't waznt  to answer,  just say so  and  we 
can skip them. 
ILLNESS  HISTORY 
Would  you  say that you're anorexic now? 
YES- when  would  you  say it started? would  you  say you're  'cured'  ? 
NO  - could you  tell  me  when  you  realised you  had anorexia,  and  how 
long you'd say you  had it ? 
How  did  you  realise that you  were  anorexic ?  gradually dawned  on  you 
suddenly realised 
someone  else told you 
Looking  back,  can you  identify any particular incident  or remark or 
feeling that you  would say  'triggered'  the anorexia? 
How  did  you  control  your weight? 
- eating little 
- diuretics/laxatives 
- vomiting 
- other 
What  sort of treatment  did  you  get/are you  getting ? 
where  ? 
who  from ? 
duration ? 
what  sort  ? 
more  than one  kind of  help ? 
What  do/did  you  think of the treatment that  you  got  - did it help ? 
How  did  the 'people  around  you  - friends,  family  - react to your  illness 
How  did  you  feel  about it? did you  always feel  'ill' ? 
- depression 
- anxiety 
- powerful 
- in control 
- out  of  control 
-as though  you  just couldn't stop? 
Why  do  you  think that you  were/are  anorexic/bulimic ? 
Do  you  think that  you  understand  what  causes anorexia  ? 
Do  you  think most  people  understand about anorexia  ?  anyone  ? 
FOOD  & EATING Were  there  any  particular foods  or drinks that  you  wouldn't  eat  ? 
Or  special  foods/drinks that you  did eat ? 
What  was  it about  these foods/drinks that you  liked/didn't  like 
What  foods/drinks/sorts of  food  do  you  really like  ?  Do  you  eat it now? 
Did  you  eat it when  you  were  anorexic ?  If  NO  why  ? 
What  did/do  you  feel  like/think about  when  you  eat/ate ? 
Could  you  describe  what  you  would eat and  how  you  would  eat it on  a 
'good'  anorexic day? 
How  did/does it feel  having  food  in your  stomach ?  mouth  ? 
How  did  you  feel  when  you  managed  to eat as little as you  wanted to ? 
How  di  you  feel  when  you  were  thinking about/about  to eat ? 
Did/do  you  feel  completely in control  of  what  you  eat/  how  much/how 
often/  who  with etc.  ? 
How  did/do  you  feel  about  giving up trying to control  what  you  eat  ? 
Did/do  you  prefer to eat on your  own  ? 
It's sometimes said that anorexics don't feel  hungry,  or can't recognise 
hunger  - do  you  think this is true ?  did you  feel  hungry  when  you  were 
anorexic  ? 
For  RECOVERED  - how  do  you  decide  what  to eat now  ? 
- 'healthy diet' 
eat  what  you  want/feel  like 
eat  what  others eat 
is it easy or difficult to control  what  and  how  much  you  eat  now  ? 
For  BULIMICS- do  you  eat different kinds  of  food  when  you're binging? 
- which  foods/drinks 
-do you  eat faster if it's a  binge? 
How  often do  you  binge eat? 
could  you  tell me  a  bit about  how  you  feel  when  you're  having a 
binge  ?  - before 
- during 
- after 
If  you  could survive healthily without  eating anything,  would  you  ? 
If  you  could eat anything at all and nothing  would  make  you  put  on 
weight,  what  would  you  eat  ?  lots ?  how  would  this feel  ? 
BODY 
Are  you  reasonably  happy  with your  body  now? 
- is there anything you'd like to change  ? 
would  you  like to  lose  weight  ?  how  much  ? 
would  you  like to put  on  any  weight  ?  how  much  ? 
do  you  think you're thin/fat/OK ? Do  you  think about  or worry about  your  weight  ? 
Do  you  weigh yourself  often ? 
Do  you  think that most  women  think/worry about  their weight  and  how  the 
look ?  too  much  ?  not enough ?  why  ? 
If  YES  - can you  ever  imagine  just not caring about  your  weight  ? 
What  do  you  think is the ideal  shape/size for  a  woman  ? 
- ie size  10 
- or ie Selina Scott 
Do  you  know  what  the  'correct'  weight  for your  height  is - ie 
medical  tables ?  How  would  you  feel if you  were  this weight  ? 
How  would  you  feel  if you  were  fat  ? 
from 
How  would  you  feel if you  were  back at the  lowest  weight  you've ever 
been ? 
LIFE 
How  important is being/having  been  an anorexic  ? 
Are  you  frightened that it will  recurr ? 
Do  you  tell people about  being/having been anorexic ? 
How  would  you  say it has affected your life ? 
- relationships 
- work 
- emotions 
Do  you  know  other anorexic  women?  did  you  ?  did it help knowing  you 
weren't  the only one  ? In  some  of  the  questions  there  will  be  a  number  of  options  which  you 
can  choose  by  ringing/ticking  them,  but  most  of  the  questions  are 
open-ended  and  ask  you  to describe  your feelings and behaviour.  If you 
need  more  space,  please use  the extra sheet,  numbering your answers. 
Before  you  start,  there are a  few general questions about  you. 
Which  of  these descriptions fits you  best  ? 
Wage  earner  Student  Housewife  Unemployed  Other 
If you  work  outside the  home,  what  is your present occupation ? 
Are  you 
Divorced/separated  Single  Widowed  Living with someone  Married 
Do  you  live 
Alone  With  parents/relatives  With  husband/boyfriend/lover 
Shared house/flat  with friends 
Have  you  attended/do  you  attend 
Secondary school  Grammar  school  College  University 
Age 
-211-I'd like to start off  by  asking  you  a  few  questions about  your  anorexia 
and  the  treatment  you  have  received. 
1  How  would  you  describe  yourself  now  ? 
Anorexic 
Bulimic 
Recovered 
Other 
(if you  have  recovered,  please 
answer  for the  period  v.rhen  you 
were  anorexic) 
2  How  long  has  your  illness lasted  ? 
3  What  methods  do/did  you  use  to try to control  your  weight  ? 
Starvation 
Gradually eating less and  less 
Vomiting 
Diuretics/Laxatives 
Other  Cplease  specify) 
4  Do  you/did  you  binge  ?  If you  do,  about  how  often ? 
5  Have  you  had  medical  treatment  for  anorexia ? 
From  your  GP 
From  a  psychiatrist 
FrQm  a  psychoanalyst 
From  a  self-help group 
Any  other kind  of  treatment 6  Have  you  ever  been hospitalized  for  anorexia  ?  If  you  have,  please 
say for  hm;  long,  and  if you  were  a  voluntary patient. 
7  Please describe  the  treatment  you  received. 
8  Do  you  think this treatment  helped  you  ? 
9  could you  try to explain  why  you  became  anorexic/bulimic  ? Now  I'd like to ask questions about  food  and eating. 
1  Do  you  have  a  set of specific foods/drinks  that  you  eat  roost  or all 
of  i;he  time  ?  If so,  please list them. 
2  What  is it about  them that  you  like  ? 
----------------
3  Are  there any foods/drinks that  you  never,  or  very  rarely,  eat  ? 
4  Why  don't  you  eat these foods? 
----------- ·-----
5  What  are  your  favourite  foods  and drinks  ? 6  Do  you  eat  them now  ?  If so,  how  often ? 
7  How  do  you  feel  when  you  eat ? 
8  Do  you  plan each  day  v1hat  and  how  much  you  are  going  to eat  7 
Yes  No  Sometimes 
Other 
9  Please describe  v1hat  and  how  much  you  would  usually eat  if  you 
kept  to this plan. 
10  How  do  you  feel  when  you've  managed  to eat  what  you  had  planned  and 
no  more  ? 
11  Can  you  describe  your  feelings before,  during and after you  eat  7 
----------------------------------------~----------------------12  Do  you  feel  that  you  are  completely  in control  of  your  eating  ? 
13  How  do  you  feel  about  giving up  trying to control  your  eating ? 
14  Do  you  prefer to eat  on  your  own  ?  Please tick the  sentence  that 
best  describes how  you  feel. 
I  like eating with other people. 
don't  mind  eating with other people. 
prefer to eat alone,  but  I  do  ea:t  with others some  of  the  time. 
I  hate eating in front  of others,  and try to avoid it. 
I  never  eat  in front  of other people. 
Other 
15  Do  you  feel  hungry  ? 
All  the  time  __  _ 
Often 
Occasionally 
Rarely 
Never 
Other 16  Could  you  describe  how  you  feel  with food  in your  mouth  ? 
1?  Please describe  hov~ you  feel  when  there is food  in your  stomach. 
18  Some  anorexic  women  have  eating  'rituals'  - for  example,  cutting 
each bit of food  into 6  pieces,  or chewing  each mouthful  10  times. 
Do/did  you  have  any rituals like this? 
19  If  you  could survive  healthily without  eating anything at all,  would 
you  ?  How  would  this feel  ? 
20  If you  could eat  whatever  you  liked,  and nothing vmuld  make  you  put 
on  weight,  what  would  you  eat,  and  how  would this feel  ? 
21  Do  you  binge  ? 
Never 
Rarely Sometimes:  Once  a  month  ? 
Once  a  week  ? 
More  Often  ?  ____ times each  week 
22  If  you  binge,  do  you  eat different foods/drinks during  a  binge  ?  If 
so,  could you  list them,  and  say about  how  much  you  eat  in a  binge  ? 
23  Why  do  you  choose  these  foods  ? 
24  Some  women  say that they eat  much  faster  when  they binge.  Could  you 
describe  hQN  you  eat  when  you  binge  ? 
25  Have  you  ever eaten a  non-food substance,  and if so,  what  was  it ? 
The  next  3  questions are  for  women  'Vlho  have  recovered  from anorexia. 
1  Hov;  do  you  decide  v;hat  and  how  much  to eat  now  you've  'recovered' 
from anorexia? For  example,  do  you  try to eat  a  'healthy'  diet,  or 
just  whatever  you  feel  like ? 
----------------------------------------~--------------------2  How  difficult is it for  you  to organise  your  eating now? 
Very  difficult,  I  continually think and  worry  about  food 
Quite difficult,  but  I  have  to  pay attention to  what  I  eat 
Quite easy,  I  eat  more  or  less what  I  feel  like 
Very  easy,  I  rarely worry  about  food 
Very  easy,  I  am  interested in  food,  eating and  cooking 
Other 
3  If  you  find eating difficult,  is the difficulty 
in eating enough?  in not  eating too much  ? 
other 
I'd like to finish off  by  asking  a  few  questions about  how  you  feel 
about  your  body. 
1  Are  you  reasonably  happy  with  your  body  now? 
Yes  No 
Other -----------------------------------------
2  Is there anything about  your  body  that  you  would  like to change  ? 
3  Would  you  like to  be  a  different  weight  ? 
I I  d  like to  weigh  more  About  bow  much  ?  -------------
I I  d  like to  weigh  less  About  how  muc1l  ?  ------------I'm happy  with  my  weight 
4  Vould  you  like to  be  a  different shape  ? 
5  How  often do  you  weigh  yourself  ? 
Daily  Veekly 
:Monthly  Hardly ever 
Never  Other 
6  Do  you  knm-1  what  the  'correct'  weight  for  your  height  is ? 
Yes  No  Other 
7  Hm-1  would  you  feel  if you  were  this weight  ? 
8  How  would  you  feel  if you  were  back at  the  lowest  weight  you'd ever 
been ?  <Or  if you  are at that  weight,  how  do  you  feel  now  ?) 
9  Can  you  imagine  being very  fat  ?  How  would  this feel  ? 10  If  you  have  ever physically hurt yourself,  could  you  please describe 
this. 
11  How  do  you  feel  about  other people  touching  you,  or  being  very 
close ? 
12  Could  you  describe  how  being/having been anorexic  has affected  your 
sexuality or sexual  feelings? 
Thank  you  very  much  for taking the  time  to fill  in this questionairre. Bibliography Bibliography 
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